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05/08/2026

PLJ 2026 Lahore 534

Following questions of law arise for determination by this Court: i. Whether the death of the drawer/defendant during pendency of a summary suit under Order ###VII, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC"), causes the suit to abate in terms of Order XXII, CPC, or whether the right to sue survives?

ii. Whether an objection regarding maintainability of a suit under Order ###VII, CPC, can be raised for the first time, in view of Sections 29 and 29-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("the Act"), at the appellate stage by legal representatives who, after impleadment, adopted the written statement of the deceased and contested the suit on merits?

iii. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of Section 50, CPC, the impugned decree can be executed against the appellants?

Held that the objection raised by the appellants that the suit was not maintainable, keeping in view Sections 29 and 29-A of the Act as also the ratio laid down in case of Muhammad Abaid Ullah v. Ateeq-ur-Rehman and 8 others (2015 CLC 641 Lahore), is misconceived on account of distinguishable facts inasmuch as in case of Muhammad Abaid Ullah supra, the suit was instituted after death of the drawer therein, whereas in the present case, the suit was validly instituted against the drawer/defendant during his lifetime who sought and obtained leave to defend and contested the claim and upon his demise, the appellants were impleaded and voluntarily stepped into his shoes by adopting his defence and leading evidence. At no stage before the Trial Court did, they question maintainability of the suit on the basis of Sections 29 and 29-A of the Act. On the contrary, they expressly adopted the written statement of the deceased drawer/defendant and led complete defence evidence. Further held that the impugned decree determines liability of the deceased drawer/defendant. Its executability against legal representatives is statutorily circumscribed by Section 50, CPC. The Executing Court is competent to determine, upon objection, whether and to what extent any estate has been inherited and is available for satisfaction of the decree. The decree, therefore, is executable only to the extent of any estate inherited by the appellants, and not beyond.
R.F.A. 84-13
MST. ZUBAIDA KHANAM ETC VS
HAJI MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE

03/08/2026

S.406-Criminal breach of trust---
Amanat (trust)---Mere mention of word "Amanat" in FIR- Offence under Section 406. P.P.C. not attracted unless ingredients otherwise made out-Merely mentioning the word "Amanat" (trust) in the FIR does not attract the provisions of Section 406, P.P.C., if the offence is otherwise not made out in the case.
Crl.A. 10-L of 2026
LIAQAT ALi vs State.
2026 SCMR 1379
PLJ 2026 SC (CrC) 228

2026 YLR 1561
PLJ 2026 CrC 545
Bail in cae under Punjab Fertilizers Control Act, 2025
کھاد (Fertilizers) سے متعلق مقدمات میں لاہور ہائیکورٹ کی تازہ ترین ہدایات
Crl. Misc.-5480-B-25
MUHAMMAD ARSHAD VS THE STATE ETC.

PLJ 2026 CrC 598

When there is no material available on the record to show that original copy of the document has been lost and any order qua reconstruction of record from the competent authority is also not available, then mere production of photocopy of said document is of no legal value and cannot be read in evidence.
Jail Appeal.14716/23
Muhammad Sabir Vs The State

PLJ 2026 SC 400
The subsequent transferees are required to discharge a heavy burden to establish that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the prior agreement, litigation and the rights of the earlier vendee, in terms of section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The provision provides that specific performance of a contract may be enforced against any person claiming under a party thereto, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith an without notice of the original contract.

It is by now well-settled that the plea of a bona fide purchaser under section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, cannot be accepted on mere assertion, but must be established through cogent evidence and the attending circumstances of the transaction. The subsequent vendee is required to demonstrate that he acted in good faith and with due care, having undertaken such inquiry into the title of the vendor as would be expected of a prudent purchaser. Where the surrounding circumstances disclose elements of haste, lack of inquiry or such facts as would reasonably put a purchaser on notice of a prior claim, the protection of the said provision is not attracted. In such a situation, the subsequent transferee cannot claim the status of a bona fide purchaser, and the prior agreement remains enforceable against him.
Civil Appeal No. 168-L/14 etc.
Mian Mohammad Mehmood Ahmed(deceased)Versus Safdar Hussain

PLJ 2026 SC 406
Khula should not ordinarily be granted without the wife’s consent or clear election where she had sued on cruelty and valuable financial rights are implicated. However, where cruelty is not proved and marital life has manifestly collapsed, the Court must afford the wife an opportunity to elect whether to pursue dismissal of her claim or accept dissolution by khula upon lawful terms, rather than compelling restoration of a relationship that has ceased to exist in substance.
C.P.L.A. No.4792/2025
Mst. Selab Akhtar Versus Quwat Khan & Others

PLJ 2026 SC 415

(i) whether the suit challenging long-standing revenue entries was barred by limitation;

(ii) whether the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction in view of section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967; and

(iii) whether settled and long-standing entries could be disturbed where thirdparty rights had bona fide intervened.

