Chohan Law Associates

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11/09/2022
2022 PCrLJ 1466 When recovery of the narcotic is affected from petitioner's co-accused, then merely because petitioner w...
10/09/2022

2022 PCrLJ 1466
When recovery of the narcotic is affected from petitioner's co-accused, then merely because petitioner was accompanying the principal accused will not establish that the contraband was in his active possession or even he had any knowledge about it. Evidence of an accomplice is ordinarily regarded as suspicion; therefore, extent and level of corroboration has to be assessed keeping in view the peculiar facts and surrounding circumstances of the case.

2022 PLD Lahore 664Section 154 Cr.P.C. ordains that when an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence i...
10/09/2022

2022 PLD Lahore 664
Section 154 Cr.P.C. ordains that when an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence is given to an officer in-charge of a police station he shall enter it in the prescribed book/ register. Thus, section 154 Cr.P.C. leaves no discretion to the police in terms of registration of FIR as the legislature has used the word “shall” which carries a mandatory connotation. It does not permit them to hold a preliminary inquiry before it to ascertain whether the information communicated to him is authentic. In contrast, as adumbrated, Rule 7 requires some actions before the FIR is lodged.
In the general law, section 155 Cr.P.C. deals with noncognizable cases. It provides that the officer in-charge of the police station shall enter the information in the book (Rozenamcha) maintained for that purpose and, without any investigation, refer the matter to the magistrate for orders. If allowed, he may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation as are available to him in respect of a cognizable case except that he shall not make any arrest without warrant

It is by now well settled that registration of FIR is not a condition precedent for commencement of investigation.
Inasmuch as cybercrimes require some preliminary inquiry to justify prosecution of the accused as discussed above, Rule 7(4) of the Investigation Rules talks of legal opinion and prior approval of the Additional Director. It needs to be appreciated that these cannot be rendered unless the authority has some material before it. Keeping all these aspects in view, the tension between different provisions can be resolved by holding that when a complaint is received at the Cybercrime Reporting Centre the Circle In-charge may allow it to be registered for further processing and nominate an officer therefor. FIR is to be lodged only if it is found that a cognizable offence has been committed under the PECA and that too after completing the requirements of Rule 7(4) but in the case involving non-cognizable offence the Circle In-charge should seek permission of the competent court for investigation. This interpretation is in consonance with Standing Order No. 05/2020 issued by the Director General, FIA, to regulate the Every complaint is registered as an inquiry in the first instance and further steps are taken in the light of its result. Agency’s working. The PECA and the Investigation Rules constitute special law on the subject and would prevail over the general law set out in the Code.

The Code does not define the term “police authorities.” It does, however, at some places uses the expression “officer in-charge of a police station.” The first question that arises for consideration is whether the officers of the FIA can be described as police authorities in terms of section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C.
The Parliament has established FIA through the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (the “FIA Act”), for inquiry and investigation of certain offences committed in connection with matters concerning the Federal Government. Section 3 of the Act read with the Schedule thereto lists those offences and adds that it would include an attempt or conspiracy to commit any such offence and the abetment thereof. Section 4(2) stipulates that administration of the FIA shall vest in the Director General who shall have the same powers as the Inspector General of Police under the Police Act, 1861. Section 5 of the FIA Act (reproduced later in this judgment) is very significant. Section 5(1) invests the members of the Agency with all the powers that the provincial police have in relation to search, arrest of person and seizure of property and investigation of offences and states that, subject to any order of the Federal Government, they may exercise them throughout the country. Section 5(2) empowers a member of the Agency, who is not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector to exercise any of the powers of an officer incharge of a police station for the purposes of any inquiry or investigation under the Act. In this view of the matter, FIA is fully covered by the expression “the police authorities” occurring in section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. and amenable to the jurisdiction of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace.

It is pertinent that the Investigation Rules somewhat follow the scheme of the FIA Act and the Rules of 2002 framed thereunder.
This is necessitated by the fact that the cybercrimes constitute a special class and generally some preliminary inquiry is required to ascertain the nature of offence and determine whether sufficient evidence is available to justify prosecution of the accused.
Rule 7 retains the distinction between cognizable and noncognizable offences as we have in the Code. However, it is not happily worded and appears to be incoherent. Rule 7(1) lays down that the Circle In-charge may allow registration of a complaint received under Rule 6(3) and nominate an investigation officer while Rule 7(4) enjoins that if the offence alleged in the complaint is cognizable, the Circle In-charge shall order registration of a case after seeking legal opinion and approval of the Additional Director in the Zone. On the other hand, Rule 7(5) ordains that non-cognizable offences are to be dealt with according to section 155 Cr.P.C. and permission of the competent court is necessary for their investigation.

Prevention of Elctronic Crimes Act 2016 (PECA) aims to check cybercrimes in Pakistan and provides mechanism for their investigation, prosecution, trial and international cooperation and for matters ancillary thereto. Section 29(1) of the Act stipulates that the Federal Government may establish or designate a law enforcement agency for investigation of the offences under it. Section 29(2) of the PECA enjoins that “unless otherwise provided for under this Act, the investigation agency and the authorized officer shall in all matters follow the procedure laid down in the Code [of Criminal Procedure, 1898] to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.”

