The Legal Experts - TLE

01/08/2026

31/07/2026

LLB degree is not equivalent to a master’s degree---
2026 P L C (C.S.) 862

Advance increments on higher qualification---Entitlement---Determination---Applicability of ‘incentive schemes’---Audit department officer holding LLB---Eligibility---Briefly, respondent was serving as an accounts officer in the ‘audit department’ of Pakistan Railways---He acquired an LLB degree in 1992 and thereafter sought grant of two advance increments under the incentive scheme for railways officers and subordinates, 1966, and the ‘general scheme for grant of advance increments, 1996’---Respondent’s representation was rejected by the finance department on the ground that the 1966 Scheme had been abolished and that his qualification did not fall within the 1996 Scheme, whereupon the Federal Service Tribunal allowed his claim under the 1966 Scheme---The issue requiring determination before the Supreme Court was “whether the accounts officer of the ‘audit department’ holding an LLB degree was legally entitled to advance increments under either of the aforesaid schemes”?---Held: No benefit under the Scheme, 1966 had been extended to officers of the audit department, and an LLB qualification was not recognized under the General Scheme, 1996, therefore, the respondent’s case did not fall within the scope of either scheme---The benefit extended by the Service Tribunal under the Scheme, 1966 was thus unsustainable---Moreover, an LLB degree was not equivalent to a master’s degree---Respondent was not entitled to advance increments under either of the schemes---

Employment cases---Remanding of cases---Supreme Court’s view viz remanding the matters on issues not addressed by lower forums---“Remand” is not an automatic judicial reflex, it is a judicial instrument to be employed only when justice so demands, not as a matter of routine---A case may properly be remanded to a lower forum where material facts remain undetermined, procedural fairness has been compromised, or essential evidence has not been duly examined, situations in which the Appellate Court cannot itself do complete justice---The purpose of remand is corrective, not dilatory; it serves to secure a just adjudication, not to prolong litigation---Yet, the power to remand must be exercised with circumspection and restraint---Where the factual matrix is complete, the issues are purely legal, or the appellate record permits a final determination, the Appellate Court ought to decide the matter itself---To remand in such circumstances is to sacrifice substance at the altar of form and to delay justice in the name of process---The restraint against unnecessary remand finds its rationale in the principle of judicial economy, a foundational tenet of modern adjudication that obliges courts to avoid duplication of proceedings, promote finality, and conserve judicial time---It embodies the constitutional command for expeditious justice under Article 37(d) of the Constitution, ensuring that litigation does not get trapped in repetitive procedural rounds---Judicial economy thus demands that appellate courts decide, not defer, where the record enables them to do so, for justice delayed is justice denied.

---Matters of policy discretion or administrative choice of executive authority---Judicial restraint---Institutional autonomy---Principle---Courts, while the ultimate interpreters of legality, must exercise judicial restraint in matters where the law vests policy discretion or administrative choice in an executive or institutional authority---The principle of institutional autonomy thus guards against judicial overreach, ensuring that policy formation remains the prerogative of the executive, and that courts confine themselves to ensuring legality, rationality, and procedural fairness within the limits set by law.

ORDER
---Brief facts of the case are that the respondent, serving as Accounts Officer in the Audit Department of Pakistan Railways, enhanced his qualification by obtaining an LLB degree in the year 1992. Consequently, he applied for two advance increments under two schemes: (i) THE INCENTIVE SCHEME FOR RAILWAYS OFFICERS AND SUBORDINATES dated 22.01.1966 (“Scheme, 1966”) issued by the Railway Department, Government of West Pakistan; and (ii) GRANT OF ADVANCE INCREMENTS TO THE EMPLOYEES DRAWING PAY IN BPS-16—Office Memorandum dated 08.07.1996 (“General Scheme, 1996”). The respondent approached the department through a representation, which was referred to the Finance Department and subsequently rejected vide order dated 26.09.2019 on the ground that the Scheme, 1966 stood abolished on 01.12.2001. The respondent challenged the said decision before the Tribunal, which, vide impugned judgment dated 26.10.2022, granted him relief under the Scheme, 1966.

2. Learned Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, representing Pakistan Railways and the Federal Government, assisted by Mr. Jawad Mahmood Pasha, ASC, and Ms. Huma Noureen, Legal Consultant, Pakistan Railways, submits that the respondent, being an Accounts Officer in the Audit Department, was not entitled to any incentive under the Scheme, 1966. Learned Law Officer referred to the scheme to show that while it extends benefits to various departments of Pakistan Railways, the Audit Department is not one of them. With regard to the General Scheme, 1996, it was submitted that the said scheme requires a person to possess an M.A. or M.Sc. degree to qualify for two advance increments. As the respondent’s qualification is LLB, he does not fall within its ambit.

3. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that several judgments of the Tribunal, as well as letters issued by Pakistan Railways and the Finance Division, have extended similar benefits to officers who obtained an LLB degree. Some of these references, however, relate to departments already covered under the Scheme, 1966, and none pertains to an Accounts Officer of the Audit Department.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record. Upon careful perusal of both schemes, we find that no benefit under the Scheme, 1966 has been extended to officers of the Audit Department, and that an LLB qualification is not recognized under the General Scheme, 1996. Therefore, the respondent’s case does not fall within the scope of either scheme. The benefit extended by the Tribunal under the Scheme, 1966 is thus unsustainable and stands set aside.

5. As to the respondent’s alternate plea under the General Scheme, 1996, the Tribunal did not address it. We considered the option of remanding the matter to the Tribunal for this purpose. However, since the record before us is complete and enables us to finally determine the issue, there is no occasion to remand the case.

6. We wish to highlight that “Remand” is not an automatic judicial reflex. It is a judicial instrument to be employed only when justice so demands, not as a matter of routine. A case may properly be remanded to a lower forum where material facts remain undetermined, procedural fairness has been compromised, or essential evidence has not been duly examined—situations in which the appellate court cannot itself do complete justice. The purpose of remand is corrective, not dilatory; it serves to secure a just adjudication, not to prolong litigation.

