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10/09/2026

3. In re Juan Pardo, No. 26-0384, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. Oct. 9, 2026) (Hawkins, J., concurring in denial of mandamus)

Proceeding: Original proceeding, petition for writ of mandamus

Disposition: Mandamus denied

Opinion: Justice Kyle D. Hawkins concurring in the denial, joined by Justices Young and Sullivan.

This may be the most interesting practitioner opinion of the day.

Justice Hawkins begins with the question whether Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 592, which provides for writs of attachment involving "property," can be used to arrest and confine an uncooperative deponent.

His initial reaction is refreshingly direct:

"I would think the answer is no."

The trial court had signed an order styled "Order for Issuance of Writ of Attachment of Juan Pardo," directing a sheriff or constable to take Pardo into custody and place him in jail with a cash bond. According to the concurrence, the order was issued on the basis of the opposing party's affidavit.

Justice Hawkins explains why Rule 592 is such an awkward fit. The rule concerns preservation of property. It contains valuation, bonding, replevy, and preservation requirements designed to prevent a defendant from disposing of assets before judgment. Those concepts make little sense when the subject being "attached" is a human being.

The concurrence memorably asks:

"What is the maximum value of a deponent? What does it mean to keep him 'safe and preserved subject to further orders'? What bond does he post to replevy himself?"

But Texas law already contains mechanisms for dealing with a person who refuses to comply with discovery or a subpoena. Justice Hawkins points specifically to Rules 176.8 and 215.2, along with the contempt authority contained in the Government Code. And when confinement is involved, the procedural protections associated with contempt and due process matter.

So why deny mandamus?

The record apparently wasn't clean enough to decide the issue. The parties disputed whether the trial judge actually relied on Rule 592, merely mislabeled the order, or was exercising some other authority. Pardo filed no reply brief addressing the respondent's characterization. More importantly, the writ had expired, the claims had been nonsuited, and nothing suggested Pardo faced the same punishment again.

Still, Justice Hawkins leaves a pretty unmistakable warning:

If this happens again in an appropriate case, Supreme Court intervention may be warranted.

Practitioner takeaway

If you are trying to compel a recalcitrant witness or deponent, use the procedural mechanism actually designed for that purpose.

Rule 592 is a prejudgment property-attachment rule. Rules 176.8 and 215.2, and contempt procedures where appropriate, provide mechanisms addressing subpoena and discovery violations. And if someone's liberty is at stake, due-process protections become critical.

For appellate lawyers, there's another lesson here: build a clean mandamus record and answer the respondent's characterization of what happened below. The concurrence specifically notes the ambiguity over the source of the trial court's authority and that the relator filed no reply brief.

10/09/2026

2. Blanchard Refining Company LLC & Marathon Petroleum Company LP v. Industrial Specialists, LLC, No. 26-0118, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. Oct. 9, 2026) (per curiam)

Proceeding: Petition for review

Opinion: Per curiam

Disposition: Petition granted without oral argument; First Court of Appeals' judgment vacated; remanded to that court under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1.

This case concerns whether a contract creates an enforceable right to comparative indemnification.

The important procedural development occurred after the court of appeals decided the case. The Supreme Court subsequently issued S&B Engineers & Constructors, Ltd. v. Scallon Controls, Inc., 734 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. 2026). Both sides agreed that S&B is relevant, although they sharply disagreed about which side it favors. Amici also briefed S&B extensively.

Rather than decide that issue itself, the Supreme Court invoked its preference for allowing lower courts to consider legal questions in the first instance. It therefore granted review, vacated the First Court's judgment, and sent the case back so that court can reconsider the dispute in light of S&B. Importantly, the Supreme Court expressly stated that it "express[es] no view as to the proper outcome."

10/09/2026

Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries | October 9, 2026

Three writings from the Texas Supreme Court today. One involves interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, one sends an indemnity dispute back to the court of appeals in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent, and the third is a particularly interesting concurrence involving the attempted use of a writ of attachment to put a deponent in jail.

