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SYED NAEEM ALI Advocate, district courts layyah, Kot Sultan (2026)

30/04/2026

2026 SCMR 723
A department cannot impose any penalty on an employee that is not expressly provided under the law. Any disciplinary action must have a clear legal basis; otherwise, it is unlawful and liable to be set aside. This principle ensures fairness, transparency, and protection of employees from arbitrary or unauthorized punishments.

30/04/2026

It is a well-settled principle of law that an agent is under a fiduciary obligation and cannot lawfully deal with the property of the principal for his own benefit or in favour of his close relatives without the prior knowledge, consent, or specific authorization of the principal, and any such self-serving transaction is liable to be repudiated.
Civil Revision No.950-D of 2025
Abdul Shakoor & othersVersusGhulam Muhammad (deceased) through his Legal Heirs & others
2026 LHC 2690

30/04/2026

Reliance on findings in criminal case, while dealing with civil matter, between the same parties....
Articles 55 to 57 of the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order-1984.

Article 56 of the QSO reads that judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in Article 55 are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state. Article 55 of the QSO provides that a final judgment or order or decree by the competent Court inexercise of (i) probate, (ii) matrimonial, (iii) admiraltyand (iv) insolvency jurisdiction are relevant when it confers upon or takes away any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant.

Article 57 of the QSO provides that judgment, order or decree other than those mentioned in Articles 54, 55 and 56 are irrelevant unless existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this order. The same provision existed as section 43 in the Evidence Act-1872.

The QSO is clear that opinion of a Judge in one case can be relevant for another only when given in the cases specifically referred to in the QSO and in no others. The judgment referred by the learned Appellate Court given in the criminal jurisdiction is related to the specific subject matter and it cannot be relied upon in the civil proceedings or for that matter family cases. It is elementary that each case must be decided on the evidence recorded in it and evidence in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at the decision. Even in the civil cases this cannot be done unless the parties have agreed that the evidence in one case may be treated as evidence in the other.

The above are settled and recognized principles of law. Though Section 17(1) of the Family Courts Act-1964 provides that provisions of QSO and the Code, except Sections 10 and 11 are not applicable and the learned Family Courts are permitted to adopt their own procedure, however, judgment-in-appeal lacking of discussion of the evidence led in that particular case and logical reason to reach the conclusion, is unsafe to be left in the field.

Compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 of the the Code of Civil Procedure-1908.

WP.11961-16
IJAZ HAMED VS ADILA IJAZ ETC.
Mr. Justice Sultan Tanvir Ahmad
2026 LHC 2699
Approved for reporting.Announced in open Court on 30.04.2026

30/04/2026

It is by now well settled that even where the vendor is alleged to have avoided ex*****on of the sale deed, the vendee seeking specific performance is expected to establish her continuous readiness and willingness not only through pleadings but also through tangible evidence, which may include deposit of the balance amount or proof of financial capacity. Failure to satisfy this essential requirement disentitles a party from claiming the discretionary relief of specific performance. In the present case, the absence of any such effort or evidence on the part of the respondent further reinforces the conclusion that the mandatory ingredients for grant of such relief have not been fulfilled.

It may further be observed that although there is no absolute requirement under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 compelling a plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration at the time of filing of a suit for specific performance, yet the relief itself being discretionary and founded on equitable principles cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The plaintiff is not only required to aver readiness and willingness in the pleadings but must also substantiate the same through tangible and credible evidence demonstrating his financial capacity to perform his part of the contract. Production of material such as pay orders, bank statements or other reliable evidence assumes significance in this regard so as to satisfy the Court that the claim is bona fide and not a device to cover up default or to gain time to arrange funds. In the present case, no such evidence has been brought on record. It is also to be kept in view that with the passage of time the value of money depreciates while that of immovable property generally appreciates; therefore, Courts, while exercising equitable jurisdiction, are required to balance the interests of both parties. The complete absence of any effort on the part of the respondent to secure or deposit the balance consideration further militates against the grant of discretionary relief of specific performance.

In the absence of proof of readiness and willingness, the imposition of interest on the alleged balance consideration amounts to rewriting the contract between the parties, which is impermissible in law, particularly in a case where the very existence of the agreement is doubtful.

It is by now well settled that the relief of specific performance is discretionary and equitable in nature. A party seeking such relief must come to the Court with clean hands and must demonstrate through unimpeachable evidence that he / she was always ready and willing to perform his / her part of the agreement.

Civil Revision No.581-D of 2018
Muhammad NadeemVersusAnees Akhtar
Date of hearing: 16.04.2026.