7. Yet, the power to remand must be exercised with circumspection and restraint. Where the factual matrix is complete, the issues are purely legal, or the appellate record permits a final determination, the appellate court ought to decide the matter itself. To remand in such circumstances is to sacrifice substance at the altar of form and to delay justice in the name of process. The restraint against unnecessary remand finds its rationale in the principle of judicial economy—a foundational tenet of modern adjudication that obliges courts to avoid duplication of proceedings, promote finality, and conserve judicial time. It embodies the constitutional command for expeditious justice under Article 37(d) of the Constitution, ensuring that litigation does not get trapped in repetitive procedural rounds. Judicial economy thus demands that appellate courts decide, not defer, where the record enables them to do so, for justice delayed is justice denied.

8. It was next argued by learned counsel for the respondent that an LLB degree is equivalent to an M.A. degree, hence the respondent is entitled to benefit under the General Scheme, 1996. No such facility for treating equivalent degrees is provided in the scheme, nor can such a condition be judicially read into it. Institutional autonomy is a vital facet of constitutional governance. It reflects the recognition that each organ or department of the State possesses its own sphere of competence, expertise, and discretion within which it must be permitted to function freely. Courts, while the ultimate interpreters of legality, must exercise judicial restraint in matters where the law vests policy discretion or administrative choice in an executive or institutional authority.

9. When a scheme or departmental policy—such as one framed by Pakistan Railways or the Finance Division—does not expressly provide for a particular benefit, it is not the function of the Court to read that benefit into the scheme. Doing so would amount to judicial legislation and would erode the institutional autonomy that underpins administrative efficacy. Courts are to interpret the scheme as framed, not to re-engineer it according to perceived notions of equity or convenience.

10. The judiciary must therefore respect the institutional boundaries drawn by law. Unless the omission complained of violates a constitutional or statutory command, the Court cannot compel an institution to adopt a policy or grant a concession not contemplated by its own governing framework. The principle of institutional autonomy thus guards against judicial overreach, ensuring that policy formation remains the prerogative of the executive, and that courts confine themselves to ensuring legality, rationality, and procedural fairness within the limits set by law.

11. Furthermore, this Court has already held that an LLB degree is not equivalent to a Master’s degree. Reference may be made to order dated 17.02.2022 passed in CPLA No. 262 of 2018 titled Government through Secretary Finance, Finance Division (Regulation Wing), Islamabad v. Manzoor Qadir, Assistant Director (Mails) and others, and order dated 13.03.2018 passed in CPLA No. 65 of 2017 titled The Secretary Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v. Hakim Ali Soomro and others.

12. Accordingly, we see no reason to remand the matter to the Tribunal and hold that the respondent is not entitled to advance increments under either of the Schemes. We note that, following the impugned judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, the respondent has already received advance increments amounting to Rs. 75,000/-. The Additional Secretary, Pakistan Railways, submits that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Department does not intend to recover the said amount from the respondent. The Department has shown grace and magnanimity in foregoing this amount; however, this arrangement shall not be treated or cited as a precedent in any other case. The instant petitions are converted into appeals and allowed.

Civil Petitions Nos. 3651-L and 4648 of 2022
The SECRETARY/CHAIRMAN RAILWAYS, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, Versus TARIQ MANSOOR and others
Rasool Awan

29/07/2026

سیشن کورٹ لاہور

لاہورمیں اٹارنی جنرل کے گھر غلط ریڈ کرنے کا معاملہ

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عدالت نے پچاس ہزارکےمچلکے جمع کرانے کی ہدائت کردی

عدالت نے ملزمان کو شامل تفتتیش ہونے کا حکم دے دیا

ایڈیشنل اینڈ سیشن جج ڈیوٹی سلمان طارق نے سماعت کی

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تھانہ سرور روڈ میں پولیس کی مدعیت میں درج کیا گیا،یہ مقدمہ اختیارات سے تجاوز کی دفعات کے تحت درج کیا گیا۔

ایس ایچ او سرور روڈ سمیت 11 اہلکاروں نے اٹارنی جنرل کے گھر غلط ریڈ کی

ایس ایچ او سمیت تھانے کے عملے کو معطل کردیا گیا تھا

27/07/2026

لباس تو شاہانہ ہے، مگر بادشاہ ننگا ہے: پاکستان کی آئینی ترامیم نے جمہوریت کو کیسے کھوکھلا کر دیا

تحریر: عابد ساقی

پاکستان میں اب بھی انتخابات ہوتے ہیں۔ اب بھی پارلیمان موجود ہے، کابینہ کام کر رہی ہے، اور سپریم کورٹ کی عمارت قومی پرچم تلے کھڑی ہے۔ کاغذ پر 1973ء کا آئین—جو کبھی ذوالفقار علی بھٹو کی حکومت اور ولی خان کی اپوزیشن کے درمیان ایک مشکل مگر تاریخی اتفاقِ رائے کی علامت تھا—آج بھی نافذ ہے۔

لیکن کاغذ بہت کچھ برداشت کر لیتا ہے، اور اس پر لکھی ہوئی عبارت کو اس طرح بدلا جا سکتا ہے کہ اس کا مفہوم اپنی اصل سے بالکل مختلف ہو جائے۔ 26ویں اور 27ویں آئینی ترامیم نے پاکستان میں جمہوریت کو ختم نہیں کیا، بلکہ اس سے بھی زیادہ مؤثر کام کیا ہے: انہوں نے جمہوریت کا ظاہری چہرہ برقرار رکھا، مگر اس کے بنیادی ادارے اور روح بدل دی۔

یہ سب کچھ پاکستان کی تاریخ میں پہلی بار نہیں ہوا، اور یہی بات سب سے زیادہ تشویش ناک ہے۔ 1973ء کے آئین میں اس سے پہلے بھی ایسی ترامیم کی جا چکی ہیں جنہوں نے انتظامیہ اور فوج کو زیادہ اختیارات دیے، اور ہر بار اس کی کوئی نہ کوئی معقول توجیہ پیش کی گئی۔

1985ء میں جنرل ضیاء الحق کی آٹھویں آئینی ترمیم کے ذریعے آئین میں آرٹیکل 58(2)(ب) شامل کیا گیا، جس نے صدرِ مملکت کو قومی اسمبلی توڑنے اور منتخب وزیراعظم کو برطرف کرنے کا صوابدیدی اختیار دے دیا۔ 1988ء سے 1996ء کے درمیان یہی اختیار چار مرتبہ استعمال ہوا، جس کے نتیجے میں بے نظیر بھٹو اور نواز شریف دونوں کی منتخب حکومتیں اپنی آئینی مدت پوری نہ کر سکیں۔

