Young Legal Eagles - YEL

Young Legal Eagles - YEL Contact information, map and directions, contact form, opening hours, services, ratings, photos, videos and announcements from Young Legal Eagles - YEL, Lawyer & Law Firm, Jhang Sadar.

Young Legal Eagles (YEL) – Your Trusted Legal Partner

Located at Jhang and Faisalabad, Young Legal Eagles (YEL) is a premier litigation and legal consultancy firm dedicated to delivering comprehensive and result-driven legal solutions۔

24/05/2026

Exculpatory & Inculpatory Confessions in Criminal Jurisprudence: Evidentiary Value, Judicial Caution & the Rule Against Selective Reliance !!!

⚖️ Adv. Zulfikar Khan Nasir
Former Judge • Amicus Curiae • Forensic Criminologist
Criminal Defence Mentor • 🎓 Honorary Researcher (IFNLS)
🏛️ Trustee – (MSPUI)
📧 [email protected]
📱 +92 300 7600232
+92 334 4551214

The law relating to confessions occupies a central place in criminal jurisprudence because a confession, if voluntarily and legally made, may become one of the strongest pieces of evidence against an accused. At the same time, history repeatedly demonstrates that confessions are also susceptible to coercion, inducement, psychological pressure, custodial influence, and investigative manipulation. It is for this reason that courts have consistently evolved strict safeguards governing admissibility, voluntariness, corroboration, and evidentiary use of confessional statements.

A fundamental distinction recognized in criminal law is between an inculpatory confession and an exculpatory confession.

An inculpatory confession is one in which the accused admits his involvement in the commission of the offence. For example, where an accused states: “I committed the murder,” the statement is inculpatory because it directly implicates him.

An exculpatory confession, however, is a statement where the accused either wholly denies criminal liability or admits the act while asserting circumstances that legally excuse or justify it. Thus, where an accused states: “I caused the death but acted in self-defence,” the latter portion constitutes an exculpatory explanation. Similarly, where an accused shifts blame to co-accused while absolving himself, the statement becomes exculpatory qua himself.

The distinction is not merely semantic; it carries profound evidentiary consequences.

⸻

Constitutional & Statutory Framework

The law jealously guards against involuntary confessions. Article 38 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 renders inadmissible any confession made to a police officer or made while in police custody unless recorded in accordance with law. Similarly, Article 40 permits limited admissibility only insofar as the statement leads to discovery of a relevant fact.

Section 164 Cr.P.C. read with Section 364 Cr.P.C. prescribes the legal mode for recording judicial confessions, while Chapter 13 of Volume III of the High Court Rules and Orders establishes procedural safeguards intended to secure voluntariness and authenticity.

The Magistrate must:

* explain to the accused that he is not bound to confess;
* warn that the confession may be used against him;
* satisfy himself that the confession is voluntary;
* ensure complete freedom from police influence;
* observe the demeanor and condition of the accused;
* and record objective reasons demonstrating judicial satisfaction.

The expression “reasons to believe” requires objective judicial satisfaction rather than mere suspicion or ritual compliance.

The Supreme Court in Said ur Rehman v. The State (2026 SCMR 955) reiterated that confessions must be approached with exceptional caution, particularly where the accused remains in police custody, because the distress and vulnerability of detention may impair rational judgment and even induce false confessions.^1

⸻

Judicial Confession Must Be Accepted or Rejected as a Whole

One of the most deeply entrenched principles governing confessional jurisprudence is that a confession cannot ordinarily be dissected into inculpatory and exculpatory portions for selective acceptance.

The rule is founded upon fairness and logical consistency. If the court chooses to rely upon the confession as truthful, then the statement must ordinarily be read in its entirety. The prosecution cannot rely only upon those portions favourable to it while discarding portions beneficial to the accused.

