Peyper & Botha Attorneys Inc.

05/06/2026

VACANCY: LEGAL SECRETARY / LEGAL TYPIST

12/05/2026

Commissioner for SARS v Poulter (1110/2024) [2026] ZASCA 68: a major win for access to justice in the Tax Court

On 12 May 2026, the Supreme Court of Appeal delivered an important decision in The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Poulter, confirming that a taxpayer may be represented in the Tax Court by a duly authorised person who is not a legal practitioner.

What the case was about. Ms Poulter had authorised her father, Mr Gary Van der Merwe, to appear for her in an appeal in the Tax Court relating to her 2018 assessment. SARS objected, the Tax Court excluded him, proceeded in the taxpayer’s absence, confirmed the assessment, and ordered punitive costs. The Western Cape High Court (full court) set that aside, and SARS appealed to the SCA.

What the SCA decided. The SCA held that neither section 125 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 nor rule 44(7) of the Tax Court Rules requires a taxpayer’s representative to be an attorney or advocate. On an ordinary reading, “a person authorised to appear on the party’s behalf” includes any person properly authorised by the taxpayer. The SCA therefore upheld the full court’s approach and dismissed SARS’s appeal with costs.

Why this matters (and why it’s bigger than one taxpayer).

• Access to justice and affordability: Many taxpayers cannot fund High Court-level representation for a Tax Court appeal. This judgment confirms that a properly authorised lay representative can still present the case in that forum.

• Procedural fairness: The decision is a warning against “default-style” outcomes where a taxpayer is effectively shut out because their representative is excluded and the matter proceeds in their absence.

• Clarity on the rules: The SCA’s interpretation reduces uncertainty created by earlier disputes about whether the repeal of section 125(2) changed representation rights.

• Practical impact on tax dispute strategy: Taxpayers and practitioners can structure representation (including tax practitioners, accountants, and trusted advisers, where authorised) with greater confidence—while still recognising that complex matters may warrant legal counsel.

Takeaways. If you are litigating (or advising on) a Tax Court appeal, confirm that the taxpayer’s representative is clearly authorised in writing and that the mandate covers the hearing. If SARS raises an objection to representation, this judgment will be central to the response.

In short: CSARS v Poulter strengthens fairness and accessibility in tax dispute resolution—an important development for taxpayers, tax practitioners, and SARS alike.

06/05/2026

17/04/2026

THE MINISTER BEARING THE ONUS TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED DETENTION AFTER ARREST:

Makofane William Mohlala v MEC for Transport, Limpopo and Others (843/2024) [2026] ZASCA 55 (17 April 2026)

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judgment in Makofane William Mohlala v MEC for Transport, Limpopo and Others is a timely reminder that claims arising from arrest, detention and prosecution turn on careful, claim-by-claim analysis: a lawful arrest does not automatically make subsequent detention or prosecution lawful.

BACKGROUND IN BRIEF:

The dispute stems from an arrest connected to alleged drunken driving and a related charge. In earlier proceedings, aspects of the claimant’s case were not upheld. By the time the matter reached the SCA, the focus was on whether the state actors (across different departments) could be held liable for the detention and/or prosecution that followed, even where the arrest itself was treated as lawful.

KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM THE SCA’S APPROACH:

• Separate the delicts. Unlawful arrest, unlawful detention and malicious prosecution are distinct causes of action. Conceding (or proving) one does not dispose of the others.

• Detention must be justified at each stage. The enquiry is not only “was there a basis to arrest?”, but also whether continued deprivation of liberty was legally justified as the process unfolded (including decisions around holding, bringing to court, and opposing or not opposing release).

• Malicious prosecution requires more than an acquittal. A claimant must still grapple with the well-known requirements (including lack of reasonable and probable cause and improper motive) and show how the prosecutorial decision-making crossed the line into delictual unlawfulness.

• Evidence quality matters. Where breath/alcohol testing (or other technical evidence) is relied upon, the litigation often turns on the reliability, admissibility, and chain of proof—not merely on suspicion.

• Multi-department cases demand clear pleadings. When several organs of state are cited, pleadings and evidence must connect the specific decision-maker’s conduct to the specific harm claimed.

WHY THIS MATTERS (BEYOND THE PARTIES):

For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of pleading and proving each leg of a liberty-related claim with precision, and of leading evidence that speaks to each decision-point (arrest, continued detention, and prosecution). For state respondents, it highlights the litigation and constitutional risk in “process drift” after an arrest—where paperwork, evidentiary gaps, or mechanical opposition to bail can convert an initially lawful intervention into unlawful detention exposure.

Bottom line: Mohlala is a useful authority for the proposition that accountability in the criminal justice chain is granular. Liberty is protected not only at the point of arrest, but throughout the state’s continuing justification for detention and the fairness of the decision to prosecute.

29/03/2026

🚗 Injured in a Motor Vehicle Accident?

You may be entitled to claim compensation from the Road Accident Fund.

Our experienced RAF attorneys can assist you with claiming:

✅ Past and Future Medical expenses;
✅ Past and future Loss of income;
✅ Past and future Loss of support;
✅ Pain and suffering.

📞 Contact us today for professional legal assistance and let us guide you through your RAF claim.

Don’t delay — your rights matter.

25/03/2026

Road Accidant Fund lliable for interest even when court orders are silent – SCA settles the debate:

The Supreme Court of Appeal has delivered a decisive judgment on the long-standing dispute between the Road Accident Fund (RAF) and judgment creditors regarding post-judgment interest.

