NOWITZ ATTORNEYS

02/09/2021

RIGHT OF APPEAL AGAINST CSOS ADJUDICATION: WHAT NOW?

The Community Schemes Ombud Service (“CSOS”) was established inter alia to provide an alternative dispute resolution service, relating to disputes arising in community schemes (i.e. sectional title disputes between owners and/or owners and body corporates).

Ultimately, the purpose of the aforegoing, was to potentially circumvent the necessity of litigation and to provide for a more cost-effective mechanism of resolving such disputes, so as to maintain harmonious communal living and assist Courts in alleviating caseloads.

Whilst effective, it does not vitiate the inevitable eventuality of litigation, occasioned by an aggrieved party’s statutorily entrenched right of appeal, as provided for in Section 57 of the CSOS Act, 9 of 2011 (the “Act”), against an Adjudication Order handed down by CSOS Adjudicator, pursuant to the said alternative dispute resolution service thus rendered by CSOS.

Section 57 of the Act provides as follows:

(1) An applicant, the association or any affected person who is dissatisfied by an adjudicator’s order, may appeal to the High Court, but only on a question of law.

(2) An appeal against an order must be lodged within 30 days after the date of delivery of the order of the adjudicator.

(3) A person who appeals against an order, may also apply to the High Court to stay the operation of the order appealed against to secure the effectiveness of the appeal.

It becomes clear from the aforegoing, that the statutory appeal process set out in Section 57 of the Act is sui generis in nature, in that it empowers a litigant to have direct access of appeal to a higher court, from a quasi-judicial forum, without making reference to the process to be followed in terms thereof. Moreover, this process is not set out in the Uniform Rules of the High Court.

This led to historic confusion relating to the interpretation of Section 57 of the Act, and its intended process, by various divisions of the High Court, which resulted in different jurisdictions amending its Practice Directives, in order to give effect thereto, without any uniformity regarding its application.

Only recently, in the case of Stenersen and Tulleken Administration CC v Linton Park Body Corporate (A3034/2018) [2019] ZAGPJHC 387; 2020 (1) SA 651 (GJ) (24 October 2019), was the appeal process, at set out in Section 57 of the Act, clarified, and a set procedure prescribed for all appeals relating thereto in all divisions of the High Court, in terms whereof inter alia:

a the appeal is to be launched by way of Notice of Appeal, wherein the grounds of appeal are to be set out succinctly;

b the Notice of Appeal should be served on the Respondents to the appeal, via Sheriff; and

c both the Adjudicator and CSOS should be cited as Respondents.

It appears now that uniformity in the application of the appeal process has been established, and that the shrouds of doubt and uncertainty have been unraveled, which has eventually given effect to the intentions of the legislators responsible for the drafting of the CSOS Act.

In the event that you require any legal assistance, please contact our offices on (011) 325 5300 / [email protected], or Mr Bradley Schroder directly on 082 33 44 735 / [email protected], in order to assist you therewith.

Brad Schroder,

Nowitz Attorneys
ATTORNEY, LLB (UJ)

02/08/2021

ARTICLE: 02 AUGUST 2021

Being a South African citizen is a challenge on its own, especially when the political unrest and socio-economic factors exacerbate the consequences of the pandemic. The people often voice their opinions by means of Protest action.

Protest action in itself is not the issue. The issues arise when the protest action leads to criminal offense and/or misconduct. As we are all aware, recently there has been a huge spat of looting. Whilst it is trite that looting is a criminal offence, this article will focus on the legal ramifications of misconduct during looting, with specific reference to labour relations and the employment spheres.

In a digital age where everything is recorded and stored, there are several instances where the misconduct during looting has been captured on CCTV and certain individuals identified. It is for the State to prosecute individuals that commit an offence in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, the question arises as to whether an employer can discipline an employee/s for participating in such looting activities and committing further acts of misconduct.

In most instances, for an employer to discipline an employee, there must be misconduct, which misconduct must have occurred either (i) in the course and scope of employment or (ii) at the work place. To look at it from the other side of the coin, it is unreasonable for an employee to be disciplined by their employer when embarking on protest action that does not concern the employer as the employee is not acting in the corse and scope of employment when protesting and further that such protest action does not occur at the workplace.

