Thomas R. King, Esq

Thomas R. King, Esq Boutique law firm dedicated to the legal needs of you and your family. A small, personal law firm dedicated to the legal needs of your family.

I specialize in all facets of family law from mediation to uncontested divorces to complex divorce litigation. Divorce
Alimony
Child support
Special needs & special education
Bankruptcy

Judge Maenza was one of the best family judges to sit in Morris County Family court. It is nice to get a recommendation ...
09/10/2020

Judge Maenza was one of the best family judges to sit in Morris County Family court. It is nice to get a recommendation from a judge I've litigated before when they retire to private practice.

07/05/2020

Law office - help wanted - friendly
solo family law practice at 45 Broadway looking for legal secretary / paralegal 3-5 days a week, 5 hours a day, possibly full time in the near future. Salary commiserate with experience.

04/15/2020

Below is a recent case that shows the difficulty in proving co-habitation in New Jersey to reduce Alimony. The husband is paying $14000 per month, a large enough sum for wife and her partner to got to great lengths to keep up enough separation to rebut an argument of co-habitation. In hindsight, because of the large monthly support payment, the husband should have required additional language in their settlement agreement that would suffice for co-habitation.

FAMILY LAW
20-2-4220 Garcia-Travieso v. Garcia-Travieso, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (20 pp.) Defendant appealed from that part of a Family Part order denying his motion to terminate his alimony obligation to plaintiff, his former wife, based on her alleged cohabitation. The parties were married on May 7, 1993 and had three children together. A dual judgment of divorce, with an accompanying matrimonial settlement agreement, was entered by the court on April 21, 2014. The MSA required defendant to pay plaintiff $14,000 per month in alimony, terminating upon either party's death or plaintiff's remarriage. The MSA further provided defendant's alimony obligation may be modified or terminated upon the cohabitation of plaintiff, pursuant to the law at that time. Defendant certified that plaintiff's new partner was actively involved in plaintiff's family and life events, was a significant part of the children's lives, that he and plaintiff vacationed together on several occasions, that he assisted plaintiff with household chores, that he was present at plaintiff's home on a regular basis, that he loaned plaintiff approximately $50,000 to complete the construction of her home, and that he and plaintiff's relationship had become increasingly committed, exclusive, and marriage like. Defendant provided details regarding plaintiff's partner's involvement in his daughter's fifteenth birthday celebration to show the two could not be living in separate households. Defendant also supported his application with a report from a private investigator. Plaintiff argued her new partner resided in Connecticut, she repaid him the money she borrowed from him, and that they covered their own expenses. Plaintiff's new partner also submitted a certification showing receipts and his Connecticut lease and related bills. The court denied defendant's request, finding he had not met the burden of a prima facie showing of a change in circumstances. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court noted its review of a decision not to modify alimony was under an abuse of discretion standard. The court found no abuse of discretion in the court's determination that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that plaintiff and her new partner were cohabitating. The court noted the changed circumstances standard of Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157, continues to apply to a motion to suspend or terminate alimony based on cohabitation following the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n), per Landau v. Landau, 461 N.J. Super. 107-08 (App. Div. 2019). Although the court did not separately identify the factors it considered in rendering its opinion, the court found the applicable factors adequately addressed.

04/08/2020

Family law often involves restraining orders. It is important to treat an application for a restraining order carefully. In New Jersey restraining orders are very serious and may last forever. Below is a recent case where the court overturned a restating order because the parties were given a sufficient chance to cross examine the other side. If you need a retraining order, get one, but make sure it is done correctly or you may end up back in court again and again.

J.F. v. L.F., N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (7 pp.) Defendant appealed from the entry of a domestic violence final restraining order entered against her in favor of her son. Both parties appeared pro se at the FRO plenary hearing. The court asked defendant if she wished to speak to an attorney, but defendant declined. The court informally asked questions of both plaintiff and defendant. At no point did the court explain to either party that they could cross-examine the other. Nor did the court ask defendant if she had any questions that she wanted the court to pose to plaintiff. The trial court found that defendant committed the predicate act of harassment by driving past plaintiff's house repeatedly and by "posting" her vehicle near his house for approximately five hours. The court also found that an FRO was needed to prevent further abuse. On appeal, the court reversed entry of the FRO, reinstated the TRO, and remanded for a new FRO hearing. The court found the initial plenary hearing after which the FRO was granted was informal and defendant was not given adequate opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff or fully present her case. The court noted that while there is deference given to a lower court's ruling on a FRO, that deference presupposes that the FRO hearing was conducted in accordance with the due process rights of the parties.

