Umair Shafique Mughal

Umair Shafique Mughal "I am a lawyer, and wearing the black coat is a symbol of my pride and honor. The bar is my home, and my fellow lawyers are my professional family.

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2021 S C M R 1145[Supreme Court of Pakistan]Present: Mushir Alam, Yahya Afridi and Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed, JJMUHAMMAD ...
29/07/2026

2021 S C M R 1145
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Mushir Alam, Yahya Afridi and Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed, JJ

MUHAMMAD ARSHAD ANJUM---Petitioner

Versus

Mst. KHURSHID BEGUM and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No.1530 of 2019, decided on 16th April, 2021.

(Against the order dated 04.03.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court Multan Bench Multan in F.A.O. 135 of 2011)

πŸ“(a) Family Courts Act (###V of 1964)---

----S. 17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 10, 11 & 12(2)---Fraud---Land bought by petitioner, unknown to him, under attachment due to a decree passed by Family Court in favour of respondent---Question as to whether exclusion of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.) barring Ss. 10 & 11 thereof, stood in impediment to petitioner's approach to the Family Court for re-examination of the judgment within the contemplation of S. 12(2), C.P.C. or that he should have asserted his claim of being a bona fide purchaser with consideration through an intervener in civil plenary jurisdiction---Held, that there was no clog on the authority of a Family Court to re-examine its earlier decision with a view to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its jurisdiction and for the said purpose, in the absence of any express prohibition in the Family Courts Act, 1964, it could borrow the procedure from available avenues, chartered by law---In the present case, the Family Court decreed the suit, without a full dress trial merely upon failure of respondent's husband to take special oath, a circumstance that also prevailed with the Appellate Court---Ostensible contest remained restricted between the spouses without slightest breach in their nuptial bond, therefore, in the circumstances, reconsideration/re-examination of the impugned judgment and decree by the Family Court was the only expedient option, conducive to the interest of the contestants---Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment was set aside, and it was directed that the petitioner's application under S. 12(2) of C.P.C. before the Additional District Judge shall be deemed to be pending.

Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge Lahore and others 2014 SCMR 1365 and Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal and others 2017 SCMR 321 ref.

πŸ“(b) Family Courts Act (###V of 1964)---

----S. 17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.10 & 11 & Preamble---Proceedings before Family Court---Exclusion of provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (C.P.C.)---Scope---Exclusion of normal rules of procedure and proof, applicable in civil plenary jurisdiction for adjudication of disputes in proceedings before a Family Court, was essentially designed to circumvent delays in disposal of sustenance claims by the vulnerable; this did not derogate its status as a Court nor took away its inherent jurisdiction to protect its orders and decrees from the taints of fraud and misrepresentation---As such powers must vest in every tribunal to ensure that stream of justice ran pure and clean; such intendment was important yet for another reason, as at times, adjudications by a Family Court may involve decisions with far reaching implications/consequences for a spouse or a sibling and, thus, there must exist a mechanism to recall or rectify outcome of any sinister or oblique manipulation, therefore, there was no clog on the authority of a Family Court to re-examine its earlier decision with a view to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its jurisdiction and for the said purpose, in the absence of any express prohibition in the Family Courts Act, 1964 it could borrow the procedure from available avenues, chartered by law.

πŸ“(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 12(2) & Preamble---Proceedings before Tribunals---Fraud and misrepresentation---Exclusion of provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Scope---Impact of fraud practiced upon tribunals exercising plenary or limited jurisdictions, respectively, could not be procedurally classified as in all jurisdictions it unredeemedly vitiated the very solemnity of adjudication, a wrong that could not be countenanced and must be remedied through dynamic application of equitable principles of law---Such approach had been approved by the Supreme Court in a good number of cases.