There are exceptions to the aforegoing, a clear example being where employees have been disciplined for committing offenses whilst wearing their work attire or displaying their company details despite not acting under the corse and scope of employment and not being at the workplace. This is due to the fact that the employer had successfully shown that the criminal act affected the employer’s business and/or impacted on its reputation. In essence, the employer proved the employment relationship and that the conduct of the employee negatively impacted the employer. This concept has been extended to circumstances where although the employee is not wearing or displaying any company attire or name, the employee is well known to clients and/or customers and is associated with the brand. Again the employment relationship and the negative impact thereon is clear.

With regards to the recent looting, the above concept is of crucial importance in order for an employer to succeed in disciplinary proceedings against an employee/s. However, where an employee has embarked on looting at his/her own place of employment, even though not under the corse and scope of employment and outside of offices hours, the employer will be able to easily establishment of the employment relationship and the fact that the conduct occurred at workplace and would most likely be successful in disciplining such employee/s, which may include their dismissal.

For more information on Labour relations and disciplinary proceedings, please contact Richard Hastie of Nowitz Attorneys on (011) 325 5300.

01/07/2021

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03/05/2021

09/04/2021

POST-DIVORCE SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

It is a common understanding that there is a reciprocal duty of support between spouses during a marriage, being the responsibility of both spouses to meet the lifestyle needs of the other and their respective abilities to meet such needs, but when a marriage is terminated, either upon divorce or death, such duty comes to an end. However, in South African law and in accordance with the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, such a duty to support can be extended post dissolution of the marriage.

Understandably, if each party is already independent and able to look after themselves post marriage, there would be no need to rely on the other party in the form of maintenance, but if there is a claim for spousal maintenance the courts are the ones who have the discretion to decide whether to grant post-divorce spousal maintenance or not. Due to maintenance being discretionary, the party who is claiming maintenance is required to establish that there is a need to be maintained and if there is no such need, then that it is “just” in the circumstances to be maintained.

When deciding whether there is a duty to support a spouse post-divorce, the court will consider the circumstances in accordance with section 7 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (“The Act”).

In terms of section 7(1) of the Act and upon granting a divorce, the court may make an order in terms of a maintenance arrangement agreed to between the parties. This is when a divorce is uncontested and the parties have entered into a settlement agreement, which would set out the agreed maintenance payments.

In the absence of a settlement agreement stipulating the maintenance for the spouse needing same, in terms of section 7(2) of the Act, the court, by considering a number of factors, may decide whether such duty to support is necessary. These factors will include, but not be limited to each spouses current and potential future financial means (financial position), their age and earning capacities at the time of the divorce, their financial needs and obligations, how long the marriage lasted and the standard of living they have become accustomed to.

Likewise, in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990, a surviving spouse may claim maintenance against the deceased spouse’s estate

It is important to take note that post-divorce spousal maintenance is not an automatic right and the court, in exercising its discretionary power, will decide whether there is need and entitlement to such maintenance by the claiming party. Therefore, there is no guarantee that a court will grant post-divorce spousal maintenance and the onus is on the claimant to prove their need for financial support.

If you require any further legal advice with regards to any family law matters, kindly contact our offices on (011) 325 5300 / [email protected] / [email protected] for further assistance.

Shannon Murray
NOWITZ ATTORNEYS
Attorney (BA, LLB) (Witwatersrand)

02/03/2021

CONTEMPT OF COURT: CRIMINALIZING CIVIL MISCONDUCT

By definition, contempt of court comprises the unlawful and intentional violation of the dignity, repute or authority of a judicial officer in his or her capacity, or of a judicial body, or the unlawful and intentional interference with the administration of justice in a matter pending before a judicial body.

From the aforegoing, it is clear that contempt of court is a defined crime, which also finds application in both civil proceedings and in quasi-judicial fora, in terms whereof criminal law overlaps with civil law. Such quasi-judicial fora include inter alia commissions of enquiry (with which the daily news is currently inundated).

Contempt of court is an unusual crime, which is characterized by manifesting itself in a variety of forms, each with specific requirements, forming sub-offences. To this end, certain instances of contempt of court are not only dealt with in the normal course, through criminal processes, but by civil law (which is the focus herein), i.e. through non-compliance with an order of court, for example, which is aptly named, “civil contempt”.

In general, a person against whom an order of court has been granted, is compelled to comply therewith, even in the event that same was wrongly granted. In other words, an order of court is valid and binding against a person, until such time as same has been set aside by the court. The rationale for the aforegoing is that it would be detrimental, if not fatal, to the authority of the court, should an order of court not be complied with.