This principle received comprehensive reaffirmation in 2023 SCMR 139, where the Supreme Court held that:

* a confession must be read as a whole;
* exculpatory portions cannot be discarded selectively;
* where prosecution evidence fails independently, the accused’s exculpatory version must ordinarily be accepted;
* and the prosecution cannot use the plea of the accused to fill gaps in its own case.^2

The Court laid down several important propositions:

(a) Confession Cannot Be Split Arbitrarily

Where conviction is based substantially upon a confession, the court cannot engage in “pick and choose” by accepting inculpatory parts while rejecting exculpatory ones.

(b) Solitary Confession Requires Total Acceptance or Total Rejection

If confession constitutes the sole incriminating material, it must either be accepted wholly or rejected wholly.

(c) Exculpatory Portions Carry Evidentiary Value

The exculpatory element cannot be ignored merely because it weakens prosecution theory.

(d) Confession of One Accused Cannot Inculpate Another

A confession may operate against its maker but cannot, by itself, become substantive evidence against co-accused.

⸻

Extra-Judicial Confession & Co-Accused

The Supreme Court of India recently reiterated this principle while setting aside a murder conviction on May 22, 2026. The Court observed that an accused’s extra-judicial confession implicating co-accused, without affording such co-accused an opportunity to cross-examine the maker, cannot safely form the basis of conviction.^3

The ruling reinforces a universally accepted criminal law principle:

confession is substantive evidence only against its maker and not against co-accused unless independently corroborated through legally admissible evidence.

This principle flows from the right to fair trial and confrontation.

The evidentiary weakness becomes even more pronounced where the statement is partially self-serving or exculpatory in nature.

⸻

Burden Upon Prosecution Remains Unshifted

Another settled principle is that prosecution must independently establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt irrespective of any defence plea raised by the accused.

The accused bears no burden to prove innocence unless statutory presumptions apply.

The Supreme Court in 2023 SCMR 139 categorically observed that:

* prosecution cannot fall back upon the accused’s plea to prove its case;
* burden upon accused arises only after prosecution establishes a prima facie case;
* and benefit arising from reasonably possible defence must go to accused.^4

Thus, where prosecution evidence itself suffers from doubt, inconsistencies, procedural illegality, or lack of corroboration, the exculpatory statement of the accused acquires greater significance.

⸻

Exculpatory Evidence & Duty of Investigating Officer

The investigative process is not intended merely to collect incriminating material. The Investigating Officer is equally bound to collect and preserve exculpatory evidence.

In 2020 MLD 1785, the Court held that withholding evidence favourable to the accused violates the constitutional guarantee of fair trial.^5

The Investigating Officer must therefore fairly investigate:

* inculpatory evidence,
* exculpatory material,
* contradictions,
* forensic inconsistencies,
* and circumstances beneficial to defence.

Suppression of exculpatory evidence fundamentally impairs the integrity of criminal process.

⸻

Medical & Forensic Contradictions as Exculpatory Circumstances

The importance of exculpatory evidence was also reflected in 2020 YLRN 42, where acquittal in a gang r**e case was based upon cumulative inconsistencies between ocular, medical, and forensic evidence.

The Court particularly relied upon:

* absence of injuries despite allegations of violent assault;
* lack of forensic continuity;
* unexplained chain-of-custody defects;
* contradictory DNA indicators;
* and uncertainty in medico-legal findings.^6

The judgment illustrates that exculpatory circumstances need not independently prove innocence; it is sufficient if they create reasonable doubt regarding prosecution certainty.

⸻

Voluntariness & Custodial Vulnerability

Courts have consistently recognized that confessions extracted during police custody require heightened scrutiny because custodial pressure may undermine voluntariness.

In Said ur Rehman v. The State (2026 SCMR 955), the Supreme Court emphasized:

* confession must be voluntary;
* delay in recording confession while accused remains in custody casts serious doubt;
* handcuffs and police influence must be removed;
* and even retracted confessions require corroboration.^7

The Court importantly acknowledged the psychological dimension of custodial vulnerability, observing that trauma and fear may induce even innocent persons to confess falsely.