بالآخر 1997ء میں تیرہویں آئینی ترمیم کے ذریعے، مختلف سیاسی جماعتوں کے اتفاقِ رائے سے، یہ اختیار صدر سے واپس لے لیا گیا اور پارلیمانی نظام کو نسبتاً اپنی اصل شکل میں بحال کیا گیا۔ مگر یہ بحالی زیادہ دیر برقرار نہ رہ سکی۔

2003ء میں جنرل پرویز مشرف کی سترہویں آئینی ترمیم نے ایک مرتبہ پھر صدر کو اسی نوعیت کے اختیارات دے دیے، اگرچہ انہیں مفاہمت کا نام دیا گیا۔ اس کے بعد اگلے سات برس تک پاکستان ایک ایسے صدر کے زیرِ سایہ رہا جو کسی بھی وقت منتخب حکومت کو گھر بھیج سکتا تھا۔

پھر 2010ء میں اٹھارہویں آئینی ترمیم منظور ہوئی، جسے ملکی تاریخ میں نادر سیاسی اتفاقِ رائے کے ساتھ متفقہ طور پر منظور کیا گیا۔ اس ترمیم نے دوبارہ وزیراعظم کو انتظامی اختیارات کا اصل مرکز بنایا اور صدر کے منصب کو بڑی حد تک رسمی حیثیت تک محدود کر دیا۔

گزشتہ چار دہائیوں کی تاریخ ایک واضح نمونہ پیش کرتی ہے: پہلے کسی غیر جوابدہ ادارے یا منصب میں طاقت مرتکز کی جاتی ہے، پھر اس طاقت کا غلط استعمال ہوتا ہے، اور برسوں بعد ایک نئی پارلیمان اپنی سیاسی توانائی صرف کر کے وہ اختیارات واپس لیتی ہے۔ لیکن کچھ عرصے بعد کسی نئی حکومت اور کسی نئے جواز کے ساتھ یہی سلسلہ دوبارہ شروع ہو جاتا ہے۔

26ویں اور 27ویں آئینی ترامیم اس تاریخی سلسلے سے انحراف نہیں کرتیں بلکہ اسی کی تازہ ترین اور شاید سب سے زیادہ بے باک مثال ہیں۔ فرق صرف یہ ہے کہ اس بار مقصد کسی طاقتور صدر کو بحال کرنا نہیں، بلکہ عدلیہ کو اپنے زیرِ اثر لانا اور فوج کی بالادستی کو براہِ راست آئینی حیثیت دینا ہے، بغیر اس درمیانی مرحلے کے جس میں پارلیمان کو تحلیل کیا جاتا تھا۔

26 ویں اور 27ویں آئینی ترامیم: عدالتی اصلاح یا ادارہ جاتی گرفت؟

26ویں آئینی ترمیم، جو 21 اکتوبر 2024ء کو قومی اسمبلی کے ایک راتوں رات منعقد ہونے والے اجلاس میں منظور کی گئی، اسے “عدالتی اصلاحات” کے عنوان سے پیش کیا گیا۔ لیکن حقیقت میں اس نے وہ روایت ختم کر دی جس کے تحت سپریم کورٹ کا سب سے سینئر جج خود بخود چیف جسٹس بنتا تھا۔

اس کے بجائے ایک پارلیمانی کمیٹی کو یہ اختیار دے دیا گیا کہ وہ متعدد امیدواروں میں سے اپنی پسند کا چیف جسٹس منتخب کرے۔ اسی ترمیم کے ذریعے ایسے نئے طریقہ کار بھی متعارف کرائے گئے جن سے حکومت کو ہائی کورٹ کے ججوں کے تبادلوں اور ان کی مدتِ ملازمت پر اثر انداز ہونے کے مزید مواقع مل گئے۔

انٹرنیشنل کمیشن آف جیورسٹس (International Commission of Jurists) نے اس ترمیم کو عدلیہ کی آزادی، قانون کی حکمرانی اور انسانی حقوق کے تحفظ پر ایک شدید ضرب قرار دیا۔

یہ اعتراض صرف انسانی حقوق کے کارکنوں یا وکلا تک محدود نہیں تھا۔ پاکستان کی اپنی قانونی برادری نے بھی خبردار کیا کہ اگر ججوں کی تقرری بند کمروں میں، سینیارٹی یا شفاف میرٹ کے بجائے سیاسی پسند و ناپسند کی بنیاد پر ہونے لگے تو یہ بالکل وہی صورتحال پیدا کرے گی جسے آئین روکنے کے لیے بنایا جاتا ہے۔

اس کے بعد نومبر 2025ء میں 27ویں آئینی ترمیم منظور کی گئی، جو اس سے بھی ایک قدم آگے بڑھ گئی۔ اس ترمیم کے ذریعے ایک نئی وفاقی آئینی عدالت (Federal Constitutional Court) قائم کی گئی، جسے آئینی معاملات میں سپریم کورٹ کے روایتی حتمی اختیار سے بھی بالاتر حیثیت دے دی گئی۔

ایمنسٹی انٹرنیشنل نے اس اقدام کو عدلیہ کی آزادی کے خلاف مسلسل جاری حملوں کا حصہ قرار دیتے ہوئے اسے ایک سنگین پسپائی کہا۔

سابق سینیٹر افراسیاب خٹک نے اس صورتحال کو زیادہ واضح الفاظ میں بیان کیا۔ ان کے مطابق 1973ء کا آئینی معاہدہ عملاً ختم ہو چکا ہے اور اس کی جگہ ایک “فوجی رنگ اختیار کر چکا آئین” لے چکا ہے۔

27ویں آئینی ترمیم نے ایک ایسا قدم بھی اٹھایا جس کی مثال ماضی کی کسی آئینی ترمیم میں نہیں ملتی۔ اس کے تحت چیف آف ڈیفنس فورسز کا نیا آئینی عہدہ قائم کیا گیا اور آرمی چیف کو تاحیات پانچ ستارہ جنرل کا رینک دینے کے ساتھ ساتھ فوجداری مقدمات اور گرفتاری سے استثنا بھی فراہم کیا گیا۔ اس سے پہلے اس نوعیت کا قانونی تحفظ صرف صدرِ مملکت کو حاصل تھا۔