Bearing in mind the above definitional elements of the crime of contempt of court, it is generally held that this crime can only be committed intentionally, i.e. a wilful disobedience of an order of court. In this regard, the conduct of a person against whom an order of court has been granted, becomes relevant, when contempt of court proceedings are initiated and prosecuted.

A distinction is drawn between contempt in facie curiae, i.e. in the face of the court, and ex facie curiae, i.e. outside of the court. The current focus is contempt ex facie curiae, relating to the wilful disobedience of an order of court. The prosecution of contempt is a summary procedure, in terms whereof the Magistrate’s Court is only empowered to deal with cases of contempt in facie curiae, whereas the High Court is entitled to deal with both instances of contempt of court.

In the context of the aforegoing, and the crux of the issue herein, is that a party to a civil case against whom an order of court has been granted, but who intentionally refuses to comply therewith, commits the crime of contempt of court. However, even though contempt of court is a criminal offence which is committed in a civil forum, same is rarely prosecuted in a criminal court, but is rather left to the party in whose favour the order of court has been granted, to apply to the same civil court, to convict the defaulting party in a summary manner (hence the overlap between criminal law and civil law, whereby civil misconduct is criminalized).

On Application by the party in whose favour the order of court has been granted, a defaulting party may be convicted and sentenced by a civil court for contempt of court, such sentence comprising imprisonment for a period of 6 months (depending on the number of counts of contempt of court, the period of imprisonment may be extended by a further 6 months for each count), on conviction, after taking into account any extenuating factors which may be raised by the defaulting party for such non-compliance. Yet, the norm is that such period of imprisonment is suspended on the condition that the defaulting party complies with the order of court within a prescribed period of time, as determined by the court.

The often-cited case of Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) is the generally-accepted leading case relating to civil contempt, and deals with the requirements and effects thereof, as cemented in law by the Supreme Court of Appeal.

In the event that you require any legal assistance, please contact our offices on (011) 325 5300 / [email protected], or Mr Bradley Schroder directly on 082 33 44 735 / [email protected], in order to assist you therewith.

Brad Schroder,

Nowitz Attorneys
ATTORNEY, LLB (UJ)

01/02/2021

“The New Normal”

What was supposed to be the year of recovery, February 2021 has revealed the continuing effects of the Covid19 pandemic and consequential lock downs, both on the economy at large as well as each and every individual. We, as individuals and as companies need to adapt to the “new normal”.

As we are all well aware, available funds are diminishing and there has not been a resurgence in the economy, as was previously thought. In fact, there is a continued decline in overall available funds which is having the result of many debtors unable to pay their debts and many individuals and businesses are becoming distressed. On the converse side of the coin, Creditors are unable to receive remuneration for work done. The nett result is that all parties are under severe financial pressure.

The consideration for any business depends on which side of the coin they fall. A useful way to ensure that all parties are well aware of their obligations is reduce the agreement into writing and to ensure an adequate and comprehensive set of terms and conditions accompany the agreement which do not leave any room for the unknown and which is easily understandable and enforceable.

Recent experience relating to litigation show that basic terms and conditions to which parties contract, are coming under more and more scrutiny as there has been a substantial rise in disputes relating to the terms and conditions of an agreement. What was once an appropriate agreement (containing certain terms and conditions) must now be amplified to account for every possibility as a result of the pandemic and consequential squeeze on available cash flow.

A specific clause which is now fast becoming regular in terms and conditions is with reference to force majeure or vis major. These are provisions which deal with unforseen circumstances that prevent a party from fulfilling an agreement. However, in the absence thereof, there is also the common law doctrine which may be of assistance and deals with instances where force majeure or vis major is not included in the agreement specifically yet the common law principle of Supervening Impossibility of Performance still applies. This is where each party’s obligation to perform in terms of an agreement and their respective rights to receive performance under that agreement will be extinguished in the event that the performance by a party of its obligations become objectively impossible as a result of unforseen and unavoidable events, which are not the fault of any party to that agreement.

Another specific clause under scrutiny, is that which relates to Non-refundable deposits. The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 as well as the Conventional Penalties Act 15 of 1962 both have application. In terms of Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, a supplier who accepts a reservation to supply goods / services on a later day may require payment of a reasonable deposit in advance and may impose a reasonable charge for cancellation. Whilst a consumer has the right to cancel advanced reservations, the said consumer will be liable to the supplier of a reasonable charge for cancellation. The key element is reasonableness.

