LEX ELIT - Litigators & Corporate Consultants

05/08/2026

Does the limitation period to challenge a Federal Service Tribunal judgment before the Supreme Court start from the day the judgment was signed, or the day it actually reached the parties? The Supreme Court has now settled this question, and the answer matters for every government department and employee who may need to approach the apex Court.

The Director General, Federal Directorate of Education, Islamabad, filed several petitions against a Tribunal judgment that had restored pay benefits to a group of employees. The Court's office objected that the petitions were filed late. The department argued that although the Tribunal's judgment was signed on one date, it was only dispatched to the parties two weeks later, and limitation should run from that later date.

The Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning, but only up to a point. It held that where a Tribunal judgment is signed but never actually pronounced in open court in front of the parties, limitation cannot be counted from the date of signing, because a decision nobody has been told about cannot yet be acted upon. Instead, relying on Rule 21 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974, which requires the Tribunal to send certified copies of every signed judgment under registered cover, the Court ruled that limitation begins from the date the judgment is actually dispatched by the Tribunal's own office. That is the first moment the aggrieved party can realistically know a decision exists and act on it.

Even so, the department's petitions did not survive. Counting limitation from the later dispatch date still left the petitions filed beyond time. The Court also rejected the department's request to excuse the delay, holding that the ordinary movement of government files and internal approvals is not a special or sufficient reason for condonation. The law of limitation, the Court reaffirmed, binds the State exactly as it binds any private citizen, and the petitions were dismissed.

کیا فیڈرل سروس ٹریبونل کے فیصلے کو سپریم کورٹ میں چیلنج کرنے کی میعاد فیصلے پر دستخط ہونے کے دن سے شروع ہوتی ہے، یا اس دن سے جب فیصلہ فریقین تک پہنچتا ہے؟ سپریم کورٹ نے اب اس سوال کا فیصلہ کر دیا ہے، اور اس کا جواب ہر سرکاری محکمے اور ملازم کے لیے اہم ہے جسے کبھی سپریم کورٹ سے رجوع کرنا پڑے۔

ڈائریکٹر جنرل، فیڈرل ڈائریکٹوریٹ آف ایجوکیشن، اسلام آباد نے ٹریبونل کے اس فیصلے کے خلاف کئی درخواستیں دائر کیں جس میں کچھ ملازمین کی تنخواہ کے مراعات بحال کیے گئے تھے۔ عدالت کے دفتر نے اعتراض اٹھایا کہ درخواستیں تاخیر سے دائر کی گئی ہیں۔ محکمے کا مؤقف تھا کہ اگرچہ ٹریبونل کا فیصلہ ایک تاریخ کو دستخط ہوا، مگر یہ فریقین کو دو ہفتے بعد روانہ کیا گیا، اور میعاد کا حساب اسی بعد کی تاریخ سے ہونا چاہیے۔

سپریم کورٹ نے اس دلیل سے اتفاق کیا، مگر ایک حد تک۔ عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ اگر ٹریبونل کا فیصلہ دستخط شدہ ہو مگر فریقین کی موجودگی میں کھلی عدالت میں کبھی سنایا ہی نہ گیا ہو، تو میعاد کا حساب دستخط کی تاریخ سے نہیں لگایا جا سکتا، کیونکہ جس فیصلے کی کسی کو خبر ہی نہ ہو اس پر عمل نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔ اس کے بجائے، سروس ٹریبونلز (پروسیجر) رولز 1974 کے رول 21 کے تحت، جو ٹریبونل کو ہر دستخط شدہ فیصلے کی تصدیق شدہ نقل رجسٹرڈ ڈاک کے ذریعے بھیجنے کا پابند بناتا ہے، عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ میعاد اس تاریخ سے شروع ہوگی جب فیصلہ ٹریبونل کے دفتر سے باقاعدہ روانہ کیا گیا۔ یہی وہ پہلا لمحہ ہے جب متاثرہ فریق حقیقی معنوں میں فیصلے کے وجود سے آگاہ ہو کر اس پر عمل کر سکتا ہے۔