اس تبدیلی کو خواہ کسی بھی نام سے پکارا جائے، اس کی حقیقت واضح ہے۔ آئین کا بنیادی مقصد مسلح افواج کو عوام کے منتخب اور جوابدہ سول نظام کے تابع رکھنا ہوتا ہے، مگر یہ ترمیم اس اصول کو الٹ دیتی ہے اور فوج کی بالادستی کو اسی آئین کا حصہ بنا دیتی ہے جو دراصل اس کی حدود متعین کرنے کے لیے وجود میں آیا تھا۔

پاکستان کی تاریخ پہلے ہی یہ دکھا چکی ہے کہ آئینی ترمیم اور فوجی مداخلت کے درمیان فاصلہ کبھی کبھی بہت کم رہ جاتا ہے۔ لیکن 2024ء اور 2025ء کی صورتِ حال اس لحاظ سے مختلف ہے کہ اس مرتبہ فوج کو سڑکوں پر ٹینک لانے کی ضرورت نہیں پڑی؛ اسے صرف پارلیمان میں مطلوبہ ووٹ درکار تھے، جو اسے حاصل ہو گئے

ہر جمہوری ملک اپنے آئین میں وقتاً فوقتاً ترامیم کرتا ہے، اور ہر آئینی ترمیم عوام کے خلاف جرم نہیں ہوتی۔ لیکن ان ترامیم میں واضح فرق ہوتا ہے جو مختلف جوابدہ اداروں کے درمیان اختیارات کا توازن قائم کرتی ہیں، اور ان ترامیم میں جو طاقت کو اس انداز سے ایک جگہ مرتکز کر دیتی ہیں کہ مستقبل میں اس کا احتساب ہی ممکن نہ رہے۔

ان دونوں ترامیم میں ایک واضح اور مسلسل رجحان نظر آتا ہے: پہلے عدلیہ سے ججوں کی آزادانہ تقرری کا اختیار محدود کیا جاتا ہے، پھر ایک ایسی نئی عدالت قائم کی جاتی ہے جس پر حکومت کا اثر و رسوخ زیادہ ہو، اس کے بعد فوج کی اعلیٰ ترین قیادت کو قانون کے دائرۂ احتساب سے باہر کر دیا جاتا ہے، اور یہ سب کچھ راتوں رات بلائے گئے اجلاسوں میں انجام دیا جاتا ہے، جہاں نہ عوامی بحث کی گنجائش ہوتی ہے، نہ قانونی جانچ پڑتال کی، اور نہ ہی اختلافِ رائے کو خاطر میں لایا جاتا ہے۔

جب ان اقدامات کو ایک ساتھ دیکھا جائے تو یہ الگ الگ اصلاحات نہیں بلکہ دو بنیادی اداروں کو کمزور کرنے کا عمل دکھائی دیتا ہے: ایک آزاد عدلیہ اور ایسا آئینی نظام جس میں منتخب سول حکومت کو فوج پر بالادستی حاصل ہو۔ یہی دونوں ادارے کسی بھی منتخب حکومت کو مطلق العنان بننے سے روکتے ہیں۔

انتخابات اپنی جگہ جاری رہ سکتے ہیں، لیکن انتخابات کی حقیقی اہمیت اسی وقت ہوتی ہے جب ان کے بعد آزاد ادارے منتخب حکومت کا احتساب کرنے کی صلاحیت رکھتے ہوں۔ اگر عدلیہ کی آزادی ختم کر دی جائے اور فوج کو قانون سے بالاتر کر دیا جائے تو جمہوریت کی صرف ظاہری رسم باقی رہ جاتی ہے، جبکہ اس کا اصل جوہر ختم ہو جاتا ہے۔

تاہم نیت اور نتیجہ ہمیشہ ایک جیسے نہیں ہوتے، اور آئین کا فیصلہ اس بنیاد پر نہیں کیا جاتا کہ اسے بدلنے والوں کے ارادے کتنے نیک تھے۔ تاریخ میں ہر آمرانہ رجحان خود کو اصلاح کے نام پر پیش کرتا آیا ہے۔ کبھی کہا جاتا ہے کہ عدالتیں اپنے اختیارات سے تجاوز کر رہی ہیں، کبھی نظم و ضبط کی بحالی کا دعویٰ کیا جاتا ہے، اور کبھی یہ کہا جاتا ہے کہ اب آئین کو زمینی حقائق کے مطابق ڈھالنے کا وقت آ گیا ہے۔

حقیقت یہ بھی ہے کہ ماضی کی عدلیہ پر ہونے والی بعض تنقیدیں بے بنیاد نہیں تھیں۔ اگر کوئی عدالت اپنے دائرۂ اختیار سے بڑھ کر قانون سازی کرنے لگے، سیاست دانوں کے درمیان پسند و ناپسند کا رویہ اختیار کرے، یا ازخود نوٹس کے اختیار کو ذاتی صوابدید سمجھنے لگے، تو یہ یقیناً کسی بھی جمہوریت کے لیے مسئلہ ہے۔

لیکن ایک ایسی عدلیہ کا حل، جس کے پاس غیر جوابدہ اختیارات زیادہ ہوں، یہ نہیں کہ انتظامیہ کو اس سے بھی زیادہ غیر محدود اختیارات دے دیے جائیں۔ اسی طرح اگر فوج سول سیاست میں حد سے زیادہ مداخلت کر رہی ہو تو اس کا علاج یہ نہیں کہ اسے قانون کے دائرۂ احتساب سے مستقل طور پر باہر کر دیا جائے۔

مصنف کے مطابق پاکستان نے ایک عدم توازن کو ختم کرنے کے بجائے اس سے بھی بڑا عدم توازن پیدا کر دیا ہے۔ عمارت وہی ہے، صرف نقشہ بدل گیا ہے اور دستاویز پر دستخط کرنے والے افراد مختلف ہیں۔

24/07/2026

VVVVVVI. MUST READ JUDGEMENT.
Dissolution of Marriage and Dower (Haq Mehr).

Effect of declaration by the Federal Shariat Court regarding Section 10(5) & (6) of the Family Courts Act, 1964.

Distinction between Khula and dissolution under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

Wife's entitlement to dower where dissolution is granted on account of husband's cruelty?Principles for determination by Family Courts.

