Atty. Joemar Paquio

06/05/2026

The has acquitted a man charged with violence against women and their children, or VAWC, for allegedly refusing to provide financial support to a child not proven to be his, emphasizing that a legal duty to provide financial support arises only after filiation or paternity has been established.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division reversed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2024 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵).

The case arose from a complaint filed by a woman against her former boyfriend, accusing him of refusing to provide financial support for her child.

The accused consistently denied he was the father, claiming that the child was born only eight months after they last had sexual relations.

During trial, the woman presented the child’s birth certificate as evidence. However, the portion indicating the father’s name, was marked "𝘕/𝘈" and left unsigned.

The woman also admitted in court that the accused refused to give financial support because he doubted that he was the child’s father.

In reversing the accused’s conviction, the SC explained that to convict a person for economic abuse under Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the victim is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the offender’s wife or partner, or someone with whom the offender has a common child; (3) the offender refused to give financial support due; and (4) the refusal was intended to cause mental or emotional suffering.

In this case, the SC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove two essential elements: that the accused and the woman share a common child, and that the refusal to provide support was done to inflict psychological harm.

As the accused’s paternity was not proven in this case, no legal obligation to provide support could be imposed.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164663.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164655.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution.

05/05/2026

THE LEGAL MIND | Can misconduct cost a student her academic honors?

A Grade 12 student, attacked a schoolmate and was suspended after due process. Although academically qualified for honors, she was delisted from the honor roll under the school’s handbook but was still allowed to march on graduation day. Her guardian rejected the decision, and she verbally attacked school authorities both in person and online, and eventually filed a complaint with the Department of Education’s regional office.

"Was the school correct in disqualifying the student from the school’s honor list?

Yes.

Legally speaking, while the relationship between a student and a private school is imbued with public interest, it remains essentially contractual."

Read the full article in the comments below.

04/05/2026

The has affirmed that the President does not have the power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition for review filed by the Office of the President (OP). The petition challenged a ruling of the Court of Appeals that voided the OP’s dismissal of then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur H. Carandang.

While Carandang can no longer be reinstated because his term as Overall Deputy Ombudsman already expired in 2020, the SC said that the penalties imposed on him, including the forfeiture of his retirement benefits, have no legal effect. It ruled that Carandang is entitled to his full retirement benefits and to the salaries he would have received during his preventive suspension and dismissal, up to the end of his term.

In 2017, Carandang was reported to have claimed in an ambush interview that the Office of the Ombudsman had proof of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of then President Rodrigo R. Duterte and his family, including bank transaction records said to have been transmitted by the Anti-Money Laundering Council to the Ombudsman. These statements related to a complaint filed by former Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV regarding President Duterte’s alleged unexplained accumulated wealth.

Two administrative complaints were then filed against Carandang before the OP, accusing him of improperly disclosing confidential information and showing partiality during the interview. The OP ordered Carandang’s preventive suspension, but this was not enforced by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.

Carandang challenged the complaints, arguing that the SC had already ruled in the 2014 case of 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘐𝘐𝘐 𝘷. 𝘖𝘗 (𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴) that Section 8(2) of the 𝘖𝘮𝘣𝘶𝘥𝘴𝘮𝘢𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1989 was unconstitutional for granting the President administrative disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman.

The OP, claiming that the SC abandoned its ruling in 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 in the 2016 case of 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦 𝘷. 𝘖𝘗 (𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦), proceeded to find Carandang liable for graft and corruption as well as betrayal of public trust and dismissed him from service. Then newly appointed Ombudsman Samuel Martires directed Carandang to cease and desist from performing his duties and declared his post vacant.

Holding that 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 had not been abandoned by 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦, the SC clarified that 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦 did not revisit or overturn 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 because that case merely upheld the dismissal of a complaint against then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro without imposing any sanction. The President’s disciplinary authority and the constitutionality of Section 8(2) were not at issue.

𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 was also decided by the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, and could not be modified or reversed by a Division ruling, such as 𝘈𝘨𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯-𝘚𝘦.

The SC explained that when it decided 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 in 2014, it became part of the law of the land, firmly establishing that the President has no authority to remove the Deputy Ombudsman.