The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Mohammad Fazil Khan and others PLD 1975 SC 331; Tanveer Jamshed and another v. Raja Ghulam Haider 1992 SCMR 917; Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another 1992 SCMR 1908; Fazal Elahi Malis through legal heirs v. Miss Abida Reasat Rizvi 1993 SCMR 226; Haji Khudai Nazar and another v. Haji Abdul Bari 1997 SCMR 1986; Masjid Intizamia Committee and others v. Anjuman-e-Falah-o-Bahbood and others 2000 SCMR 540; Hanif and others v. Malik Armed Shah and another 2001 SCMR 577; Suhail Printing Press v. Syed Aley Eba Zaidi 2005 SCMR 882; Muhammad Tariq Khan v. Khawaja Muhammad Jawad Asami and others 2007 SCMR 818; Ammanullah Khan Leghari v. Abid Shaikh Ahmed 2007 SCMR 1434; Sheikh Saleem v. Mrs. Shamim Attaullah Khan and others 2014 SCMR 1694 and Abdul Salam v. Mrs. Tahira Zaidi 1984 CLC 2855 ref.

Ibad ur Rehman Lodhi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Maulvi Anwar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Barrister Umer Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 16th April, 2021.

πŸ”΄ JUDGMENT

QAZI MUHAMMAD AMIN AHMED, J.---Center of controversy is land measuring 298-Kanals 4-Marlas situating in the revenue limits of Mouza Lutafpur District Multan; it originally vested with Muhammad Manzoor respondent No.6 who sold it to Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Shameer, Muhammad Khalid and Muhammad Hamid sons of Wali Muhammad for a consideration of Rs.93,18,700/- vide mutation No.1994, attested on 17.8.2005; petitioner purchased this land from its previous owners through different transactions, mutated on 26.7.2007 and 27.10.2007, respectively; it is his claim that on 7.1.2010, his request to obtain certified copies of the revenue record relating to the said land was declined by the Halqa Patwari on the ground that it was under attachment; he was astonished by a Family Court decree dated 30.05.2008 whereby a suit filed by Khurshid Begum against her husband, respondent No.6 for the recovery of maintenance, dower and dowry was decreed in consequence of latter's failure to take special oath; he also failed in appeal before a learned Additional District Judge at Multan on 15.07.2008; a Constitution petition before a learned Judge-in-Chamber of the Lahore High Court at Multan Bench met with no better fate on 5.11.2008. Baffled by the events, the petitioner first filed an objection petition on 9.1.2010, dismissed on 5.5.2010 due to pendency of an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code); it was withdrawn in view of pendency of an identical application before a learned Additional District Judge, that too was dismissed on 9.4.2011, having regard to the failure of supra Constitution petition. Undeterred by successive failures, the petitioner once again approached the learned Additional District Judge for setting aside the decree with results no different than the previous; this once again brought him before the High Court with yet another setback by judgment dated 4.03.2019 to have his last recourse before us. In his arduous journey throughout, it has been his case that Family Court decree was procured through a surreptitious conspiratorial collusion that manifestly constituted "fraud and misrepresentation" within the contemplation of section 12(2) of the Code ibid and, thus, was liable to be set aside.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that suit filed by respondent No.1 against her husband was fraudulently devised, structured on a marriage certificate with interpolated entries, mischievously contrived to defeat petitioner's legitimate rights acquired through valid transactions and as such the impugned decree, based upon a dubious conduct as well as outcome of fraud cannot sustain. Fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings, added the learned counsel. It is next argued that exclusion of provisions of the Code barring sections 10 and 11 does not stand in impediment to examination of a plea of fraud by a party before a Family Court particularly when it is evident on the record. The spouses seemingly remained in the wedlock throughout despite an ostensible acrimonious contest for a sizable chunk of land claimed as deferred dower against a petty sum of Rs.500/- as prompt are circumstances by itself intriguing, clamouring for a thorough probe, concluded the learned counsel. Contrarily, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that the land in question was given by late Muhammad Manzoor to his wife as dower and, thus, no subsequent transaction could possibly defeat her interest in the said land; according to him, it was beyond jurisdictional competence of a Family Court to adjudicate upon the issues raised by the petitioner, a business to be best attended in a plenary jurisdiction; he has also referred to the limited application of the Code in proceedings before a Family Judge.

