Steven G. Higgins, Attorney at Law

05/16/2026

Greenwood v. Greenwood, 2026 Ark. App. 290: In this domestic-relations case, the circuit court awarded Katie custody of the parties’ son and granted Drew only supervised visitation. On appeal, Drew argued the trial court erred by declining to apply Arkansas’s statutory presumption favoring joint custody.

The Arkansas Court of Appeals explained that although Arkansas law favors joint custody, the presumption may be rebutted by a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a parent has engaged in a “pattern of domestic abuse.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(b)(1) & (c)(2). The court further explained that whether a “pattern of domestic abuse” exists is a question of fact for the circuit court.

The Court of Appeals affirmed because substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s finding of a pattern of domestic abuse, including evidence that Drew engaged in controlling and abusive behavior, broke Katie’s cell phone, threw a bottle that caused significant injury, held Katie down and impeded her breathing, caused Katie to fear him, and displayed repeated angry outbursts during the court proceedings themselves [Note--if the other party claims you are a jerk, don't prove it by acting like one in court!].

Lesson: Although Arkansas law contains a strong presumption favoring joint custody, that presumption can be overcome where the evidence establishes a pattern of domestic abuse.

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Legal services in Russellville, Arkansas

05/16/2026

Gray v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 293: This was a Garland county case where the State charged Cyril Gray III with theft of property claiming Gray stole a boat from Wesley Burnett.
The case went to trial Gray’s counsel cross-examined Burnett about his insurance claim on the boat alleging theft, and counsel sought to introduce a letter from Burnett’s insurance company, which denied coverage because the company found that the boat had not been stolen. The State objected to the introduction of the letter on the basis of hearsay and lack of authentication, and the court sustained the objection.
The prosecutor also referenced the insurance letter during closing statements. Specifically, the prosecutor stated, “In openings, defense counsel also showed you a letter from an insurance company. I submit to you . . . you don’t have that letter into evidence. You can’t consider it.”
Later, during Gray’s closing statement, his attorney said, “the letter from the insurance company. You dang right I mentioned it in my opening. You dang right I did. And you know what? You heard me question about it. You heard me try to get it into evidence. And the State has the burden here today. And they didn’t enter it. Why didn’t they? Why are they hiding the letter from the insurance company from you?”
The State objected and asked for a cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard counsel’s comment that the State is “hiding” the letter. The court sustained the State’s objection and advised Gray’s counsel that “[y]ou can tell them that . . . the burden was on them to . . . prove their case. You can tell them that . . . you thought the letter was important, but it didn’t come in, and so you can’t go any further than that.”
On appeal, Gray argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by restricting his closing statements concerning the State’s failure to introduce the insurance letter. He asserts that he was entitled to comment on the letter and about the weaknesses in the State’s case, and he claims that the circuit court denied him the ability to present a defense in violation of his constitutional rights.
The Court of Appeals held since Gray did not raise any constitutional issues at trial that his constitutional arguments are not preserved for our review. It is well settled that an appellant must raise and make an argument at trial to preserve it on appeal.
Lesson— if defense counsel fails to make a proper record at trial—including specifically raising constitutional objections—the defendant’s ability to challenge alleged trial-court errors on appeal will ordinarily be waived.

If you are charged with a felony and intend to take your case to a jury trial, it is important to have an attorney who is genuinely comfortable and experienced in the courtroom. Jury trials involve far more than simply knowing the law. Trial counsel must know how to preserve objections, conduct voir dire, cross-examine witnesses, introduce evidence, make strategic decisions in real time, and protect issues for appeal. Cases like Gray v. State illustrate how mistakes at trial—particularly failures to preserve arguments—can significantly limit what can later be challenged on appeal.

