https://www.facebook.com/226763400995232/

M/s Yasir Law Associates, Suite #309, 3rd Floor, Uni shopping Center, Abdullah Haroon Road, Karachi (2026)

Q: What is the address?

Suite #309, 3rd Floor, Uni Shopping Center, Abdullah Haroon Road

09/08/2026

PLD 2026 Peshawar 154
Attachment of property of absconder ------
Restoration of attached property----Limitation-+++
Application of the accused/petitioner for restoration of his attached property was dismissed on the ground of limitation-Said orders were challenged by filing an appeal but the same was also dismissed-Validity-Accused, who was involved in a criminal case remained absconder for a considerable period and proceedings under S.88, Cr.P.C., were initiated against him and an order for attachment of his land was passed-Record transpired that the petitioner/accused appeared before the Court, faced trial and was acquitted of the charge under S.265-K, Cr.P.C-After his acquittal, accused-petitioner filed an application for restoration of the property attached in favour of the Provincial Government--However, the trial Court dismissed the said application on the ground that it was not submitted within the period of two years, as prescribed by the provision of S.89, Cr.P.C-Said findings were endorsed by the appellate Court... Plain reading of the provision of S.89, Cr.P.C, made it clear that the statutory period of two years from the date of attachment was expressly linked to two categories of persons, i.e., (i) those who appeared voluntarily, and (i) those who were apprehended and brought before the Court-Language of the said provision did not draw a distinction in the application of the two-year limitation-Instead, the expression "if, within two years..." grammatically and legally governed both categories of appearance-Legislature, having consciously used inclusive phrasing, must be presumed to have intended equal treatment of both forms of appearance within the prescribed time frame---Had it been the intention of the law to restrict the time limit only to voluntary appearance, the legislature would have either excluded the second category or prescribed a separate limitation for persons who were arrested and produced in custody-Absence of any such separate clause strongly indicated that both forms of appearance were meant to be treated identically for the purpose of invoking the right to restoration of attached property---If the two-year limitation were interpreted to apply only to persons who appear voluntarily, it would result in irregular

categories, legal consequences-Pertinent question would then arise, what period. the Court, as the statute was silent on any such alternate timeline-To if any, would govern the case of a person arrested and brought before silent for the other would introduce confusion, uncertainty, and apply the two-year limitation to only one category and it remaining arbitrariness in a matter involving coercive deprivation of property, that would be contrary to the principles of legal certainty and fair procedure embodied in Arts. 4 and 10-A of the Constitution Therefore, the two-year period prescribed under S.89, Cr.P.C. applied uniformly to both apprehended and brought before the Court, subject to the condition whether the person appeared voluntarily or was that he satisfied the Court that he did not abscond or conceal himself to avoid ex*****on of the warrant and that accused had no sufficient notice time-Such interpretation not onation to appear the plain and unambiguous language of the statute but also upheld well-established principles of statutory interpretation, i.e., no part of a legislative provision should be rendered redundant or superfluous; secondly, where the legislature employed comprehensive or liberal language, it must be construed liberally so as to give full effect to the legislative intent; and, thirdly, any interpretation that led to irrationality, uncertainty, or arbitrary distinctions between similarly positioned persons must be avoided-Purpose of the provisions of S.88, Cr.P.C, was not to punish an accused person and its object was to procure his attendance, which object, on the face of it, had been achieved as the petitioner was arrested and after facing the trial, he was acquitted of the charge under S.265-K, Cr.P.C--Likewise, the property, though, was entered in the name of the Provincial Government but practically and physically was in possession of the petitioners without any interference and, thus, the impugned attachment having not yet finalized as required under the law, was liable to be set aside---Attachment included taking physical possession and other methods as specified in subsection (4) of S.88, Cr.P.C---Therefore, the limitation period under S.89, Cr.P.C, could only be invoked after the complete attachment of the immovable property-In the present case, since the process of complete attachment was not carried out, the question of limitation did not arise in the given circumstances-