3. Heard. Record perused.

4. Petitioner's recourse to defend his title in the disputed land, decreed in respondent's favour as her dower, before the Family Court and latter before the Additional District Judge, though somewhat haphazard, nonetheless, was the only option available to him. The Family Court decreed the suit, without a full dress trial merely upon failure of respondent's husband to take special oath, a circumstance that too prevailed with the learned Appellate Court. Ostensible contest remained restricted between the spouses without slightest breach in the nuptial bond, to the exclusion of rest of the world. Failure of petitioner's Constitution petition in the High Court also turned out a far cry. Throughout the contest, respondent relied upon technical barricades, thus, the questions that call for our consideration are whether exclusion of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 barring sections 10 and 11 thereof, stood in impediment to petitioner's approach to the Family Court for re-examination of the judgment within the contemplation of section 12(2) of the Code or that he should have asserted his claim of being a bona fide purchaser with consideration through an intervener in civil plenary jurisdiction?

The Family Court Act 1964 (W.P. Act ###V of 1964) (the Act) was enacted for " expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith"; provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (P.O. No.10 of 1984) and those of the Code except sections 10 and 11 have been excluded to achieve the legislative intent. The exclusion of normal rules of procedure and proof, applicable in civil plenary jurisdiction for adjudication of disputes in proceedings before a Family Court, is essentially designed to circumvent delays in disposal of sustenance claims by the vulnerable; this does not derogate its status as a Court nor takes away its inherent jurisdiction to protect its orders and decrees from the taints of fraud and misrepresentation as such powers must vest in every tribunal to ensure that stream of justice runs pure and clean; such intendment is important yet for another reason, as at times, adjudications by a Family Court may involve decisions with far reaching implications/consequences for a spouse or a sibling and, thus, there must exist a mechanism to recall or rectify outcome of any sinister or oblique manipulation, therefore, we find no clog on the authority of a Family Court to re-examine its earlier decision with a view to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its jurisdiction and for the said purpose, in the absence of any express prohibition in the Act, it can borrow the procedure from available avenues, chartered by law.

Question of non-applicability of the Code barring sections 10 and 11 thereof came up before the Court in the case of Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge Lahore and others (2014 SCMR 1365), in the said case, plea of ouster of procedure was repelled as under:

"We are not persuaded to hold, that the ex parte decree dated 4.7.2008 was void, for the reason that there is no provision in the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 to strike off the defence of the petitioner, when he failed to file the written statement, thus, it (decree) should be ignored; suffice it to say that the Family Court is the quasi judicial forum, which can draw and follow its own procedure provided such procedure should not be against the principles of fair hearing and trial, .".

In the case of Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal and others (2017 SCMR 321) it was reiterated that:

"Family Court, whether as a trial court or an executing court, are governed by the general principles of equity, justice and fair play".

Impact of fraud practiced upon tribunals exercising plenary or limited jurisdictions, respectively, cannot be procedurally classified as in all jurisdictions it unredeemedly vitiates the very solemnity of adjudication, a wrong that cannot be countenanced and must be remedied through dynamic application of equitable principles of law and such approach has been approved by this Court in a good number of cases arising out of erstwhile rent laws that too excluded wholesale application of the Code. See PLD 1975 SC 331 The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Mohammad Fazil Khan and others, 1992 SCMR 917 Tanveer Jamshed and another v. Raja Ghulam Haider, 1992 SCMR 1908 Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another, 1993 SCMR 226 Fazal Elahi Malis through legal heirs v. Miss Abida Reasat Rizvi, 1997 SCMR 1986 Haji Khudai Nazar and another v. Haji Abdul Bari, 2000 SCMR 540 Masjid Intizamia Committee and others v. Anjuman-e-Falah-o-Bahbood and others, 2001 SCMR 577 Hanif and others v. Malik Armed Shah and another, 2005 SCMR 882 Suhail Printing Press v. Syed Aley Eba Zaidi, 2007 SCMR 818 Muhammad Tariq Khan v. Khawaja Muhammad Jawad Asami and others, 2007 SCMR 1434 Ammanullah Khan Leghari v. Abid Shaikh Ahmed, 2014 SCMR 1694 Sheikh Saleem v. Mrs. Shamim Attaullah Khan and others and 1984 CLC 2855 Abdul Salam v. Mrs. Tahira Zaidi.

