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M/s Yasir Law Associates, Suite #309, 3rd Floor, Uni shopping Center, Abdullah Haroon Road, Karachi (2026)

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Suite #309, 3rd Floor, Uni Shopping Center, Abdullah Haroon Road

07/09/2026

A person who voluntarily raises construction or effects improvements upon another's property without the consent of the owner does so at his own risk. Such unauthorized improvements neither confer title nor create a legal entitlement to compensation. The law protects ownership and possession; it does not permit an unauthorized occupant to impose financial liability upon the true owner by making unilateral alterations to the property. The law is well settled that a person occupying another's property as a tenant or under permissive possession cannot claim compensation for improvements or constructions raised without the consent of the owner. Any such expenditure is incurred at his own risk and does not create a proprietary, equitable, or compensatory right in his favour.

Civil Appeal No. 140-P of 2018
Sher Said vs Umar Akhtar
PLJ 2026 SC 478

07/09/2026

2026 PCrLJ 1278
Electronic evidence---Emails, proof of---Absence of statutory certificate/proof---Effect---Accused contested general election but was convicted by the Trial Court for committing corrupt practices by filing a forged educational degree and making a false declaration---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him variously, the maximum sentence being six months' imprisonment---Validity---Persons who allegedly sent the emails produced by the prosecution did not appear as witnesses to prove that they had sent emails to the Registrar of the foreign university to verify the degree of the accused, or that they had received replies thereto---Question also arose as to who had taken printouts of the emails exhibited in evidence---Prosecution witness who produced the emails did not produce the requisite certificate/proof under Art. 78-a of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, nor was the statutory requirement under Ss. 16 & 17 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 satisfied for proving electronic signatures/documents---Prosecution did not specifically prove that the emails established involvement of the accused in any offence---Electronic evidence was not duly proved in accordance with law---Email was typed on a computer but was not in the format used to view or download emails from "Yahoo Mail"---None of the emails produced by the prosecution qualified as admissible electronic evidence in the absence of the requisite certificate/proof under Art. 78-a of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 and Ss. 16 & 17 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002---Contents of the emails were not duly proved by the prosecution witness---Emails in question were inadmissible as electronic evidence as they were not original emails and were not supported by the requisite statutory certificate/proof.