1. Conduent State Healthcare, LLC v. M&M Orthodontics, PA; Diana Malone, DDS; and Scott Malone, DDS, No. 24-0802, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. Oct. 9, 2026)

Proceeding: Petition for review from an interlocutory appeal

Author: Justice James P. Sullivan, for the Court

Disposition: Court of appeals' judgment and opinion vacated; remanded to the trial court.

This is an important interlocutory appellate jurisdiction case.

The underlying litigation arose from Texas Medicaid orthodontic services. Conduent, a private contractor for HHSC, sought interlocutory review after the trial court denied its plea to the jurisdiction asserting derivative sovereign immunity and the Tort Claims Act's election-of-remedies provision. The Third Court of Appeals reached the merits and affirmed.

The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals never had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal in the first place.

Conduent relied principally on Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(8), which permits an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit. But Conduent is a private company. Unlike charter schools, certain private-university police departments, or ERCOT, its governmental authority does not derive from legislation. Its status derives from its contract with HHSC. Thus, it is not a "governmental unit" for purposes of § 51.014(a)(8).

The Court also rejected § 51.014(a)(5) as an alternative jurisdictional route. That subsection addresses immunity asserted by an"individual" who is a state or local officer or employee. Justice Sullivan emphasized the textual distinction between a "person" and an "individual." Conduent may be a statutory "person," but a limited liability company is not a natural person and therefore is not an "individual."

Practitioner takeaway

Do not confuse having an immunity argument with having an immediate right to appeal.

Before briefing the merits of an interlocutory appeal, make sure § 51.014 actually authorizes the appeal for that appellant and that order. The Supreme Court was explicit:"Jurisdiction always comes first."

There's another useful point buried at the end. The Court noted that the trial court on remand may consider allowing a permissive interlocutory appeal under § 51.014(d) concerning Conduent's immunity and election-of-remedies arguments.

So the message isn't necessarily that those substantive issues can never receive interlocutory review. It's that you have to enter through the right jurisdictional door.

10/09/2026

Texas Supreme Court Friday Statistics | October 9, 2026

After last week's grant-heavy order list, the Texas Supreme Court gave us a much different Friday.

Today's numbers:

• 2 merits dispositions/opinions

• 0 new petitions for review granted

• 4 petitions for review denied

• 1 petition for review dismissed

• 2 PFR rehearings denied

• 1 mandamus rehearing denied

• 3 mandamus petitions denied

• 1 mandamus dismissed

• 1 mandamus proceeding abated

Total matters acted upon: 14.

For family-law practitioners, the most striking statistic is this:

All four petitions for review denied today were cases involving children.

The Court also denied rehearing in another In the Interest of case, making this a particularly family-law-heavy denial list.

And what a difference a week makes:

October 2: 6 PFR grants

October 9: 0 new PFR grants

The First Court of Appeals in Houston had the largest presence on today's list, accounting for four matters.

The Court did issue two substantive dispositions in cases already on its docket, Conduent State Healthcare v. M&M Orthodontics and Blanchard Refining v. Industrial Specialists. And Justice Hawkins, joined by Justices Young and Sullivan, wrote separately concerning the denial of mandamus in In re Juan Pardo.

I'll take up the opinions separately because there are some interesting things there worth discussing beyond the statistics.

10/02/2026

Texas Supreme Court Statistical Snapshot - October 2, 2026

The Texas Supreme Court cleared a significant portion of its docket today.

Highlights from the Court's orders:

6 petitions for review granted and set for oral argument
1 mandamus proceeding set for oral argument
31 petitions for review denied
16 mandamus petitions denied
11 rehearing motions denied
3 dismissals (including one DWOJ and one habeas matter)

A few observations:

• The Court granted review in approximately 17% of the petitions for review disposed of today (6 of 35), a relatively grant-heavy order list.
• The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) accounted for 4 of the 6 grants, making it the clear headline court of the day.
• Family-law practitioners saw another reminder of how selective the Court remains in domestic-relations cases. Multiple family-law petitions and mandamus proceedings were denied, while no family-law cases received merits review today.
• Several of the newly granted cases were immediately set for oral argument, suggesting the Court is continuing to move cases through the pipeline efficiently.