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Legal services in Russellville, Arkansas

05/09/2026

McChristian v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 288: The defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the second degree. The prosecution, under the pe*****le exception, called the defendant’s niece who testified the defendant r***d her starting at the age of 12. To combat this, the defendant testified and said he was incarcerated during the time period alleged by his niece. During the closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
But [defendant] also was a little unclear on dates when he was testifying. Can’t remember when he was in prison, can’t remember when he was out. [Defense counsel] walked him through some dates on a piece of paper, while the defendant nodded along, but the Defense didn’t bring anyone from the ADC to explain any of that paperwork to you.
McChristian’s attorney immediately objected, claimed the prosecutor was burden shifting, and requested a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion based on Doll v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 153, which held that the State may comment in closing argument that a defendant did not call witnesses, other than the defendant, to establish facts or theories about the case, and doing so does not shift the burden of proof to the defense. Because McChristian introduced the issue of his incarceration in an effort to undermine the victim’s timeline, the State was permitted to challenge the credibility and evidentiary support for that claim. Under Doll v. State, the prosecution may comment on the defense’s failure to call witnesses supporting its theory of the case, aside from the defendant’s testimony, without improperly shifting the burden of proof.

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Legal services in Russellville, Arkansas

05/09/2026

Harris v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 273 — Harris was convicted in 2009 of committing a terroristic act and first-degree battery. He later filed a petition under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111(a), arguing that the dual convictions violated Arkansas’s multiple-offense statute, section 5-1-110(a)(1). The Court of Appeals held that section 16-90-111 allows a circuit court to correct a facially illegal sentence at any time, but Harris’s claim was not that the judgment was facially invalid. Instead, his double-jeopardy/multiple-conviction argument alleged that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. That type of claim must be raised at trial or in a timely Rule 37.1 petition, and section 16-90-111 cannot be used as a substitute for Rule 37 postconviction relief. Because Harris’s claim was untimely under Rule 37.1, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition.

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Legal services in Russellville, Arkansas

05/09/2026

Little v. Jackson, 2026 Ark. App. 275 : Jacob Little and Kaitlyn Roberts were married. They had one child together (MC). During the marriage, Jacob developed a substance abuse problem. Based on his conduct, Kaitlyn filed for divorce and obtained an order of protection. Over the next few years, Jacob was convicted of 48 different criminal offenses, primarily drug offenses, and spent most of his time incarcerated. Kaitlyn remarried and her new husband, Jackson, filed a petition for adoption. The trial court ruled Jacob’s consent to the adoption was not necessary. Ordinarily, the consent of a natural parent is required in an adoption case. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-206 (Repl. 2020). However, this consent is not required “if the parent for a period of at least one (1) year has failed significantly without justifiable cause (i) to communicate with the child or (ii) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-207(a)(2). A significant failure is “one that is meaningful or important” and is “unjustifiable if it is voluntary and intentional, i.e., arbitrary and without adequate excuse.” Jacob argued that his lack of communication with MC was justifiable due to his incarceration, the divorce decree, and the order of protection. The court of appeals rejected this argument citing Gordon v. Draper, 2013 Ark. App. 352 where the court held when an order of protection or a period of incarceration stems from an individual’s intentional misconduct, the individual cannot later use the order of protection or incarceration as justification for failure to communicate.

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Legal services in Russellville, Arkansas

05/02/2026

State v. Ramirez, 2026 Ark. 92: The State agreed to nolle pros charges against Ramirez based on his representation that he would join the Marines. Ramirez did not join, and the State later refiled the charges. Ramirez moved to dismiss, arguing that the agreement was binding and that the State’s refiling prevented him from completing his end of the bargain. The circuit court dismissed the charges, finding that Ramirez had made a good-faith effort to join the Marines by studying for the GED for three hours. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed. It held that agreements between prosecutors and defendants are generally interpreted under ordinary contract principles, and this agreement was a unilateral contract: the State promised a benefit—nonprosecution—if Ramirez performed by joining the Marines. Because a unilateral contract becomes enforceable only upon performance, and because Ramirez never joined the Marines, the State could revoke its offer before performance was complete. Ramirez’s good-faith efforts were not enough. The circuit court therefore should have denied the motion to dismiss.

