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Advocate Rana Nauman Ashraf, Lahore (2026)

08/12/2025

2025 PCrLJ 955
PLJ 2025 FSC 100

Ss. 500 & 502-A---Defamation---Private complaint---Petitioner filed private complaint against the respondent with the contention that he levelled false allegation of zina upon her---Complaint was dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---Admittedly, the accusation of zina/illicit terms with "RM" against the petitioner was imputed by the respondent in divorce deed dated 07.06.2020, which he repeatedly made in the pleadings of the suits and family matters, which he also reiterated and reaffirmed in presence of the Court and in public, in union council office, and judicial/non-judicial proceedings, even after severing marital bond with the petitioner and no longer remaining her husband---This prima facie fell within the definition of Qazf and there was no question of applicability of the provisions of S.14 of the Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979 regarding the li'an in this case---Trial judge very conveniently overlooked such aspects of the case and dismissed the subject complaint, being not maintainable, holding that the respondent, who was the husband of the petitioner, had made the accusation of zina/ illicit relations against the petitioner during subsistence of the marriage, therefore, the provisions of S.14 of the Qazf Ordinance, 1979, were attracted to the case of the petitioner---Petitioner had supported the contents of her complaint by cursory evidence and she had also been supported by the witnesses in their respective cursory statements recorded before the Judicial Magistrate, who after conducting preliminary enquiry under S.202, Cr.P.C, and recording the statements of petitioner's witnesses submitted his enquiry report dated 16.01.2023, in affirmative, which had also been completely ignored by the trial judge while passing the impugned order---Said material brought on the record had to be considered to determine whether a prima facie case was made out or not and no deeper appreciation was required at the initial stage---
Mst. Sassi Hizbullah vs Junaid Ahmed Khan

08/12/2025

PLD 2025 FSC 18
Muhammadan Law---Applicability---Dispute between parties was with regard to change of family name of adopted child---Petitioner relied upon provision of S. 346 of Muhammadan Law by D. F. Mullah---Validity---Principles of Muhammadan Law had no force of law as the book was authored by Dinshah Fardunji Mullah and was only a reference book---Book in question did not have force of law and did not come under the ambit of law as provided under Art. 203B(c) of the Constitution---Federal Shariat Court declined to interfere in the matter as the matter had already been thrashed out in an earlier judgment titled Najaat Welfare Foundation v. Federation of Pakistan and others, reported as PLD 2021 FSC 1---
Mst. MUSSARAT FAYYAZ VS GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad

08/12/2025

2025 MLD 1500
PLJ 2025 FSC 79
S. 7---Commission of offence of qazf---Appreciation of evidence---Accused was charged for leveling allegation containing imputation of zina against the complainant while recording his statement in a civil suit---Perusal of the record revealed that the complainant during his cross examination in his criminal petition of Qazf, recorded on 16.05.2023 admitted that some quarrel happened between the appellant/accused and his counsel after recording of that piece of statement containing the disputed allegation of zina, on the basis of that statement subsequently the case of Qazf was filed---Such piece of statement had raised a question that some dispute did happened inside the Court, which had rendered some doubts regarding the recording of statement containing the allegation of zina amounting to Qazf, which apparently the Trial Court had ignored---Any statement which was a part of judicial proceedings containing signatures of the Presiding Officer i.e. the Court in that case, bore a presumption that the statement was recorded by the same Presiding Officer/Court himself, unless proven otherwise, therefore, in that case the Trial Court had failed to appreciate the evidence of the parties available on record to evaluate that whether that statement containing the allegation of zina was recorded by the Court itself or not, or whether the Court was present at that time while the alleged statement was being recorded or not---Said aspects of the case not only were relevant but crucial in Hudood laws because such questions were pivotal to evaluate the authenticity of the evidence for proving the allegation against the accused beyond any shadow of doubt---Perusal of the record revealed that the Trial Court had failed to adopt the procedure mentioned in S.203-B, Cr.P.C, which the Court was bound to follow in the light of S.17 of the Ordinance, 1979---However, the Trial Court failed to understand that a complaint could not be declared as a sacrosanct document and its impact needed to be examined before granting permission---Thus, non-compliance of procedure as noted by the Trial Court had deprived the appellant of his right of having a fair trial, therefore, in such view of the matter, the case was remanded back to the Trial Court for de novo trial. Consequently, the captioned criminal reference filed for confirmation of the punishment awarded to appellant was answered in negative---
Muhammad Aman vs State