C.P.L.A. No. 1086/2019
Nadeem Akhtar (deceased) through LRs. & Others Versus Manzoor Ahmad

PLJ 2026 SC 422
It is by now a settled principle that locus standi is not to be determined on the basis of a narrow or technical formula but with reference to whether the impugned action has adversely affected the legal rights, lawful interests or legitimate expectations of the person invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the Court. Where an administrative or quasi-judicial order operates to divest a person of an accrued statutory right or otherwise prejudicially affects his civil consequences, such person cannot be denied access to judicial review merely because he is not the direct beneficiary or addressee of the impugned order. Constitutional jurisdiction exists to prevent unlawful exercise of statutory power and to protect persons whose legal rights stand infringed thereby.

Civil Appeals. 382-L & 383-L of 2012

30/07/2026

Doctrine of Merger.
Once a superior Court Decides the matter , the earlier judgment loses independent existence on the touchstone of the doctrine of merger.
2026 SCMR 1298

30/07/2026

Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell Readiness and willingness to perform agreement-Determination-Delay in payment-Joint property-Non-joinder of co-sharers-Effect-Suit filed by respondent/vendee was dismissed by Trial Court, but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same subject to deposit of balance sale consideration-Validity-Record did not reflect that respondent/vendee was unwilling to perform his part of the contract---Respondent/vendee had approached the Trial Court seeking enforcement of agreement and expressed his readiness to remaining consideration-In matters of specific performance, readiness and willingness of vendee is to be judged from the overall conduct of the parties and not by isolating a delay in payment, particularly when no penal consequence is provided in the contract-Non-joinder of co-sharers and joint nature of the property were not sufficient to defeat the claim of vendee-Agreement to sell executed by a co-sharer can be enforced to the extent of his share and vendee may be put into symbolic or joint possession, leaving the parties to seek partition Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court as it was rightly held that such technicalities could not be made a ground to deny substantive relief where contract itself stood admitted-Appeal was dismissed.

2026 SCMR 1268

26/07/2026

PLJ 2024 SC 373
[Appellate Jurisdiction]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, Cj, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Ms. Musarrat Hilali, JJ.

BABAR ANWAR--Petitioner

versus

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and another--Respondents

C.P. No. 5972 of 2021, decided on 24.1.2024.

(Against the Judgment dated 17.09.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in Civil Revision No. 115-D/2021)

Specific Relief Act, 1877 (I of 1877)--

----Ss. 39 & 42--Civil Procedure Code, (V of 1908), S. 115--Suit for declaration and cancellation--Decreed--Concurrent findings--Permission was not obtaining by GPA for transfer of suit property--Gift-deed in favour of Respondent No. 1 by his father--Complaint was filed against Respondent No. 1 and GPA--Acquittal--Suit property was gifted to petitioner through GPA--Challenge to--Neither anything was reflected from record that general attorney obtained permission or consent from his principal for transferring property in question by means of gift to petitioner, nor was it ever pleaded that earlier gift was revoked for any reasons--If it was a case of gift, then plea of sale was misleading and erroneous, and if property was purchased against valuable consideration, then there was no logical reason for ex*****on of a gift deed rather than a conveyance deed to unveil a straightforward sale transaction--Respondent No. 1 has two sons and four daughters, and seemingly, there was no rhyme or reason on record to divulge why Respondent No. 1 deprived his own offspring, and conveyed his attorney to gift property to petitioner--Attorney ever asked for permission or consent of his principal to gift property in question to petitioner; such a gift was not validated by Courts below in three concurrent judgments--The attorney or agent may gift property on express permission and instructions of his principal--Concurrent findings of three Courts below on a question of fact neither based on any misreading or non-reading of evidence nor suffering from any illegality or material irregularity affecting merits of case--Petition dismissed. [Pp. 376, 377 & 379] A, B, E, F & H

PLD 2003 SC 494, PLD 2008 SC 389, 2016 SCMR 1781,
2017 SCMR 402 ref.