Days like this offer a useful reminder that most appellate work ends long before merits briefing and oral argument at the state's highest court. The real statistical story is often not the grants, but the large number of petitions and extraordinary-writ proceedings quietly resolved on a single order list.

10/01/2026

Texas Supreme Court Rejects Comity for Pakistani Talaq Divorce Obtained Without Notice

Case: Hira Azhar v. Mohammad Ali Choudhri, No. 24-0939 (Tex. Sept. 25, 2026) (per curiam). Court: Supreme Court of Texas. Opinion Delivered: September 25, 2026. Disposition: Petition for review granted; court of appeals reversed and case remanded. Not Participating: Justice Huddle and Justice Young did not participate.

The Texas Supreme Court issued a significant family-law and international-comity decision last week, holding that a Pakistani divorce judgment obtained through a talaq proceeding was not entitled to comity in Texas because the wife received constitutionally inadequate notice.

Although the case involves a foreign divorce, the Court's reasoning reaches far beyond the specific facts. The opinion is fundamentally about due process, notice, and the limits of international comity when foreign proceedings conflict with Texas public policy.

The Facts
The husband had lived in Houston since age three, built multiple Texas businesses, and accumulated more than $100 million in community assets during the marriage. After sending his wife to Pakistan, he obtained a unilateral Pakistani talaq divorce in 2013. According to the record, the wife received no actual notice of the proceeding. Instead, notice consisted of publication in a small local Pakistani newspaper for only five days before the divorce proceeding. She did not learn of the divorce until approximately two years later.

After returning to Texas, the wife filed for divorce and sought a division of the marital estate. The trial court granted comity to the Pakistani proceedings, recognized the parties as divorced, and ultimately denied the wife's claims regarding the marital estate. The First Court of Appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed.

The Most Important Holding: Notice Matters
The central takeaway is straightforward:

A foreign divorce judgment is not entitled to comity when it results from a process that fails to provide notice reasonably calculated to inform an interested party of the proceeding.

The Court repeatedly emphasized longstanding Texas and federal due-process principles requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard. Quoting its recent decision in Shamrock Enterprises, the Court reiterated that notice efforts must reflect the actions of someone who actually wants to find and notify the other party, not someone merely trying to satisfy a technical requirement.

The Court concluded that publication for five days in a single obscure newspaper did not remotely satisfy that standard where the husband knew who his wife was and had numerous available ways to contact her.

For family lawyers, this portion of the opinion should sound familiar. The Court relied heavily on principles previously discussed in In re E.R., Mitchell v. MAP Resources, Mullane, and related notice jurisprudence. The same "reasonable diligence" concepts that apply in Texas service cases can become decisive when a party asks a Texas court to recognize a foreign judgment.

A Powerful Statement About Texas Public Policy
The opinion is equally important for its discussion of comity.

Texas courts routinely recognize foreign judgments, but the Court emphasized that comity is never automatic. Recognition remains discretionary and may be denied when a foreign judgment conflicts with Texas public policy or fundamental notions of justice.

The Court traced this principle from Hilton v. Guyot through Texas precedent such as Banco Minero v. Ross, McElreath v. McElreath, and Gannon v. Payne. The theme running throughout the opinion is that Texas will respect foreign proceedings, but not at the expense of basic procedural fairness.

One striking passage states that a foreign judgment cannot receive comity when it is "the product of a process incompatible with our foundational notions of justice."

That language will likely appear in future litigation involving foreign judgments, not just foreign divorces.

Why This Matters in Family Law
Several practical lessons emerge.

1. Rule 308b Remains Important
The Court reviewed the history behind Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b, which was adopted after legislative action directing Texas courts to scrutinize foreign judgments arising out of marital relationships. Although Rule 308b did not apply to this particular case because it predated the rule's effective date, the opinion reinforces the importance of compliance when a party seeks recognition of a foreign family-law judgment.

