Law & Law students Guide

Law & Law students Guide unreservedly about the Law and Pakiatani Judiciary⚖️

04/06/2024

اسلام آبادہائیکورٹ نے شادی کی عمر سے متعلق اہم فیصلہ سناتے ہوئے 18 سال سے کم عمر شادی کو غیر قانونی معاہدہ قرار دے دیا ہے۔
PLD 2022 ISLAMABAD 228
جسٹس بابر ستار نے جاری کردہ فیصلے میں لکھا کہ 18 سال سے کم عمر لڑکی آزادانہ شادی نہیں کرسکتی، حیاتیاتی طور پر بلوغت کی عمر 18 سال کا ہونا ہی ہے۔

عدالتی فیصلے میں کہا گیا کہ محض جسمانی تبدیلیوں پر 18 سال سے پہلے قانونی طور پر بلوغت نہیں ہوتی، بلوغت کی قانونی عمر 18 برس ہے، اس سے کم عمر لڑکی کی شادی غیر قانونی ہوگی۔

فیصلے میں کہا گیا کہ 18سال سے کم عمر لڑکی کے ورثا بھی جسمانی تعلق والا معاہدہ نہیں کراسکتے۔

عدالت نے بیٹی کی بازیابی کے لیے دائر ممتاز بی بی کی درخواست پر فیصلہ سنادیا اور 16سالہ سویرا فلک شیر کو واپس والدہ کے سپرد کرنے کا حکم دے دیا۔
عدالت نے ایس ایچ او گولڑہ کو دارالامان سے لڑکی واپس والدہ کے سپر کرنے کا حکم بھی دیا۔
عدالت نے مسلم فیملی لاز آرڈیننس میں وضاحت نہ ہونے کا معاملہ کابینہ ڈویژن اور پارلیمنٹ کے سامنے رکھنے کی ہدایت کردی۔
ممتاز بی بی نے مئی 2021 سے بیٹی کے اغوا کا مقدمہ درج کرایا تھا، لڑکی نے ہائی کورٹ میں مرضی سے شادی کرنے کا بیان دیا تھا۔

1. Can a Minor execute a valid contract of marriage and can a marriage between an adult and a child, even if with the consent of the child, be deemed to be a valid marriage?

2. What is the age of majority in Pakistan, and does a Minor have the legal competence to enter into a contract of marriage before attaining the age of majority?

3. Can the consideration and purpose of contract of marriage be regarded as lawful in view of section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, read together with sections 375 and 377A of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?

4. Can a contract of marriage, involving an object and purpose that is proscribed, be treated as a valid contract while simultaneously creating criminal liability for the male for carrying out acts conceived by such contract? .....................................

A. A child is defined as a person who has not attained the age of 18 years. A child is required to be placed in somebody’s care whether it is a parent or guardian or other caregiver appointed on behalf of the state. Complete agency to grant informed consent for purposes of entering into contract, including, inter alia, a marriage contract cannot be attributed to such child.

B. A female child below the age of 18 cannot be deemed competent to freely grant her consent to enter into a marriage contract merely because she manifests the physical symptoms of having attained puberty. In view of provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018 and PPC, when read together, while being guided by principles of Islamic jurisprudence and Principles of Policy enshrined in the Constitution, (including state’s obligation to protect the woman, the child and the family), the test for legal agency and competence of a female child is her biological age and not her state of physical and biological growth.

C. The provisions of sections 375 and 377A of PPC are mandatory provisions and any contract entered with the object of breaching such provisions or that has the effect of breaching such provisions cannot be treated as a valid contract. A marriage contract in which one of the parties is a child under the age of 18 is therefore a contract executed for an unlawful purpose and is void ab initio. Such marriage contract can neither be registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, nor can be given effect by a court, as that would tantamount to defeating provisions of law that have been promulgated to uphold rights of children guaranteed by Article 9 of the Constitution read together with the provisions of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

D. A child under the age of 18 years is a dependent of an adult whether such adult is a parent or guardian or other caregiver appointed by the State. The State is under an obligation to uphold and guarantee the rights of such child, who cannot be deemed to have the competence or capacity to parent a child of his/her own and act as guardian endowed with the primary responsibility to provide for his/her child while being a child himself/herself.

