Myburgh Attorneys Inc

Myburgh Attorneys Inc The firms expanding client base serves as proof of our commitment to excellence. In every matter we apply the highest standard of ethical norms and principles.
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Myburgh Attorneys Incorporated is a boutique firm that has been in existence since 1 August 1999, previously trading as a sole proprietorship called Myburgh & Associates Attorneys. The firm's level of service and efficiency has repeatedly proven that the interests of clients are paramount and that the value added service offered to our clients' business and personal interests are of utmost importa

nce. At Myburgh Incorporated we pride ourselves in setting ourselves apart from other legal firms in that we actively strive to serve each and every client with the highest standard of competence possible. Our largest client component is derived as a result of word of mouth referrals wherefrom we secure our local, national and international client base. In so doing we have built up a sound reputation within the legal fraternity. The firm is secure in that the majority of the firm’s staff has been with the firm for an extensive period of time. All the staff members are competent and well experienced in their fields of expertise. Each staff member is well versed in the firm’s policies and procedures and committed to ensuring that the highest standards are applied at the firm. We are an inspired, structured, motivated and outgoing team who believe that passion, hard work, honesty, integrity and vision is the backbone of being a successful legal firm. Contact Janine Myburgh or Anel de Bruyn at Myburgh Attorneys Inc at (021) 945 4960 / [email protected]. The Firm Prides itself on its experience in fields of

Family Law,
Divorce Matters
MVA Claims
Civil Litigation (High Court and Magistrates Court)
Collections
Drafting of Contracts (Commercial and Marriage)
Criminal Law
Family and Divorce Mediation
Labour Law
Drafting of wills
Estates

     Civil contempt is not merely a procedural dispute between two parents; it is a criminal offense that directly chall...
05/06/2026



Civil contempt is not merely a procedural dispute between two parents; it is a criminal offense that directly challenges the constitutional authority of the judiciary. Under Section 165(5) of the Constitution, court orders are legally binding on all individuals, and Section 1(c) establishes the rule of law as a foundational national value. Furthermore, the High Court sits as the Upper Guardian of all minor children, meaning that a child’s best interests under Section 28 of the Constitution can never be severed from compliance with the law. Dissatisfaction with a court order does not grant a license for non-compliance, and any deliberate interference with a judicial directive undermines the entire system designed to protect vulnerable individuals.

This critical intersection of family law and the rule of law was firmly tested in M.N v J.E and Another [2026] ZAWCHC 189. The Western Cape High Court had to address a severe situation where an urgent return order regarding a four-year-old child was ignored for weeks. A mother had absconded with the child, actively guided by a third-party lay activist who was operating under a power of attorney. The case highlights how non-compliance in urgent child-care matters goes beyond delaying enforcement; it alters the practical reality on the ground, creates a parallel and unregulated decision-making system, and places children beyond the reach of lawful protective structures.

Applying the definitive contempt test established by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Fakie NO v CCII Systems, the court evaluated whether the non-compliance was wilful and mala fide (in bad faith). While the mother’s subsequent remorse, withdrawal of the activist’s power of attorney, and cooperation with the Family Advocate led to a wholly suspended fine, the lay activist received a suspended 30-day imprisonment sentence. This serves as a vital legal lesson: subjective, private views of justice or activism can never override an active court order. A power of attorney does not transform a lay person into a legal practitioner, nor does it shield them from accountability when aiding and abetting the evasion of the law.

Finally, the judgment offers an essential lesson in professional legal ethics and administrative discipline. The Court expressed deep concern over an attorney who came on record for the mother without directly consulting her, instead allowing the lay activist to draft pleadings and steer the litigation strategy. Under Uniform Rule 16(4), coming on record or withdrawing from an urgent matter requires precise, independent professional judgment to ensure a client is not left procedurally exposed. Because the attorney failed to act as a proper officer of the court and protect the integrity of the proceedings, the High Court referred the practitioner's conduct to the Legal Practice Council (LPC) for formal regulatory investigation.

05/06/2026

PLEA AND SANCTION AGREEMENT WAS BINDING
The employee was the Human Resource Manager at Capricorn District Municipality and faced six disciplinary charges, largely of dishonesty. The parties concluded a written plea and sanction agreement under the Disciplinary Procedure Collective Agreement applicable in local government, in terms of which the employee pleaded guilty to one charge, received a written warning and a short suspension without pay, and the remaining charges were withdrawn. The chairperson approved the agreement as required, bringing the disciplinary process to finality. Shortly thereafter, however, the Municipality purported to withdraw from the agreement and reconstituted the disciplinary proceedings on essentially the same charges, culminating in the employee’s dismissal. The employee referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the Bargaining Council, resulting in an arbitration award finding the dismissal substantively unfair but awarding compensation instead of reinstatement.

