27/09/2026
2026 SCMR 1798
PLJ 2026 SC (Cr.C.) 180
پولیس کی جانب سے ایف آئی درج کرنے میں تاخیر سے متعلق سپریم کورٹ کا فیصلہ جس میں اس شکایت کا انتہائی سختی سے نوٹس لیتے ہوئے پولیس کے اعلی حکام کو ہدایات جاری کی گئی ہیں
اطلاع دہندہ کو فریادی اور بخدمت جناب ایس ایچ او صاحب لکھنا استعماری دور کی علامت ہے
In regards to the delay, which is usually associated with the conduct of the informant or complainant, as to what was his manner after the particular incident, the basic principle is enshrined in Article 21 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984.
Consequently, the victim cannot be made to suffer on account of the delay occasioned by the conduct, omission or negligence of the police officials.
The informant, in the present case, acted with due promptitude in reporting the occurrence, as is borne out from the contemporaneous entry made in the Roznamcha. It is well settled that while examining the effect of delay, the Courts are required to consider whether such delay is attributable to the informant in reporting the crime, and not the delay occasioned by the failure of the police to discharge their statutory obligation of promptly registering the F.I.R.
To hold otherwise would frustrate the very object and spirit of the relevant provision of law, as it would permit the entire prosecution to fail on account of the omission, inefficiency or neglect of a police officer, over which the complainant or the victim has no control.
The explanation advanced by the police officials in their earlier reports submitted before this Court that the complainant party remained engaged in funeral processions cannot be accepted as a lawful or plausible justification. Once information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is conveyed to the police through any source whatsoever, it is their bounden statutory duty to take immediate steps to ascertain the facts and to ensure the prompt registration of the F.I.R. The police are not legally justified in waiting for the heirs of the deceased to approach them after the completion of funeral rites, nor can such conduct be countenanced in law.
The registration of a case under section 154 of the Cr.P.C cannot be refused nor delayed when the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence has been given to or received by the Officer Incharge of a Police Station as held by this Court in numerus of judgments. The registration of the case is the primary step to put the criminal proceedings in motion and to enable the Officer in Charge of a Police Station to initiate the course of investigation strictly in accordance with the mandate set out in the Cr.P.C. The police official cannot assume the role of an adjudicator or assume the role of a Magistrate or a court to embark upon an inquiry in order to ascertain the credibility of the information before it is entered in the prescribed book kept under section 154 of the Cr.P.C.
This Court has observed that investigation or inquiry in the nature of finding the correctness or otherwise of the information prior to registration of the FIR will be hit by the provisions of section 162 of the Cr.P.C. It is well established that the First Information Report (FIR) is a way to inform the police about a serious crime, known as a cognizable offense. The purpose of FIR is to report the incident and provide details so that the police can start investigation. While FIR is one way to set the investigation process in motion, nevertheless, the police don't always need one to start investigating. If they have credible information or knowledge about a crime from any informer, they can begin investigating on their own. In fact, the police have a duty to takeaction and not wait for complainant to appear for FIR if they have reason to believe that a cognizable offense has been committed. They should take initiative to investigate and gather evidence without any delay.
A person who furnishes information under section 154, Cr.P.C. is, in the eye of law, merely an informant. He is neither a complainant nor a petitioner invoking mercy or indulgence. In prosecutions initiated on the basis of an F.I.R., the State is the complainant, acting through its investigative and prosecutorial machinery. A private citizen or a victim reporting the commission of a cognizable offence does not assume the status of a complainant, nor does the law require him to do so. Any practice that treats such a citizen as a supplicant is inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of access to justice and fair treatment guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution.
The description of such a citizen as a ‘Faryaadi’ is legally misconceived and constitutionally impermissible, as it demeans the citizen by portraying him as a seeker of favour rather than as a rightsbearing individual invoking the protection of law. Such terminology strikes at the very dignity of the citizen, which stands inviolable under Article 14 of the Constitution, and undermines the concept of equal protection of law envisaged by the constitutional framework. Police officers are public servants entrusted with constitutional and statutory duties. They are bound to protect life, liberty and security of person, values which lie at the core of Article 9 of the Constitution. They are required to serve the public and are remunerated from public funds. Citizens, therefore, approach the police as of right, and not as a matter of charity, grace or indulgence. Any institutional practice that reverses this relationship erodes public confidence in the rule of law and weakens constitutional governance. The continued use of the term ‘Faryaadi’ depicts an obsolete and unconstitutional mindset wherein public authorities are perceived as rulers rather than servants of the people a notion expressly repudiated by the constitutional order established under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Expressions such as ‘Faryaad’ and formulaic addressals like ‘Bakhidmat Janaab SHO’ are remnants of a colonial and pre-constitutional paradigm. Despite the constitutional transformation brought about by the Constitution of 1973, vestiges of this mindset regrettably persist through institutional habit.