07/09/2026

Correction in Date of birth case law of LAHORE HIGH COURT.
COMPLETE : 2018 YLRN 55 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD ZAHIR SAJJAD
Side Opponent : NATIONAL DATABASE AND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
S. 42---Suit for declaration---correct ion of Date of birth in educational testimonials---Scope---Contention of plaintiff was that his Date of birth was 10-01-1986 instead of 10-09-1992---Suit was dismissed concurrently--- Validity--- Plaintiff through oral and documentary evidence had proved that his actual Date of birth was 10-01-1986 and not 10-09-1992---Documents produced by the plaintiff were of ficial record and their authenticity could not be doubted---Findings recorded by the Trial Court were based on presumptions---Appellate Court without formulating points for determination had relied upon the stance of defendants and had not considered the impact of oral and documentary evidence of plaintiff---Both the Courts below had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them---Findings recorded by the Courts below were result of mis-reading and non-reading of evidence---Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below were set aside and suit was decreed---Revision was allowed in circumstances.
: 2018 CLCN 10 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION LAHORE
Side Opponent : ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, SHEIKHUPURA
Ss. 42 & 54---Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act (XIII of 1976), Ss. 29 & 31---Date of birth , correct ion of ---Ex parte decree, setting aside of ---Petitioner, Board of Secondary Education against which an ex parte decree was passed in a suit for correct ion of Date of birth of respondent---Trial Court, on application of the Board set aside ex parte judgment and decree but Lower Appellate Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside order passed by Trial Court---Validity---Trial Court had passed ex parte decree after taking into consideration evidence produced by respondent and Board had failed to defend the suit at the relevant time---No reason was available with Trial Court to set aside ex parte judgment especially when none of the grounds raised by the Board in its application was made out from the record---Lower Appellate Court was justified in entertaining revision for setting aside order especially when representative of the Board appeared in court and did not raise any question of lack of jurisdiction before Lower Appellate Court and absented himself therefrom--- High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Lower Appellate Court as no illegality, perversity or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction could be pointed out in the order passed by Lower Appellate Court---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. : 2017 YLR 1485 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE
Side Opponent : AKBAR ALI
S. 42---Suit for declaration---Limitation---Change of Date of birth ---Scope--- Rectification of school Certification--- Scope--- Contention of plaintiff was that his Date of birth was 06-12-1983 instead of 06-12-1978---Suit was decreed concurrently---Validity---Ossification test was conducted on the instructions of defendant---Result of ossification test was in favour of plaintiff which had not been rebutted by the defendant through documentary evidence---Date of birth of plaintiff was 06-12-1983---Mistake might have occurred in the admission form and same was rectifiable---Suit for which no period of limitation was provided could be filed within a period of six years when right to sue accrued---Civil Court being court of ultimate jurisdiction could look into the illegality committed by any forum---Plaintiff had taken all possible steps for rectification of school certificate---Decisions of courts below were based on reasons---No illegality or irregularity had been pointed out in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the courts below---correct ion of Date of birth did not affect right of any person or policy of Education Board---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.
: 2017 CLCN 200 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, MULTAN
Side Opponent : MUHAMMAD SHAHZAD ASLAM
S. 29---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 9---correct ion of Date of birth and father's name in matriculation certificate---Defendant/Education Board challenged jurisdiction of Civil Court---Education Board contended that Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976 barred jurisdiction of Civil Court to adjudicate the matter and further submitted that plaintiff himself filled up Date of birth and parentage in his admission form---Respondent/plaintiff contended that decree and judgment of the two courts below were justified as his Date of birth in Union Council certificate was correct , similarly correct name of his father was incorporated in CNIC of his father---Validity---Respondent/plaintiff himself appeared before the court and got his statement recorded to the effect that his actual Date of birth was 01-01-1983 which had wrongly been inserted as 01-01-1981 in the matriculation certificate whereas his father's name had also been wrongly mentioned and at the time of issuance of the CNIC such was pointed out by the NADRA authorities---Respondent/plaintiff was cross-examined but no material discrepancy was found regarding the said facts---Exhibited birth certificate issued by the Secretary Union Council corroborated the stance taken by the plaintiff/respondent---Moreover, CNIC of the father of the respondent also revealed the correct name of father---No evidence was produced by the petitioner/defendant to rebut the contents of the plaint except that the entries, age and father's name, were made in the documents of the Board by the respondent himself---Contention about ouster clause, in terms of S. 29 of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976 was repelled because, S. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 conferred the plenary jurisdiction to the civil court which could not be taken away in a situation where the aggrieved person found himself remediless, particularly, when a dispute required detailed evidence in order to resolve a factual controversy---Respondent had no alternate forum for redressal of his grievance---High Court declined interference in the concurrent findings of the courts below---Revision petition was dismissed accordingly. : 2016 PLD 539 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : AHMAD NAWAZ KHAN BAKHTIARI
Side Opponent : APPELLATE AUTHORITY