2. Foreign Divorce Does Not End the Inquiry
Practitioners sometimes assume that once a foreign country has entered a divorce decree, Texas courts will simply recognize the result.

This opinion demonstrates otherwise.

Texas courts may independently evaluate whether the foreign proceeding respected basic procedural rights before extending comity. The existence of a foreign divorce judgment is only the beginning of the analysis.

3. Texas Community Property Rights Matter
Although the Court stopped short of addressing all of the wife's arguments, the factual backdrop is impossible to ignore. The parties allegedly accumulated more than $100 million in community assets during a Texas-domiciled marriage. The wife's challenge arose in large part because Pakistani law did not recognize the same community-property rights that Texas law provides.

The Court ultimately resolved the case on notice grounds, but practitioners should note how frequently the opinion references Texas public policy interests when marital property rights are at stake.

Bottom Line
The most important lesson from Azhar v. Choudhri is not about Pakistan or talaq divorce specifically.

It is about due process.

The Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that Texas courts will not recognize a foreign judgment, even a divorce judgment, when the proceeding fundamentally failed to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. International comity remains an important doctrine, but it ends where constitutional fairness begins.

For Texas family-law practitioners, this decision will likely become a leading authority whenever foreign divorce decrees, foreign family judgments, or international-comity issues intersect with Texas marital-property rights and due-process concerns.

Citation: Hira Azhar v. Mohammad Ali Choudhri, No. 24-0939, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. Sept. 25, 2026) (per curiam). Justice Huddle and Justice Young did not participate.

09/11/2026

Texas Supreme Court Statistical Summary

Orders Pronounced September 11, 2026

Mandamus Granted 1

Petitions for Review Granted 1

Petitions for Review Denied 9

Petitions for Review Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction 1

Motions for Rehearing Denied (PFRs) 9

Motions for Rehearing Denied (Mandamus) 2

Direct Appeals Dismissed 1

Original Mandamus Petitions Denied 3

Prior Opinion Revised on Rehearing Denial 1

Total matters acted upon: 27

Opinion Summary

In re the Honorable Derreck Rose, Wilma Green, and Diane Merchant

No. 26-0916 (Tex. Sept. 11, 2026) (per curiam)

Issue

Whether Galveston County could redraw commissioner and justice precincts after the March 2026 primary election and then use the new precinct lines in the November 2026 general election.

Holding

The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered Galveston County to use the same precinct boundaries for the November 2026 general election that were used in the March 2026 primary election.

Why This Opinion Matters

This is a significant election-law opinion for at least three reasons:

Strong reaffirmation that Texas local governments have only delegated powers. The Court framed the issue as one of affirmative authority, not absence of prohibition.

Creates a clear rule against voluntary mid-election redistricting. Once a primary election is conducted, the precincts used for that election generally must remain fixed through the corresponding general election.

Likely to be cited in future disputes involving election administration, local-government authority, and statutory construction. The opinion repeatedly invokes the Election Code's requirement of uniformity and consistency and emphasizes preserving the integrity of the election process.

Notable Quote

"We conclude that a commissioners court's general power to redraw precinct lines 'from time to time' does not include the power to change the lines applicable to an election after the election has begun."

Takeaway

The Court's message is straightforward: you may redraw precincts between election cycles, but absent a legal mandate, you cannot change the playing field after the election has already started. The primary and general election are treated as one continuous electoral process for purposes of precinct boundaries.

For your running Supreme Court tracking, I'd mark this as an important election-law and local-government authority decision, but not one that directly affects Texas family-law practice. The family-law headline remains another week with no new grants in family cases.

09/09/2026

Texas Supreme Court Statistical Update | September 9, 2026

A Wednesday order list? That's unusual enough.

Today's Texas Supreme Court orders looked less like a major opinion day and more like a significant housekeeping day, with the Court clearing a substantial number of pending matters from its docket.