09/08/2026

PLD 2026 Islamabad 164

Inheritance of propositus---Children of predeceased son or daughter---Entitlement to share of predeceased parent---Pending appeal against Federal Shariat Court judgment---Judgment not taking effect till disposal of appeal-Scope-Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 provides that where a son or daughter of a deceased person dies before succession opens, the children of such predeceased son or daughter, if any, shall per stirpes receive a share equivalent to the share which such son or daughter would have received if alive---Thus, S.4 enables the children of a predeceased son or daughter to receive their deceased parent's share in the inheritance of the propositus Provision of S.4 of the Ordinance was reviewed by the Federal Shariat Court in Allah Rakha and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2000 FSC 1) and was held to be against the Injunctions of Islam; however, said judgment was challenged before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court and the appeal was pending adjudication In view of the first proviso to Art. 203-D(2) of the Constitution, the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court in Allah Rakha case would not take effect before disposal of the pending appeal by the Supreme Court---Significantly, S.4 of the Ordinance restricts its application to the "children of predeceased son or daughter of the propositus" and does not extend to all legal heirs of such predeceased son or daughter The spouse of the predeceased son/daughter is therefore excluded from inheriting the share of such predeceased son/daughter from the propositus under S.4---Unless the Supreme Court decides otherwise in the pending appeal against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court in Allah Rakha case, S.4 of the Ordinance is to be given effect as binding law---

09/08/2026

کرپٹو کرنسی، USDT/P2P ٹریڈنگ، PECA، FERA سے متعلق لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا فیصلہ
صرف بینک اکاؤنٹ میں رقم وصول ہونا جرم ثابت نہیں کرتا۔
صرف P2P یا USDT ٹرانزیکشن جرم نہیں۔
فوجداری ذمہ داری ہمیشہ انفرادی ہوتی ہے۔
ہر ملزم کا کردار الگ الگ ثابت کرنا ضروری ہے۔
PECA کی دفعات لگانے کے لیے الیکٹرانک فراڈ یا جعلی ڈیٹا کا واضح ثبوت ضروری ہے۔
PPC کی دفعات 468 اور 471 صرف جعلی دستاویز یا جعلی الیکٹرانک ریکارڈ کی موجودگی میں لاگو ہوں گی۔
USDT کو خودکار طور پر Foreign Currency یا Foreign Exchange قرار نہیں دیا جا سکتا۔

Crl. Misc. No. 1974-B/2026
Hammad Ali and others Vs The State and another
2026LHC4849

09/08/2026

منشیات کے کیس میں ریکوری میمو پر مقدمہ نمبر ، وقت درج نہ تھا، اور نہ ہی جگہ کا نام تھا جہاں سے منشیات برآمد/پکڑی گئی تھی، ملزم شک کی بنیاد پر بری.

2025 YLR 75

Possession of narcotic substances---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery memo---Doubtful---Prosecution case was that 2250-grams charas was recovered from the possession of the accused---Record showed that recovery memo of charas neither contained the number nor the date of the FIR nor the name of police station---Complainant had admitted that in recovery memo there was no specific mention of place where the contraband was allegedly recovered from the accused---Furthermore, the recovery witness in his cross-examination had also deposed that he did not remember as to what case FIR number was written on the recovery memo. at the time when he signed the same---In view of such depositions of the witnesses, serious doubt was casted upon the authenticity of preparation of recovery memo.---Moreover, tenor of the testimonies of prosecution's witnesses clearly revealed the recovery memo. was prepared after registration of the FIR in the case, therefore, no legal sanctity could be attached to such document---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused beyond any shadow of doubt---

Crl. Appeal 549-23
NAYYAR ABBAS VS
STATE ETC

09/08/2026

🔴 Identification Parade .. (شناخت پریڈ)

شناخت پریڈ کے قوائد جاننے کے لئے ایک بار ضرور پڑھ لیں ۔۔
PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.c) 153

----The necessary guidelines for Identification Parade...

(a) An identification parade, to inspire confidence, must be held at earliest possible opportunity after occurrence;

(b) A test identification, where possibility of witness having seen accused persons after their arrest cannot be ruled out, is worth nothing at all--It is, therefore, imperative to eliminate all such possibilities.

(c) identification parades should never be held at police stations;

(d) the Magistrate, supervising identification proceedings, must verify period, if any, for which accused persons have remained in police custody after their arrest and before test identification and must incorporate this fact in his report about proceedings;

(e) Ordinarily ratio between accused persons and dummies should be 1 to 9 or 10--This ratio must be followed unless there are some special justifiable circumstances warranting a deviation from it;

(f) If there are more accused persons than one, separate identification parades should ordinarily be held in respect of each accused person;

(g) A witness has participated in identification proceedings, he is stationed at a place from where he cannot observe proceedings and that after his participation he is lodged at a place from where it is not possible for him to communicate with those who have yet to take their turn;

(h) The Magistrate conducting proceedings must take an intelligent interest in proceedings;

(i) The Magistrate is obliged to prepare a list of all persons (dummies) who form part of line-up at parade alongwith their parentage, occupation and addresses;

(j) The Magistrate must faithfully record all objections and statements, if any, made either by accused persons or by identifying witnesses before, during or after proceedings;

(k) Where a witness correctly identifies an accused person,Magistrate must ask witness about connection in which witness has identified that person;

(l) and where a witness identifies a person wrongly, Magistrate must so record in his report and should also state number of persons wrongly picked by witness;

29/07/2026

PLD 2026 SC 308

Supreme Court determined the extent of the period for which a neglected wife can claim maintenance, concentrating on the maximum retrospective period that the Court can consider when deciding such claims.