08/12/2025

Words "may" and "shall" used in a section of an Act or an Ordinance---Whether directory or mandatory---Principle---'May' and 'shall' are interchangeable and their interpretation as to whether they are directory or mandatory in nature depends upon the context in which they are used and cannot be interpreted with the rigidity attributed to them in ordinary parlance---If no penal consequences are given in a provision, even if the word "shall" is used therein, the said provision becomes directory (and not mandatory) and the word "shall" will be read as "may".

2025 CLC 1852

08/12/2025

2025 CLC 1852
Provision in a statute---Whether directory or mandatory---Principle---In order to determine whether a proviso is directory or mandatory, the duty of the court is to try to unravel the real intention of the legislature---The ultimate test is the intent of the legislature and not the language in which the intent is clothed---The object and purpose of enacting the provision provide a strong and clear indicator for ascertaining such intent of the legislature---The intention of the legislature must govern and this is to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, its object, and the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other---This exercise entails careful examination of the scheme of the Act in order to discover the real purpose and object of the Act---A provision in a statute is mandatory if the omission to follow it renders the proceedings to which it relates illegal and void, while a provision is directory if its observance is not necessary to the validity of the proceeding---One of the important tests that must always be employed in order to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory in character is to consider whether the non-compliance of a particular provision causes inconvenience or injustice and, if it does, the court would say that that provision must be complied within and that it is obligatory in its character---There are three fundamental tests, which are often applied with remarkable success in the determination of this question---They are based on considerations of the scope and object, sometimes called the scheme and purpose, of the enactment in question, on considerations of justice and balance of convenience and on a consideration of the nature of the particular provision, namely, whether it affects the performance of a public duty or relates to a right, privilege or power - in the former case the enactment is generally directory, in the latter mandatory.

08/12/2025

2025 CLC 1982

Scribe of a document can only be a competent witness if he has fixed his signatures as an attesting witness of document and not otherwise---Signing of document in capacity of writer, does not fulfill and meet mandatory requirement of attestation by scribe separately---Scribe may be examined by concerned party for corroboration of evidence of marginal witness.

Proof of document---Procedure-Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Petitioners /plaintiffs claimed that they were owners in possession of suit property on the basis of agreement to sell executed in year 1943 in favour of their predecessor-in-interest by predecessor-in-interest of respondents/defendants---Suit and appeal were concurrently dismissed by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court---Validity---When no attesting witness is found, it is obligatory under Art. 80 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, upon party to prove factum of death of its witnesses that they have died or cannot be traced out---Findings of both the Courts below on question of facts and law were based upon proper appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced in suit---
Civil Revision No. 339-D of 2016
KHER DIN versus Mst. HAYAT BIBI

08/12/2025

*2024 SCMR 1292*

_*Interim maintenance*_

Father failing to comply with order for payment of maintenance to the minors --- Contumacious conduct --- Costs , imposition of --- Family Court , in accordance with Section 17-A of the Family Courts Act , 1964 , had the lawful authority to strike off the defence of the petitioner ( father ) and decree the suit for maintenance on the basis of averments in the plaint and other supporting documents on record of the case , once the petitioner failed to pay the interim maintenance allowance by fourteenth day of each month during the pendency of proceedings --- Petitioner was also put to notice by the Family Court to clear the arrears of interim maintenance allowance otherwise the provisions of Section 17-A of the Act would be invoked , which the petitioner failed to comply with -- Moreover , the determination of the amount of maintenance by the Family Court was neither arbitrary nor capricious --- Hence , the High Court had rightly declined to interfere with the findings of the Family Court with regard to the quantum of maintenance allowance --- In view of the callous disregard of the petitioner for the court order to pay interim maintenance and his attempts to delay the payment of decreed maintenance allowance for his minor children , the Supreme Court imposed costs on the petitioner in the sum of Rs . 1,00,000 / - ( Rupees one hundred thousand only ) to deter such conduct in the future with the direction that the costs shall be recovered by the executing court as part of the decree for maintenance .