Likewise, in applications addressed to the Station House Officer, the use of the expression ‘Bakhidmat Janaab SHO’ is discouraged, having no legal sanction, and a simple addressal as ‘Janaab SHO’ shall suffice.
It is imperative to bear in mind that the terminology employed by courts and public institutions shapes procedural understanding, institutional behaviour and the lived experience of constitutional rights. In a legal system governed by statute and the Constitution, courts and executive authorities are duty-bound to employ language that reflects legislative intent, constitutional values and procedural clarity. Failure to do so perpetuates confusion, entrenches unconstitutional hierarchies, and undermines the disciplined and rights-based application of criminal law
This Court has in various cases directed the Inspector Generals of the Police of all provinces for prompt registration of F.I.R, but observe that this practice of late registration is still persisting. A prime example is Khizar Hayat case10 where the statutory duty of the police officials to register F.I.R promptly was emphasized. In Haider Ali case, this Court directed Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces to submit reports regarding the accountability of the police officers, as inefficiency, maladministration and abuse of powers by the Police in regards to registration of F.I.R was observed by this Court. Recently, in Seeta Ram case, this court called Inspector General of Sindh to explain the reasons for this persistent practice as, to our observations, this is more prevalent in the province of Sindh as compared to other provinces.
Before departing with this judgment, this court directs that the Inspector General of Police all provinces must ensure that there shall be prompt registration of F.I.R, once the informant informs the Officer Incharge of the Police Station, then the same is duty bound to register the F.I.R, without causing any delay. Criminal Justice system has evolved and we have observed that in investigation of criminal matters, the time is of essence, and delay can result in either the loss or deuteriation of evidence, to be very specific, forensic evidence, ultimately prejudicing the merits of the case. It is pertinent to refer to the report of U.S. Department of Justice, the relevant part reads as under:
“The time elapsed from crime commission and its report to police, and the delay in police response to the scene, have long been considered factors not only in apprehending criminals but also in the preservation of scene evidence. With the passage of time, the likelihood increases that the evidence may be contaminated or destroyed by the victim, witnesses and passersby.”
Therefore, the law recognizes investigations after the registration of F.I.R, and a delay in registration means that a delayed start to the investigation of offence which might cause lost or disappearance of evidence caused by the Officer Incharge of Police Station, who was furnished information, but the F.I.R was registered after considerable delay.
In cases where the Officer Incharge of Police Station delays the registration of F.I.R, it shall be presumed that such delay is caused to benefit the accused persons, unless the police official establishes to the contrary and the burden of proof shall lie upon him. It bears emphasis that section 201 PPC does not create any exception in favour of public functionaries, including police officials. The provision employs the expression ‘whoever’, which is of widest amplitude, and by settled principles of statutory interpretation, encompasses every person, irrespective of rank, office, or official capacity. A police officer, therefore, stands on no higher pedestal than a private citizen when the question concerns the concealment or disappearance of evidence of an offence. This principle flows directly from the law declared by the Supreme Court in Malik case, wherein it was unequivocally held that no authority or functionary is above the law, and that any immunity not expressly granted by statute is alien to constitutional governance.
Apart from above, where a police official, having knowledge of the commission of a cognizable offence through any source whatsoever, deliberately fails to set the law in motion, or despite receiving information, declines or delays the registration of an F.I.R., or omits to initiate the legally mandated proceedings, such omission cannot be viewed as a mere procedural lapse. Rather, where the consequence of such omission is the loss, destruction, or disappearance of evidence, the conduct squarely attracts the provision of section 201 PPC.