03/27/2020

An update to changes to laws in New Jersey due to Covid-19.

Here is a list of recent legislation that may help you or your clients during this Emergency:

A3095/S1982: This bill provides county clerks with an additional week to mail ballots for the primary election. It also fixes an issue when the statutorily mandated ballot-position-draw occurs on a holiday. The draw can occur one day early if the draw date is a holiday.

A3840/S2281: This bill requires school districts to continue to provide school meals or meal vouchers to students who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.

A3843/S2283: This bill requires Medicaid and health insurance coverage of coronavirus testing. Also requires coverage for telehealth and telemedicine related to coronavirus.

A3845/S2284: This bill authorizes the EDA to extend deadlines on certain grant/loan applications. It also expands existing grant programs to accept small businesses affected by the crisis which would not normally be eligible for such grants.

A3848/S2301: This bill makes it illegal to fire someone for taking off sick from work if that person is positive for coronavirus.

A3849/S2302: This bill lifts the 7-day OPRA deadline during the emergency order; instead, clerks have to make "every reasonable effort" to respond to OPRA requests.

A3850/S2294: This bill allows public bodies to conduct meetings electronically during the emergency order.

A3851/S2295: This bill extends the deadline for county and municipal governments to adopt their budgets.

A3852/S2296: This bill allows the Legislature to conduct its business outside of Trenton, or to conduct its business using electronic means.

A3854/S2286: This bill allows healthcare facilities and labs to conduct their own coronavirus tests. Prior to this bill, DOH was conducting all the tests. This bill also empowered the DOH Commissioner to waive statutory staffing ratios, as she sees fit.

A3855/S2287: This bill requires 2-1-1 to have information about food access; this information is supposed to be prominently posted on Executive Branch websites.

A3859/S2276: This bill halts enforcement of eviction or foreclosure orders for the duration of the emergency.

A3860/S2289: This bill expands the kinds of health services that can be provided through telemedicine.

A3861/S2290: This bill allows corporations to conduct shareholders' meetings electronically.

A3862/S2298: This bill allows Consumer Affairs to expedite licensure proceedings for certain professions (healthcare).

A3865/S2291: This bill limits the ability of individuals to return food items purchased at retail food stores.

ACR165/SCR109: This resolution urges the NJ DHS to apply for waivers related to SNAP and other federal programs in order to reduce barriers to access and wait times for benefits (filed with Secretary of State

03/20/2020

I handle DYFS or DCP&P child protection service matters. While I feel DCPP does a good job in many cases, they also greatly overreach all too often and judges tend to rubber stamp their findings and conclusions.
A recent case that illustrates this is below. The trial court should never have allowed the guardian to have any conflict, and should hold DCPP to the highest standard when taking custody away. DCPP has all the resources and custody battles with the state all too often hinge on finances and the parent's ability to hire an expert.
If you are in a fight with DCP&P don't take it lightly and hire an attorney who will fight them.

3-30-2020 20-2-4091 New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. T.S., N.J. Super. App. Div. (Fuentes, J.) (37 pp.) Mother appealed from the judgment of guardianship that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, Andrea. The guardianship trial took place over six days; mother appeared for the first day of trial and appeared again on the last day of trial to testify in her own defense. On appeal, mother argued that the judgment of guardianship had to be vacated in favor of a new trial because the resource parent Andrea was placed with worked as a domestic violence liaison in the district office that handled Andrea's guardianship case. Mother argued that there was a clear conflict of interest that the district office failed to remedy by transferring the guardianship matter to another office. Mother argued that the conflict violated her due process rights. Alternatively, mother argued that there was no clear and convincing evidence to support finding that termination of her parental rights was in Andrea's best interest. In response, the division argued that Brady rules were not applicable to guardianship proceedings and that the resource parent's work in the district office had been disclosed to mother's counsel. The court ruled that the division had violated the Conflict of Interest Law by failing to transfer the guardianship matter to another district office based on the resource parent's work in the district office and the perception of bias and risk of prejudice it posed. The court remanded for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent of the harm posed by the apparent conflict of interest and the appropriate remedy for such harm. Finally, the court held that remand was necessary to make factual findings to support a determination of whether the division presented a sufficient case to warrant termination of mother's parental rights. (Approved for Publication)

03/18/2020

Interesting reported case from Judge Passamano in Essex County that involves the changing landscape of paternity with the growing use of DNA testing. What this case does is make it a little easier to request a DNA test even if a father signed a certificate of parentage. But the case is a warning not to wait, because family law courts are loathe to make a party payback child support. One issue this raises is whether the father could sue the mother in civil court for fraud. In hindsight, the father should have asked for a lien on the estate of the mother instead of payback of child support. (As a side note, I am often before Judge Passamano and he is very pedantic and by-the-book. He keeps a tattered hard copy of the Gann Court Rules on his desk and reads from it often. When I appear before him I bring my own copy and set it on top of my papers.