Gift--

---- Presenting a gift, whether grand or tiny, is an act of kindness and compassion, and between parents and children, it is somewhat out of love and affection. [P. 376] C

Hiba--

----Donation of a thing from which donee may derive a benefit; in language of law it means a transfer of property made immediately, and without any exchange. [P. 376] D

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908)--

----S. 115--Concurrent findings-- The jurisdiction vested in High Court under Section 115 of C.P.C. is to satisfy and reassure that order is within its jurisdiction and Court below has not acted illegally or in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, or by committing some error of procedure in course of trial which affected ultimate decision--High Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere in concurrent conclusions arrived at by Courts below while exercising power u/S. 115, C.P.C. [P. 379] G

Mian Muhammad Yasin, ASC for Petitioner.

Not Represented for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 24.1.2024.

Judgment

Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.--This Civil Petition is brought to challenge the judgment dated 17.09.2021, passed by Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in Civil Revision No. 115-D/2021, by means of which the civil revision was dismissed.

2. The compendium of facts of the case are that Respondent No. 1 had filed a suit for declaration and cancellation of a registered gift deed dater 24.09.2011. The sequence of events is that the property in question was originally owned by his father, who gifted it to the Respondent No. 1 vide gift deed No. 100 dated 10.01.1978, and also handed over its possession. Thereafter, Respondent No. 1 raised construction on the land and on 01.03.2006, he also executed a power of attorney in the name of his father for administration and supervision of the property, but the said attorney gifted the property in question to petitioner vide gift deed dated 24.09.2011. It was further stated in the plaint that the said attorney (the father of Respondent No. (sic) due to his old age and cardiac issues, was also not in a proper frame of mind. Therefore, the gift deed was the result of connivance and desingenuousness. The learned Trial Court, after recording evidence, decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020. The petitioner filed an appeal before the learned District Judge but vide judgment and decree dated 04.02.2021, the appeal was dismissed thereafter, the petitioner filed Civil Revision No. 115-D/2021 in the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which was also dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 17.09.2021.

3 The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that a valid registered gift deed was on record but all the Courts below misread the evidence. It was further contended that the concerned Sub-Registrar appeared before the learned trial Court and his evidence was also recorded, wherein he verified the contents of the registered documents. An important piece of evidence of D.W.1 was also ignored, who remained as a tenant on the property in question and depositing rent into the bank account of the petitioner from 2012 till September 2015. He further argued that the petitioner is a permanent resident of United Kingdom and in his absence, Respondent No. 1 forcibly took over possession of the property for which the petitioner had already initiated criminal proceedings against Respondent No. 1. It was further averred that in the power of attorney, the principal had authorized his attorney to gift out the property; hence, there was no need to ask for any consent or permission of the principal for conferring the gift.

4. Heard the arguments. Incontrovertibly, the property in question was gifted to the petitioner through the general attorney of Respondent No. 1. Neither is anything reflected from the record that the general attorney obtained permission or consent from his principal for transferring the property in question by means of gift to the petitioner, nor was it ever pleaded that the earlier gift was revoked for any reasons. All the more so, the petitioner pleaded in his defense that he purchased the property in question against valuable consideration, but at the same time, he was also claiming the property as a lawful donee. Both pleas are mutually destructive if considered in juxtaposition. If it was a case of gift, then the plea of sale was misleading and erroneous, and if the property was purchased against valuable consideration, then there was no logical reason for the ex*****on of a gift deed rather than a conveyance deed to unveil a straightforward sale transaction. As far as the proof of possession of Respondent No. 1 is concerned, it clearly transpires from the documents exhibited in the Trial Court that though the petitioner’s special attorney averred that at the time of transfer of property, possession was also delivered, but subsequently, it was snatched by Respondent No. 1 which assertion was belied and in support of thereof, the Respondent No. 1 produced copies of Form P.T.I as Exh.P7 to Exh. P. 10 a bunch of electricity bills as Exh.P12, and a bunch of sui gass bill as Exh.P13 to corroborate and substantiate the factum of possession. The petitioner filed a complaint under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 against Respondent No. 1 and his special attorney, but the Trial Court acquitted them vide judgment dated 13.03.2019, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court vide order dated 09.12.2019.