By the numbers:

11 motions for rehearing denied

44 petitions for review denied

15 petitions for writ of mandamus denied

70 total case dispositions

A few additional items of note:

• The Court revised opinions/judgments in Spectrum Gulf Coast v. CPS Energy and MV Transportation v. GDS Transport rather than simply denying relief.

• Gopalan v. Marsh saw rehearing denied, bringing another closely watched case to a final conclusion.

• Family law practitioners may note the denial of review in several cases involving parental-rights and SAPCR-related matters, including:

In the Interest of D.M.W. and J.J.W., Children

C.Q. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

In the Interest of K.D.C., A Child

Anna Kong v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

In the Interest of D.J., A Child

In the Interest of E.T., E.T., E.T., E.D., Children

In the Interest of B.E.S.D. and T.D.G., Children

From a docket-management perspective, this was one of those days where the Court appeared focused on reducing inventory rather than announcing new law. Seventy dispositions on a Wednesday is a substantial amount of housecleaning.

For appellate lawyers, it is a reminder that not every important day at the Supreme Court comes with blockbuster opinions. Sometimes the story is simply the speed and volume with which the Court moves pending matters toward finality.

09/04/2026

Texas Supreme Court Orders Summary

September 4, 2026

Overall Activity

Causes Abated 1

Petitions for Review Denied 1

Rehearing Motions on Petitions for Review Denied 6

Rehearing Motions on Mandamus Petitions Denied 2

Mandamus Petitions Dismissed 1

Total Matters Acted Upon 11

For Texas family lawyers, the noteworthy item is that the Court again issued no grants and no substantive merits opinions today. The Court disposed of:

1 new family-law Petition for Review (denied)

2 family-law rehearing requests (denied)

This continues the trend that rehearing relief remains exceedingly rare, especially in SAPCR and parental-rights matters.

Practice Takeaway

This was a very light administrative order list. The Court primarily cleaned up its docket through rehearing denials and one agreed dismissal of a mandamus. The only active case-management action was the abatement of Lattimore Materials v. Trinity Industries Leasing Co., which remains off the active docket pending a status report or dismissal motion by October 15, 2026.

Running theme: another day with zero grants and zero merits decisions, meaning the Court continues to be highly selective in accepting new cases for full review.

09/01/2026

The Surprisingly Broad Right to a Jury Trial in Texas Family Law

Most lawyers associate jury trials with personal injury cases, criminal prosecutions, and commercial disputes. Family law, by contrast, is often viewed as a world dominated by bench trials and judicial discretion.

In Texas, however, that perception is only partially true.

Texas remains one of the few jurisdictions where juries continue to play a significant role in resolving family law disputes. The Texas Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury in civil cases, and family law litigants frequently have access to juries on issues that surprise even experienced practitioners.

That does not mean every family-law issue can be decided by a jury. Far from it. The Legislature has carved out important exceptions, and decades of jurisprudence have refined the line between issues that belong to a jury and those that remain within the trial court's discretion. Still, the breadth of Texas jury practice in family law is remarkable.

The General Rule: If It Is a Fact Issue, a Jury Is Often Available
A useful starting point is this: Texas generally allows juries to resolve disputed fact issues unless the Legislature has expressly removed the issue from the jury's consideration or the nature of the issue places it within the court's discretion.

That constitutional foundation explains why jury trials continue to appear throughout Texas family courts long after they have largely disappeared elsewhere.

Divorce Cases: More Jury Questions Than Many Realize
Many attorneys assume a divorce jury decides little or nothing. The reality is more nuanced.

Jurors may determine important factual disputes such as:

Whether property is separate or community.

The existence of disputed assets.

Valuation issues.

Certain reimbursement-related fact questions.

Whether an informal (common-law) marriage existed.

What jurors generally do not decide is the ultimate division of the marital estate. Texas law requires the court to make the "just and right" division of community property. While a jury may resolve underlying fact disputes, the final division remains a judicial decision.

That distinction can have enormous strategic implications. A favorable jury finding on characterization or valuation can substantially shape the court's ultimate division of property.