⸻

Evidentiary Rule Against Selective Reliance

The cumulative jurisprudence establishes the following settled propositions:

1. A confession must ordinarily be accepted or rejected as a whole.
2. Exculpatory portions cannot be selectively discarded.
3. Confession of one accused is weak evidence against co-accused.
4. Prosecution must independently prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Failure of prosecution evidence enhances significance of exculpatory circumstances.
6. Judicial confessions require strict compliance with procedural safeguards.
7. Extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak evidence.
8. Voluntariness remains the foundational requirement for admissibility.
9. Custodial confessions require exceptional judicial caution.
10. Investigating agencies are equally bound to collect exculpatory evidence.

⸻

Ratio Decidendi Emerging from the Jurisprudence

The combined effect of the above authorities may be summarized thus:

A confessional statement, whether judicial or extra-judicial, must ordinarily be considered in its entirety. The inculpatory portion cannot be selectively relied upon while discarding exculpatory elements unless independent reliable evidence justifies such separation. Where prosecution evidence independently fails to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt, and exculpatory statements cannot be ignored to sustain conviction.

⸻

Conclusion

Confessional jurisprudence ultimately reflects the constitutional balance between societal interest in crime detection and the individual’s right against compelled self-incrimination and unfair conviction.

Modern criminal law no longer treats confession as the “queen of evidence” in an unqualified sense. Rather, courts insist upon:

* voluntariness,
* legality,
* corroboration,
* procedural fairness,
* forensic integrity,
* and contextual reliability.

The judicial insistence that exculpatory portions cannot be discarded selectively is rooted in fairness, logic, and the presumption of innocence. Criminal courts are not permitted to reconstruct confessions selectively to suit prosecutorial theory.

Where doubt exists, benefit must necessarily accrue to the accused—not as charity, but as a matter of legal right.

⸻

Footnotes

1. Said ur Rehman v. The State, 2026 SCMR 955.
2. 2023 SCMR 139.
3. Statement of accused absolving himself while incriminating co-accused not reliable, Supreme Court of India, decided May 22, 2026. See LiveLaw Report
4. 2023 SCMR 139.
5. 2020 MLD 1785.
6. 2020 YLRN 42.
7. Said ur Rehman v. The State, 2026 SCMR 955.

24/05/2026

“The dignity of the legal profession rests upon integrity, knowledge, and truth. When fake degrees infiltrate the system, it is not merely the profession that suffers — justice itself stands compromised. The legal fraternity must remain a sanctuary for genuine advocates who uphold the rule of law with honesty, competence, and responsibility.”

24/05/2026

Ipse Dixit of Police and Its Evidentiary Value in Criminal Trials!

Judicial Control over Investigative Opinion under Pakistani Criminal Jurisprudence!

⚖️ Adv. Zulfikar Khan Nasir
Former Judge • Amicus Curiae • Forensic Criminologist
Criminal Defence Mentor • 🎓 Honorary Researcher (IFNLS)
🏛️ Trustee – (MSPUI)
📧 [email protected]
📱 +92 300 7600232
+92 334 4551214

The criminal justice system recognizes a clear distinction between investigation and adjudication. The police investigate; the courts determine guilt. This distinction forms the foundation of the principle that the ipse dixit of police is not binding upon the court. Although investigative findings may possess persuasive value where supported by objective material, the ultimate judicial determination remains exclusively within the domain of the judiciary.

The expression ipse dixit is a Latin phrase meaning “he himself said it.” In legal discourse, it denotes a bare assertion unsupported by analytical reasoning, evidentiary foundation, or demonstrable data. Pakistani criminal jurisprudence has repeatedly emphasized that a mere police opinion regarding the innocence or guilt of an accused cannot bind a Magistrate or Trial Court. At the same time, courts have also acknowledged that investigatory conclusions supported by substantive material may legitimately create doubt in the prosecution case and may therefore deserve judicial consideration.

Meaning and Scope of Ipse Dixit

The most authoritative exposition on the subject was rendered by the Lahore High Court in Altaf Hussain v. The State where the Court explained that ipse dixit signifies an assertion made but not proved, a mere word-of-mouth opinion lacking analytical foundation or syllogistic reasoning.[1] The Court observed that while unsupported opinion is entitled to no evidentiary weight, an investigative conclusion grounded in objective material, physical evidence, surrounding circumstances, and rational analysis may acquire persuasive value akin to expert opinion.