اس کے باوجود محکمے کی درخواستیں بچ نہ سکیں۔ روانگی کی بعد کی تاریخ سے میعاد کا حساب لگانے پر بھی درخواستیں میعاد سے باہر دائر ہوئی تھیں۔ عدالت نے تاخیر کی معافی کی درخواست بھی مسترد کر دی اور قرار دیا کہ سرکاری فائلوں کی معمول کی نقل و حرکت اور اندرونی منظوریاں تاخیر معاف کرنے کی خاص یا کافی وجہ نہیں بنتیں۔ عدالت نے دہرایا کہ قانونِ میعاد ریاست کو اسی طرح پابند کرتا ہے جس طرح کسی بھی نجی شہری کو، اور درخواستیں خارج کر دی گئیں۔

Reference: The Director General, Federal Directorate of Education, Islamabad v. Ms. Sajida Anjum and others, Civil Petitions No. 352, 353, 355 and 356 of 2026, Supreme Court of Pakistan, order dated 04.08.2026.

03/08/2026

Can a deceased employee's brothers and sisters claim a share in his pension? The Supreme Court of Pakistan says no, and the reasoning has an important lesson for every family dealing with a loved one's retirement benefits.

A PESCO employee passed away in 2007. He left behind a widow, no children, and several brothers and sisters. After his death, the siblings went to court seeking a succession certificate, arguing that as his legal heirs they were entitled to a share in his pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits. The widow contested this, and the case travelled all the way from the trial court to the Peshawar High Court and finally to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court settled the matter firmly in the widow's favour. It explained that pension paid after an employee's death is not like money or property he owned during his lifetime. Anything the employee had already earned and received while alive becomes part of his estate and is inherited normally by his heirs. But family pension is different. It only comes into existence after death, and it is created purely by the pension rules of the department, not by the law of inheritance. Those rules are designed to look after the widow and other dependents the department recognises, not the wider family. That is why brothers and sisters, however close, cannot claim a share simply because they are legal heirs or because the couple had no children. Even having a succession certificate in hand does not change this; it cannot force a benefit that the pension rules never gave to them in the first place. Since the widow was the recognised dependent, the Court held that she alone was entitled to the pension, arrears, gratuity and other dues, and dismissed the siblings' appeal.

کیا کسی مرحوم ملازم کے بھائی بہن اس کی پنشن میں حصہ دار بن سکتے ہیں؟ سپریم کورٹ آف پاکستان کا جواب ہے، نہیں، اور اس فیصلے کی وجوہات ہر اس خاندان کے لیے اہم ہیں جو کسی پیارے کی ریٹائرمنٹ مراعات کا معاملہ درپیش رکھتا ہو۔

پیسکو کا ایک ملازم 2007 میں انتقال کر گیا۔ اس کی کوئی اولاد نہ تھی، البتہ بیوہ اور کئی بھائی بہن حیات تھے۔ ان کی وفات کے بعد بھائی بہنوں نے عدالت سے سکسیشن سرٹیفکیٹ کے حصول کے لیے رجوع کیا اور مؤقف اپنایا کہ بحیثیت قانونی وارث وہ مرحوم کی پنشن، گریجویٹی اور دیگر مراعات میں حق دار ہیں۔ بیوہ نے اس دعوے کی مخالفت کی، اور یہ مقدمہ ٹرائل کورٹ سے پشاور ہائیکورٹ اور بالآخر سپریم کورٹ تک پہنچا۔

سپریم کورٹ نے یہ معاملہ بیوہ کے حق میں طے کر دیا۔ عدالت نے واضح کیا کہ موت کے بعد ملنے والی پنشن اس رقم یا جائیداد جیسی نہیں جو ملازم اپنی زندگی میں خود کما چکا ہو۔ جو کچھ ملازم زندگی میں حاصل کر چکا تھا وہ اس کے ترکہ کا حصہ بن کر عام وراثتی اصولوں کے مطابق تقسیم ہوتا ہے۔ لیکن خاندانی پنشن مختلف ہے۔ یہ موت کے بعد وجود میں آتی ہے اور مکمل طور پر محکمے کے پنشن قواعد کے تحت بنتی ہے، نہ کہ قانونِ وراثت کے تحت۔ یہ قواعد صرف بیوہ اور محکمے کی جانب سے تسلیم شدہ زیرِ کفالت افراد کی دیکھ بھال کے لیے بنائے گئے ہیں، پورے خاندان کے لیے نہیں۔ یہی وجہ ہے کہ بھائی بہن، خواہ کتنے ہی قریبی کیوں نہ ہوں، محض قانونی وارث ہونے یا میاں بیوی کی اولاد نہ ہونے کی بنا پر حصہ دار نہیں بن سکتے۔ سکسیشن سرٹیفکیٹ کا حاصل ہونا بھی اس صورتحال کو نہیں بدلتا، کیونکہ یہ ایسا حق نہیں دلا سکتا جو پنشن قواعد نے کبھی دیا ہی نہیں۔ چونکہ بیوہ ہی تسلیم شدہ زیرِ کفالت تھی، عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ وہی پنشن، بقایاجات، گریجویٹی اور دیگر مراعات کی واحد حقدار ہے، اور بھائی بہنوں کی اپیل خارج کر دی۔