08/12/2025

2025 M L D 1973

Trial Court "turning down" the request for grant of ad-interim relief ---"Turned down", terminology of---Scope ---Trial Court should either accept or dismiss the request for grant of ad-interim relief and terminology of "turned down" is not to be used ---Appellants filed a suit for declaration, recovery and permanent injunction along with an application under O.###IX, R.1 & 2 of C.P.C. for grant of temporary injunction but the Trial Court "turned down" their requests for grant of ad-interim relief --- Validity --- Without discussing the reasons/grounds taken by the Trial Court for "turning down" the appellants' request for grant of temporary injunction the terminology "turned down" was not to be used in deciding application under O.###IX, R.1 & 2 of C.P.C. and the Trial Court should accept or dismiss it---Order ###IX, R.1 & 2 of C.P.C. provided that court could grant a temporary injunction to restrain a party from committing an act that could cause injury to the other party or damage to the subject matter of the suit on specific terms, such as duration, keeping an account or providing security --- Impugned order of Trial Court suffered from a legal lacuna and it could not be sustained and the same was set-aside---Appellants' application for grant of temporary injunction was deemed to be pending before the Trial Court for decision afresh---

Appeal against order of Trial Court refusing to grant ad-interim relief --- Order of Trial Court suffering from legal lacuna ---High Court dispensing with the requirement of issuingnotice to opposite side to promote the principle of speedy justice ---Limine control, doctrine of --- Applicability and scope --- Under the doctrine of limine control for early and expeditious disposal of a case, the court can decide the matter at limine stage on the basis of material/documents available on the record/file and without issuing notice to other side so that the party concerned may not face inconvenience or monetary loss in approaching the High Court.

Order---The Appellants have filed this appeal under Order XLIII of C.P.C. against the impugned order dated 12.06.2025, passed by Civil Judge, Rawalpindi, whereby their application for grant of temporary injunction has been turned down.

2. At the outset, learned counsel submits that against the impugned order the Appellants have also filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi but subsequently, the same was withdrawn vide order dated 17.06.2025 due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. He further submits that the Appellants have a strong case for grant of interim injunction but the Civil Judge has turned down their request through the impugned order by not considering material aspects of the matter in true perspective. He prays for setting aside of the impugned order, being illegal and against the norms of justice.

3. Arguments heard and record perused.

4. Since short point is involved, notice to other side is dispensed with to avoid further delay and to promote the principle of speedy justice. Moreover, under the doctrine of limine control developed by this Court in Asif Saleem v. Chairman BOG University of Lahore and others (PLD 2019 Lahore 407) for early and expeditious disposal of a case, the Court can decide the matter at limine stage on the basis of material/documents available on the record/file and without issuing notice to other side so that the party concerned may not face inconvenience or monetary loss in approaching this Court.

5. Admittedly, the Appellants have filed a suit for declaration, recovery and permanent injunction along with an application under Order ###IX Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C. for grant of temporary injunction but the Civil Court has "turned down" their request for grant of an ad-interim relief through the impugned order dated 12.06.2025. Without discussing the reasons/grounds taken by the Civil Court for "turning down" the Appellants' request for grant of temporary injunction, significant to mention here is that the terminology "turned down" is not used in deciding an application Order ###IX Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C. and the Civil Court should accept or dismiss it. If a quick glance is taken on the provisions contained in Order ###IX Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C., it will elucidate that the Court may grant a temporary injunction to restrain a party from committing an act that could cause injury to the other party or damage to the subject matter of the suit on specific terms, such as duration, keeping an account or providing security. In the case of Shariq Builders and Property Advisors v. Dr. Muhammad Faisal Murad and others (2024 MLD 32), this Court has already discussed and elaborated these provisions of C.P.C.