30/04/2026

LEGAL EFFECT OF RESTRUCTURING OF FINANCIAL FACILITIES...............
Restructuring, as recognized under the law and settled judicial principles, constitutes a fresh arrangement of an already admitted liability. It does not involve any new disbursement; rather, it is a mechanism whereby the acknowledged outstanding amount is converted into a demand finance facility with a revised repayment schedule. Such restructuring is only undertaken upon default or inability of the borrower to repay, and is granted upon the borrower's categorical admission of liability. It is by now settled jurisprudence that in cases of restructuring/rescheduling, the financial institution is not required to produce statements of account prior to the restructuring agreement, as the liability stands admitted and acknowledged by the borrower. By agreeing to restructuring, the bank merely deferred its immediate right of recovery and enforcement, granting concessionary terms to facilitate repayment. The legal consequence thereof is a clear and binding acknowledgment of liability, which operates as an estoppel against the borrower from subsequently disputing either the existence or the quantum of the debt. The plea that no liability survives after restructuring is, therefore, wholly misconceived and contrary to the settled principles governing financial and banking transactions.

PLEA OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS................
The plea regarding non-compliance with statutory requirements is also without merit. The plaint is accompanied by all requisite documents, including finance agreements, restructuring instruments, and the certified statement of account, as mandated under Section 9 of the Ordinance, 2001. The suit has been instituted through a duly authorized attorney of the plaintiff-bank, supported by a valid Power of Attorney available on record. No concrete deficiency has been pointed out by the defendants to render the institution of the suit defective. The law is well settled that technical objections, in the absence of demonstrable prejudice, do not defeat a claim otherwise validly instituted. The superior Courts have consistently held that substantial compliance with statutory requirements is sufficient where the liability stands otherwise established through documentary evidence. The Court holds that the plaintiff-bank has strictly complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 9 of the Ordinance, 2001, by placing on record all relevant financing documents, restructuring instruments, and certified statement of account. The suit has been instituted through a duly authorized attorney, and no material illegality or procedural defect has been demonstrated by the defendants. It is well settled that technical objections, in the absence of demonstrable prejudice or failure of justice, cannot defeat a claim otherwise supported by unimpeachable documentary evidence. Accordingly, the objection regarding non-compliance is devoid of legal force and substance.

It is a settled proposition that a general or evasive denial of liability does not suffice to rebut the statutory presumption attached to a certified statement of account. The law requires a defendant to point out precise discrepancies and support such objections with credible material, failing which the account statement must be accepted as correct.

COS No.13 of 2022
National Bank of PakistanVersusM/s Hussain Mills Limited & others
2026LHC2620

30/04/2026

A civil revision filed by a party itself, even if admitted for regular hearing, can be dismissed for non-prosecutionand a revisional court should not be compelled to decide a civil revision on merits in the absence of either party(ies) just because it has been admitted to regular hearing. In the said judgment it was laid down that the court should not be rendered a slave to a person who filed a revision petition and subsequently chose not to appear, nor should such person be awarded a premium for his indolence. The underlying rationale is rooted in the maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt—the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights.

Viewed from the above perspective, both situations i.e., the dismissal for non-prosecution and dismissal for non-compliance of a Court direction stem from a common underlying principle of failure of the party to diligently pursue the remedy and to adhere to the procedural discipline imposed by the Court. In fact, non-compliance of a specific direction of the Court, particularly when coupled with a history of repeated defaults, stands on an even weaker footing and provides a stronger justification for termination of proceedings.Thus, in the context of revisional jurisdiction, the principles governing dismissal for non-prosecution, as elucidated in Ghulam Qadir’s case, equally inform and justify dismissal of a civil revision for non-compliance of Court orders, especially where the jurisdiction has been invoked by a party and not exercised suo motu by the Court.
C.R. No.517 of 2018.
Muhammad Umar Versus Hafiz Muhammad Idrees
2026LHC2597

30/04/2026

Admitted gifts are not recoverable, as such, suit for recovery of gifts inter se spouses is not maintainable before the Family Court and liable to be dismissed forthwith by invoking the principles of civil law encapsulated in Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
WP. 82719/23
Simra Arif Vs ADJ etc. Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha
23-04-2026
2026 LHC 2639

30/04/2026

PLJ 2026 SC 215

It is now well recognised that a suit for partial partition is not maintainable. A party choosing to seek partition should not have the liberty to selectively choose and acquire a share in the more valuable aspects of the joint holdings while simultaneously excluding those portions of lesser value.

Each co-owner possesses ownership rights over every inch of the joint holding corresponding to their share. Therefore, it is inappropriate for any part of the joint holding to be permitted for separate partition. This principle is rooted in the need to protect all co-owners from potential discrimination and inequity. As a result, the entire property corpus is aggregated into a common pool, overseen by the Court, which ensures that each co-owner receives their allocated share fairly, based on the relative value of the properties, taking into account their area, location, and nature.