A wife's claim to recover past maintenance is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, prescribing a six-year period; but since non-payment of maintenance recurs monthly and constitutes a "continuing wrong" under Section 23 thereof, a fresh cause of action accrues de die in diem with each missed payment, so that the limitation bar operates only upon the remedy and not upon the underlying debt, entitling the wife to recover arrears for the period falling within six years preceding the suit notwithstanding her earlier delay in approaching the Court.
C.A.1413/202
Muhammad Aslam Chattah v. Shehnaz Akhtar Zahoor Ahmed and another

29/07/2026

Past Maintenance: An Important Judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan

C.A. No. 1413 of 2021
Muhammad Aslam Chattha v. Shehnaz Akhtar Zahoor Ahmed and another
PLD 2026 Supreme Court 308

Can a wife claim maintenance for the years during which her husband failed to support her, even if she approaches the court much later?

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has answered this question in an important judgment.

The wife married the appellant in 2002. According to her, the husband stopped maintaining her from 2004. She eventually filed a suit in 2017, claiming maintenance from June 2004.

The Family Court awarded her maintenance from June 2004 at Rs.10,000 per month, with a 15% annual increase. The appellate court, however, limited the maintenance to the period from the date of filing of the suit. The High Court restored the Family Court’s decision.

The husband then approached the Supreme Court, arguing that the wife could not claim maintenance for a period beyond six years.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court held that a husband’s duty to maintain his wife arises from the marriage and continues during the marriage, subject to the conditions recognised under Islamic law.

The Court also made an important point about limitation.

Under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a claim for recovery of past maintenance is subject to a six year limitation period. But maintenance is not a one time obligation. It becomes due every month.

So, when maintenance remains unpaid, the cause of action continues or arises afresh month after month. In the words of the Court, it is a continuing wrong.

This means that the fact that a wife did not immediately approach the court does not, by itself, wipe out her right to claim past maintenance.

The Court also treated unpaid maintenance as a debt owed by the husband to his wife. The passage of time, by itself, does not absolve him of that obligation.

In this case, the evidence showed that the husband’s refusal to pay maintenance had occurred within six years before the suit was filed. The Court therefore held that the claim was within the permissible limitation period.

The wife was consequently held entitled to recover past maintenance for the period claimed in her plaint and proved through evidence.

The takeaway is simple: A neglected wife does not lose her right to past maintenance merely because she took time to approach the court. Where the husband continues to withhold maintenance, the cause of action may arise month after month.

This judgment is important because it makes it clear that limitation law cannot be used as a shield to avoid a genuine maintenance obligation where the cause of action is recurring or continuing.

PLD 2026 Supreme Court 308

21/07/2026

VVVVVVI. MUST READ JUDGEMENT.
Dissolution of Marriage and Dower (Haq Mehr).

Effect of declaration by the Federal Shariat Court regarding Section 10(5) & (6) of the Family Courts Act, 1964.

Distinction between Khula and dissolution under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

Wife's entitlement to dower where dissolution is granted on account of husband's cruelty?Principles for determination by Family Courts.

Following questions determined:

i) Whether, after the declaration of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 as repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, the Family Court retains jurisdiction to determine a wife's entitlement to dower on a case-to-case basis

ii) Whether a decree for dissolution described as "Khula" necessarily entails forfeiture or return of dower irrespective of the cause of dissolution, or whether a distinction exists in law between dissolution founded on the wife's mere aversion (Khula simpliciter) and dissolution occasioned by the husband's cruelty or other grounds under law?

iii) Whether physical, psychological, emotional, verbal or economic abuse amounts to cruelty sufficient to disentitle the husband from claiming return of dower, in whole or in part?

iv) What principles ought to govern the exercise of judicial discretion by Family Courts in determining the question of dower where dissolution is sought on the ground of cruelty or matrimonial misconduct?

v) Whether the learned Family Court erred in awarding fifty percent (50%) of the deferred dower to the wife on the facts of this case.