E. Sections 375 and 377A of PPC read together with Article 9 of the Constitution, Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018, and provisions of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child unequivocally provide that no one can engage in sexual conduct in any form with a child and neither can any person invite or entice a child to engage in sexual conduct in any form, and any invitation or enticement provided to a child to engage in sexual conduct, even under the cloak of marriage, would fall within the definition of sexual abuse in terms of section 377A.

F. Neither a child under the age of 18 can consent to engage in sexual conduct in any form, nor can a parent or guardian of a child, contract a child out to engage in sexual conduct. A child is not a chattel that can be contracted out by a trustee or guardian to engage in conduct that the child himself/herself cannot grant consent for. No consent can be granted on behalf of a child by a parent or guardian involving discharge of personal service by the child or engagement in conduct that is unlawful and prohibited, such as that required to be performed under a marriage contract. While a parent or guardian can deal with a child’s property in his/her best interest, the parent or guardian is not at liberty to contract out the child to engage in a contract of personal service or conduct otherwise prohibited by law.

G. Sections 375 and 377A of PPC do not provide for any exceptions or exclusions to conduct that otherwise qualifies as r**e or sexual abuse as defined therein, and the said sections would be attracted even where the offence is made out against a person who seeks to defend himself on the basis that such conduct was pursuant to a marriage contract executed by a child under the age of 18 years or his/her parent or guardian on his/her behest.

Once this Court has come to the conclusion that a marriage contract involving a child under the age of 18 years is a contract prohibited by law, which, even if executed by a child, is void ab initio, the question of treating the purported nikah-nama between respondent No.1 and the Minor as a basis to release her in the custody of respondent No.1 does not arise. This Court has not however determined the age of the Minor definitively, nor has it made any observations as regard the liability of respondent No.1 under provisions of PPC. Doing so in writ jurisdiction could fetter the rights of the parties involved to due process and fair trial as guaranteed by Article 10A of the Constitution. The determination of such questions is left to the court of competent jurisdiction before which such questions are raised.

For reasons stated above, the instant petition is allowed and respondent No.5 is directed to ensure that the Minor is released from Dar-ul-Aman into the custody of the petitioner, who is her mother, and the petitioner along with her husband (i.e. the father of the minor) are responsible to provide for the safety and wellbeing of the Minor in accordance with the provisions of Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018. Respondent No.1 shall pay the petitioner cost of litigation in the amount of Rs.20,000/- under section 35 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 within a period of thirty days and the learned counsel for the respondent will file a certificate with the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court confirming that the order as to costs has been complied with.

The office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Cabinet Division, and Secretary, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, to bring to the attention of the Cabinet and the Parliament, respectively, (i) the absence of a clear statutory provision in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, stating the permissible age for marriage in Pakistan, (ii) section 21 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, which is in conflict with provisions of Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018, read together with provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child, and capable of creating the false impression that children in Pakistan under the age of 18 are still deemed capable of being guardians in select circumstances,and (iii) provisions of statutory instruments dating back to colonial times, including the Majority Act, 1975, Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, provisions of which, if read on a stand-alone basis, could be vulnerable to interpretations in conflict with provisions of Sections 375 and 377A of PPC read together with Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018, and provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child. The office is also directed to send a copy of this judgment to Chief Commissioner, ICT, for information and compliance for purposes of registration of marriages under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, within Islamabad Capital Territory.

ALHAMDOLILLAH by the wisdom of His Lordship, Vice chairman Punjab Bar Kamran Bashir Mughal, Ahmad Qayum sb MPC, presiden...
17/04/2024

ALHAMDOLILLAH by the wisdom of His Lordship, Vice chairman Punjab Bar Kamran Bashir Mughal, Ahmad Qayum sb MPC, president Lahore Bar Munir Bhatti sb and Prosecutor General Syed Farhad Ali Shah sb recommended that 7 ATA to be deleted from Advocate Case, also it is decided by lawyers representatives that from now on no FIR of 7 ATA shall be registered against the lawyers.