Rule 3 of the Investigation Rules designates the FIA as the investigation agency in terms of section 29(1), ibid. It functions through the Cybercrime Wing under the supervision of the Director General. The Circle In-charge is the overall in-charge of each Cybercrime Reporting Centre of a Cybercrime Wing and acts as the authorized officer for the purposes of registration of a complaints and conducting their investigation. The aforesaid designation has nothing to do with the character or original remit of the FIA and does not affect its status of “police authority” and it remains the same when it is performing functions under the PECA. Resultantly, an individual can approach the Ex-officio Justice of Peace under section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. for issuance of an appropriate direction. “Appropriate” means “suitable, acceptable or correct for the particular circumstances” function. 7and involves a quasi-judicial 8It follows that the Ex-officio Justice of Peace is not obligated to issue direction for registration of FIR in every case brought before him.

The Code does not define the term “police authorities.” It does, however, at some places uses the expression “officer in-charge of a police station.” The first question that arises for consideration is whether the officers of the FIA can be described as police authorities in terms of section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C.
The Parliament has established FIA through the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (the “FIA Act”), for inquiry and investigation of certain offences committed in connection with matters concerning the Federal Government. Section 3 of the Act read with the Schedule thereto lists those offences and adds that it would include an attempt or conspiracy to commit any such offence and the abetment thereof. Section 4(2) stipulates that administration of the FIA shall vest in the Director General who shall have the same powers as the Inspector General of Police under the Police Act, 1861. Section 5 of the FIA Act (reproduced later in this judgment) is very significant. Section 5(1) invests the members of the Agency with all the powers that the provincial police have in relation to search, arrest of person and seizure of property and investigation of offences and states that, subject to any order of the Federal Government, they may exercise them throughout the country. Section 5(2) empowers a member of the Agency, who is not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector to exercise any of the powers of an officer incharge of a police station for the purposes of any inquiry or investigation under the Act. In this view of the matter, FIA is fully covered by the expression “the police authorities” occurring in section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C. and amenable to the jurisdiction of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace.

PLD 2022 Lahore 694Section 11 of The Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960 (XLV of 1960) manifests that for future, the...
10/09/2022

PLD 2022 Lahore 694
Section 11 of The Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960 (XLV of 1960) manifests that for future, the conviction as imposed against the accused/appellant being solely under the Ordinance, ibid, shall not deem to be a conviction for any purpose, rather it would confine limited only to the proceedings wherein such order has been passed (Probation Ordinance) or any subsequent proceedings that too if taken against such convict again under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960, alone.
Sub-section (2) of Section 11, of the Ordinance, ibid, makes the position further clear requiring that where any law imposes any disqualification or disability upon a convicted person, or authorized or required the imposition of any such disqualification or disability, then such conviction of an offender (under the Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960) shall stand disregarded for the purpose of such law which imposes any disqualification or disability upon convicted persons, or authorizes or requires the imposition of any such disqualification or disability.

اگر ٹرائل کورٹ کسی بھی ملزم کو section 382B کے حق سے محروم کرے  تو اسکو ایک معقول وجہ بتانی ہوگی، اگر کورٹ ایسا نہیں کرت...
10/09/2022

اگر ٹرائل کورٹ کسی بھی ملزم کو section 382B کے حق سے محروم کرے تو اسکو ایک معقول وجہ بتانی ہوگی، اگر کورٹ ایسا نہیں کرتی تو ٹرائل کورٹ کا یہ عمل غلط ہوگا اور ہائی کورٹ اس حق کو دلوا سکتی ہے۔۔۔

It is not denied that this Court, while disposing of the appeal as lodged by the petitioner, had not considered this aspect that whether the learned trial Court on sound principles had withheld the benefit provided under section 382B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. and the judgment in this behalf is silent on the point. Under section 561-A,Cr.P.C., the Court has the inherent power to extend the benefit provided under section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in appropriate cases even after the decision of the appeal. The only determining factor was to consider whether the learned trial court, which withheld the benefit provided under section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, had considered the relevant facts for withholding the said benefit.

Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was added by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The word "shall" was substituted for the word "may" by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Second Amendment) Ordinance (Ordinance No. LXXI of 1979). This substitution by the word shall mean that this provision was mandatory and it was obligatory on the Courts to give this benefit to the accused who was awarded the sentence of imprisonment. This benefit was also available to a person who was awarded death sentence by the trial court but subsequently the same was reduced to life imprisonment. A legal valuable right has been conferred upon the accused after the amendment of section 382-B, Cr.P.C., and this right cannot be ignored or refused. Needless to add that the object of granting this benefit under section 382-B Cr.P.C is to compensate the accused for the unnecessary delay that had been caused in the commencement and the conclusion of his trial. Therefore, the Courts must take into consideration the period that the accused spends in jail prior to his conviction. The present petitioner, therefore, after the sentence of death awarded to petitioner namely Naseer Ahmad son of Allah Din under section 302(b) P.P.C. was altered to imprisonment for life, was entitled to get the benefit provided under section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from this Court. The provisions of section 382-B, Cr.P.C., have undergone scrutiny by the superior Courts and have been interpreted in a plethora of cases.
W.P. No.4822 of 2022
Naseer Ahmad. VS. The State and two others.
21-06-2022

Very Important👇جہاں پر ملزم Hardened  یا desperate کریمنل ہو، اسکو   delay in conclusion of trial کے statutory گراؤنڈ پر...
10/09/2022

Very Important
👇

جہاں پر ملزم Hardened یا desperate کریمنل ہو، اسکو delay in conclusion of trial کے statutory گراؤنڈ پر بھی ضمانت پر رہا نہ کیا جاے گا۔۔۔

PLD 2022 SC 541

S . 497 ( 1 ) , third & fourth proviso - Penal Code ( XLV of 1860 ) , Ss . 336 , 334 , 367 , 354 , 342 , 148 & 149 --- Constitution of Pakistan , Art . 185 ( 3 ) -- Cutting of a person's nose- Bail , refusal of --- Delay in conclusion of trial --- " Hardened , desperate or dangerous criminal " -- In the present case , the nature and manner of the commission of offence and the role attributed to the accused of cutting the nose of his sister - in - law and her alleged paramour were the circumstances which described him as a person who could be harmful and dangerous for the society if released on bail and thus made him to fall within the scope of the expression of a hardened , desperate or dangerous criminal " as used in the fourth proviso to Section 497 ( 1 ) . Cr.P.C .--- Accused was therefore not entitled to the benefit of bail on statutory ground of delay in conclusion of his trial , under the third proviso to Section 497 ( 1 ) , Cr.P.C .--- Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed , and accused was refused bail .

جب بھی ٹرائل کورٹ میں کوئی فریق کسی بھی گواہ کو court witness کے طور پر بلانے کے غرض سے ٹرائل کورٹ میں سکیشن 540 Crpc کے...
10/09/2022

جب بھی ٹرائل کورٹ میں کوئی فریق کسی بھی گواہ کو court witness کے طور پر بلانے کے غرض سے ٹرائل کورٹ میں سکیشن 540 Crpc کے تحت درخواست دے تو عدالت صرف اس وجہ سے درخواست خارج نہ کرسکتی ہے کہ یہ belated stage پر دی گئی ہے ، بلکہ کورٹ نے یہ دیکھنا ہے کہ وہ گواہ Just decision of case کے لیے کتنا ضروری ہے اور اس۔چیز کو دیکھتے ہوئے درخواست کا فیصلہ کرنا ہوتا ہے۔۔۔۔

The production and examination of witnesses has also been explained by various provisions contained in Chapter X of the Qanune-Shahadat Order, 1984. This provision in unequivocal terms prescribes the mode and manner of examination of witnesses. The prosecution witnesses or any party calling and examining the witnesses is called, 'examination-in-chief' while examination of the same witnesses by the opposite party is called, 'cross-examination'. Subsequent examination of the same witnesses by the party calling it, is called 're-examination'. There is no denial to the fact that the solitary purpose of any trial is the discovery of the truth and to arrive at a correct conclusion and to see that no innocent person is punished. Section 540, Cr.P.C. deals with power of the court qua summoning of witnesses.
A close reading of afore-mentioned provision indicates that it gives rather wide powers to the Court to examine any witness as a court witness at any stage of the case. The section consists of two parts: one giving discretionary power to the Court and the other imposing an obligation on it.

The Court cannot summarily dismiss an application in terms of section 540 Cr.P.C. by merely holding that either that it was belated application or that it may fill up lacuna the to e in prosecution case, unless tality of material placed before it is considered to find out whether examination of the said witness is essential for a just decision of the case.

Criminal Appeal No. 297 of 2022
(The State Vs. Ahmed Yar)
07-06-2022

10/09/2022

جہاں motivation شکایت کنندہ یا گواہوں کے خلاف ہو لیکن ملزمان نے انہیں کوئی نقصان نہیں پہنچایا، باوجود اس کے کہ ان کے فائرنگ کی حد میں ہوں، یہ ظاہر کرے گا کہ مذکورہ گواہ وقوعہ کی جگہ پر موجود نہیں تھے۔

Where the motivation was against the complainant or the witnesses but the accused did not cause any harm to them, notwithstanding being within the range of their firing, would reveal that the said witnesses were not present at the place of occurrence.

Murder Reference No. 07 of 2020
(The State Vs.
1. Muhammad Maqbool alias Allah Wasaya
2. Muhammad Rafique alias Mithu)

Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 2020
(Muhammad Maqbool alias Allah Wasaya and another Vs.The State and another ) Date of hearing: 07.06.2022

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