C.P.L.A.281-P/2012
Shahbaz Khan v. Dowlat Khan (deceased) through LRs & others

30/04/2026

PLJ 2026 SC 220

Part VII of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) deals with the appeals from original decrees and section 96 provides the remedy of appeal against original decree and section 100 provides remedy of second appeal. Order XLI of the Code ibid lays down the procedure in appeals. In terms of Rule 11 of Order XLI of "C.P.C." appellate court is vested with the power to dismiss the appeal without sending notice to the lower court. By virtue of sub-rule (2) of the Rule ibid if on the day fixed or any other day to which the hearing is adjourned the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the court may make an order of dismissal of appeal. Rule 12 of Order XLI of "C.P.C." deals with the day for hearing appeal.

It is thus manifestly clear from the above that if the appeal is not dismissed in terms of Rule 11 of Order XLI of "C.P.C." the court shall fix a day for hearing appeal. Rule 16 prescribes the manner of hearing of appeal. Rule 17(1) of Order XLI of "C.P.C." provides the consequences of default of the appellant to appear on the day fixed or any other day to which the hearing is adjourned.. In addition to the above, it is a settled principle of law that mere technicalities, unless offering insurmountable hurdles, are not to be allowed to defeat the ends of justice, because the principal object behind the legal formalities is to safeguard the paramount interest if justice.

C.P.L.A.5179/2025
Abdul Rehman and another v. Syed Jaffar Hussain Razvi

30/04/2026

PLJ 2026 SC CrC 119
2025 SCMR 1967
It is a settled proposition of law that in cases falling within the prohibitory clause, the grant of post-arrest bail is restricted to the exceptions enumerated therein, namely:

(i) under the first proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., where the accused is a woman, minor, or a sick or infirm person;

(ii) under the third proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., where there is an unreasonable delay in the conclusion of the trial, not attributable to the accused; and

(iii) under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C., where the case requires further inquiry into the guilt of the accused. However, upon (naeem)tentative assessment of the available material, the petitioner’s case does not appear to qualify as one of further inquiry so as to bring it within the purview of Section 497(2),Cr.P.C.

It is a settled proposition of law that where there appear reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the case falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C.
At the bail stage, deeper scrutiny of material available on record is unwarranted, as that would affect the merits of the case at the trial. However, a (naeem)tentative assessment of material available on record prima facie connects the petitioner with the commission of the offence which falls within the ambit of the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C.
Crl.P.L.A.1425/2024
Ghazi Arab v. The State

30/04/2026

PLJ 2026 SC CrC 136

Injuries do not inherently grant access to the truth and, therefore, a narrative must resonate with authenticity to warrant trust.

Another significant feature of the case is the failure to record the statement of the aforementioned witness under section 161 of the Cr.P.C., despite the witness being stationed at the same police station. Section 265-C of the Cr.P.C. mandates that the trial judge must provide the accused with statements and documents specified therein, including witness statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Cr.P.C. In the instant case, the witness statement under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. was not documented. The record indicates that Haroon-ur Rasheed purportedly sustained injuries at the time of occurrence on 03.06.2010, however, he failed to present himself to the police, nor was he summoned to provide his statement, until he appeared before the trial judge for the first time on 02.11.2010, six months after the incident. We concur with the learned Prosecutor General for State that the mere failure to examine a witness by the police does not preclude the admissibility of that individual’s statement as evidence. Nevertheless, the primary consideration for the courts is whether the lack of examination under section 161 Cr.P.C has resulted in any prejudice to the accused. In this case, Haroon-ur-Rasheed, the prosecution’s star witness and an injured party, did not have his statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C, and his initial appearance before the court on 02.11.2010 undoubtedly astonished the appellant. Prolonged silence regarding the issue is adequate to invalidate the entire evidence, as his behavior was exceedingly irregular. The appellant was unaware of the specific point Another significant feature of the case is the failure to record the statement of the aforementioned witness under section 161 of the Cr.P.C., despite the witness being stationed at the same police station. Section 265-C of the Cr.P.C. mandates that the trial judge must provide the accused with statements and documents specified therein, including witness statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Cr.P.C. In the instant case, the witness statement under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. was not documented. The record indicates that Haroon-ur Rasheed purportedly sustained injuries at the time of occurrence on 03.06.2010, however, he failed to present himself to the police, nor was he summoned to provide his statement, until he appeared before the trial judge for the first time on 02.11.2010, six months after the incident. We concur with the learned Prosecutor General for State that the mere failure to examine a witness by the police does not preclude the admissibility of that individual’s statement as evidence. Nevertheless, the primary consideration for the courts is whether the lack of examination under section 161 Cr.P.C has resulted in any prejudice to the accused. In this case, Haroon-ur-Rasheed, the prosecution’s star witness and an injured party, did not have his statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C, and his initial appearance before the court on 02.11.2010 undoubtedly astonished the appellant. Prolonged silence regarding the issue is adequate to invalidate the entire evidence, as his behavior was exceedingly irregular. The appellant was unaware of the specific point.
Crl. A. No. 655/2020
Muhammad Abras Versus The State

SYED NAEEM ALI Advocate

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