19/03/2024

2023 S C M R 6

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, Yahya Afridi and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ

MUNIR HUSSAIN and others---Applicants

Versus

RIFFAT SHAMIM and others---Respondents

Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 3492 of 2022 in Civil Petition No. Nil of 2022, decided on 14th November, 2022.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 12.04.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in W. P. No. 213 of 2022)

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 42---Paternity of child---Suit for declaration challenging paternity of a child---Suit was filed about seven months after the death of the child's father "AH" and at a time when the child was aged about 17 years---Admittedly child was brought up by "AH" and his wife (the respondent) as their daughter and as long as "AH" lived, the child's paternity was not questioned by the plaintiffs/petitioners who, for the first time, did so after the father, "AH" had departed from this world--- Respondent/mother testified that the child was her and "AH's" daughter---Petition for leave to appeal and application were dismissed.

(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 42--- Paternity of child---Suit for declaration challenging paternity of a child---Maintainability---Through their declaratory suit the plaintiffs/petitioners sought a negative declaration to the effect that the child in question was not the daughter of "AH" but of "MZ"---To challenge another's paternity/legitimacy is not an assertion of one's own legal character in terms of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877---However, a person whose legal character, including paternity, was being denied such person could file a suit to claim it, but the present case was not such a case---Plaintiffs lacked legal character under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877---Petition for leave to appeal and application were dismissed.

Laila Qayyum v. Fawad Qayum PLD 2019 SC 449 ref.

Ch. Afrasiab Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants.

Nemo for the Respondents.

Date of hearing: 14th November, 2022.

ORDER

Qazi Faez Isa, J.---

C.M.A. No. 3492/2022: Through this application the petitioners seek permission to array Tuba Sahab (respondent No. 2) as the daughter of Muhammad Zareef.

2. The petitioners had filed a suit alleging that Tuba Sahab was not the daughter of Azhar Hussain but of Muhammad Zareef. However, the learned Judge of the High Court held that Tuba Sahab was in fact the daughter of Azhar Hussain. Nothing much turns on this application as the petition for leave to appeal has been filed within time and the application could only be granted if the impugned judgment of the High Court was to be set aside. Therefore, even though the petition for leave to appeal has not been numbered we, after the learned counsel said he was ready to proceed with the case on merits, proceeded to hear the petition. The office is directed to number the civil petition for leave to appeal ('CPLA').

3. CPLA No. 3842/2022: The learned counsel for the petitioners states that the petitioners are the siblings of Azhar Hussain who died issueless on 4 June 2013. The learned counsel submits that Azhar Hussain adhered to the Sunni Hanafi fiqh of Islamic Shariah, therefore, if Tuba Sahab is taken to be the daughter of Azhar Hussain then their share in the estate of Azhar Hussain would be significantly reduced. It is admitted that Azhar Hussain was married to Riffat Shamim (respondent No. 1). The case of the petitioners (plaintiffs in the suit) was that Tuba Sahab was actually the daughter of Muhammad Zareef and not of Azhar Hussain. The suit was filed on 29 January 2014, that is, about seven months after the death of Azhar Hussain and at a time when Tuba Sahab was, as per learned counsel, aged about 17 years. Admittedly, Tuba Sahab was brought up by Azhar Hussain and Riffat Shamim as their daughter and as long as Azhar Hussain lived her paternity was not questioned by the petitioners who, for the first time, did so after the father, Azhar Hussain, had departed from this world. The mother (respondent No. 1) testified that Tuba Sahab was her and Azhar Hussain's daughter.

4. The learned Judge of the High Court had referred to a number of decisions including the decision in the case of Laila Qayyum v. Fawad Qayum (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 449) which had considered in detail the scope of a declaratory suit filed under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and like in that case the paternity of another was denied by the plaintiffs. In other words the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) through their suit sought a negative declaration. After considering the scope of the said section 42 and precedents this Court held in Laila Qayyum's case that to challenge another's paternity/legitimacy was not an assertion of one's own legal character in terms of section 42. However, a person whose legal character, including paternity, was being denied such person could file a suit to claim it, but the instant case is not such a case. In Laila Qayyum's case the plaintiffs lacked legal character under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and the same principle is attracted in this case. The learned counsel has also not been able to distinguish the decision in Laila Qayyum's case from the instant one.