5. Recourse to plenary jurisdiction as suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent would be a journey into a blind alley as in the face of a final decree by the Family Court, holding the field, the proposed course would inevitably lead to a chaotic collusion, if at all the petitioner ever succeed. Therefore, in the circumstances, reconsideration/re-examination of the impugned judgment and decree by the learned Family Court is the only expedient option, conducive to the interest of the contestants. The petition is converted into appeal and allowed with no order as to costs. Impugned judgment dated 04.03.2019 is set aside, as a consequence thereof, appellant's claim in the property as mentioned in his application be attended by the learned Additional District Judge Multan before whom his application under section 12(2) of the Code shall be deemed as pending. Since this matter is pending for considerable time, the learned Court seized of the matter, in the fullness of time, shall decide it with all convenient dispatch sooner rather than later.

MWA/M-32/SC Petition allowed.

2021 S C M R 2011[Supreme Court of Pakistan]Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJRESHAM KHAN and an...
29/07/2026

2021 S C M R 2011
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ

RESHAM KHAN and another---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore and another---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 950 of 2021, decided on 7th October, 2021.

Against the Order dated 29.07.2021 passed by Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in Crl. Misc. No.1339-B of 2021

πŸ“(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Discrepancy in location and nature of injuries---Complainant reached at the scene of crime when the accused persons were escaping from the spot which explicated that complainant was himself not the eye-witness of the incident but he was informed by two other witnesses, who were allegedly present at the scene of offence---In the FIR the complainant claimed that the fi***rm injuries were shot on the front side of abdomen of deceased, but the postmortem report did not show any wound of entry on abdomen from front side but showed exits---According to the challan submitted by the Investigation Officer (I.O), the names of accused persons were mentioned in Column No.2 and they were not sent for trial and for such reason the complainant had already filed a private complaint---Locale of injury in the FIR were pointed out by the complainant on the front of abdomen and left side of deceased's body, whereas in the private complaint the complainant had mentioned that the accused persons had caused fi***rm injuries on different parts of body of deceased and did not point out any specific locale of injuries---Investigation had been completed; report under S. 173, Cr.P.C. had been already filed---Case emanating from FIR and private complaint were proceeding in the Trial Court---No tangible evidence or incriminating material had been found or collected by the I.O against the accused persons, hence, there shall be no useful purpose achieved or attained to hold him behind bars---Sufficient grounds were available for further inquiry---Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused persons were granted post arrest bail.

πŸ“(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 185(3)--- Bail--- Appreciation of evidence--- Scope--- Further inquiry---At bail stage deeper appreciation of evidence couldn't be made out but the court had to get the picture through tentative assessment of prosecution story---In order to reach even a tentative assessment, whether the accused had made out a case of further inquiry or not, the court had to glean and congregate the composite effect of incriminating material brought on record by the prosecution, inconsistency or contradiction if any in the statement made in the FIR vis- -vis postmortem report and or the situation where ocular evidence was not supported by the medical evidence.

πŸ“(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 173--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)--- Bail--- Police opinion---Scope---Opinion expressed by Investigation agency was neither binding on court nor could be taken as gospel truth but it depended on the circumstances of each case to be considered---Court could not get rid of or brush aside such opinion unless some other cogent reasons or extenuating circumstances were available to discard and dislodge such opinion to come to another judicious and sagacious conclusion.

πŸ“(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 185(3)---Bail---Further inquiry---Scope---Insight and astuteness of further inquiry was a question which must have some nexus with the result of the case for which a tentative assessment of the material on record was to be considered for reaching just conclusion---Case of further inquiry pre-supposed the tentative assessment which may create doubt with respect to the involvement of accused in the crime.

πŸ“(e) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 185(3)---Bail---Benefit of doubt---Benefit of doubt could be extended to the accused even at bail stage if the facts of the case so warrant.

Azam Nazeer Tarar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Ch. M. Sarwar Sandhu, Additional P.G. and Abdul Rehman, SI for the State.

Malik Ghulam Mustafa Kandwal, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2.

Date of hearing: 7th October, 2021.

πŸ”΄ ORDER

MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J.---This Criminal Petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench on 29.07.2021 in Criminal Miscellaneous No.1339-B of 2021, by means of which the petitioners applied for bail after arrest in FIR No.54/2021, lodged under sections 302/109/148/ 149/114, P.P.C. at Police Station, Lillah, District Jhelum was dismissed.

