22/07/2026
دعوی تکمیل معاہدہ میں عدالت کی طرف سے دیے گئے وقت کے اندر بقیہ زر بیع جمع کرانا لازمی ہے۔
اگر مقررہ وقت کے اندر بقیہ زر بیع جمع نہ کرایا جائے تو دعوی خارج ہوگا۔
مقررہ وقت کے بعد بقیہ زر بیع جمع کرانے کی اجازت نہ دی جاسکتی ہے
(2026 SCMR 1063)
The relief of specific performance, though statutorily recognized, is not granted as a matter of right. It is rooted in equity and regulated by settled judicial principles. The discretion conferred upon the Court is not unstructured, it is judicial discretion, to be exercised on sound legal standards.
From the Court’s perspective, readiness and willingness is foundational because it reflects the equitable balance inherent in specific performance. The Court is asked to compel performance of reciprocal obligations; it cannot do so unless satisfied that the party invoking its jurisdiction has himself adhered to the discipline of the contract. Equity does not intervene merely because an agreement exists, it intervenes where the claimant has demonstrated faithfulness to his own undertakings. Continuous readiness and willingness thus serve as the lens through which the Court evaluates entitlement to this discretionary relief and this burden begins at the threshold: the plaintiff must first articulate, in clear terms, the facts demonstrating his preparedness to perform the contract as agreed, and must then substantiate those assertions through reliable evidence. The inquiry, therefore, is both procedural and evidentiary, first in pleadings, then in proof.
In continuance of the above, the requirement of pleading readiness and willingness is not an empty technicality; it is a statutory discipline embedded in procedural law.
These authorities collectively establish three propositions. First, readiness and willingness must be pleaded in clear and specific terms, conforming to the statutory form. Second, such readiness must relate to the contract as executed, including its timelines and conditions. Third, it must be continuous, from inception of the obligation until institution of the suit. The Court, therefore, does not merely search for a formal sentence in the plaint; it examines whether the pleadings, read as a whole, assert performance in accordance with the agreed stipulations, and whether the evidence sustains that assertion without interruption. Where either element is deficient, the foundation for equitable relief becomes unsustainable.
The obligation to pay the balance sale consideration constitutes the core reciprocal promise resting upon the vendee in a contract for sale of immovable property. The concept of readiness and willingness, therefore, must necessarily be examined in the context whether the purchaser secured, tendered, or palpably arranged the consideration in terms of the agreement. The jurisprudence of this Court has consistently treated this obligation as central while assessing entitlement to specific performance.
Deposit is not an inflexible statutory precondition, failure to tender or demonstrate availability of funds materially impacts the plaintiff’s claim of readiness and willingness. From the Court’s perspective, the obligation to pay the balance consideration is not ancillary but central to the contract of sale. Readiness and willingness cannot be established in abstraction; they must be reflected through objective acts which demonstrate financial capacity and preparedness to perform. The preparation of a pay order, segregation of funds, or prompt deposit in Court are not ceremonial acts but evidentiary indicators that the vendee has placed himself beyond mere assertion and into demonstrable compliance.
The jurisprudence also clarifies that the law does not mandate automatic dismissal merely because the amount was not deposited at the time of filing the suit. However, where no credible material is produced to show that the buyer had secured or tendered the consideration in terms of the agreement, the Court is justified in drawing an adverse inference regarding bona fides. The equitable jurisdiction to decree specific performance is engaged only when the plaintiff’s conduct exhibits consistency, financial capability, and adherence to contractual timelines. In absence of such material, the foundational requirement of continuous readiness and willingness remains unfulfilled.
Proceeding further, it is observed that in a contract for sale of immovable property, the obligations of the vendor and vendee are ordinarily reciprocal and interdependent. The duty of the vendor to execute and register the sale deed is conditioned upon the purchaser’s performance of his corresponding obligation to pay the balance sale consideration in terms of the agreement. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction in a suit for specific performance, must therefore examine the mutuality of obligations and determine whether the party seeking enforcement has first satisfied the pre-requisite of demonstrating his own readiness to perform.
Wwhether time is of the “essence of the contract” because it assumes considerable significance in suits for specific performance. Although, as a general proposition, time is not ordinarily regarded as the essence in transactions relating to immovable property, the parties are competent to expressly stipulate otherwise. Where the agreement itself prescribes a definite time for payment and provides consequences for default, the Court must give due effect to the contractual terms as settled between the parties. The equitable jurisdiction of the Court does not extend to rewriting the bargain or diluting express stipulations relating to timelines and forfeiture.
Equally significant is the aspect of pleadings. The plaint does not contain a categorical and specific averment in the tenor mandated by Form-47 of Appendix-A to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, affirming that the plaintiffs “have been and still are ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement” in accordance with its true construction. The absence of a clear and continuous assertion of readiness and willingness in the plaint weakens the foundation of the claim, particularly when the relief sought is discretionary and equitable.
The courts below, however, appear to have treated the subsequent deposit of the balance consideration, made pursuant to court direction and long after expiry of the stipulated period, as sufficient to cure the earlier default. In doing so, they did not undertake the necessary inquiry as to whether readiness and willingness existed on the due date fixed by the contract and continued thereafter without interruption. The jurisprudence of this Court does not equate belated compliance with continuous readiness; rather, it requires the Court to assess whether the plaintiff had, at the material time, secured or tendered the consideration in accordance with the agreed terms. Failure to conduct this examination amounts to overlooking a material legal requirement governing the grant of specific performance.
Viewed in totality, the record does not satisfactorily establish that the respondents fulfilled the essential precondition of continuous readiness and willingness in terms of the contract. The approach adopted by the courts below, in treating a delayed deposit as dispositive of the issue, does not align with the settled principles consistently affirmed by this Court.
It is by now well settled that although concurrent findings are not ordinarily disturbed, interference is warranted where the findings are the result of misreading or non-reading of material evidence or are contrary to settled principles governing equitable relief.
C.P.L.A.3639/2025
Muhammad Imran v. Ishfaq Ahmed and othes
(As received)
Advocate Ch. Abdur Rahman Nasir Burm-Online Legal Services-Pakistan , Supreme Court of Pakistan 🇵🇰 LL.M. 📱 No. 0333 5123431 Website proficientlawyers.pk