The judgment further clarified that the opinion of an Investigating Officer is not inherently inadmissible or irrelevant. Rather, its worth depends upon the quality of supporting material. Where the opinion emerges from impartial investigation, corroborative evidence, and analytical scrutiny, it may create “a small dent, a minor crack or a yawning gap” in the prosecution case.[2]

Thus, Pakistani jurisprudence distinguishes between:

1. a bare and unsupported police opinion; and
2. an investigatory conclusion supported by credible analytical data.

Only the former is treated as mere ipse dixit devoid of legal weight.

Police Report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.

Under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Investigating Officer submits a final report upon completion of investigation. Such report may place certain accused in Column No.2 after declaring them innocent. However, the consistent judicial view is that the Court is not bound by such placement.

In Mudassar Altaf v. The State, the Supreme Court reiterated that findings of police are not binding upon the court because the duty of the investigating agency is merely to collect evidence.[3] Likewise, in Muhammad Abbasi v. The State, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Trial Court possesses independent authority to summon an accused even if the police had declared him innocent during investigation.[4]

Similarly, in Waqar-ul-Haq alias Nithoo v. The State, the Supreme Court held that even where police discharge an accused during investigation, the Court may still summon such person to stand trial if the case itself has not been cancelled.[5] The same principle had earlier been recognized in Raja Khushbakhtur Rehman v. The State, wherein the Apex Court held that persons placed in Column No.2 can lawfully be summoned by the Trial Court.[6]

These rulings affirm a fundamental constitutional and procedural principle: adjudicatory authority cannot be surrendered to the investigative agency.

Magistrate’s Supervisory and Judicial Powers

The Magistracy occupies a supervisory position during criminal investigation. Courts have therefore consistently held that Magistrates are not powerless spectators dependent upon police conclusions.

In Muhammad Ismail v. State, the Peshawar High Court held that the Justice of Peace possesses no authority to direct insertion of specific penal provisions in an F.I.R.; however, the Magistrate and Trial Court may correct investigative errors, add or delete penal sections, and frame charges according to the evidence available on record.[7] The Court categorically observed that the Trial Court is not bound by the ipse dixit of police.

This principle also found recognition in Khizar Hayat’s case, where the Lahore High Court stressed that mechanical acceptance of police conclusions without judicial scrutiny is impermissible.[8] The Court emphasized that judicial application of mind is indispensable before summoning or discharging an accused.

The same approach was reaffirmed in PLD 2015 Lahore 81, where the High Court reiterated that investigative opinion cannot override judicial discretion or statutory powers vested in the courts.[9]

Investigatory Findings and Benefit of Doubt

Although courts are not bound by police findings, investigative conclusions may nevertheless become relevant where they expose infirmities in the prosecution case. This nuanced principle was extensively developed in Altaf Hussain v. The State.[10]

In that case, the Investigating Officer concluded, on the basis of physical evidence, surrounding circumstances, independent witnesses, and forensic probabilities, that certain accused had been falsely implicated due to enmity. The Lahore High Court held that such opinion could not be brushed aside as mere word-of-mouth because it rested upon objective investigative material.

The Court observed that Investigating Officers, due to their direct interaction with the scene of occurrence and witnesses, often become repositories of critical factual insight. Consequently, where their conclusions are impartial and analytically supported, they may legitimately weaken the prosecution case and entitle the accused to benefit of doubt.[11]

This distinction is critical. Pakistani criminal law does not elevate police opinion into binding judicial determination; however, neither does it wholly exclude investigatory findings from evidentiary appreciation where they are supported by reliable data.

Judicial Independence and Separation of Functions

The doctrine that police opinion is not binding upon courts ultimately protects judicial independence and due process. Investigation and adjudication are distinct constitutional functions. The police collect material; the courts evaluate it according to law.