5. Presenting a gift, whether grand or tiny, is an act of kindness and compassion, and between the parents and children, it is somewhat out of love and affection. According to Hedaya, “Hiba,” in its literal sense, signifies the donation of a thing from which the donee may derive a benefit; in the language of the law it means a transfer of property made immediately, and without any exchange. While according to Ameer Ali, “A hiba, pure and simple, is the voluntary transfer, without consideration, of some specific property (whether existing in substance or as a chose in action)”. According to Mulla, “A hiba or gift is “a transfer of property, made immediately and without any exchange” by one person to another, and accepted by or on behalf of the latter”. Whereas according to Fyzee, “Hiba” is the immediate and unqualified transfer of the corpus of the property without any return”. According to Sir Abdul Raheem, “the Muhammadan law defines hiba or a simple gift inter vivos as a transfer of a determinate property without an exchange”. A similar definition is provided by Baillie, “Gift”, as it is defined in law, is the conferring of a right of property in something specific, without an exchange. Similarly, according to Sahih Muslim, “A Hiba is defined as the transfer of possession of property, movable and immovable, from one person to the other willingly and without reward”. The doner should be compos mentis, meaning thereby a person who is of sound mind and has the mental capacity to understand the legal implications of his act of making a gift, and he must be of age and the owner of the property intended to be gifted; the thing gifted should be in existence at the time of making hiba; the thing gifted should be such that benefitting from it is lawful under the Shariat; the donor must be free from any coercion/duress or undue influence while making a gift; the thing gifted should come into the possession of the donee himself or through his representative/ guardian for an effective hiba. Under the Muslim law, the constituents and components of a valid gift are tender, acceptance, and possession of property. It is also obligatory that the donor divest and dissociate himself from the dominion and ownership over the property of the gift and put into words his categorical intention to convey the ownership to the donee distinctly and unambiguously with the delivery of possession of the property and ensure that donee has secured physical ascendency over the property to constitute the delivery of possession [Ref: Abid Hussain and others vs Muhammad Yousaf and others (PLD 2022 SC 395)].

6. One more important aspect that cannot be lost sight of is that Respondent No. 1 has two sons and four daughters, and seemingly, there was no rhyme or reason on record to divulge why Respondent No. 1 deprived his own offspring, and conveyed his attorney to gift the property to the petitioner. A gift emanates from love and affection and sometime it is quid pro quo personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. Consideration like love or affection in the matter of alienation must proceed from the original and real owner of the property in relation to the donee; such an element if springing out from a delegatee or agent, could not be supplanted on the principal, not being the donor himself. Nothing is presented on record through cogent evidence that the attorney ever asked for the permission or consent of his principal to gift the property in question to the petitioner; therefore, such a gift was not validated by the Courts below in three concurrent judgments. The attorney or agent may gift the property on express permission and instructions of his principal. A similar proposition was also dealt with by this Court in the following dictums:-

1. Jamil Akhtar and others vs. Las Baba and others (PLD 2003 SC 494). It was held that it is a settled principle of law that whenever a general attorney transfers the property of his principal in his even (sic) or in the name of his close fiduciary relations, he has to take (sic) permission from the principal.

2. Muhammad Ashraf and 2 others vs Muhammad Malik and others (PLD 2008 SC 389). There is no evidence on record to show that the attorney before making the gift in favour of his son-in-law ever obtained the consent and permission of the plaintiffs and sought any approval from the real owner of the property, who even according to the stance of the petitioners are his principals. It is a settled law by now that if an attorney intends to exercise right of sale/gift in his favour or in favour of next of his kin, he/she had to consult the principal before exercising that right. The consistent view of this Court is that if an attorney on the basis of power of attorney, even if “general” purchases the property for himself or for his own benefit, he should firstly obtain the consent and approval of principal after acquainting him with all the material circumstances. Here the cases of Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan (deceased) through legal heirs and others PLD 1985 SC 341. Mst. Shumal Begum v. Mst. Gulzar Begum and 3 others 1994 SCMR 818 and Nisar Ahmad and others v. Naveed-ud-Din and others 2004 SCMR 619, can be referred, which are fully applicable to the case in hand.

3. Mst. Naila Kausar and another vs Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh and others (2015 SCMR 1781). It is settled law that an attorney cannot utilize the powers conferred upon him to transfer the property to himself (sic) is kith and kin without special and specific consent and permission of the principal. It is an equally settled law that the power of attorney cannot be utilized for effecting a gift by the attorney without intentions and directions of the principal to gift the property, which intentions and directions must be proved on record. There is also no specific written permission by Mst. Fatima Jan to Appellant No. 2, Sardar Muhammad Aslam to gift the property to Appellant No. 1 his daughter.