2. The gist of FIR lodged by the complainant on 23.03.2021 divulges the allegations that on the day of occurrence when his brother Qazi Rab Nawaz was going to his house on a motor bike, the present petitioners armed with Kalashnikov along with Khawar Shehzad armed with pistol and an unknown person with two accomplices Babar Shehzad and Sarsa Khan, both armed with pistols, intercepted the deceased and the petitioner No.1 made burst shot with his Kalashnikov on the front of his abdomen, thereafter, the petitioner No.2 made burst short with his Kalashnikov on the left side of body of deceased. As claimed by the complainant the occurrence was witnessed by Faisal Nawaz and Tayyab Rehman who were following Rab Nawaz, whereas complainant himself reached at the spot after hearing the fire shots when accused persons were escaping from the crime scene.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the learned High Court while rejecting the bail plea failed to consider the major contradictions in between ocular account and medical evidence. The complainant has also filed private complaint regarding the same occurrence but with different allegations. It was further contended that the detention of the petitioners would serve no useful purpose when the investigating agency has declared them innocent and placed their names in Column No.2 of the Challan. The learned counsel further contended that the High Court has wrongly discarded the result of investigation based on CCTV footage showing the presence of petitioners at a different spot at the time of occurrence. The learned counsel invited our attention to the autopsy report and argued that allegedly the petitioner No.1 made fire shots which caused injuries to the deceased on front of his the abdomen but the medical evidence contradicts this allegation as no entry wound was find out on the front side of the abdomen. The post-mortem report describes all injuries on upper part of the body with entry wounds from back side.

4. The Additional P.G did not deny that the names of the present petitioners are placed in Column No.2 of the Challan hence he could not point out any plausible reason for refusing the bail, however he only added that the complainant (respondent No.2) has already filed a private complaint for the same occurrence which is pending.

5. The counsel for the complainant (respondent No.2) argued that the petitioners are involved in the commission of offence but the prosecution failed to properly investigate the matter and placed their names in Column No.2. He further argued that the complainant has already filed a private complaint to prove the guilt of petitioners.

6. Heard the arguments. The pith and substance of FIR demonstrates that complainant reached at the scene of crime when the accused persons were escaping from the spot which explicates that complainant was himself not the eye-witness of the incident but he was informed by two other witnesses, who were allegedly present at the scene of offence. In the FIR the complainant claimed that the fi***rm injuries were shot on the front side of abdomen of deceased, therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners invited our intention to the postmortem report with regard to description of injuries. The postmortem report does not show any wound of entry on abdomen from front side but showing exits wounds as per description and attached sketch. According to the Challan submitted by the Investigation Officer, the names of petitioners are mentioned in Column No.2 and they were not sent for trial and for this reason the complainant has already filed a private complaint. The locale of injury in the FIR were pointed out by the complainant on the front of abdomen and left side of his body, whereas in the private complaint the complainant has mentioned that the petitioners had caused fi***rm injuries on different parts of body of deceased and did not point out any specific locale of injuries. It is well settled exposition of law that at bail stage deeper appreciation of evidence couldn't be made out but the court has to get the picture through tentative assessment of prosecution story, however in order to reach even a tentative assessment, whether the petitioners have made out a case of further inquiry or not, the court has to glean and congregate the composite effect of incriminating material brought on record by the prosecution, inconsistency or contradiction if any in the statement made in the FIR vis- -vis postmortem report and or the situation where ocular evidence is not supported by the medical evidence.

7. The investigation has been completed; report under section 173, Cr.P.C. has been already filed. The case emanating from FIR and Private complaint are proceeding in the trial court. The fact remains that at this stage, no tangible evidence or incriminating material has been found or collected by the I.O against the petitioners, hence, there shall be no useful purpose achieved or attained to hold him behind bars. Albeit we are considering the question of bail, even at this stage, the court cannot lightly ignore the opinion of investigating officer but it needs to be considered in collocation and juxtaposition. In the State case, it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubts but at present no incriminating material has been produced by the prosecution against the petitioners. In tandem, we are also sanguine that the opinion expressed by Investigation agency is neither binding on court nor can be taken as gospel truth but it depends on the circumstances of each case to be considered. In the case in hand, the court cannot get rid of or brush aside it unless some other cogent reasons or extenuating circumstances are available to discard and dislodge such opinion to come to another judicious and sagacious conclusion.