S. 27(1)(b)---National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000), Ss. 9, 10 & 19---Election for local government---Dispute with regard to age of candiDate ---Entries of National Identity Card and birth Registration Certificate---Scope---Nomination papers were rejected by the Returning of ficer on the ground that candiDate did not qualify being under twenty-five years of age---Appellate authority accepted the nomination papers holding that candiDate was more than twenty five years according to birth Registration Certificate---Validity---National Identity Card was a public document having probative value---Presumption of truth was attached to the National Identity Card which could be considered as evidence---Entries of National Identity Card were considered to be more authentic and admitted to be correct ---Such entries should be given preference over other documents/certificates unless same were rebutted by better and strong evidence---Entries of National Identity Card should be considered for determining the age of any person---Preference should be given to the entries made in the National Identity Card over the entries made in the birth Registration Certificate---Computerized National Identity Card of the candiDate , in the present case, was duplicate or had been issued after expiry of old one---Nothing was on record that any effort was made by the candiDate for correct ion of his Date of birth if wrongly mentioned on Computerized National Identity Card before filing of his nomination papers---CandiDate had used present National Identity Card for many years without any complaint---Date of birth of candiDate was less than twenty five years at the time of filing of nomination papers and he was not eligible to contest the election---Impugned order passed by the appellate authority was set aside and that of Returning of ficer was restored---Nomination papers submitted by the candiDate were rejected---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.: 2016 YLR 2435 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
Side Opponent : MUHAMMAD UMAIR
S. 42---Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act (XIII of 1976), Ss. 29 & 31---Suit for declaration---Date of birth , correct ion of ---Malice---Scope---Contention of plaintiff was that his correct Date of birth was 14-11-1993 and not 07-11-1991---Suit was decreed concurrently---Validity---Malice on the part of defendants (Board of Secondary Education) had been asserted in the plaint---Plaintiff was not under any obligation to specify any person of the Education Board with an allegation of any enmity rather it was ridiculous to presume that there would be any enmity or personal grudge of the of ficials of Education Board against a student---Non-performance of duties in accordance with rules, regulations and principle of natural justice would amount to mala fide on the part of Board of ficials---Where rights of any one were infringed then civil court had ample jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter--Plaintiff had proved his case through cogent evidence---Actual Date of birth of plaintiff was 14-11-1993---Revision was dismissed in circumstances
: 2016 YLR 1625 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
Side Opponent : MUHAMMAD ASLAM SHAD
S. 27---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199--- Constitutional petition---Nomi-nation of a candiDate ---Disqualification of candiDate for being under age---Scope---According to CNIC, Date of birth of respondent was 25-09-1986 whereas its entry in CNIC varied from the Date preserved with NADRA where his Date of birth was recorded as 25-09-1991---Copies of both CNIC's had the same number and even Date of issuance and Date of expiry was the same---Photocopy of CNIC attached with nomination papers of respondent was tampered with to change his actual Date of birth ---Respondent had placed on record same photocopy of CNIC of respondent, which had already been appended by petitioner with the petition---Photocopy of CNIC produced by petitioner had been obtained by him from online verification of NADRA ---- High Court observed that there was no force in the argument that Date of birth had wrongly been recorded in CNIC of respondent---CNIC was issued to respondent on 21-12-2013 and he remained silent for about two years and did not make any effort to get his Date of birth correct ed from NADRA---Date of birth of respondent shown in his computerized birth Certificate also did not tally with his Date of birth mentioned in the photocopy of ID card appended with nomination papers ---Respondent at the time of filing of his nomination papers was having inherent defect of disqualification, therefore, he was not qualified to hold any public of fice on such basis ---- Respondent was disqualified from being elected as General Councillor and Election Commission of Pakistan was ordered to hold re-election within a period of two months---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
: 2011 YLR 2062 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : SALMAN ILYAS
Side Opponent : VICE-CHANCELLOR, BZU
Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Petitioner challenged cancellation of his admission to M.B.A. on account of his being overage---Validity---Petitioner had already passed his first semester before his admission was cancelled---Denial of re-admission to petitioner could put his future prospects at stake---Vacancy resulting from cancellation of petitioner's admission would cause loss of public money---No fraud or misrepresentation had been alleged against the petitioner who mentioned his correct Date of birth on the application Form---If petitioner had been found ineligible, his application should have been rejected at initial stage allowing him opportunity to apply for admission to some other course or degree---Negligence was committed by the University Staff in scrutinizing the application of petitioner---Constitutional petition was allowed with direction to the University to allow the petitioner to rejoin his studies in M.B.A. programme.
: 2007 PLD 453 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : Malik MUHAMMAD FAISAL
Side Opponent : STATE LIFE INSURACNE CORPORATION through Chairman, Karachi and 2 others
---Date ----Date of birth , proof of ---National Identity Card and School/Board Record both containing different Date s of birth of same person---Validity---Date of birth mentioned in National Identity Card would ordinarily be taken to correct unless proved to the contrary by cogent and convincing evidence---Date of birth recorded in School/Board record, though different, but earliest in time than National Identity Card, would be taken to be true---Principles.
: 2002 MLD 1966 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE
Side Opponent : Miss GHAZALA ROOHI
Specific Relief Act 1877 ----S.42.---Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act (XIII of 1976), Ss.29 & 31 Educational institution- correct ion of Date of birth of candiDate - Suit for declaration---Jurisdiction of Civil Court--Criteria to determine, jurisdiction of Civil Court---If any action had been taken in good faith though same might not have been done strictly in accordance with relevant provisions of law, jurisdiction of Civil Court would be excluded under Ss.29 & 31 of Punjab Boards of Intermediate end Secondary Education Act, 1976---Wheie -no allegation was levelled with regard to mala fides and lack of good faith on part of Board's committee, jurisdiction of Civil Court would stand ousted---If Board's Committee had acted against provisions of Statute or allegations of mala fides were made against Board regarding any act, jurisdiction of Civil Court could not be ousted despite provisions of Ss.29 & 31 of Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976---If there was no allegations of mala fides and bad faith on part of of ficials of Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain suit regarding correct ion of entries of Date of birth of plaintiff candiDate .