4. Allah Ditta and others vs Manak alias Muhammad Siddique and others (2017 SCMR 402). The Court noted that the relationship inter se the alleged donor and the petitioners is of uncle and nephew(s). The consideration for the gift as alleged by the respondent, that he has been looking after the alleged donor has not been proved on the record. It seems unnatural that a person could deprive his own children and dole out the property to others, may be nephews. The alleged donor had his

own children, besides the mutation of transfer of immovable property is only a manifestation of the oral transaction and it does not (sic) any presumption of correctness, particularly in the circumstances when it has been assailed by the person affected by the same.

7. The jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“C.P.C.”) is to satisfy and reassure that the order is within its jurisdiction and the Court below has not acted illegally or in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, or by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which affected the ultimate decision. Furthermore, the High Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere in the concurrent conclusions arrived at by the Courts below while exercising power under Section 115, C.P.C. Here the concurrent findings of the three Courts below on a question of fact neither based on any misreading or non-reading of evidence nor suffering from any illegality or material irregularity affecting the merits of the case.

8. In our considered analysis, the judgment passed by the High Court does not suffer from any misreading or non-reading of evidence nor from any other illegality and/or irregularity. For the reasons to be recorded later, this Civil Petition was dismissed and leave was refused by our short order dated 24.01.2024. Above are the reasons in the aid of our short order.

(Y.A.) Petition dismissed

Off loading of passengers by emigration department
26/07/2026

Off loading of passengers by emigration department

Travel abroad by an accused.
26/07/2026

Travel abroad by an accused.

20/07/2026

عدالتی حکم و فیصلہ کے بعد نقولات کے درخواست دینا اور معیاد کی ترتیب و گنتی کے لیے اہم تفصیلی کیس لا۔
PLJ 2025 Tr.C. (Labour) 173
[Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal No. II, Multan]

Present: Justice ® Shahid Mobeen, Chairman

SHAMIM & COMPANY (PVT) LTD., DISTRICT JAIL ROAD,MULTAN through Chief Executive of the Company--Petitioner

versus

KHIZAR HAYAT and another--Respondents

Labour Revision No. 07 of 2024, decided on 27.8.2025.

Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (IV of 1936)--

----Ss. 15(2) & 17--Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), S. 5, 12--Appeal--Dismissed--Time barred--Limitation--Exclusion of time for obtaining certified copies--Remanded to-- It would not be out of place to mention that petitioner applied for certified copy of order passed by Respondent well within 30 days, which was a period for filing appeal under Section 17 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936-- Limitation of appeal was governed by S. 17 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936--It would not be out of place to mention here that if time requisite for obtaining copy of order was excluded then appeal would be within time--It was clears that 03 days i.e. day on which order was pronounced and day on which copy applied and day on which copy was delivered shall be excluded from commutation of time as time requisite under S. 12 of Limitation Act, 1908--Period in preparing copy was also excluded and if this principle was applied in present case, then appeal had been filed within a period of 30 days as enshrined in Payment of Wages Act, 1936--As available record clearly demonstrates above position, therefore, non filing of application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, had no relevance. [Pp. 175 & 176] A, B, E & F

High Court Rules & Order--

----Vol. I, Chap.-C--Commencement of limitation--Under High Court Rules and Order, Volume-11 Chapter-C, Rule 7, 22 coping agency is bound to intimate applicant/ appellant about date on which, copy would be prepared and where a date is notified to applicant/ appellant to be date of, for delivering, then, limitation period would be commuted from notified date and not from date of delivery--Where particular date has been notified by copying agency for delivery of copy then applicant would be obliged to visit office on that date, even when judgment is duly communicated on that date.

[P. 176] C

General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897)--

----S. 9--Computation of limitation--Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of Limitation Act, 1908 clearly lays down that day of announcement of judgment was also to be excluded as Section 9 of General Clauses Act, 1897 also provides for exclusion of first day in a series of days or any other period of time--Petition allowed. [P. 176] D

Ms. Robina Magsi, Advocate for Petitioner.

Mr. Zahoor Ahmad Chaudhry, Advocate for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 27.8.2025.

Order

Through this revision petition, the petitioner assail the order dated 23.07.2019 passed by Authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Multan (hereinafter to be referred as “Authority) and judgment dated 13.02.2024 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. IX, Multan.

