08/27/2026
“Your Base Closed Anyway” Is Not a Defense to a Defense Base Act Claim
I expect we are going to hear this argument frequently as military bases and contractor operations in Iraq close or scale back:
“You are not entitled to continuing disability benefits because your base closed. You would have lost that job anyway.”
There is a major problem with that argument.
The Benefits Review Board recently addressed essentially the same issue in Woolum v. ARMA Aviation, a published Defense Base Act decision.
Mr. Woolum worked as an aircraft mechanic in Kabul, Afghanistan. He sustained a compensable nasal and sinus injury that prevented him from returning to his former work. He later obtained lower-paying employment in the United States.
Then the United States withdrew from Afghanistan.
The employer argued that once the withdrawal eliminated the Kabul jobs, Mr. Woolum should no longer receive disability benefits. In other words: the employer argued that claimants may not receive lost earning capacity from a job that no longer exists.
The Board rejected that argument. And that makes sense.
Defense Base Act disability is not determined by asking whether the exact base, contract, or overseas position where someone once worked still exists. Disability concerns the worker’s loss of wage-earning capacity because of the work injury.
Those are two very different questions.
Consider an Iraqi contractor who earned substantial wages working for an American contractor at an Iraq base. While that job still existed, the contractor developed PTSD and became unable to return to war-zone employment. Two years later, the base closes.
The closure did not cure the PTSD. It did not restore the contractor’s ability to work overseas. And it does not retroactively transform the contractor’s pre-closure wage-earning capacity into zero.
That is an important part of Woolum. The Board explained that the Longshore Act does not allow the parties to go back and recalculate a worker’s average weekly wage because of later events that might have affected the worker’s employment anyway. The statute establishes the compensation formula based on the worker’s earning capacity at the relevant time.
A later geopolitical event does not rewrite history.
There is also a practical problem with the “base closed” argument.
A contractor’s earning capacity was rarely limited to one particular gate, building, or military installation. People who worked in Iraq often possessed experience that allowed them to pursue contractor work in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Africa, Europe, or elsewhere. The relevant question, then, is what the injured worker could realistically earn after the injury—not whether one particular installation remained open forever.
To be clear, the parties can litigate suitable alternative employment and post-injury earning capacity. But that is very different from saying: “The base closed, therefore your disability disappeared.”
A military withdrawal does not cure an injury. A contract ending does not restore wage-earning capacity. And a base closure does not automatically extinguish Defense Base Act benefits.
That distinction may become increasingly important for contractors who worked in Iraq.