09/08/2026

PLD 2026 Peshawar 154
Attachment of property of absconder ------
Restoration of attached property----Limitation-+++
Application of the accused/petitioner for restoration of his attached property was dismissed on the ground of limitation-Said orders were challenged by filing an appeal but the same was also dismissed-Validity-Accused, who was involved in a criminal case remained absconder for a considerable period and proceedings under S.88, Cr.P.C., were initiated against him and an order for attachment of his land was passed-Record transpired that the petitioner/accused appeared before the Court, faced trial and was acquitted of the charge under S.265-K, Cr.P.C-After his acquittal, accused-petitioner filed an application for restoration of the property attached in favour of the Provincial Government--However, the trial Court dismissed the said application on the ground that it was not submitted within the period of two years, as prescribed by the provision of S.89, Cr.P.C-Said findings were endorsed by the appellate Court... Plain reading of the provision of S.89, Cr.P.C, made it clear that the statutory period of two years from the date of attachment was expressly linked to two categories of persons, i.e., (i) those who appeared voluntarily, and (i) those who were apprehended and brought before the Court-Language of the said provision did not draw a distinction in the application of the two-year limitation-Instead, the expression "if, within two years..." grammatically and legally governed both categories of appearance-Legislature, having consciously used inclusive phrasing, must be presumed to have intended equal treatment of both forms of appearance within the prescribed time frame---Had it been the intention of the law to restrict the time limit only to voluntary appearance, the legislature would have either excluded the second category or prescribed a separate limitation for persons who were arrested and produced in custody-Absence of any such separate clause strongly indicated that both forms of appearance were meant to be treated identically for the purpose of invoking the right to restoration of attached property---If the two-year limitation were interpreted to apply only to persons who appear voluntarily, it would result in irregular

categories, legal consequences-Pertinent question would then arise, what period. the Court, as the statute was silent on any such alternate timeline-To if any, would govern the case of a person arrested and brought before silent for the other would introduce confusion, uncertainty, and apply the two-year limitation to only one category and it remaining arbitrariness in a matter involving coercive deprivation of property, that would be contrary to the principles of legal certainty and fair procedure embodied in Arts. 4 and 10-A of the Constitution Therefore, the two-year period prescribed under S.89, Cr.P.C. applied uniformly to both apprehended and brought before the Court, subject to the condition whether the person appeared voluntarily or was that he satisfied the Court that he did not abscond or conceal himself to avoid ex*****on of the warrant and that accused had no sufficient notice time-Such interpretation not onation to appear the plain and unambiguous language of the statute but also upheld well-established principles of statutory interpretation, i.e., no part of a legislative provision should be rendered redundant or superfluous; secondly, where the legislature employed comprehensive or liberal language, it must be construed liberally so as to give full effect to the legislative intent; and, thirdly, any interpretation that led to irrationality, uncertainty, or arbitrary distinctions between similarly positioned persons must be avoided-Purpose of the provisions of S.88, Cr.P.C, was not to punish an accused person and its object was to procure his attendance, which object, on the face of it, had been achieved as the petitioner was arrested and after facing the trial, he was acquitted of the charge under S.265-K, Cr.P.C--Likewise, the property, though, was entered in the name of the Provincial Government but practically and physically was in possession of the petitioners without any interference and, thus, the impugned attachment having not yet finalized as required under the law, was liable to be set aside---Attachment included taking physical possession and other methods as specified in subsection (4) of S.88, Cr.P.C---Therefore, the limitation period under S.89, Cr.P.C, could only be invoked after the complete attachment of the immovable property-In the present case, since the process of complete attachment was not carried out, the question of limitation did not arise in the given circumstances-