A Charge for cancellation is unreasonable if it exceeds a fair amount in the circumstances, having regard to (i) the nature of the goods / services that were reserved or booked; (ii) the length of notice of cancellation provided by the consumer; (iii) the reasonable potential for the service provider, acting diligently, to find an alternative consumer between the time of receiving the cancellation notice and the time of the cancelled reservation; and (iv) the general practice of the relevant industry.

A comprehensive understanding of not only the above mentioned provisions but also contract law as a whole is necessary for valid and enforceable agreement which caters for unforseen eventualities, this include the terms and conditions thereof.

We at Nowitz Attorneys have extensive experience in contract law, including the drafting, interpretation and enforcability of terms and conditions from all aspects, including with reference to the needs of the individual, Small to Medium Enterprises as well as larger corporations.

We would be happy to advise and assist you with all your commercial needs, both from a individual as well as a juristic point of view, in order to ensure that you and/or your business remains operational, maximizes its returns and can continue flourishing long after the pandemic is over.

Please contact our Associate, Mr Richard Hastie on 011 325 5300 for all your enquiries.

31/12/2020

The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) which is currently gripping the world has in many
ways changed the way we view many things. There is much talk of living with,”the new
normal”’. What is equally true with the prevailing pandemic is that society, including in South
Africa has had to change to deal with the death of so many people.

In certain instances, family members cannot even be with their beloved family members
during their last moments of life, should they succumb to death.

For many years in South Africa, it was accepted by the courts that for there to be a valid last
will and testament, there would have to be compliance with the Will Act of 1953, (“the Act”).
Previously, the High Court, in its view regarded compliance with the formalities referred to in
section 2 of the Act, as centering around the signature of the testator. The signature could
be in the form of a signature, a thumbprint of the testator or a signature of a person signing
in the presence and under the direction of the testator.

However, The Supreme Court Of Appeal of South Africa (“SCA”), in the matter of Van der
Merwe v the Master of the High Court and Another [2010] JOL26090(SCA) handed down a
Judgement, (as dealt with more fully below), in terms of which it found that a will which has
been electronically stored on a computer hard drive and which was prepared by the
deceased, when one has regard to Section 2 of the Wills Act No. 7 of 1953, is not
invalidated, where the Court noted that the lack of a signature had never, in terms of Section
2(3) of the said Act, been held to be a complete bar to a document being declared a will.
The Court considered whether the document was drafted by the deceased and whether the
deceased had intended it to be his/her Last Will.

Whilst section 2(1)(a) of the Act records the formalities required in the ex*****on of a will,
section 2(3) of the Act sets out the power of a Court in relation to a will or amendment
thereof which does not comply with the prescribed formalities. It reads as follows:
“If a court is satisfied that a document or the amendment of a document drafted or executed
by a person who has died since the drafting of ex*****on thereof, was intended to be his will
or an amendment of his will, the court shall order the Master to accept that document, or that
document as amended, for the purposes of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66
of 1965), as a will, although it does not comply with all the formalities for the ex*****on or
amendment of wills referred to in subsection (1).

Whilst it is clear that the formalities prescribed by section 2(1) and section 2(2) in relation to
the ex*****on of a will and amendments thereto are to ensure authenticity and to guard
against false or forged wills, section 2(3) of the Act demonstrates that the legislature was
intent on ensuring that failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by the Act should not
frustrate or defeat the genuine intention of testators. It has rightly and repeatedly been said
that once a Court is satisfied that the document concerned meets the requirements of the
subsection a Court has no discretion whether or not to grant an order as envisaged therein.
In other words, the provisions of section 2(3) are peremptory once the jurisdictional
requirements have been satisfied.

Where for example, testator has drafted a will on his computer and the surrounding
circumstances evidence not only that it was drafted by the testator but also that it was the
testator’s intention that it be his last will, then the court will find that the provisions of section
2 (3) of the Act have been met and will order the Master to accept that document, or that
document as amended, for the purposes of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66
of 1965), as a will, although it does not comply with all the formalities for the ex*****on or
amendment of wills referred to in subsection (1).

In these extremely difficult times in which we live and where we are unable to even
communicate with our loved ones during their last moments or even where our loved ones
are unable to comply with the formalities of the Act, effect may be given to their wishes and
their intentions as to their Last Will and Testament, even if not signed, for the reasons set
out above.