If investigative conclusions were treated as binding, the judiciary would effectively abdicate its constitutional role. Such a proposition would violate fundamental principles of criminal justice, including:

* presumption of innocence;
* independent judicial assessment;
* fair trial guarantees; and
* separation between executive investigation and judicial adjudication.

Therefore, even where police recommend discharge under Sections 169 or 173 Cr.P.C., the Court may independently summon an accused if sufficient material exists. Conversely, where police investigation exposes false implication or serious prosecutorial infirmities, courts may extend benefit of doubt to the accused.

Conclusion

The doctrine relating to ipse dixit of police reflects a carefully balanced judicial approach. Pakistani courts have consistently maintained that police opinion, by itself, neither convicts nor acquits an accused. Judicial power cannot be delegated to investigative agencies. Yet courts also recognize that investigatory findings supported by objective material, forensic analysis, independent evidence, and rational reasoning may legitimately influence appreciation of evidence.

The true principle, therefore, is not that police opinion is wholly irrelevant, but that its value depends entirely upon the quality of supporting material. Bare assertions unsupported by evidence constitute mere ipse dixit and deserve no credence. Investigative conclusions grounded in analytical data, however, may expose weaknesses in the prosecution case and create reasonable doubt benefiting the accused.

The ultimate decision nevertheless remains that of the Court alone.

⸻

Footnotes

1. Altaf Hussain v. The State.
2. Ibid.
3. Mudassar Altaf v. The State.
4. Muhammad Abbasi v. The State.
5. Waqar-ul-Haq alias Nithoo v. The State.
6. Raja Khushbakhtur Rehman v. The State.
7. Muhammad Ismail v. State.
8. Khizar Hayat case.
9. PLD 2015 Lahore 81.
10. Altaf Hussain v. The State.
11. Ibid.

23/05/2026

De Die in Diem, Adjournments, and the Crisis of Grassroots Justice !!!

⚖️ Adv. Zulfikar Khan Nasir
Former Judge • Amicus Curiae • Forensic Criminologist • Criminal Defence Mentor • Honorary Researcher (IFNLS) • Trustee – (MSPUI)

When justice lives at the grassroots, neglect at the bottom weakens the entire legal system.

The observation of Surya Kant that “the Supreme Court and High Courts shape the law, but it is the district judiciary that gives it meaning in the daily lives of ordinary people” captures a profound institutional reality across the subcontinent. For the overwhelming majority of citizens, district courts are not merely the first forum of justice—they are often the only forum they will ever meaningfully encounter. It is there that liberty is determined, rights are enforced, and public confidence in the rule of law is either strengthened or destroyed.

Yet this central role remains deeply inconsistent with prevailing ground realities.

The district judiciary across South Asia continues to suffer from chronic underfunding, inadequate infrastructure, overcrowded courtrooms, outdated administrative systems, and severe procedural congestion. Lawyers—particularly young practitioners and women advocates—often work without adequate facilities, professional support, or institutional security. Litigants bear substantial financial and emotional burdens, yet little visible reinvestment is made into strengthening the justice delivery system itself.

Most concerning, however, is the growing culture of procedural drift.

Adjournments, leftovers, technical objections, and avoidable delays have increasingly overshadowed substantive adjudication. Cases are frequently fixed for hearing only to be adjourned at the end of the day after litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and public officials have spent hours waiting in court precincts. No meaningful system exists for advance notification that a matter is unlikely to proceed. The resulting wastage of time, cost, and institutional energy has gradually normalised delay as a feature rather than a defect of the system.

This phenomenon directly undermines the doctrine of de die in diem embodied in Section 309 Cr.P.C., which mandates that once recording of evidence begins, proceedings should continue from day to day unless exceptional reasons justify postponement. The purpose of the provision is not mechanical speed, but disciplined continuity in the pursuit of fairness.

The balance required in criminal adjudication has long been expressed through two competing legal maxims:

Justice delayed is justice denied.
Justice rushed is justice crushed.