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Legal services in Russellville, Arkansas

05/02/2026

Linkous v. Linkous, 2026 Ark. App. 261: The parties divorced in November 2019. The mother was awarded custody of the parties’ two children, subject to the father’s visitation, and the father was ordered to pay child support. The parties later reconciled and cohabited from January 2020 through May 2023. During that period, the father did not pay support as ordered. After the father reopened the case, the mother filed a counterpetition seeking contempt and retroactive child support for the cohabitation period. The father testified that he financially contributed while the parties lived together, but the mother disputed the extent of those contributions and testified that she worked three jobs during that time. After weighing the testimony, the circuit court assessed a child-support arrearage from March 1, 2020, through August 1, 2025, in the amount of $24,324. With interest, the arrearage totaled $27,324, and the father was ordered to pay an additional $203 per month until satisfied. On appeal, the father argued that the circuit court erred by awarding retroactive child support for a period when the parties were reconciled and living together. The court of appeals affirmed, explaining that enforcement of a child-support judgment may be subject to equitable defenses, including laches, but those defenses are fact intensive and rest within the circuit court’s discretion. Likewise, whether to award retroactive child support depends on the equities of the case. Because the circuit court’s ruling turned on credibility determinations regarding the parties’ competing testimony about the father’s financial contributions, the court of appeals found no error and affirmed the arrearage judgment.

Takeaway: A noncustodial parent with an existing child-support obligation should not assume that reconciliation or cohabitation suspends the duty to pay. Unless the parties remarry, the support obligation is modified by court order, or the obligation terminates by operation of law, unpaid support may later be assessed as an arrearage.

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Legal services in Russellville, Arkansas

04/25/2026

Tyler v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 248: In this murder trial, the evidence demonstrated that the bullets that killed the victim came from the back seat of the truck. There was evidence that the defendant was one of two passengers in the truck when the shooting occurred. After the shooting, the defendant left the scene. Nearly a month passed before the defendant reappeared, turning himself in to the police. Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court provided the following instruction to the jury: “Evidence that the defendant fled to avoid arrest or detention by the police may be considered by you in your deliberations as circumstantial evidence corroborative of guilt of the defendant.” The Vincent court concluded based on the record that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the flight instruction. While the court described this as the flight instruction, prosecutors can request this instruction and use it to argue that the defendant’s actions constituted a consciousness of guilt.

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04/25/2026

Hogue v. State, 2026 Ark. 83: A jury found petitioner Greg Hogue guilty of capital murder for the death of Jess Brown, the owner of a convenience store, and sentenced Hogue to life imprisonment without parole. Hogue had just turned 18 years old when he committed the offense. In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Hogue maintained that there is data that demonstrates there is little neurological difference between a seventeen-year-old juvenile and an eighteen-year-old adult. Based on this data, Hogue asked the court to extend Miller and to remand his case for resentencing. Justice Bronni rejected Hogue’s invitation to extend Miller and noted the data cited by Hogue existed when the US Supreme Court decided Miller.

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04/25/2026

Garland County District Court, et al. v. John Mercer, et al., 2026 Ark. 76: The Garland County District Court imposed fines and costs and required alcohol-education programming. The sentencing orders also placed Mercer on at least six months of probation, required him to pay a $25 monthly probation fee, and subjected him to conditions including random drug and alcohol testing. Mercer argued the Court lacked statutory authority to place him on probation, and the $25.00 monthly probation fee constituted an illegal exaction under Article 13 Section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. One issue addressed by Mercer was whether a district court can place a DWI offender on probation. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that probation as a form of punishment for DWI is prohibited under the Omnibus DWI Act. However, the court clarified that courts may impose limited supervision—not as punishment, but solely to ensure compliance with lawful sentencing requirements (such as fines or education programs). The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Circuit Court for findings of fact on whether the reporting requirements, random drug tests, and the threat of revocation constitute probation as punishment instead of probation solely to ensure compliance with the lawful sentencing requirements. If the probation fee was imposed in connection with supervision not permitted by statute, it would constitute an illegal exaction. This case is worth monitoring because it could affect other Courts in Arkansas.

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