Len Nowitz
Attorney
[email protected]

09/12/2020

Retrenchment Realities
During these trying and unfortunate times, now more than ever, many businesses are finding it necessary to minimise their losses due to unforeseeable and uncontrollable factors, which could lead to employers considering the retrenchment process.

Whether you are in the position of employing people or are the employee, it is always important to know how and when this dismissal process should be used.

Retrenchment is a no-fault type of dismissal whereby the economic, structural, technological, or similar needs of the business requires it and in order for a retrenchment to be deemed as valid, the employer must be able to show that the correct procedure was followed, and that the retrenchment was ultimately unavoidable. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the employer to ensure that all possibilities have been considered before initiating such retrenchment process.

Brief Overview:
Upon consideration of the retrenchment process, an employer must issue a section 189 notice*, inviting the affected employees to a consultative process regarding the proposed retrenchment. During this consultative process, the particulars of the retrenchment will need to be disclosed and discussed, and hopefully consensus on the way forward can be reached, which will ideally be in the best interests of both the business and the employees.

The essential particulars during the consultative process will include discussions around the “Why? How? When? and Who?”, as well as the alternative options that were considered before attending to the “last-resort” of the retrenchment process.

If, in the unfortunate event that the retrenchment process is unavoidable, despite fair attempts to mitigate the effects in the consultative process, the employer is to then issue a written notice of retrenchment, which must include all relevant details of the dismissal.

A common method in deciding which employees to retrench, is the notion of “last in first out”, but this is circumstantial and may be dependent on various aspects, such as an employee’s expertise and/or ability.

As previously stated, the responsibility of following the correct procedure and ensuring the reasons for a retrenchment are legitimate, vest with the employer and if an employee believes such retrenchment is unfair, either substantively or procedurally, he/she may approach the CCMA (Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration), or a bargaining council, within 30 (thirty) days from retrenchment in an attempt to resolve the dispute.

The CCMA Commissioner may decide to grant an employee’s claim, either in full or in part, or to dismiss the claim in its entirety. If a dispute cannot be resolved at this stage of conciliation, the employee may then refer his/her claim to the Labour Court.

If you are an employer or an employee and you have any concerns or require any legal assistance regarding the retrenchment process, kindly contact Nowitz Attorneys on (011) 325 5300 or [email protected]

Shannon Murray
Nowitz Attorneys
ATTORNEY, LLB, BA (Wits)

*Section 189(3) of the Labour Relations Act No. 6 of 1995

03/11/2020

TYPES OF BAIL AND EFFECTS THEREOF

The South African Criminal Justice System has been codified, into what is mainly the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 (as amended) (“the Criminal Procedure Act”).

Sections 58 to 71 of the Criminal Procedure Act deals with Bail, in general, as well as the types thereof, the circumstances under which each may be granted and the requirements for each.

Although the Criminal Procedure Act provides for Bail to be granted, pursuant to specific criminal offences committed, this is not of a right, but is rather seen as a “privilege”.

Ultimately, the purpose of Bail being granted, is to secure an accused person’s attendance, who has been held in police custody, at his or her Trial, or the proceedings relating to the criminal offence in respect of which the accused is released on Bail are adjourned, until a sentence is imposed, or where such proceedings are disposed of prior to sentencing.

Generally, there are three types of Bail, namely:

1 “Police Bail”, in terms whereof –

An accused person who is in custody in respect of any criminal offence, other than an offence referred to in Part II or Part III of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act may, before his or her first appearance in a Lower Court (i.e. Magistrate’s Court), be released on Bail in respect of such offence by any police official of or above the rank of non-commissioned officer, in consultation with the investigating officer, if the said accused person deposits at the police station concerned, a sum of money determined by such police official.

2 “Prosecutor’s Bail”, in terms whereof –

A prosecutor may, in respect of the criminal offences referred to in Schedule 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and in consultation with the investigating officer, authorize the release of an accused person from custody on Bail. The effect of the aforegoing is that the accused person shall be released from custody upon payment of, or the furnishing of a guarantee to pay, a sum of money determined for his or her Bail at his or her place of detention, subject to reasonable conditions imposed by the prosecutor concerned, or payment of such sum of money or the furnishing of such guarantee to pay, and the imposition of such conditions.

3 “Court Bail”, in terms whereof –

An accused person who is in custody in respect of a criminal offence (not falling within either Part II or Part III of Schedule 2, or Schedule 7, of the Criminal Procedure Act), subject to the provisions of Section 50(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act, be entitled to be released on Bail at any stage preceding his or her conviction in respect of such criminal offence, if the Court is satisfied that the interests of justice so permit, i.e., an accused remains in police custody until his or her first appearance, whereat the presiding officer determines the Bail amount payable, as well as any conditions to be imposed in connection therewith.