20-4-4072 S.K. v. P.D., N.J. Super. Ch. Div. (Passamano, J.) (18 pp.) (March 29, 2019) Defendant applied to disestablish paternity, terminate child support, and vacate support arrears. After plaintiff gave birth to the child, the parties signed a certificate of parentage listing plaintiff as the child's mother and defendant as father. After the parties' relationship ended, plaintiff moved out of state with the child; defendant has not had contact with the child since then. The court established child support arrears after defendant failed to appear for a hearing. After the court issued an arrest warrant for continuing arrears, defendant appeared and satisfied the arrears. Defendant then filed the present application. A genetic test concluded that there was no probability that defendant was the child's biological father. Based on the results, the court granted defendant's application in part, disestablishing paternity and terminating defendant's ongoing support obligations. However, the court denied defendant's application to vacate existing arrears. Although the court noted that the right to child support belonged to the child, the court held that the genetic testing results, the fact that the parties never married, and the fact that defendant had no contact or relationship with the child supported terminating defendant's ongoing support obligations. However, the court declined to backdate the termination to the filing date of defendant's application, noting that defendant had failed to move quickly to bring the matter to resolution. Finally, the court found no legal authority to support the proposition that arrears could be vacated due to a lack of parental relationship or proof of lack of a biological relationship. The court held that defendant's failure to demand paternity testing before signing the certificate of parentage meant that he should bear the consequences of having to support the child until it was established that he was not the child's biological father. (Approved for Publication)

03/13/2020

Below is a recent interesting case where the parties tried to amend their settlement agreement, which was denied on appeal.
The take away is when you want to amend your divorce agreement you have to meet a high burden of fairness and equity or the court may not enforce your amendment.
I had a similar case where I got a client out of his divorce agreement because his first language wasn't English and we were able to show the court that he didn't fully appreciate the meaning of the contract he signed.

20-2-4044 B.G. v. P.G., N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (13 pp.) Defendant appealed from the portion of a March 29, 2019 order of the Family Part denying his motion to vacate a January 17, 2018 consent order waiving his right to receive alimony while incarcerated. The parties were married in 1987. In 2014, the Family Part entered a final judgment of divorce incorporating a property settlement agreement executed by the parties. Pursuant to the PSA, plaintiff was to pay defendant alimony of $2,000 a month. The PSA allowed for the cessation or modification of alimony in specified circumstances, but that list of circumstances did not include defendant's incarceration. Defendant was disabled due to mental health issues and was incarcerated on January 20, 2017. Plaintiff unilaterally stopped alimony payments on February 1, 2017. Plaintiff's counsel drafted a consent order suspending alimony payments while defendant is incarcerated. The order was sent to defendant who signed and returned the order to plaintiff's counsel. The court entered the order on January 17, 2018. When defendant was released from prison in December 2018, he moved pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 to vacate the January 17, 2018 consent order, arguing fraud, lack of capacity, and inequity. He also alleged plaintiff misappropriated money in his bank account while he was incarcerated. The court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, stating there was no information submitted in support of the motion that would persuade the judge to allow the motion, even if taken as true. The court considered the consent order as a settlement agreement and held defendant had the opportunity to consult a lawyer, even if he was in prison. The lower court judge also found the payment of alimony would have been a windfall as defendant's needs were being met by the Department of Corrections. The lower court noted that plaintiff did return the misappropriated funds to defendant. On appeal, the court vacated the portion of the order under review and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. Defendant raised a number of disputed factual issues that, if true, may constitute fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by plaintiff under Rule 4:50-1(c), render the consent order void for lack of consent by defendant under Rule 4:50-1(d), or constitute exceptional circumstances warranting relief under Rule 4:50-1(f). The court also noted the PSA was the settlement agreement, and the consent order was a departure from the PSA.

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03/06/2020

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A personal law firm dedicated to the legal needs of your family. I specialize in all facets of family law from mediation to uncontested divorces to complex divorce litigation. Divorce Alimony Child support Special needs & special education DUI