Reference: Haji Painda Khan & others v. Mst. Gul Indana Bibi & others, Civil Appeal No. 208-P of 2015 & CPLA No. 637-P of 2015, Supreme Court of Pakistan, order dated 12.05.2026.

24/07/2026

Be a responsible citizen and file your returns in time.

12/07/2026

Lex Elit is pleased to share the successful outcome secured for our client before the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, in the case of Saiqa Munawar v. Director General FGEI & Another, Appeal No. 1062(R)CS/2025, a reported judgment of the Tribunal. Our client, a school teacher serving since 2008, had proceeded on leave recommended by her head of institution due to genuine domestic hardship, yet the department treated her absence as unauthorized and imposed the major penalty of removal from service.

Arguing on her behalf, our team successfully established that the show cause notice failed to specify the grounds for the proposed penalty as required under the Civil Servants (E&D) Rules 2020, and that the department had predetermined her removal without affording her a genuine hearing, thereby violating principles of natural justice. The Tribunal held that a penalty cannot be sustained where the grounds are not clearly stated in the notice, and that passing orders without properly hearing the employee amounts to condemning her unheard.

As a result, the Tribunal set aside the removal order as void in the eyes of law and directed the reinstatement of our client with back and consequential benefits. This outcome reaffirms Lex Elit's continued commitment to safeguarding the due process rights of civil servants before the Federal Service Tribunal.

11/07/2026

Our partner Mr. Afaq Ahmad delivering lecture of corporate law to the Young lawyers at the Young Lawyers Association Islamabad.

03/07/2026

03/07/2026

Exciting News from Lex Elit - Litigators, Arbitrators & Legal Consultants!

We are proud to announce our collaboration with the Young Lawyers Association Islamabad (YLAI) to deliver a series of lectures for law students and newly enrolled lawyers!

This initiative reflects our firm’s continued commitment to nurturing the next generation of legal professionals sharing practical insights on litigation strategy, tribunal practice, and courtroom advocacy drawn from real case experience.

At Lex Elit, we believe that strengthening the legal community starts with investing in those who will shape its future. We look forward to engaging with bright young minds entering the profession and contributing to their growth.

🏛️ Lex Elit — Litigators, Arbitrators & Legal Consultants

03/07/2026

Sanaullah Khan

03/07/2026

Our firm is pleased to share that our partner, Mr. Sanaullah Khan, Advocate High Court, successfully represented the appellant in Appeal No. 553(R)CS/2023 before the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, resulting in the reinstatement of a senior government officer who had been dismissed from service after 32 years in the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service. The Tribunal set aside the dismissal order in its entirety and directed reinstatement with full back and consequential benefits, including pay, seniority, and promotion.

The judgment turned on several important principles of administrative and constitutional law. The Tribunal held that denying the appellant the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses during the inquiry amounted to a violation of Article 10-A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial. It further found that the disciplinary authority had overstepped its lawful role by effectively acting as an inquiry officer rather than confining itself to reviewing the findings placed before it, and that fresh allegations had been introduced at a later stage without ever forming part of the original charge sheet. Taken together, the Tribunal concluded that the proceedings were arbitrary, lacked impartiality, and were inconsistent with the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973.

The judgment serves as a reminder that due process and the right to a fair hearing remain non-negotiable, even within departmental and disciplinary proceedings, and that these safeguards apply with equal force to matters concerning the careers and reputations of civil servants.