09/08/2026

PLD 2026 Islamabad 164

Inheritance of propositus---Children of predeceased son or daughter---Entitlement to share of predeceased parent---Pending appeal against Federal Shariat Court judgment---Judgment not taking effect till disposal of appeal-Scope-Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 provides that where a son or daughter of a deceased person dies before succession opens, the children of such predeceased son or daughter, if any, shall per stirpes receive a share equivalent to the share which such son or daughter would have received if alive---Thus, S.4 enables the children of a predeceased son or daughter to receive their deceased parent's share in the inheritance of the propositus Provision of S.4 of the Ordinance was reviewed by the Federal Shariat Court in Allah Rakha and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2000 FSC 1) and was held to be against the Injunctions of Islam; however, said judgment was challenged before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court and the appeal was pending adjudication In view of the first proviso to Art. 203-D(2) of the Constitution, the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court in Allah Rakha case would not take effect before disposal of the pending appeal by the Supreme Court---Significantly, S.4 of the Ordinance restricts its application to the "children of predeceased son or daughter of the propositus" and does not extend to all legal heirs of such predeceased son or daughter The spouse of the predeceased son/daughter is therefore excluded from inheriting the share of such predeceased son/daughter from the propositus under S.4---Unless the Supreme Court decides otherwise in the pending appeal against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court in Allah Rakha case, S.4 of the Ordinance is to be given effect as binding law---

09/08/2026

کرپٹو کرنسی، USDT/P2P ٹریڈنگ، PECA، FERA سے متعلق لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا فیصلہ
صرف بینک اکاؤنٹ میں رقم وصول ہونا جرم ثابت نہیں کرتا۔
صرف P2P یا USDT ٹرانزیکشن جرم نہیں۔
فوجداری ذمہ داری ہمیشہ انفرادی ہوتی ہے۔
ہر ملزم کا کردار الگ الگ ثابت کرنا ضروری ہے۔
PECA کی دفعات لگانے کے لیے الیکٹرانک فراڈ یا جعلی ڈیٹا کا واضح ثبوت ضروری ہے۔
PPC کی دفعات 468 اور 471 صرف جعلی دستاویز یا جعلی الیکٹرانک ریکارڈ کی موجودگی میں لاگو ہوں گی۔
USDT کو خودکار طور پر Foreign Currency یا Foreign Exchange قرار نہیں دیا جا سکتا۔

Crl. Misc. No. 1974-B/2026
Hammad Ali and others Vs The State and another
2026LHC4849

09/08/2026

منشیات کے کیس میں ریکوری میمو پر مقدمہ نمبر ، وقت درج نہ تھا، اور نہ ہی جگہ کا نام تھا جہاں سے منشیات برآمد/پکڑی گئی تھی، ملزم شک کی بنیاد پر بری.

2025 YLR 75

Possession of narcotic substances---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery memo---Doubtful---Prosecution case was that 2250-grams charas was recovered from the possession of the accused---Record showed that recovery memo of charas neither contained the number nor the date of the FIR nor the name of police station---Complainant had admitted that in recovery memo there was no specific mention of place where the contraband was allegedly recovered from the accused---Furthermore, the recovery witness in his cross-examination had also deposed that he did not remember as to what case FIR number was written on the recovery memo. at the time when he signed the same---In view of such depositions of the witnesses, serious doubt was casted upon the authenticity of preparation of recovery memo.---Moreover, tenor of the testimonies of prosecution's witnesses clearly revealed the recovery memo. was prepared after registration of the FIR in the case, therefore, no legal sanctity could be attached to such document---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused beyond any shadow of doubt---

Crl. Appeal 549-23
NAYYAR ABBAS VS
STATE ETC

09/08/2026

🔴 Identification Parade .. (شناخت پریڈ)

شناخت پریڈ کے قوائد جاننے کے لئے ایک بار ضرور پڑھ لیں ۔۔
PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.c) 153

----The necessary guidelines for Identification Parade...

(a) An identification parade, to inspire confidence, must be held at earliest possible opportunity after occurrence;

(b) A test identification, where possibility of witness having seen accused persons after their arrest cannot be ruled out, is worth nothing at all--It is, therefore, imperative to eliminate all such possibilities.