Following questions determined:

i) Whether, after the declaration of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 as repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, the Family Court retains jurisdiction to determine a wife's entitlement to dower on a case-to-case basis

ii) Whether a decree for dissolution described as "Khula" necessarily entails forfeiture or return of dower irrespective of the cause of dissolution, or whether a distinction exists in law between dissolution founded on the wife's mere aversion (Khula simpliciter) and dissolution occasioned by the husband's cruelty or other grounds under law?

iii) Whether physical, psychological, emotional, verbal or economic abuse amounts to cruelty sufficient to disentitle the husband from claiming return of dower, in whole or in part?

iv) What principles ought to govern the exercise of judicial discretion by Family Courts in determining the question of dower where dissolution is sought on the ground of cruelty or matrimonial misconduct?

v) Whether the learned Family Court erred in awarding fifty percent (50%) of the deferred dower to the wife on the facts of this case.

For the guidance of all Family Courts within the jurisdiction of this Court, the principles emerging from this judgment are summarized below:-

I. Dower is a proprietary right arising from the contract of marriage. It is not a penalty upon the husband, nor a benefit held at the Family Court’s discretion. It cannot be forfeited, reduced or apportioned without a specific finding that the law permits it.I

I. The right to dissolve a marriage and the right to dower are separate rights. A decree of dissolution does not by itself decide the fate of the dower; that requires its own finding, on its own evidence.

III. Imran Anwar Khan’s case (PLD 2022 FSC 25) struck down the fixed formula in sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964. It did not strike down the distinction the Federal Shariat Court itself drew between a wife’s separation founded on mere aversion and one compelled by the husband’s own nashuz. That distinction survives. What has changed is that the Family Court must now apply it on the facts of each case, without a fixed formula to fall back on.

IV. A decree is not Khula merely because that word appears in the plaint, the written statement, or the decree sheet. Where the wife has pleaded and pursued a ground recognized under Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, the suit must be decided on that ground. Khula may not be substituted for it without the wife’s informed consent appearing on the record.

V. Cruelty under Section 2(viii) of that Act is not confined to physical violence; it extends to psychological, verbal, emotional and economic abuse, assessed by its effect on the particular wife. It is proved on the balance of probabilities, and a wife’s own credible testimony does not need medical or documentary corroboration.

VI. Where a ground under Section 2 is proved, Section 5 of that Act governs: the wife’s dower is not affected by the dissolution. This is not a question of degree. The Family Court does not weigh the severity of the cruelty to decide how much dower survives. Once the ground is proved, dower, whether prompt or deferred, paid or unpaid, stands unaffected in full.

VII. Where no such ground is proved and the case is of Khula, forfeiture is still not automatic. The Family Court must independently decide, with reasons, what amount, if any, is to be returned, and may not order the return of dower that was never paid.

VIII. Where the evidence is genuinely close and the Family Court cannot say with confidence which of the above applies, the doubt is to be resolved in favour of the wife's dower, not against it.

IX. Every order concerning dower must record the finding it rests on, whether a ground under Section 2 was proved, and if not, why the case was treated as Khula and on what material. A decree silent on this point does not meet the standard laid down in this judgment.

The confusion this judgment has tried to resolve did not arise from the Federal Shariat Court’s reasoning in Imran Anwar Khan’s case, which was sound. It arose because sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 were struck down without anything being put in their place. The underlying law, the Quran, and Section 5 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, never changed; only the formula a trial court could once apply disappeared. Family Courts, left with the bare fact that the provision permitting surrender of dower in Khula is gone, but no revived rule requiring payment in its place, have in practice gone the other way: treating every decree as Khula and denying the wife her dower altogether, whether a ground under Section 2 of that Act stood proved or not, as though the striking down of sub-sections (5) and (6) had taken away her entitlement to dower rather than the husband’s claim to its return.

Before parting with this judgment, it is observed that there is a need for a fresh provision, drafted in the language of Section 5 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, requiring the Family Court to record a finding on the cause of dissolution before deciding the question of dower, and making clear that dower is not affected where a ground under Section 2 of that Act stands proved. The Registrar of this Court shall forward a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Law and Parliamentary Affairs Department, Government of the Punjab, and to the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, for such action as considered appropriate.

W.P. 20300/23
Arslan . Vs Nisha Shahid etc
Mr. Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani
01-07-2026
2026 LHC 4758

22/07/2026

PLJ 2026 Lahore 294

باپ کی غیر موجودگی میں دادا کی ذمہ داری:
عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ چونکہ بچوں کا باپ سعودی عرب جا چکا ہے اور وہ بچوں کا خرچہ نہیں اٹھا رہا، اور ماں کے پاس اتنے وسائل نہیں ہیں، ایسی صورتحال میں بچوں کو بے سہارا نہیں چھوڑا جا سکتا۔

Where the father, though alive, has absented himself and failed to discharge his legal and moral obligation to maintain his minor children and where the grandfather is financially sound and capable, the law does not allow a situation in which minors are left destitute. In such circumstances, the ascendant possessed of sufficient means cannot escape responsibility. The minors cannot be rendered helpless merely on account of the father’s deliberate avoidance.
It is significant to note that the maintenance so granted does not fall within the purview of Section 14(2)(c) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 (Amendment Act XI of 2015), which bars an appeal where the maintenance allowance does not exceed Rs.5,000/- per month.

From the bare reading of this section, it demonstrates that no appeal shall lie from a decree of a Family Court for maintenance of rupees five thousand or less per month. Furthermore, sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act ibid expressly prohibits any appeal against an interim order. The legislative intent is manifest; to protect weaker segments of society particularly women and children from protracted litigation and to ensure expeditious and final determination of modest maintenance claims.

Entertaining a constitutional petition in matters consciously excluded from the sphere of appeal by the legislature amounts to going against the intent and intention of the lawmakers, who have deliberately curtailed appellate remedies in such cases to support minors and females. Filing and prosecuting constitutional petitions in cases which do not fall within the ambit of Section 14 of the Act ibid is a practice which deserves to be deprecated and discouraged. In the smooth administration of justice, no one can be permitted to create hindrance in the due course of law by adopting indirect methods to challenge decrees that have been rendered final by statutory command.

Courts exercising constitutional jurisdiction are always reluctant to interfere in decisions made under special statutes, particularly where no exceptional circumstances exist. Even otherwise, this Court does not sit as a Court of appeal to reappraise evidence or substitute its own findings unless a jurisdictional defect, patent illegality, material irregularity or manifest perversity is demonstrated.
W.P. No.1132 of 2026
Nazir Ahmad VS Judge Family Court, Khairpur Tamewali etc.