6. In view of the above, since the impugned order suffers from a legal lacuna, it cannot be sustained and the same is hereby set-aside. The Appellants' application for grant of temporary injunction will be deemed to be pending before the Civil Court which will decide the same afresh strictly as per law.
F.A.O. No. 81 of 2025
Fahim Ahmed Saeed and others Versus Mian Humayun Mahmud and others

08/12/2025

اگر درخواست ضمانت میں سہواً طور پر کوٸی جرم لکھنا رہ جاۓ۔ یا ضمانت منظور ہونے کے بعد کوٸی جرم ایزاد ہو۔ اور سپرنٹنڈنٹ جیل ملزم کو رہاہ نہ کر رہا ہو تو متعلقہ عدالت کو درخواست دی جا سکتی ہے۔ کیونکہ ضمانت مقدمہ میں ہوتی ہے نہ کہ جرم میں۔
(2020 YLR 356)
(2004 PCr.LJ 399)
(2018 PCr.LJ 837)

08/12/2025

2020 SCMR 196
PLD 2020 SC 57
2019 SCMR 930
2018 SCMR 2039
2015 SCMR 1002

9.C of CNSA,
R.6...Protocol..
Report of the govt analyst which did not specify the protocol of the test applied, did not meet the requirements of law, such report could not be relied upon for conviction of accused.

08/12/2025

2020 MLD 55
2020 YLR 2575
2019 CLC 1787
2018 CLC 273
2016 CLC 1460
2004 SCMR 1839
2003 YLR 3054

Mother though contracted second marriage but even then she cannot be debareded from custody of minor

08/12/2025

بیوی اگر خاوند کے برے روئیے ظلم زیادتی اور تشدد کی بنا پر خلع لیتی ہے تو پھر بھی حق مہر مؤجل اور غیر مؤجل کی حقدار رہےگی۔

🔴 2025 CLC 1074

Nikahnama is a valid and binding contract between the parties. Deferred dower is a contractual obligation undertaken by the husband. Unless there are valid legal grounds to deviate from the terms of this contract, husband is bound to fulfill his obligation. The mere fact that the wife sought khula does not automatically nullify this contractual obligation. In order to determine entitlement of a wife seeking khula to the claim qua deferred dower, key consideration is the reason for her seeking khula. Where a wife seeks khula on the ground of disliking against the husband, without any fault on the part of the husband, she loses her right to deferred dower in the same way as in the case of prompt dower. Conversely, if the husband's conduct compels the wife to seek dissolution, she retains her entitlement to the deferred dower. In the instant case, the respondent obtained the decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula. Nonetheless, the crucial factor to determine is what prompted the respondent to seek dissolution of marriage. In the plaint as well as her examination in chief as PW, the respondent has leveled allegations of bad conduct and disrespectful behaviour of the petitioner towards her, which prompted her to seek dissolution of marriage.

This unchallenged rather reaffirmed allegation of bad conduct and disrespectful behavior, that amounts to cruelty, provides a strong justification for the respondent/wife to be entitled to the full amount of her deferred dower in the same way as she would have been in case of divorce pronounced by the petitioner. Though in cross examination the respondent PW-1 stated that she has obtained khula on her own initiative, however, this deposition, when seen in conjunction with the above referred assertions of the PW-1, does not necessarily mean the petitioner was not at fault for respondent’s seeking khula.

As per para 289-A(a) of the Principles of Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mulla, dower becomes confirmed by consummation of marriage. Para 336(2) of the Principles of Muhammadan Law ibid provides that if the marriage was consummated, the wife becomes entitled to immediate payment of whole of the unpaid dower both prompt and deferred. These rules have been delineated in compliance of the command in verses No.20 and 21 of Surah Al-Nisa referred above. Marriage between the petitioner and the respondent subsisted for approximately nine years. During this long period, the respondent/wife fulfilled her marital obligations. The deferred dower is also seen as a form of security and compensation for the wife for her commitment during the marriage. After such a long period of marriage, it would be inequitable to deny full amount of the deferred dower to wife, especially when the dissolution was sought due to cruelty and bad behavior and conduct on the part of the petitioner.

Writ Petition No.68712 of 2024
Asif Mehmood Vs Additional District Judge, etc

Advocate Rana Nauman Ashraf

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