Notwithstanding the aforegoing, an accused person may also be released on Warning in lieu of Bail, in terms whereof –

subject to certain legislation, if an accused person who is 18 years or older is in custody in respect of any criminal offence and a police official or Court may in respect of such criminal offence release the accused person on Bail under Sections 59 or 60 of the Criminal Procedure Act, as the case may be, such police official or such Court, as the case may be, may, in lieu of Bail and if the criminal offence in question is not, in the case of such police official, a criminal offence referred to in Part II or Part III of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, release the accused person from custody and warn him or her to appear before a specified Court at a specified time, and on a specified date, in connection with such criminal offence.

In the event that either Police Bail, Prosecutor’s Bail or Court Bail has been granted, and that accused person - (a) fails to appear at the place, and on the date, and at the time – (i) appointed for his or her Trial, or (ii) to which the proceedings relating to the criminal offence in respect of which the accused person is released on Bail are adjourned, or (b) fails to remain in attendance at such Trial or at such proceedings, the Court before which the matter is pending shall declare the Bail provisionally cancelled, and the Bail money provisionally forfeited to the State, and issue a Warrant for the Arrest of the accused person. If an accused person appears before Court within 14 days of the issue of a Warrant of Arrest, a Court shall confirm the provisional cancellation of the Bail and the provisional forfeiture of the Bail money, unless the accused person satisfies the Court that his or her failure to appear or to remain in attendance, was not due to fault on his or her part. If the accused person satisfied the Court that his or her failure was not due to fault on his or her part, the provisional cancellation of the Bail and the provisional forfeiture of the Bail money shall lapse. In the event that an accused person does not appear before Court within 14 days of the issue of a Warrant of Arrest or within such extended period as the Court on good cause may determine, the provisional cancellation of the Bail and the provisional forfeiture of the Bail money shall become final. Any person who has been released on Bail and who fails, without good cause, to appear on the date and at the place determined for his or her appearance, or to remain in attendance until the proceedings in which he or she must appear have been disposed of, or who fails, without good cause, to comply with a condition of Bail imposed by the Court, including an amendment or supplementation thereof, shall be guilty of an offence, and shall on conviction, be liable to a fine or to imprisonment not exceeding 1 year.

Conversely, if an accused person who has been released on Warning fails to appear or, as the case may be, to remain in attendance at the proceedings, or who fails to comply with a condition imposed, shall be guilty of an offence, and liable to certain punishment. To this end, a Warrant of Arrest may be issued, and when he or she is brought before the Court, the Court may, in a summary manner, enquire into his or her failure to appear, remain in attendance, or comply with a condition imposed, and unless such accused person can satisfy the Court that such failure was not due to fault on his or her part, sentence him or her to a fine not exceeding R300-00, or to imprisonment not exceeding 3 months.

In the event that you require legal assistance with any criminal proceedings, please contact our offices on (011) 325 5300 / [email protected], or our Mr Bradley Schroder directly on 082 33 44 735 / [email protected], in order to assist you therewith.

Brad Schroder,

Nowitz Attorneys
ATTORNEY, LLB (UJ)

*Brad Schroder graduated from the University of Johannesburg with the LLB Degree, which was conferred on him in March 2011. Brad completed his Articles of Clerkship in December 2012, and was subsequently admitted as an Attorney of the High Court of South Africa in July 2013. Brad has been practising as an Attorney, initially at the same Firm where he commenced and completed his Articles of Clerkship and post-admission, until March 2014, when he joined Nowitz Attorneys and where he continues to practise, to date. During this time, Brad has gained a wealth of knowledge and experience through his exposure to a wide range of legal disciplines throughout his legal career. Brad also has extensive Courtroom experience, appearing personally on a regular basis in various Magistrate’s Courts, Divisions of the High Court (having obtained Right of Appearance in the High Court in May 2016), and other quasi-judicial fora, to run matters. Brad’s focus is on civil litigation, drafting of contracts, costs and criminal law, to name but a few. Brad prides himself on his dedicated work ethic, meticulous assessment of matters, being results-driven, having a wealth of knowledge and experience, and offering clients an all-round expertise in all legal facets with little to no need to outsource aspects of a matter, and a client-centric attitude and passion for Law.*