22/07/2026

2026 SCMR 1033
CDA Vs. Dr. Sh. Muhammad Shoaib.
معزز عدالت عظمی کا آرڈر IX قاعدہ 7 اور 13 کی پروسیسنگ اور حتمی فیصلہ و ڈگری کے حوالے سے اور قانون معیاد کی دفعہ 5 اور فریق مقدمہ/پبلک فنکشنریز کے حقوق و فرائض کے حوالے سے بہترین فیصلہ ہے۔ مزید یہ کہ وکیل کی غفلت اور کلائینٹ کی ذمہ داری کو ڈسکس کیا گیا ہے۔

Counsel's negligence---Litigant's responsibility to stay vigilant--- Litigant bound by conduct of his counsel---Principle---Exception---A party cannot relegate the whole accountability to his lawyer or the Court.

22/07/2026

PLJ 2026 Cr.C. (Note) 167
[Lahore High Court, Multan Bench]

Present: Muhammad Amjad Rafiq, J.

SAMAR ABBAS etc.--Petitioners

versus

STATE etc.--Respondents

Crl. Misc. Nos. 699-B of 2025 and 1362-B of 2025,
decided on 22.4.2025.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--

----S. 497(2)--Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 109, 114 & 34--Bail, grant of--Further inquiry--Allegation of murder--Court can take judicial notice of only those facts which are listed in Article 112 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and of course newspaper or journal is not mentioned in such Article--Suffice it to say that such Article says that “Facts of which Court must take judicial notice” word “must” make it obligatory for Court to take judicial notice of all such facts listed in Article 112 ibid without asking for a formal proof--Whereas Article 111 ibid gives a discretion to Court to take judicial notice of any fact not listed in Article 112 ibid, depending upon circumstances of case--Thus, Court can take judicial notice of a news clipping subject to considerations that its admissibility depends on several factors, including relevance to case, authenticity of clipping, and whether Court deems it reliable--Petitioners are behind bars since 17.10.2024, investigation is complete and persons of petitioners are not required for further investigation; thus, keeping them behind bars for indefinite period would not serve any useful purpose to prosecution. [Para 10 & 15] A & B

2025 SCMR 318 & 2024 SCMR 1716.

Malik Nazar Hussain Paunta, Advocate for Petitioner (in Crl. Misc. No. 699-B of 2025).

Mian Muhammad Hanif, Advocate for Petitioner (in Crl. Misc. No. 1362-B of 2025).

Mr. Muhammad Ali Shahab, Deputy Prosecutor General for State.

Mr. Allah Bakhsh Khan Kulachi & Ms. Raheela Saleem, Advocates for Complainant.

Date of hearing: 22.4.2025.

Order

This single order shall dispose of titled petitions filed under Section 497 of Cr.P.C., by the petitioners seeking post arrest bail in case FIR No. 444 dated 15.05.2024 registered under Sections 302/324/ 109/114/34-PPC at Police Station City Muzaffargarh, District Muzaffargarh.

2. It was the story of FIR that on 15.05.2024 at about 10:30 a.m., Muhammad Ishaq complainant along with his elder brother Ashfaq Hussain on their separate motorcycles left for their house from cardboard godown situated near Beehari colony, and at about 10:35 a.m., when they crossed thermal power bypass, Ashfaq Hussain was approximately 100 yards ahead from the complainant, two unknown persons one muffled face and other not muffled riding on a motorcycle crossed the complainant and signaled his brother to stop the motorcycle who acted upon the direction; upon which person not muffled (pillion rider) made three fires with his pistol which hit Ashfaq Hussain at his back; the complainant after stopping his motorcycle came forward, said person made two fires in the air and threatened him not to come near; the witnesses Abdul Ghaffar & Liaqat Hussain emerged there and Ashfaq Hussain was shifted to DHQ hospital, Muzaffargarh who later succumbed to the injures.

3. Learned counsel (s) for the petitioners contended that primarily, no one was nominated in the FIR and police remained on searching unknown accused for more than five months, and this effort of police was being reported in the daily newspapers because the deceased was a renowned journalist, on whose assassination Chief Minister of the Punjab had also taken a serious notice. However, on the arrest of petitioners in the month of October, 2024, police claimed Samar Abaas petitioner as close relative and neighbour of deceased, whereas Ramzan petitioner was employee of Samar Abass. Both were employed at D.G. Khan Cement Factory, Dera Ghazi Khan. However, police while ignoring above facts, procured an ante-dated supplementary statement of the complainant of 16.05.2024 (next day of occurrence), for nomination of accused/petitioners to show that case was of direct ocular evidence, otherwise it was a blind murder. In support of such contention, some press clippings of “Daily Khabrain Multan” dated 15.05.2024, 20.05.2024, 24.05.2024, 26.06.2024 & 20.10.2024 found appended with the bail petition. Further submitted that by virtue of press clipping dated 20.10.2024, petitioners were shown arrested and, in such press clipping it was reported that after 05 months of the occurrence, for the murder of Ashfaq, his close relatives and neighbour have been arrested; therefore, effort of police to show the existence of supplementary statement of the complainant on the very next day (16.05.2024), is nothing but padding into the evidence. He asserted that such press clippings can be looked into at this stage for relief of bail to the petitioners and in this respect placed his reliance on cases reported as “Anwar Hussain and 2 others versus The State” (2019 YLR 1117); “Imran Malik versus The State” (2018 MLD 1116).

Learned counsel (s) for the petitioners further added that Police Emergency call at 15 was made by one Khurram from the place of occurrence which carries an impression that complainant and PWs were not present at time of occurrence, and initiation of private prosecution through direct complaint after 08 months of the occurrence clearly shows the police and the complainant on different poles. This distrust was either of the complainant on the police investigation, or police was not ready to accept the command of the complainant.

4. Learned counsel(s) for the complainant on the other hand, opposed the bails on the grounds that Muhammad Ishaq, complainant has made first statement before the police with nomination of the petitioners on the same day which was written down by a witness Abdul Ghaffar whose signatures are also mentioned on such application, but police mala fidely did not register the FIR correctly. Further stated that petitioners were employees of D.G. Khan Cement Company and prosecution has also obtained a report of their absence from the said company at the relevant time which was received vide letter dated 24.10.2024. Another evidence alleged was the CDR of the accused/petitioners, showing their link on the day of occurrence.