5. In the impugned judgment the learned Judge had correctly applied the law, which had been interpreted in the case of Laila Qayyum. Therefore, to grant leave is not warranted and, consequently, the petition (numbered as CPLA No. 3842/2022) and C.M.A. No. 3492/2022 are dismissed, but with no order as to costs as caveat was not filed by any respondent. Copy of this order be sent to respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

MWA/M-72/SC Order accordingly.

14/03/2024

The Latin Maxim “ Locus Standi” consists of two words namely “locus” which means place and “standi” means the right to bring an action. So, collectively, it refers to the right to appear in court or to file an action. According to this principle, before approaching the court, one must demonstrate his legal capacity. It means that the person can only go to court if his personal interests are jeopardized or he is injured.

To have locus standi, a person must typically demonstrate a sufficient connection to the matter at hand. This could involve showing a direct and personal interest, such as being directly affected by the subject of the lawsuit or having a specific legal right that is being violated. The requirements for locus standi can vary depending on the jurisdiction and the specific legal context.

Ingredients of locus standi :
___________________________

1.Injury or harm
2. Causation
3. Legal interest
4. Redressability

*SUPREME COURT ON LOCUS STANDI* :
----------------------------------------------------------

*2012 SCMR 455*
Fundamental Rights---Locus Standi of petitioner---Scope---Group or class actions---Where there is violation of Fundamental Rights of a class or a group of persons who are unable to seek redress from

*2010 PLD 841 SC*
Maintainability---Locus Standi ---Contractual appointments---Petitioners were appointed on contract basis, who assailed the act of authorities for advertising posts in question for regular
Maintainability---Locus Standi ---Contractual appointments---Petitioners were appointed on contract basis, who assailed the act of authorities for advertising posts in question for regular

*2009 SCMR 1051*
Beneficiary of acquired land has no right and Locus Standi to either file reference against the award of compensation or appeal against the judgment arising out of the reference under S.18, Land

*2007 PTD 1195*
-Art. 199(1)---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, invoking of---Principles---Held, it is sine qua non for invoking the jurisdiction of High Court through Constitutional petition that petitioner

*2004 PLD 622 SC*
The existence of Locus Standi and the right to claim relief were necessary elements for a claimant seeking the survival of judicial proceedings.

*1999 SCMR 1060*
Appeal Locus Standi to file---If one of the several parties to a suit, prefers an appeal, another such party, already impleaded in the appeal, can go to a higher forum.

12/03/2024

1992 SCMR 1273
[Shariat Appellate Bench Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, Pir Muhammad Karam Shah
and Maulana Muhammad Taqi Usmani, JJ

ALLAH DAD‑‑‑Petitioner

versus

MUKHTAR and another‑‑‑Respondents

Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal No.24(S) of 1991, decided on 4th March, 1992.

(On appeal from the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court dated i;20‑3‑1991 passed in Criminal Revision No.56/1 of 1990).

(a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑S. 7‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.2‑A‑‑‑Divorce would become effective even in the absence of notice to the Chairman under S.7‑‑­Ineffectiveness of divorce in the absence of a notice to the Chairman, as envisaged by S.7, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, was against injunctions of Islam.

Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.

Muhammad Sarwar and Mst. Shahida Parveen v. The State P L D 1988 FSC 42 ref.

(b) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑S. 4‑‑‑Zina‑‑‑Definition‑‑‑Intercourse in the case of a valid marriage cannot be deemed to be Zina.

(c) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑S. 4‑‑‑`Valid marriage'‑‑‑Meaning‑‑‑If a marriage is valid in Shariah, it shall be held valid for the purposes of the Ordinance even though. it is not recognized as valid in any other law for the time being in force.

As the term of `valid marriage' has not been defined in the Ordinance, 1 the same shall be construed in the light of the Islamic Injunctions keeping‑in View the intention of the law‑maker as emerges from the title and the preamble of the Ordinance.

Both the title and the preamble of the Ordinance have disclosed the real intention of the law maker who wants to `modify' the law as it existed so as to bring it `in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam'. All the provisions of the Ordinance, therefore, should be read and interpreted in the light of this title and preamble and terms not defined in the Ordinance itself, must be construed and interpreted in accordance with the `Injunctions of Islam as set out in the Holy Qura'n and Sunnah'. The words `validly married' occurring in the definition of `Zina' in section 4 of the Ordinance have not been defined in the Ordinance. The definition, therefore, will be sought from the Injunctions of Islam because the Ordinance intends to bring the existing law relating to Zina in conformity with them.