For the guidance of all Family Courts within the jurisdiction of this Court, the principles emerging from this judgment are summarized below:-

I. Dower is a proprietary right arising from the contract of marriage. It is not a penalty upon the husband, nor a benefit held at the Family Court’s discretion. It cannot be forfeited, reduced or apportioned without a specific finding that the law permits it.I

I. The right to dissolve a marriage and the right to dower are separate rights. A decree of dissolution does not by itself decide the fate of the dower; that requires its own finding, on its own evidence.

III. Imran Anwar Khan’s case (PLD 2022 FSC 25) struck down the fixed formula in sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964. It did not strike down the distinction the Federal Shariat Court itself drew between a wife’s separation founded on mere aversion and one compelled by the husband’s own nashuz. That distinction survives. What has changed is that the Family Court must now apply it on the facts of each case, without a fixed formula to fall back on.

IV. A decree is not Khula merely because that word appears in the plaint, the written statement, or the decree sheet. Where the wife has pleaded and pursued a ground recognized under Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, the suit must be decided on that ground. Khula may not be substituted for it without the wife’s informed consent appearing on the record.

V. Cruelty under Section 2(viii) of that Act is not confined to physical violence; it extends to psychological, verbal, emotional and economic abuse, assessed by its effect on the particular wife. It is proved on the balance of probabilities, and a wife’s own credible testimony does not need medical or documentary corroboration.

VI. Where a ground under Section 2 is proved, Section 5 of that Act governs: the wife’s dower is not affected by the dissolution. This is not a question of degree. The Family Court does not weigh the severity of the cruelty to decide how much dower survives. Once the ground is proved, dower, whether prompt or deferred, paid or unpaid, stands unaffected in full.

VII. Where no such ground is proved and the case is of Khula, forfeiture is still not automatic. The Family Court must independently decide, with reasons, what amount, if any, is to be returned, and may not order the return of dower that was never paid.

VIII. Where the evidence is genuinely close and the Family Court cannot say with confidence which of the above applies, the doubt is to be resolved in favour of the wife's dower, not against it.

IX. Every order concerning dower must record the finding it rests on, whether a ground under Section 2 was proved, and if not, why the case was treated as Khula and on what material. A decree silent on this point does not meet the standard laid down in this judgment.

The confusion this judgment has tried to resolve did not arise from the Federal Shariat Court’s reasoning in Imran Anwar Khan’s case, which was sound. It arose because sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 were struck down without anything being put in their place. The underlying law, the Quran, and Section 5 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, never changed; only the formula a trial court could once apply disappeared. Family Courts, left with the bare fact that the provision permitting surrender of dower in Khula is gone, but no revived rule requiring payment in its place, have in practice gone the other way: treating every decree as Khula and denying the wife her dower altogether, whether a ground under Section 2 of that Act stood proved or not, as though the striking down of sub-sections (5) and (6) had taken away her entitlement to dower rather than the husband’s claim to its return.

Before parting with this judgment, it is observed that there is a need for a fresh provision, drafted in the language of Section 5 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, requiring the Family Court to record a finding on the cause of dissolution before deciding the question of dower, and making clear that dower is not affected where a ground under Section 2 of that Act stands proved. The Registrar of this Court shall forward a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Law and Parliamentary Affairs Department, Government of the Punjab, and to the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, for such action as considered appropriate.

W.P. 20300/23
Arslan . Vs Nisha Shahid etc
Mr. Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani
01-07-2026
2026 LHC 4758

21/07/2026

Court fees schedule.

14/07/2026

A suit for jactitation of marriage is a civil remedy available where there is a persistent and false claim of marriage. Its object is to obtain a declaration that no valid marriage exists and to secure a decree of perpetual silence against the wrongful assertion.

It is clarified, at the outset, that any criminal liability arising from the allegations made by the respondent is a matter to be adjudicated by the competent criminal court strictly in accordance with law, and nothing observed herein shall prejudice such proceedings.
C.P.L.A. No. 5626/2024
Muhammad Shahzad VersusMst. Ayesha Noor & others
PLJ 2026 SC 352

M/s Yasir Law Associates

09/08/2026

09/08/2026

09/08/2026

09/08/2026

09/08/2026

29/07/2026

29/07/2026

21/07/2026

21/07/2026

14/07/2026

Address

Telephone

Website

Alerts

Contact The Practice

Shortcuts

Share

Category

Listing takedown request