A fair criminal justice system must reconcile both. Speed and efficiency cannot come at the expense of justice; equally, endless delay cannot be defended in the name of procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court of India in (2015) 8 SCC 787 emphasised that a criminal court cannot remain a “silent spectator” and must proactively ensure that neither prosecution nor defence “play truancy” with proceedings. Likewise, (2015) 13 SCC 603 recognised speedy trial as an integral component of Article 21 and “procedure established by law.”

The Lahore High Court as early as 1970 P Cr. L J 649 (State v. Jagmal Singh) held that courts are not justified in granting indefinite adjournments to the prosecution and affirmed that the accused possesses a substantive right to speedy trial. The Court upheld closure of prosecution evidence after repeated opportunities extending over one and a half years, observing that judicial discretion must “keep the scales even.”

The consequences of uncontrolled adjournments are profound.

For the accused, delay often means prolonged incarceration without conviction, psychological distress, financial ruin, and social stigma. For victims and their families, repeated postponements create frustration and loss of faith in the judicial process. For society, delay weakens the deterrent effect of criminal law and erodes confidence in state institutions.

Repeated adjournments also directly compromise the quality of evidence itself. Witnesses forget details, become unavailable, relocate, lose interest, or are won over. Physical evidence deteriorates or loses continuity. In homicide trials especially, fragmentation of proceedings often weakens the truth-finding process itself.

Over time, delay produces a dangerous psychological effect upon all stakeholders. Litigants, lawyers, and even court staff begin to presume that matters are unlikely to proceed on any given date. Casualness gradually replaces commitment. Cases continue for years with little substantive progress. Such patterns are rarely witnessed in efficient judicial systems.

More alarmingly, when the formal justice system fails to provide timely adjudication, people increasingly drift toward informal or unconstitutional mechanisms of dispute resolution—jirgas, parallel local tribunals, coercive settlements, and, in extreme cases, violence. Non-state actors exploit weaknesses within formal institutions by presenting alternative narratives of “swift justice,” often at the cost of legality, due process, and fundamental rights.

The crisis therefore extends beyond procedural inefficiency; it becomes a constitutional and societal concern.

Meaningful reform must begin where justice is most frequently experienced: the district judiciary.

The justice system requires:

* substantial institutional investment,
* digitised and automated case-management systems,
* structured hearing schedules,
* online filing and monitoring mechanisms,
* recorded court proceedings,
* mandatory continuing judicial and professional education,
* effective performance review mechanisms,
* and strict accountability for avoidable delays.

The legal profession must also introspect. Unnecessary adjournments and tactical delays should be treated as forms of professional misconduct. Courts, likewise, must exercise firmer procedural control and discourage a culture of casual postponement.

Ultimately, the promise contained in Article 37(d) of the Constitution—“inexpensive and expeditious justice”—cannot remain aspirational rhetoric. Unless reforms are implemented at the grassroots level, lofty constitutional ideals will continue to appear remote from the lived reality of ordinary litigants.

The legitimacy of the justice system depends not merely upon pronouncements from superior courts, but upon whether the ordinary citizen experiences justice as accessible, fair, disciplined, and timely.

For when justice weakens at the grassroots, the entire constitutional structure begins to tremble.

23/05/2026

⚖️ Fundamental Principles Governing the Plea of Defence in Criminal Jurisprudence.

A Comparative Study of Common Law, Constitutional Norms & Federal Court Authority!!!

By: Zulfikar Khan Nasir
Former Judge | Amicus Curiae | Forensic Criminologists | Criminal Defence Mentor | Honorary Researcher, International Federation of Neurolegal Sciences
📧 Email: [email protected] | 📱 WhatsApp: 0300-760023

Abstract

The plea of defence in criminal law is anchored in universally recognised doctrines designed to ensure fairness, prevent wrongful conviction, and preserve the adversarial balance between State and accused. This article examines core principles such as presumption of innocence, burden and standard of proof, general defences, and protection against self-incrimination, with doctrinal reinforcement from Safdar Ali v. Crown (PLD 1953 FC 93) alongside leading common law and constitutional authorities.