Moreover, section 3 of the Ordinance has given the provisions of the Ordinance an overriding effect on `any other law for the time being in force'.

The logical result of this scheme of the provisions of the Ordinance is that if there is a clash between an existing law and the Injunctions of Islam with regard to the validity of a marriage, the Injunctions of Islam shall prevail for the purpose of this Ordinance. Thus, if a marriage is valid in Shariah, it shall be held valid for the purpose of this Ordinance, even though it is not recognised as valid in any other law for the time being in force.

(d) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑Preamble‑‑‑All the provisions of the Ordinance have to be read and interpreted in the light of the title and preamble which are not defined in the' Ordinance itself‑‑‑Ordinance must be construed and interpreted in accordance with the Injunctions of Islam as set out in the Holy Qura'n and Sunnah.

(e) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑S. 4‑‑‑`Zina'‑‑‑Definition‑‑‑Word `Zinc' having not been defined in the Ordinance the definition of the word was to be sought from the Injunctions of Islam.

(f) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑S. 4‑‑‑Validity of marriage‑‑‑Where there is clash between an existing law and the Injunctions of Islam with regard to the validity of marriage, the Injunctions of the Islam shall prevail for the purpose of the Ordinance.

(g) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)‑‑

‑‑‑S. 4‑‑‑Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.7‑‑‑Allegation of Zina‑‑‑Plea of valid marriage by accused‑‑‑Provision of S.7, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, cannot affect the validity of a marriage contracted according to Shariah at least to the extent of the criminal liability envisaged in the Ordinance.

Mirza Qamar Raja v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.

(h) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1061)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑S. 7‑‑‑Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979), S.4‑‑‑Marriage contracted according to Shariah‑‑‑Provisions of S.7, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1965 could not affect the validity of such marriage at least to the extent of the criminal liability envisaged in the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979.

Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.

(i) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑S. 7‑‑‑Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979), S.4‑‑‑Allegation of Zina‑‑‑Plea of valid marriage by accused‑‑‑If a woman after, obtaining a divorce from the husband (pronounced or written by husband) and after the necessary period of Iddat contracts a marriage with a third person such marriage could not be held as invalid marriage just because a notice of Talaq to the Chairman under S.7, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1965 had not been given by husband‑‑‑Notice of Talaq to the Chairman was not mandatory under the Injunctions of Islam and any divorce pronounced or written by a husband could not be ineffective or invalid in Shariah merely because its notice had not been given to the Chairman.

Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.

(j) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑S. 7‑‑‑Notice of Talaq to the Chairman is not mandatory under the Injunctions of Islam and any divorce pronounced or written by a husband cannot be ineffective or invalid in Shariah because its notice had not been given to the Chairman ‑‑‑If a woman after obtaining such a divorce from her husband and after the necessary period of Iddat contracts a marriage with a third person, their marriage could not be held as invalid marriage.

Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others P L D 1988 Kar. 169 approved.

(k) Offence of‑Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)‑‑‑

‑‑‑‑S. 4‑‑‑Offence of Zina cannot be made out against a man and woman unless they `wilfully' have sexual in*******se‑‑‑If a man and a woman had good reasons to believe bona fide that they were husband and wife, the commission of in*******se under such belief could not be held as `wilful commission of Zina'.

Mst. Bashiran and another v. Muhammad Hussain and another P L D 1988 S C 186 ref.

(1) Muhammadan Iaw.‑‑

‑‑‑‑Marriage contracted during period of Iddat is invalid.

A marriage contracted during the period of `Iddat' is not merely an irregular marriage, it has been termed by the Muslim Jurists as Batil (void). Even if is held to be irregular, it is still an invalid marriage, for both the irregular (Fasid) and void (Batil) marriages fall in the category of `invalid marriage'.

Ibn Abidin Raddul Muhtar, Vol. 2, p.482 and Ibn Ibidin, Vol. 2, p:835. ref.

(m) Muhammadan Law‑

‑‑‑‑ Remarriage of a woman‑‑‑Period of Iddat is 39 days.