8. The insight and astuteness of further inquiry is a question which must have some nexus with the result of the case for which a tentative assessment of the material on record is to be considered for reaching just conclusion. The case of further inquiry pre-supposes the tentative assessment which may create doubt with respect to the involvement of accused in the crime. It is well settled that object of trial is to make an accused to face the trial and not to punish an under trial prisoner. The basic idea is to enable the accused to answer criminal prosecution against him rather than to rot him behind the bar. Every accused is innocent until his guilt is proved and benefit of doubt can be extended to the accused even at bail stage if the facts of the case so warrant. The basic philosophy of criminal jurisprudence is that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and this principle applies at all stages including pre-trial and even at the time of deciding whether accused is entitled to bail or not.

9. This court in the case of Hakim Ali Zardari v. State (PLD 1998 Supreme Court 1) held that the law of bails is not a static law but is growing all the time moulding itself with the exigencies of time. The main purpose of keeping an under trial accused in detention is to prevent repetition of the offence with which he is charged or perpetration of some other offence and to secure his attendance at the trial. Such object has to be achieved within the framework of a man's right to liberty, which he enjoys along with other rights, collectively known as his freedom. Whereas in the case of Zaigham Ashraf v. State and others (2016 SCMR 18), this court made it clear that it is for the prosecution to show sufficient material/evidence, constituting 'reasonable grounds' that accused has committed an offence falling within the prohibitory limb of section 497, Cr.P.C. whereas the accused has to show that the evidence/material collected by the prosecution creates reasonable doubt in the prosecution. If the accused is ultimately acquitted at the trial then no reparation or compensation can be awarded to him for the long incarceration. According to the dictum laid down in the case of Chaudhry Shujat Hussain v. The State (1995 SCMR 1249), this court held while deciding the bail application court has to tentatively look to the facts and circumstances of the case and in order to ascertain whether reasonable grounds exist or not, the court should not probe into the merit of the case but restrict itself to the material placed before it by the prosecution to see whether some tangible evidence is available against the accused. The rule deducible from Alam Zeb and another v. State and others (PLD 2014 SC 760), expresses that reasonable grounds have to be grounds which are legally tenable, admissible in evidence and appealing to a reasonable judicial mind as opposed to being whimsical, arbitrary or presumptuous. The prosecution in order to make out a case for refusal of bail to an accused is primarily supposed to place on record material on basis of which he is believed to be involved in a non-bailable offence, but in absence of such material the court for the purpose of releasing the accused on bail, instead of dilating upon the facts of the case in details, can dispose of the matter by holding that his detention is unjustified or unreasonable. Reference can be made to PLD 1996 SC 241 and PLD 2002 SC 572.

10. Recently this court in the case of Muhammad Sarfraz Ansari. v. State and others (PLD 2021 SC 738), held that at the bail stage the court is not to make deeper examination and appreciation of the evidence collected during investigation or to conduct anything in the nature of a preliminary trial to determine the accused's guilt or innocence. However, for deciding the prayer of an accused for bail, the question whether or not there exist reasonable grounds for believing that he has committed the alleged offence cannot be decided in vacuum. The court, for answering the said question, has to look at the material available on record when the bail is applied for and be satisfied that there is, or is not, prima facie some tangible evidence which, if left unrebutted, may lead to the inference of the guilt of the accused. In the recent unreported judgment rendered in Civil Petitions Nos.3637 and 3638/2019 (Muhammad Iqbal Khan v. National Accountability Bureau (NAB)), this court held that mere accusation of an offence would not be sufficient to disentitle an accused from being bailed out. There should be "reasonable grounds" as distinguished from mere allegations or suspicion.

11. We have cautiously scanned and ruminated the material placed on record and in our tentative assessment, there are no reasonable grounds for believing the petitioners have committed the alleged offences but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry in terms of section 497(2) of Cr.P.C, therefore, on 7.10.2021, for the reasons to be recorded later, this Criminal Petition was converted into Appeal and allowed. The petitioners were granted post arrest bail on furnishing bail bonds to the tune of Rs.200,000/- (Rupees two hundred thousand) with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. Above are the reasons in the aid of our short order. The observations made in this order are tentative in nature and shall not prejudice the case of either party before the trial court.

MWA/R-10/SC Bail granted.

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