Conservatorship Cases: Texas Places Extraordinary Trust in Juries
Nowhere is Texas's unique approach more evident than in suits affecting the parent-child relationship.

Texas permits juries to make binding decisions on some of the most important questions affecting children and families. A jury may decide:

Whether a parent should be appointed sole managing conservator.

Whether the parents should be joint managing conservators.

Whether a party should be appointed possessory conservator.

Which parent has the exclusive right to designate the child's primary residence.

Whether a geographic restriction should be imposed.

The geographic area covered by that restriction.

For lawyers from other jurisdictions, this often comes as a surprise. Texas places these profoundly important questions in the hands of twelve citizens rather than leaving them exclusively to a judge.

But Jurors Do Not Decide Everything
The jury's role remains significant, but it is not unlimited.

Jurors do not establish child support. They do not draft possession schedules. They do not determine the detailed rights and duties associated with conservatorship. Those matters remain with the trial court.

As a result, a family-law jury trial often involves a hybrid decision-making process. The jury resolves certain key questions, while the judge addresses the issues that Texas law reserves to the court.

Modification Cases Frequently Remain Jury Cases
Another common misconception is that jury rights disappear after the original decree is signed.

Not necessarily.

Many modification proceedings involving conservatorship issues continue to carry jury rights similar to those available in original SAPCR proceedings. Questions involving the designation of primary residence and geographic restrictions can remain jury questions years after the original order was entered.

For litigants returning to court after divorce or a custody order, the right to a jury may still be very much alive.

Termination Cases
Perhaps the most dramatic example of Texas jury practice is found in parental termination proceedings.

Texas remains one of the few states that permits jury trials in cases seeking to terminate parental rights. Juries can determine not only the statutory grounds for termination but also best-interest questions.

Given the constitutional significance of the parent-child relationship, it is perhaps fitting that ordinary citizens continue to play such a central role in these proceedings.

Where Jury Rights End
While Texas broadly protects jury rights, certain proceedings are expressly excluded from jury consideration.

Examples include:

Child support determinations.

Adoption proceedings.

Parentage adjudications.

Many post-decree enforcement proceedings.

Specific terms and conditions of possession and access.

These exclusions illustrate an important principle: while Texas strongly values jury participation, it has chosen to reserve certain family-law determinations for judges.

The Real Story: The Jury Changes Everything
In many ways, the most significant aspect of a jury demand is not what the jury ultimately decides.

It is how the entire case must be prepared.

The moment a case becomes a jury trial, the lawyer's focus expands dramatically.

Voir dire becomes critical. Counsel must identify favorable and unfavorable jurors, develop challenges for cause, exercise peremptory strikes intelligently, and begin communicating themes before a witness ever takes the stand.

Evidence must be presented with jurors in mind rather than solely through legal analysis. Foundations and predicates become increasingly important because jurors often respond differently to evidence than judges do.

The jury charge takes on extraordinary significance. Experienced trial lawyers frequently begin preparing a jury case by examining the questions that will ultimately be submitted to the jury and then building their evidence and theory around those questions.

And after the verdict, the work may only be beginning.

Issues involving charge error, evidentiary rulings, juror misconduct, attorney misconduct, challenges for cause, polling the jury, and motions for new trial can become just as important as the evidence presented during trial itself.

Even attorney's fees can become jury issues where the reasonableness and necessity of those fees are disputed.

Conclusion
Texas family-law jury trials remain one of the most distinctive features of our civil justice system.

While statutes have created important limitations, the underlying principle remains remarkably strong: Texans continue to trust ordinary citizens to resolve some of the most important disputes affecting families and children.

For family lawyers, that means jury trials require mastery of far more than family law. They demand skill in voir dire, evidence, jury charges, preservation of error, post-verdict practice, and appellate strategy.

In an era when jury trials are becoming increasingly rare in many areas of civil practice, Texas family law continues to offer a reminder of a foundational idea: that some of society's most important decisions may still be entrusted to a jury of citizens.

LaMorgese Law Report

10/09/2026

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