5. Heard; record perused.

6. First and the foremost fact in this case is the absence of the petitioners on the day of occurrence from D.G. Khan Cement Company. Does the report furnished by the company really tag them absent on that day? Let’s see what the report speaks; it is as under;

Subject: ATTENDANCE RECORD

Attendance record of the following employees of the month of May 2024 is attached as desired, please.

a. Sammar Abbas Assistant Junior Officer (Electrical) However, he was not present at place of duty on 15 May 2024 during duty hours.

b. Muhammad Ramzan, Helper (WHRPP)

The above report was confusing; however, separate sheets attached with report reflect that Samar Abass petitioner was Employee No. 3516 and was in attendance in the company office from 7.58 a.m. to 15.58 p.m. on 15.05.2024; whereas Ramazan Petitioner being Employee No. 91459 was absent on that day. It was the stance of the company that though attendance of Samar Abass petitioner is marked in the record yet he was not physically present in the company, but such stance is not supported by any material, documentary or forensic. Role of driving motorcycle was assigned to Muhammad Ramzan petitioner, whereas role of firing was assigned to Samar Abass petitioner but from the circumstances on the record, it becomes evident that he was in D.G. Khan Cement company at the time of occurrence, casting a doubt on his involvement in commission of murder.

7. Though CDR data was claimed showing connection of Samar Abbas and Muhammad Ramzan near the place of occurrence but without any voice message/transcript. Thus, it does not connect the petitioners with the commission of offence until and unless such CDR is formalized in accordance with law as enunciated in judgment of Full Bench of this Court in a case reported as “Mst. Saima Noreen versus The State and another” (PLJ 2023 Cr. C 371 (FB); for reference, relevant paragraph is reproduced:

10. Although any accused or witness can claim or admit possession and use of any SIM “Subscriber Identity Module’ by him or anybody else at the time of occurrence or any other relevant time yet mere such claim or admission is not sufficient for relying on CDR “Call Data Record” of said SIM because CDR only shows use of SIM in territorial/geographical jurisdiction of “Cell Phone Tower” installed by telecom operator and does not disclose that who is actually/exactly carrying and using said SIM; however, “Voice Record Transcript” or “End to End Audio Recording” can reflect the detail/identification of the user. Therefore, without “Voice Recording Transcript”, mere “Call Data Record” (CDR) alone of the SIM is inconclusive piece of evidence regarding identity of its user/carrier.”

8. Learned counsel for the complainant states that pistol recovered on the lead of Samar Abbas, petitioner stood matched with the spent shells C-1 to C-5, therefore, his criminal liability stays. Had it been an occurrence of circumstantial evidence, all the evidence could have easily been looked in the form of a chain well knitted or scrambled, but once prosecution opted to make it a case of ocular account, then circumstances highlighted by learned counsel (s) for the petitioners including press clipping apparently make the case against the petitioners doubtful.

9. However, the repeated reliance of learned counsel (s) for the petitioners upon press clippings and claim of learned Counsel (s) for the complainant that it is inadmissible piece of evidence carrying a status of second-degree hearsay and misleading, a duty somewhat cast upon this Court to re-thrash the admissibility or evidentiary value of press clippings. In the backdrop of contention, I have perused the relevant case laws on the subject and found that press clippings have been used by the Courts in following three situations;

a) In Constitutional jurisdiction for matters of public importance.

b) Presumption by Courts in criminal jurisdiction.

c) Evidence of any party in criminal jurisdiction.

For the first situation, in the following judgments, while dealing with political statements/speeches against the State published in newspapers attributed to political leaders, Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that such statements if have not been denied or repudiated could be used as evidence against them. Reference is made to cases reported as “Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and another versus President of Pakistan and others” (PLD 1998 Supreme Court 388), and “Islamic Republic of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry of Interior And Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad versus Abdul Wali Khan, M.N.A., Former President of Defunct National Awami Party” (PLD 1976 Supreme Court 57), wherein it was held as under:

“It cannot be denied that so far as newspaper reports of contemporaneous events are concerned, they may be admissible, particularly where they happen to be events of local interest or of such a public nature as would be generally known throughout the community and testimony of an eyewitness is not readily available. The contemporary newspaper account may well be admitted in evidence in such circumstances as has often been done by Courts in the United States of America not because they are `business records’ or “ancient documents’ but because they may well be treated as a trustworthy contemporaneous account of events or happenings which took place a long time ago or in a foreign country which cannot easily be proved by direct ocular oral testimony. Thus, if a person does not avail of the opportunity to contradict or question the truthfulness of the statement attributed to him and widely published in newspapers he cannot complain if that publication is used against him. Such a user would not be hit by the rule of hearsay.”

Whereas in a case reported as “Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif versus Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others” (PLD 2004 Supreme Court 583), it was held as under:

“Newspaper reports and articles can only be used in above exceptional circumstances meaning thereby that if on record admissible evidence is available which is not disputed between the parties particularly in the cases where the defendant/respondent himself had brought on record certain documents in proof of his plea then the Court is not, debarred from looking into the same for the purpose of arriving at a just conclusion particularly in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 and Article 184(3) of the Constitution, where the Court had no occasion to record the evidence itself and had to base its decision on the pleadings of the parties who were supported with the documents like the present case petitioners wherein had relied upon the press clippings and articles but the respondents either on their own or under directions of the Court had brought on record material to satisfy the Court that the transaction under challenge is in accordance with law. Therefore, while accepting such request and declining to give relief, it would be incumbent upon the Court to rely upon the documents which are not disputed between the parties and such documents can be considered/treated as evidence on record.

10. Presumption by Courts in criminal jurisdiction, is the subject matter of the Evidence Act 1872 which with certain modifications was also applicable to the different States of India and by virtue of that Court was authorized to presume the genuineness of newspapers or journal as per Section 81 of said Act, which is as under;

81. Presumption as to Gazettes, newspapers, private Acts of Parliament and other documents. The Court shall presume the genuineness of every document purporting to be the London Gazette or [any official Gazette, or the Government Gazette] [Substituted by A.O. 1937, for “the Gazette of India, or the Government Gazette of any L.G., or”.] of any colony, dependency or possession of the British Crown, or to be a newspaper or journal, or to be a copy of a private Act of Parliament [of the United Kingdom] [Inserted by A.O. 1950.] printed by the Queen’s Printer and of every document purporting to be a document directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such document is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody.