This Court has repeatedly emphasised that delay in registration of F.I.R. strikes at the root of a fair investigation, as held in Muhammad Bashir case and Lal Khan case, wherein unexplained delay was recognised as a factor enabling manipulation and loss of evidence. The argument that a police officer may only be proceeded against departmentally, and not criminally, is legally untenable. Departmental liability and criminal liability operate in distinct and independent fields; the former addresses misconduct in service discipline, while the latter concerns an offence against the law and society at large. This distinction stands affirmed by this Court in Abdul Khaliq case, wherein it was held that criminal prosecution of a civil servant is not barred merely because departmental proceedings are also maintainable. Indeed, a police officer is under a higher legal and moral obligation than an ordinary citizen. While a private individual may or may not be fully cognizant of legal consequences of inaction, a police officer is specifically entrusted with the statutory duty to prevent crime, preserve evidence, and prosecute offenders. Failure to act, when coupled with knowledge of an offence, raises a presumption of intent, particularly where such failure benefits the accused or prejudices the complainant. This Court has consistently held that custodians of law are answerable with greater, not lesser, rigour, as deviation from duty by such persons erodes public confidence in justice. Therefore, why should a police officer who delays or refuses registration of an F.I.R.,thereby enabling the disappearance of evidence, not be arraigned under section 201 PPC in the same manner as a common citizen? To hold otherwise would amount to conferring unwarranted immunity, a concept repeatedly rejected by this Court, and would be destructive of the rule of law. Such selective insulation would offend the constitutional principle of equality before law, and negate the foundational doctrine that no one is above the law, a principle firmly embedded in constitutional jurisprudence. The criminal law does not recognize a privileged class immune from prosecution merely by virtue of office. 29. Accordingly, this neglect and breach of the mandatory provision of law, shall now result in initiation of criminal proceedings against the police officer. Where deliberate delay or inaction on the part of the Officer Incharge of a Police Station results in the concealment, loss or destruction of evidence, criminal liability under section 201 PPC is validly attracted. In such cases, the presumption shall operate against the delinquent officer, and the burden shall lie upon him to explain the delay and rebut the inference of intentional concealment. Hence, the District and Sessions Judges, as well as Magistrates taking cognizance under section 190 Cr.P.C would be competent to call upon such officers, either due to their own observation or on application of the informant or the victim himself/herself, and consequently charge them under section 201 of the PPC as well as any other applicable law, if they are satisfied that such delay was caused by the police officer, however, this shall be after serving show cause notice to the said police officer. Additionally, the above said Judicial officers shall be competent to initiate criminal proceedings apart from 201 PPC, under the relevant provincial laws for the discipline of police.
Since the practice of delayed registration is considerably more prevalent in Sindh as evident from the above referred cases, the Prosecutor General, Sindh, is directed to submit a report to the Officer Incharge, Branch Registry of this Court at Karachi, for our perusal in chambers, within one month regarding the average delay in registration of F.I.Rs in regard to heinous offences in the last two years in the province of Sindh.
The office is also directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Inspector Generals of Police and the Prosecutor Generals of all provinces as well as ICT. The Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces and the ICT shall ensure the mechanism of ‘internal policing’ to curb the excess/misuse of powers by the police officers. They are directed to take practical steps in order to ensure that there is no refusal or delay in registration of F.I.R under section 154 of the Cr.P.C, if the information relates to the commission of a cognizable offence, even if such information is initially entered in Roznamcha/daily diary, it shall be treated as part of FIR and incorporated accordingly. We also expect that the Prosecutor Generals of the respective Provinces as well as ICT advise the police authorities and frame standard operating procedures in accordance with the mandate of the Cr.P.C. They are further directed to make the relevant Police Rules in Line with the spirit of the Cr.P.C., specifically in regards to the Form of F.I.R., in consultation with all relevant departments.
In regard to this particular case, the Inspector General of Police, Sindh is directed to initiate departmental proceedings against the police officers who caused delay in registration of F.I.R. in instant case.
The office is directed to circulate this judgment to all the High Courts of Pakistan as well as District Courts for guidance and compliance.
The District and Sessions Judges of all districts in the province of Sindh shall ensure that in lower courts the ‘complainant’ or ‘informant’ as the case may be, is not referred to by the term ‘Faryaadi’ while calling the case
Crl.P.L.A.1021/2021
Muhammad Bux alias Shahzaib v. The State through Prosecutor General Sindh