(c) identification parades should never be held at police stations;

(d) the Magistrate, supervising identification proceedings, must verify period, if any, for which accused persons have remained in police custody after their arrest and before test identification and must incorporate this fact in his report about proceedings;

(e) Ordinarily ratio between accused persons and dummies should be 1 to 9 or 10--This ratio must be followed unless there are some special justifiable circumstances warranting a deviation from it;

(f) If there are more accused persons than one, separate identification parades should ordinarily be held in respect of each accused person;

(g) A witness has participated in identification proceedings, he is stationed at a place from where he cannot observe proceedings and that after his participation he is lodged at a place from where it is not possible for him to communicate with those who have yet to take their turn;

(h) The Magistrate conducting proceedings must take an intelligent interest in proceedings;

(i) The Magistrate is obliged to prepare a list of all persons (dummies) who form part of line-up at parade alongwith their parentage, occupation and addresses;

(j) The Magistrate must faithfully record all objections and statements, if any, made either by accused persons or by identifying witnesses before, during or after proceedings;

(k) Where a witness correctly identifies an accused person,Magistrate must ask witness about connection in which witness has identified that person;

(l) and where a witness identifies a person wrongly, Magistrate must so record in his report and should also state number of persons wrongly picked by witness;

29/07/2026

PLD 2026 SC 308

Supreme Court determined the extent of the period for which a neglected wife can claim maintenance, concentrating on the maximum retrospective period that the Court can consider when deciding such claims.

A wife's claim to recover past maintenance is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, prescribing a six-year period; but since non-payment of maintenance recurs monthly and constitutes a "continuing wrong" under Section 23 thereof, a fresh cause of action accrues de die in diem with each missed payment, so that the limitation bar operates only upon the remedy and not upon the underlying debt, entitling the wife to recover arrears for the period falling within six years preceding the suit notwithstanding her earlier delay in approaching the Court.
C.A.1413/202
Muhammad Aslam Chattah v. Shehnaz Akhtar Zahoor Ahmed and another

29/07/2026

Past Maintenance: An Important Judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan

C.A. No. 1413 of 2021
Muhammad Aslam Chattha v. Shehnaz Akhtar Zahoor Ahmed and another
PLD 2026 Supreme Court 308

Can a wife claim maintenance for the years during which her husband failed to support her, even if she approaches the court much later?

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has answered this question in an important judgment.

The wife married the appellant in 2002. According to her, the husband stopped maintaining her from 2004. She eventually filed a suit in 2017, claiming maintenance from June 2004.

The Family Court awarded her maintenance from June 2004 at Rs.10,000 per month, with a 15% annual increase. The appellate court, however, limited the maintenance to the period from the date of filing of the suit. The High Court restored the Family Court’s decision.

The husband then approached the Supreme Court, arguing that the wife could not claim maintenance for a period beyond six years.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court held that a husband’s duty to maintain his wife arises from the marriage and continues during the marriage, subject to the conditions recognised under Islamic law.

The Court also made an important point about limitation.

Under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a claim for recovery of past maintenance is subject to a six year limitation period. But maintenance is not a one time obligation. It becomes due every month.

So, when maintenance remains unpaid, the cause of action continues or arises afresh month after month. In the words of the Court, it is a continuing wrong.

This means that the fact that a wife did not immediately approach the court does not, by itself, wipe out her right to claim past maintenance.

The Court also treated unpaid maintenance as a debt owed by the husband to his wife. The passage of time, by itself, does not absolve him of that obligation.

In this case, the evidence showed that the husband’s refusal to pay maintenance had occurred within six years before the suit was filed. The Court therefore held that the claim was within the permissible limitation period.

The wife was consequently held entitled to recover past maintenance for the period claimed in her plaint and proved through evidence.

The takeaway is simple: A neglected wife does not lose her right to past maintenance merely because she took time to approach the court. Where the husband continues to withhold maintenance, the cause of action may arise month after month.

This judgment is important because it makes it clear that limitation law cannot be used as a shield to avoid a genuine maintenance obligation where the cause of action is recurring or continuing.

PLD 2026 Supreme Court 308

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