With the development of technology and availability of modern devices, above Section was later supplemented through Section 81A as under:

Presumption as to Gazettes in electronic forms.[Inserted by Act 21 of 2000, Section 92 and Sch.II (w.e.f. 17.10.2000).]The Court shall presume the genuineness of every electronic record purporting to be the Official Gazette, or purporting to be electronic record directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such electronic record is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody.

These two Sections still exist in the law of evidence of India, now titled as “the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023” in the forms of Section 80 & 81, but by the promulgation of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, Section 81 of the Evidence Act 1872 was not re-enacted rather opted to skip it in the new legislation. Thus, Courts in Pakistan by law cannot presume the genuineness of a newspaper. Same observation has been made by the Court in a case reported as “Zahid versus The State” (PLD 1993 Karachi 337). However, in a case reported as “Banaris Khan versus The State and 2 others” (2015 YLR 2076) Federal Shariat Court while dilating upon the issue of publication of confession of an accused in newspaper 4 days prior to its actual making held that in the light of judgment reported as ‘Wattan Party v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 697), Court can take judicial notice of news items. This observation is in line with provisions of Article 111 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 which is as under;

“111. Fact Judicially noticeable need not be proved: No fact of which the Court will take judicial notice need be proved.”

Some misunderstanding in law prevails that Court can take judicial notice of only those facts which are listed in Article 112 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and of course newspaper or journal is not mentioned in such Article. Suffice it to say that such Article says that “Facts of which Court must take judicial notice” the word “must” make it obligatory for the Court to take judicial notice of all such facts listed in Article 112 ibid without asking for a formal proof. Whereas Article 111 ibid gives a discretion to the Court to take judicial notice of any fact not listed in Article 112 ibid, depending upon the circumstances of the case. Thus, Court can take judicial notice of a news clipping subject to the considerations that its admissibility depends on several factors, including the relevance to the case, the authenticity of the clipping, and whether the Court deems it reliable.

11. However, as a general principle the Supreme Court of Pakistan has held in case reported as “Wattan Party through President versus Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others” (PLD 2006 Supreme Court 697) that following parameters must be met for the purpose of taking judicial notice of a newspaper report and articles:

(i) Where direct evidence is not available.

(ii) Where it is sought to be proved that a person has notice of the contents of the newspaper report.

(iii) Where it is sought to be shown that a person is an author or otherwise responsible for the statement or article published in a newspaper which is to be used against him.

(iv) In cases of defamation.

(v) If the issue/occurrence is rather old and eye-witnesses are either wanting or less reliable.

Keeping in view the above parameters, it was held in a case reported as “Alim-Ud-Din versus The State” (PLD 1982 Lahore 141) that newspaper reports may be admissible in evidence when testimony of a witness is not readily available. In another case reported as “Mrs. Mamoona Saeed versus Government of The Punjab and others” (2003 YLR 2397), it was held that newspaper clippings are admissible in evidence in case the same were not contradicted.

12. The third situation for use of press clippings is in the form of evidence produced by any party in criminal proceedings. It is consensus that press clipping is hearsay evidence and is not admissible under the law unless the author or reporter volunteers to appear as witness to prove the authenticity of the facts stated therein. Reliance in this respect is on cases reported as “Kh. Ijaz Ahmed versus D.R.O. and others” (2001 YLR 448); “Manzoor versus The State” (2010 YLR 602); “Qurban Ali and another versus The State” (PLD 2014 Sindh 538); “Mst. Shakila Bano versus Station House Officer, Police Station Model Colony, SIR, Karachi and another” (PLD 1995 Karachi 555); “Ch. Aamir Shahzad versus Muhammad Makki and 5 others” (2021 YLR 1641); “Muhmmad Ashraf Khan versus The State and another” (1996 SCMR 1747); “Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri versus The State and others” (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 17).

13. Even the rule of hearsay is not absolute, for, it is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is that statements accompanying and explaining facts are not hit by the hearsay rule. Thus, even in the case of hearsay as observed in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Edn., Vol 15, at page 320) in estimating the weight to be attached to a statement “regard must be had to all circumstances from which any inference as to the accuracy or otherwise of the statement can reasonably be drawn, and in particular to the questions whether the statement was contemporaneous with the facts stated and whether the maker had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent the facts”. Explanatory facts are regarded as relevant facts as per Article 22 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 which says that facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact ……………………, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose. In such situation, of course press clipping could be considered as explanatory evidence, that shall be read in conjunction with other evidence on the record, because press clipping as sole evidence cannot prove a fact beyond reasonable doubt.

14. It is trite that while considering material at bail stage, Court always acts inquisitorially to search for avenues of further inquiry into the guilt of accused, and thus, can consider any material, that can be transformed into admissible format at a later stage, in order to grant or decline bail to the accused. The above highlights on the subject of press clippings show that if author or reporter of press clipping appears in the dock, it could become admissible evidence; however, cogency whereof rests upon the intrinsic value of information, its reliability and source authentication which of course would be determined after recording of all the evidence in the case. Thus, Court can consider this piece of evidence at this stage as well.

15. At present, facts highlighted by learned counsel (s) for the petitioners clearly show that implication of present petitioners in this case rests on frail pillars. The above situation provides a premium to the petitioners to seek bail on the touchstone of further inquiry which is very much available in this case. Thus, petitioners have made out a case for further inquiry. Reliance in this respect is placed on cases reported as “Mazhar Ali versus The State and another” (2025 SCMR 318), “Zeeshan versus The State and another” (2024 SCMR 1716), “Mst. Ishrat Bibi versus The State through Prosecutor General, Punjab and another” (2024 SCMR 1528), “Saeed Ahmed and another versus The State” (PLD 2024 Supreme Court 1241), “Salman Zahid versus The State through P.G. Sindh” (2023 SCMR 1140) “Gul Muhammad versus The State” (2023 SCMR 857) & “Muhammad Naeem Hassan versus The State through P.G., Punjab and another” (2022 SCMR 523). Petitioners are behind the bars since 17.10.2024, investigation is complete and persons of the petitioners are not required for further investigation; thus, keeping them behind the bars for indefinite period would not serve any useful purpose to the prosecution.

16. In view of what has been discussed above, titled petitions are allowed and the petitioners are admitted to bail subject to furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 500,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court. However, above assessment of this Court is tentative in nature which shall not prejudice the case of either side during the trial.

(A.A.K.) Petition allowed