⸻

1. Presumption of Innocence: The Golden Thread of Criminal Law

The presumption of innocence is the foundational principle of criminal adjudication, requiring the prosecution to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The doctrine was firmly articulated in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, where Viscount Sankey described it as the “golden thread” running through criminal law.¹

In Pakistan, the Federal Court in Safdar Ali v. Crown (PLD 1953 FC 93) reaffirmed that:

“The burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt.”²

This position aligns with constitutional guarantees under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 and Article 14(2) ICCPR.

⸻

2. Standard of Proof: Beyond Reasonable Doubt

The standard of proof in criminal trials is deliberately stringent to minimise the risk of wrongful conviction.

In In re Winship (397 U.S. 358, 1970), the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for every element of the offence.³

Similarly, Pakistani courts consistently adopt this threshold, emphasising that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute legal proof. The principle in Safdar Ali v. Crown remains a cornerstone authority in Pakistani evidentiary jurisprudence.²

⸻

3. Burden of Proof and Special Defences

While the general burden rests on the prosecution, certain affirmative defences may require the accused to discharge a limited evidentiary burden.

Under Articles 101–105 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, the legal burden never fully shifts; however, the evidential burden may rest on the accused when pleading exceptions.

In Indian jurisprudence, Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1964 SC 1563) clarifies that:

the accused need only establish a defence on the “preponderance of probabilities.”

Pakistani courts adopt a similar approach, consistently holding that even where a defence plea is raised, the prosecution must still prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.²

⸻

4. General Defences: Justification and Excuse

Criminal law recognises circumstances where liability is excluded due to justification or lack of mens rea.

(a) Self-Defence and Necessity

In Palmer v. R (1971 AC 814), the Privy Council held that defensive force must be reasonable and proportionate.⁴

Conversely, R v. Dudley and Stephens (1884 14 QBD 273) rejected necessity as a defence to intentional homicide, establishing limits to moral justification.

⸻

(b) Insanity

The classical M’Naghten Rules (1843) establish that an accused is not criminally responsible if, due to mental disease, they cannot understand the nature or wrongness of the act.⁵

⸻

(c) Automatism

In R v. Quick (1973 QB 910), hypoglycaemia-induced conduct was recognised as non-insane automatism, negating voluntariness.⁶

⸻

5. Right Against Self-Incrimination

The right to silence is a fundamental safeguard against coercive prosecution.

Article 13(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 expressly protects individuals from being compelled to testify against themselves.

Comparatively, the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966) held that custodial interrogation requires warnings to ensure voluntariness of statements.⁷

This principle reinforces that the State must build its case independently of compelled confessions.

⸻

6. Jurisprudential Significance of Safdar Ali v. Crown

The Federal Court decision in Safdar Ali v. Crown (PLD 1953 FC 93) remains a foundational authority in South Asian criminal jurisprudence.

It established three enduring propositions:

1. The prosecution bears the full burden of proof.²
2. Presumption of innocence is a substantive legal right, not a procedural formality.²
3. Benefit of doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused where two reasonable views exist.²

This case continues to be cited in modern Pakistani criminal law as a benchmark for evidentiary sufficiency and judicial caution.

⸻

Conclusion

The plea of defence is not a procedural concession but a constitutional safeguard embedded in centuries of legal evolution—from Roman law maxims to modern constitutional jurisprudence. The enduring authority of Safdar Ali v. Crown reinforces that criminal justice systems must err on the side of acquittal rather than conviction when doubt persists.

⸻

Footnotes

1. Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL).
2. Safdar Ali v. Crown, PLD 1953 Federal Court 93.
3. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
4. Palmer v. R [1971] AC 814 (PC).
5. R v. M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200.
6. R v. Quick [1973] QB 910.
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Address

Jhang Sadar

Opening Hours

Monday 09:00 - 20:00
Tuesday 09:00 - 20:00
Wednesday 09:00 - 20:00
Thursday 09:00 - 20:00
Friday 09:00 - 16:00
Saturday 09:00 - 16:00

Telephone

+923007600232

Website

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when Young Legal Eagles - YEL posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Contact The Practice

Send a message to Young Legal Eagles - YEL:

Shortcuts

Share

Category