The period of `Iddat' laid down by the Holy Qura'n is not 90 days. It is rather three periods of menstruations which do not necessarily extend to 90 days. According to Hanifi Jurists the minimum period of menstruation is 3 days and the minimum period of `Tuhr' (period of purity) is 15 days.

In the light of these principles, the minimum period of `Iddat' may be 39 days because this is the period in which it is possible for a woman to have three menstruations with two intervening periods of purity. It is thus clear that a marriage performed after 39 days from the divorce can be a valid marriage according to Shariah if the woman has passed through three periods of menstruations during this period.

Surah Al‑Baqara: 2: 228; Al‑Fatawa Al‑Alamgiria Vol. 1, pp. 36 and 37, Book I, Chapter 6 and Al‑Quran 65:4 ref.

M. Kowkab Iqbal, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner. M. Aslam Uns, Advocate Supreme Court for the State.

Date of hearing: 4th March, 1992.

02/02/2024

1.راحت فتح علی خاں شراب کی بوتل کے معاملے پہ پھنسے تو فورا کور مارنے کے لئیے کہا۔۔وہ "دم کئیے ہوئے پانی کی بوتل" کا پوچھ رہا تھا (مذہب کا سہارا)

2.شاہین شاہ آفریدی سیریز ہار گئے،جب ان سے سوال ہوا کہ کیوں ہارے تو بجائے اپنی نااہلی،غلطی کا اعتراف کرنے کے۔۔کہتے ہیں یوسف علیہ السلام بھی تو کنویں میں پھینکے گئے بعد میں وہ مصر کے بادشاہ بن گئے (مذہب سے مدد)

3.ہمارے طاقتور ترین لوگ جب سوشل میڈیا کا مقابلہ کرنے میں ناکام ہورہے تو حافظ صاحب قرآن سے تاویلیں لارہے کہ جی قرآن سے ثابت کرسکتا ہوں کہ سوشل میڈیا کا استعمال شیطانی ہے ( مذہب کا استعمال)

4.مولانا فضل الرحمن جب بےتحاشا برسنے والی دولت کے زرائع کا جواب نہ دے سکے تو کمال عیاری سے فرماتے ہیں اللہ کی طرف سے "غیبی مدد ہے (اسے کہتے ہیں آیات بیچنا)

وہ کیا ہے کہ
‏مفلس جو اگر تَن کی قبا بیچ رہا ہے
واعظ بھی تو منبر پہ دعا بیچ رہا ہے

دونوں کو ہے درپیش سوال اپنے شکم کا
ایک اپنی خودی، ایک خدا بیچ رہا ہے۔.....!!!!

28/03/2023

2023 MLD 525

ہتک عزت (Defamation) پر لاہور ہائیکورٹ کا نہایت معلوماتی فیصلہ
It is settled principle of law that defamation is the publication of a statement which reflects on a person’s reputation and tends to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society generally or tends to make them shun or avoid him. Defamation accordingly takes the forum of two separate torts i.e. libel and slander. There is no cavil to the proposition that libel is actionable per se and injury to reputation will be presumed. However, whether the case is one of libel or slander, the following elements must be proved by the claimant:-
a. the imputation must be defamatory;
b. it must identify or refer to the claimant;
c. it must be published/communicated to at least one person other than the claimant.
Defamation is defined under Section 03 of the Ordinance, 2002.

The main ingredient constituting defamation is publication of defamatory statement in widely circulated newspaper or spoken in a large gathering. For constituting defamation:-

(a) The allegations levelled against the plaintiff should be false, baseless and unfounded
(b) The wordings used and the allegations levelled, in on the face of it, should have been defamatory derogatory nature;
(c) Such allegations should have been published in widely circulated newspapers or spoken in a large gathering;
(d) The said publications made or wordings used should have been with malice without any reasonable cause and justification;
(e) The allegations should have been directly attributed to the plaintiff by specifically mentioning his name;

Publication of defamatory matter is an actionable wrong without proof of special damage to the person defamed and where defamation is proved, damage shall be presumed as defined in section 04 of the Ordinance, 2002.

The defences available to the appellants provided in section 05 of the Ordinance, 2002, as under: In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if he s

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