06/03/2021
Constitutionality of Presidential Decrees appointing state government officials
Recently, the President of the republic of south Sudan issued a number of decrees ‘appointing’ state government officials (Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Advisors, County Commissioners and Chairpersons and Deputies of independent Commissions) in all the ten states of the country. The ‘appointments’ was welcomed by many across the nation who felt that it represents progress in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict of South Sudan (R-ARCISS). On the other hand, there were others who questioned the legitimacy of decrees.
The Decrees for the appointment of the state government officials, as read on the national broadcaster, were issued pursuant to Article 106(A)(2)(a) of the Transitional Constitution of the republic of South Sudan 2011 as amended; Articles 1.9.2.1 1.16.2, 1.16.3 and Item 20 and 21 of Annexure D of (R-ARCISS). Article 106(A)(2)(a) of TCRSS states that “the president shall, in consultation with the First Vice President and the four Vice Presidents in order to reach at mutual understanding and agreement in accordance with the Agreement and the law, exercise the powers of appointment of constitutional office holders and judicial officers including State governors.” This provision was introduced into TCRSS by Constitutional Amendment Act no.6/2020 which incorporated the provisions of R-ARCISS into TCRSS including Article 1.9.2.1 of R-ARCISS which is in pari materia with Article 106(A)(2)(a). Article 1.16.2 of R-ARCISS provides for reconstitution of state and local governments.
In addressing the constitutionality of the Decrees, one has to look firstly into the question whether those appointed state government officials are constitutional office holders (as stated in the decree) and secondly the question of who has authority to appoint those officials. According to Black’s Law Dictionary a ‘constitutional officer’ is a government official whose office is created by the Constitution; rather than by statute; one whose term of office is fixed and defined by the constitution. From that definition, state Ministers (and indeed national Ministers) and their deputies, county commissioners, Advisors are clearly not constitutional office holders since their offices are not a creation of the constitution and their functions and terms of office are not fixed by the constitution. Members of independent Commissions, on the other hand, are constitutional office holders as their functions, powers and terms and conditions of services are regulated. In that regard, the Decree is defective.
The more difficult issue to address (perhaps) is whether the Chairpersons, Deputies and members of state independent Commissions are constitutional office holders. Part IX of Transitional Constitution provides for the establishment of independent institutions and Commissions (Employee Justice Chamber, the Anti-corruption Act, the Human Rights commission Act, Public Grievances Chamber, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration Commission and HIV/ AIDS Commission). The president has powers to establish other Commissions through legislation (e.g. Peace and Reconciliation Commission).
The functions and composition of the Commissions are provided under TCRSS and written laws. The Chairpersons, deputy Chairpersons and members of the above mentioned institutions are appointed by the President (before 2020 Amendment) with the approval of National Legislative Assembly and their functions are stipulated in the enabling laws, for example the South Sudan Human Rights Commission Act 2009. Such Commissions have their Head Offices in Juba and may establish branch offices in the ten states (e.g. under section 6(4) South Sudan Human Rights Commission Act, 2009).
The question is: if national Commissions like the Human Rights Commission may, by law, establish branches in the ten states, then what would be the function of a State Human Rights Commission? Are the ‘state independent Commissions’ branches of the national Independent commissions established under the Constitution? If not is that not duplication of work? And if the national body is answerable to the President and National Legislative Assembly, to whom is the state independent commission answerable to? If answerable to the state Governor, why would the power to appoint be vested in the President?
As mentioned earlier, the question of state independent Commissions is a difficult one. Perhaps they are established under the State Constitutions, which I have not had access to any. Be that as it may, Schedule B of Transitional Constitution on the powers of states is silent on the question of independent Commissions, though Item 6 of Schedule B provides for the state Civil service.
Indeed R-ARCISS has not addressed this issue clearly stipulating that existing Commissions and Institutions shall be restructured and reconstituted at the national level only. (Article 1.19.1)
Since R-ARCISS states that existing Commissions shall be restructured and reconstituted at the national level only, then the Decree appointing Chairpersons, Deputies and members of state independent Commissions is null and void. Perhaps governors would be better placed to appoint state independent Commissions if the national and State Constitutions allow.
Regarding the mandate to appoint the other state government officials (Ministers and their Deputies, Advisors and County Commissioners, Article 1.16.2 of R-ARCISS provides for the reconstitution of state and local governments at the beginning of the Transitional period, in accordance with responsibility sharing formula dictated by R-ARCISS. The positions to be shared by the parties to the agreement includes the Governors, Speakers of state Legislatures, State Councils of Ministers, State legislatures, county commissioners and County Councils. (Article 1.16.3)
Annexure D of R-ARCISS which was also cited in the decrees as granting the President power to appoint state government officials basically provides how the Agreement shall be implemented clearly stipulating activities or tasks to be performed, the persons or bodies responsible for performing those tasks and timeframes to complete those activities. Specifically, Item 20 of Annexure D provides that Presidency and the Parties are responsible for reconstituting state and local government. Item 21 of Annexure D, on its part, provides that the Presidency, the Parties and RJMEC are responsible for “...appointment of Transitional Governors, Speakers of State Legislatures, State Councils of Ministers, State Legislatures, county Commissioners, County Councils(if any)”
From the text of Item 20 and 21 there is no explicit mention of “President”. The word closest to “President” there is “Presidency”. However the two are not synonymous. The term “Presidency” has been defined in Article 1.5.1 of R-ARCISS as comprising the President, the First President and four Vice Presidents. Having said that, it is perplexing how the word President was ‘imported’ in the Decrees. Seemingly, Item 21 was not intended to give appointing authority to any of those persons mentioned but rather to ensure that the parties to the Agreement adhere to the formula of sharing power at the state and local government level. Indeed there had initially been disagreements on how to share power in the state government level between the Parties to the Agreement and through some guidance from RJMEC, those disagreement were resolved.
Having stated that Item 21 of Annexure D was not intended to give the President appointing authority, the question is who has the power to appoint those state government officials?
The answer to that question can be found in Article 165(2) of TCRSS as amended states “The Governor of each State shall be the head of executive organ in the State and shall appoint and relieve the Deputy Governor, Advisors, and State Ministers in consultation and agreement with the President, First Vice President and the four Vice Presidents and the nominating party and in accordance with the State Constitution and the Agreement”
According to general principles of interpretation of Constitutions, where words in a constitution are clear, they should be given their plain, ordinary meaning. This literal rule is equally applicable here. The provision clearly states that the governor (not the President) has power to appoint State Councils of Ministers and Advisors. It is therefore the governors of the ten states who ought to have appointed those officials and not the president, as decreed. Consequently, those decrees are null and void.
The second principle of interpretation of Constitutions is that a Constitution has to be read as an integrated whole and no particular provision destroying the other(s) but each sustaining the other. This is called the rule of harmony; rule of completeness, and exhaustiveness and the rule of paramountcy of the written constitution. This rule has clearly been ignored here. The Advisors of the President, in their wisdom (or lack of it thereof) chose to read some parts of the constitution in isolation of others thereby arriving at an erroneous legal position.
In conclusion, no single provision of R-ARCISS or TCRSS empowers the President, explicitly or by necessary implication, to appoint State government officials (except Governors). In fact, the letter and spirit of R-ARCISS is the devolution of powers to the State and Local Government levels (Article 1.2.15). Although the list of persons appointed was agreed upon by the Presidency and the Parties, and had the blessings of the President, the proper appointing authorities ought to be the governors and the subsequent “delegation of power to governors to swear in the “appointed” state government officials is of no consequence to cure that illegality.
By Bryan Oboy
Advocate & Legal Consultant