2.Precise facts of the instant petition are that an application under Section 15(2) of Payment of Wages Act, 1936 was filed by Respondent No. 1. He claimed to have served the petitioner/ establishment as Time Keeper, however, breakup of his claims was as under:

i. Notice Pay Rs. 14,000/-

ii. Gratuity Rs. 2,58,462/-

iii. Bonus for 16 years Rs. 2,24,000/-

iv. Leave Encashment for 16 years Rs. 2.24,000/-

v. Overtime charge for 4 hours Rs. 2,58,462/-

vi. 5% workers participation Rs. 13,440/-

vii. Last 3 days pay Rs. 1,620/-

viii. Medical Allowance Rs. 2,50,000/-

ix. Legal Expenses Rs. 50,000/-

Total Amount Rs. 12.93,984/-

With 10 times compensation Rs. 1.42.33,824/-

3. The learned Authority, Multan after receiving application under Section 15(2) of Payment of Wages Act, 1936 issued notice to the petitioner. In response thereto, petitioner’s representative appeared and submitted power of attorney. The reply was submitted on 06.07.2018 and the learned Authority framed six issues including relief. The case was fixed for evidence of the parties. The learned Authority after recording the evidence and hearing the arguments accepted the claim of the Respondent No. I vide order dated 23.07.2019.

4. Being dissatisfied with the order of Authority. petitioner filed an appeal, which also met with same fate and dismissed on the ground that same is barred by limitation vide impugned judgment dated 1302.2024. Hence, this petition.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that appeal before the learned Punjab Labour Court No. IX, Multan was within time.

6. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment.

7. Heard. Available record perused.

8. It will not be out of place to mention that the petitioner applied for certified copy of the order passed by the Respondent No. 2 well within 30 days, which is a period for filing appeal under Section 17 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The limitation of appeal is governed by Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and for ease reference Section 17 is reproduced herein below:--

17. Appeal.--(1) An appeal against a direction made under sub section (3) or sub-section (4) of Section 15 may be preferred within thirty days of the date on which the direction was made before the [Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose]--

9. It is manifestly clear that appeal may be filed within a period of 30 days. From the available record it is clear that the Respondent No. 2 decided the case on 23.07.2019, the petitioner applied for certified copies on 03.08.2019 and copies were prepared on 06.08.2019 and appeal was filed on 26.08.2019.

10. It will not be out of place to mention here that if time requisite for obtaining copy of order is excluded then the appeal will be within time. For ease reference Section 12 is reproduced herein below:--

12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded.

(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.

(3) Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded.

(4) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.

(5) For the purposes of sub-sections (2), (3) and (4), the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, order, judgment or award shall be deemed to be the time intervening between the day on which an application for the copy is made and the day actually intimated to the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery.

11. Under High Court Rules and Order. Volume-1, Chapter-C, Rule 7, 22 coping agency is bound to intimate the applicant/ appellant about the date on which, the copy would be prepared and where a date is notified to the applicant/ appellant to be the date of, for delivering, then, limitation period would be commuted from the notified date and not from the date of delivery. Where particular date has been notified by copying agency for delivery of copy then applicant would be obliged to visit the office on that date, even when the judgment is duly communicated on that date.

12. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 clearly lays down that day of announcement of judgment was also to be excluded as Section 9 of General Clauses Act, 1897 also provides for exclusion of the first day in a series of days or any other period of time.

13. For commuting the period of limitation, the day on which application for copy was made and day on which such copy was obtained are both part of time requisite for obtaining the copy and would be excluded therefrom.

14. From the above discussion and the case law, it is clear that 03 days i.e. the day on which order was pronounced and the day on which copy applied and day on which copy was delivered shall be excluded from commutation of time as time requisite under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

15. The period in preparing copy is also excluded and if this principle is applied in the present case, then the appeal has been filed within a period of 30 days as enshrined in Payment of Wages Act, 1936. As available record clearly demonstrates the above position, therefore, non filing of application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has no relevance importance. The discussion made in the above paras are in line with the judgments reported in 2016 YLR 214, 2007 CLC 213, 1987 CLC 664, PLD 1978 Lahore 31, PLD 1960 Lahore 443, 1979 CLC 694, PLD 1976 Lahore 802.

16. Sequel to the above, this petition is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 13.02.2024 is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the learned Labour Court, Multan to decide the same afresh on merits after hearing the parties.

File to records.

(J.K.) Petition allowed

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