A second disciplinary process for the same misconduct is permissible only where fairness and exceptional circumstances justify it. The Collective Agreement provided that plea agreements, once approved by the chairperson, are binding determinations subject only to remedies permitted in law. The Municipality contended that the agreement was merely contractual and that it was entitled to revisit the matter in the public interest. The employee argued that the agreement conclusively resolved the dispute and that the subsequent proceedings amounted to impermissible double jeopardy.

The plea and sanction agreement, once approved by the chairperson in terms of the Collective Agreement, constituted a final and binding determination that brought the disciplinary process to an end. The Municipality was not entitled unilaterally to withdraw from the agreement and reinstitute proceedings on the same charges. No exceptional circumstances, such as new evidence or fraud, were established to justify a second disciplinary enquiry, rendering the dismissal substantively unfair. The commissioner’s conclusion on unfairness was therefore reasonable and not reviewable. However, the commissioner erred on the issue of remedy by refusing reinstatement based on allegations of misconduct that had been withdrawn and resolved in the plea agreement. The Municipality failed to prove intolerability or impracticability as required under section 193(2) of the Labour Relations Act. Accordingly, reinstatement was the appropriate remedy.

The Municipality’s review application is dismissed. The employee’s review application succeeds, and the arbitration award is substituted with an order reinstating the employee retrospectively with full backpay. There is no order as to costs.

Mahlobogwane v Capricorn District Municipality and Others (JR1211/24; JR1357/24) [2026] ZALCJHB 171 (5 May 2026)

04/06/2026

Durban Labour Court faced disruption, prompting a strong response from the judiciary. The incident highlights challenges in maintaining order and respect within South Africa’s legal system.
Read on https://tinyurl.com/bddf5s5p

   Rule 43 of the Uniform Rules of Court is designed to swiftly and economically protect vulnerable parties by regulatin...
04/06/2026



Rule 43 of the Uniform Rules of Court is designed to swiftly and economically protect vulnerable parties by regulating interim maintenance and legal costs during divorce proceedings. Because these orders are temporary, section 16(3) of the Superior Courts Act explicitly bars them from being appealed. However, the tension between this statutory prohibition and the complex dynamics of modern blended families recently led to a major jurisdictional showdown before the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA).

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) has firmly drawn the line on the appealability of interim matrimonial orders, reinforcing the strict statutory limits governing its own jurisdiction. In the matter of B.E v N.T and Others (505/2025) [2026] ZASCA 25, the Court was confronted with a bitter dispute arising from a modern blended family, culminating in a critical ruling on whether a high court’s interim maintenance order under Rule 43 constitutes an appealable "decision" under the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013.
The dispute arose following the breakdown of the parties' marriage, where the wife sought interim maintenance (pendente lite) for herself and her two minor children from a previous relationship. Despite never adopting the stepchildren, the high court held that the husband had consciously assumed a parental role during the marriage. Invoking the children’s constitutional right to parental care, the high court ordered the husband to pay substantial monthly maintenance, cover rental accommodation, and contribute R1 million toward the wife's legal costs. Although the husband secured leave to appeal on petition to the SCA regarding his liability to support the stepchildren, the SCA was first required to determine the threshold issue of its own jurisdiction.

The SCA struck the appeal from the roll, holding that it entirely lacked jurisdiction because a Rule 43 order does not constitute an appealable "decision" within the meaning of section 16(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act. The Court emphasized that under section 16(3) of the Act, Parliament deliberately barred appeals against interim maintenance orders to ensure that matrimonial disputes are regulated in an inexpensive, swift, and provisional manner. This non-appealability protects the economically weaker spouse from protracted, fragmented litigation and prevents recalcitrant litigants from abusing the process.

The SCA rejected the husband's argument that the order was "final in effect," clarifying that Rule 43 findings are provisional, do not bind the trial court, and can be reconsidered under Rule 43(6). The Court also noted that its statutory jurisdiction cannot be expanded using its inherent constitutional powers. Ultimately, the judgment signals that Rule 43 is not the vehicle for developing the common law on stepparent liability; such complex issues must be fully ventilated at trial to establish a proper record for future appeal.

03/06/2026

The Western Cape High Court has dismissed an urgent application from alleged gang leader Ralph Stanfield, who claimed his constitutional rights were violated during his solitary confinement in correctional facilities.

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