In Road Accident Fund v Sheriff of the High Court, Pretoria East and Others and Road Accident Fund v Stoffels and Another (268/2025 and 1182/2024) [2026] ZASCA 37 (24 March 2026), the SCA confirmed that the RAF is liable to pay post-judgment interest even where the court order does not expressly provide for it.

Key takeaway:

Every compensation award against the RAF constitutes a judgment debt, and in terms of section 2(1) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, such debts bear interest automatically by operation of law. No express order for interest is required.

The Court rejected the RAF’s argument that interest is only payable if specifically ordered under section 2A of the Act. That provision governs pre-judgment interest on unliquidated claims. Once judgment is granted, the claim is no longer unliquidated, and ordinary post-judgment interest applies.

When does interest start running?

The SCA confirmed that interest begins to run 14 days after the date of the court order, in line with section 17(3)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.

Importantly, the Court also held that:

• Silence on interest in a court order does not mean interest was refused.
• Res judicata does not apply merely because interest was claimed in the summons but omitted from the order.
• Post judgment interest also accrues on costs, from 14 days after taxation or agreement.
• Writs of ex*****on do not require a sworn affidavit quantifying interest, as the amount is objectively ascertainable.

Why this matters:

This judgment brings long-awaited clarity and curtails a practice that placed unnecessary obstacles in the way of claimants and practitioners. For RAF matters, the position is now clear: delay has a price, and that price is statutory interest.

For practitioners, the message is equally clear - interest need not be pleaded, argued, or expressly ordered to be recoverable.

This decision is likely to have significant practical and financial implications for the RAF and reinforces the principle that judgment creditors should not be prejudiced by administrative delay.

18/03/2026

📌 SCA Clarifies: Does a s 17(2)(f) Reconsideration Suspend Ex*****on Under s 18(1)?

The Supreme Court of Appeal has finally settled a long standing procedural debate in Hi Q Automotive (Pty) Ltd v Erga Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another (935/2024) [2026] ZASCA 31.
At issue was a simple but critical question:

👉 Does filing a reconsideration application under s 17(2)(f) automatically suspend the operation and ex*****on of a judgment under s 18(1)?

🔍 The SCA’s Answer: Yes.

In a detailed and purposive interpretation of the Superior Courts Act, the Court held that:

• A s 17(2)(f) reconsideration application is part of the appeal process.
• Its purpose is to prevent injustice where new facts or exceptional circumstances may warrant reconsideration of a refusal of leave to appeal.
• Because it forms part of the appellate mechanism, s 18(1)’s automatic suspension applies—even though the section does not mention reconsiderations explicitly.
• The contrary view expressed in Nquthu Municipality was expressly overruled.

💡 Why this matters:

This judgment restores certainty in an area where High Courts were divided. Now:

• Litigants who file a s 17(2)(f) application are protected from premature ex*****on.

• Sheriffs and practitioners must verify whether such an application is pending before enforcing an order.

• Successful parties can still apply for enforcement under s 18(3), but must meet the high threshold of “irreparable harm.”

⚖️ A win for legal clarity:

With reconsideration applications becoming more frequent, this decision ensures consistent treatment nationwide and strengthens the integrity of the appeal process.

18/03/2026

Divergent Judicial Reasoning in Luphondo v The State and What It Means for Special Leave to the SCA:

The Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in Luphondo v The State (123/2024) [2026] ZASCA 24 offers more than just a dismissal of a reconsideration application—it highlights an important judicial split and reiterates the demanding standard for special leave appeals.

A Split in Judicial Approach: Who Decides “Exceptional Circumstances”?

Section 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act allows a refused petition for leave to appeal to be reconsidered—but who decides whether exceptional circumstances exist?

Two conflicting lines of authority have emerged:

• Some SCA benches hold that the Court hearing the reconsideration must determine exceptional circumstances.

• Others hold that it is the President of the SCA who exercises this discretion when referring matters for reconsideration.
This divergence matters because it affects the gatekeeping role of the President, the standard applicants must meet, and the already high threshold attached to “exceptional circumstances.”

In Luphondo, the Court acknowledged this conflict but held that - under either approach - the applicant failed to meet the test.

Why the Application Failed:

The Court found that Luphondo’s special plea lacked merit, the High Court correctly refused leave, and no basis existed for reconsideration. The State’s authority to prosecute remained intact despite technical arguments around internal directives.

What This Case Reinforces About Special Leave:

Special leave to the SCA is truly exceptional. Applicants must show:

1. Reasonable prospects of success, and

2. Special circumstances, such as:

- A substantial legal question.
- Issues of public importance.
- Particularly compelling prospects.
- A risk of a manifest injustice.

Cases like Beadica and Wolmarans Street reaffirm that prospects alone are not enough—both elements must be present.

Key Takeaways for Practitioners:

• Expect a strict, consistently enforced standard for special leave applications.

• Treat “exceptional circumstances” as a high, evolving threshold, especially given divergent SCA views.

• Ensure precise, well framed applications - errors in labelling or affidavit structure can be fatal.

• Internal prosecutorial directives do not automatically invalidate prosecutions unless fairness is compromised.

13/03/2026

District Court Prosecutor Andrew Swarts examines the judicial interpretation of s 35(5) of the Constitution regarding the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence to protect the integrity of the justice system. https://www.derebus.org.za/under-what-circumstances-does-justice-demand-the-exclusion-of-unconstitutionally-obtained-evidence/