Reaffirming 𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘻𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴, the SC stressed that the Constitution expressly characterizes the Ombudsman as independent: free from executive control, supervision, or political influence.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164549.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164531.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/04/2026

The (SC) has ruled that ISCO Holding Corporation (ISCO) cannot register its “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍 & 𝐃𝐄𝐒𝐈𝐆𝐍” mark as it constitutes Nikon Corporation’s trade name and is confusingly similar to the well-known “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” trademark of the said corporation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division denied ISCO’s petition and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA), which rejected ISCO’s trademark application.

ISCO filed an application for a trademark for its home and household goods containing the design of an anchor enclosed in a circle with the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍”.

Nikon Corp., a foreign corporation and prior registrant and user of the “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” mark in the Philippines, opposed the application, arguing that ISCO’s mark is confusingly similar to its own mark.

The Intellectual Property Office–Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO‑BLA) agreed with Nikon Corp. and denied ISCO’s application. Although the IPO Office of the Director General later reversed this ruling, the CA reinstated the IPO-BLA’s decision, prompting ISCO to elevate the case to the SC.

ISCO claimed that its goods are unrelated to Nikon Corp.’s and that differences, such as the image of an anchor enclosed in a circle and the color scheme, prevent consumer confusion.

The SC upheld the CA’s ruling and held that ISCO’s mark cannot be registered. It explained that trademarks are used to identify and distinguish goods or services. Under Section 147 of the 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, one of the rights of a trademark owner is to exclude others from using their trademark in a way that would confuse consumers and cause financial harm to the owner.

If a well‑known trademark is registered in the Philippines, no other party may register an identical or confusingly similar mark—even if the goods are different.

In this case, the SC found that Nikon Corp.’s trademark is well‑known. The NIKON mark has long been used, promoted, and registered worldwide, including in the Philippines, with the company enjoying significant global sales and market presence.

The SC also found NIKON to be a highly distinctive trademark. It is a coined or invented word with no ordinary meaning in English or Filipino and is not commonly used in the Philippines except as a trademark.

Analyzing the two marks, the SC found that ISCO’s trademark is confusingly similar to NIKON’s. It applied the 𝐃𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐲 𝐓𝐞𝐬𝐭, which focuses on the most noticeable and memorable part of the marks. Minor differences in design, color, or layout are disregarded.

Both ISCO’s and Nikon Corp.’s marks prominently use the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍.” This word is the dominant feature of both marks. They are spelled the same, appear in bold capital letters, and sound exactly the same when pronounced. Because of this, the SC ruled that the two marks create the same visual and auditory impression.

The SC explained that if ISCO were allowed to use its NIKON mark, consumers would likely assume a connection with Nikon Corp. Given its reputation for cameras, the public might believe that ISCO’s household appliances are made, approved, or endorsed by Nikon Corp., or that it has expanded into household products.

The SC also warned that ISCO’s use of the NIKON mark would damage Nikon Corp.’s interests because it would weaken its mark’s ability to uniquely identify a single source of goods. The law protects famous trademarks from such uses to prevent the blurring of their distinctiveness and to preserve their value and reputation.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164274

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164266

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy

04/04/2026

The Office of the 2026 Shari’ah Special Bar Chairperson, Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, has issued Shari’ah Special Bar Bulletin No. 3, which provides guidelines on the digital exam software. In the same Bar Bulletin are the links to the Examplify user guide and Tech video tutorial of the 2026 Shari'ah Special Bar Examinations.

READ the Bulletin in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/files/2026SSBE-BB3.pdf.

30/03/2026

29/03/2026

The (SC) has upheld the conviction of Teresita J. Soliva, former Mayor of the Municipality of Remedios T. Romualdez, Agusan del Norte, for malversation due to her failure to liquidate cash advances from municipal development funds.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s ruling finding her guilty of violating Articles 217 and 218 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (RPC).

Soliva served as municipal mayor from 2001 to 2007. During her term, she received several cash advances for confidential and intelligence funds, travel, and peace and order expenses. The Municipal Accountant and the Commission on Audit sent her demand letters requiring her to liquidate or return cash advances amounting to over PHP 900,000. However, she failed to comply.

Although she made partial payments through payroll deductions, PHP 551,000 remained unliquidated.

Due to her continued failure to liquidate the amounts despite repeated demands, she was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of malversation and failure to render accounts in violation of Articles 217 and 218 of the RPC.

The SC upheld Soliva’s conviction, sentencing her to up to six years in prison, fined PHP 551,000, and perpetually barred from holding public office. For each of the 10 counts of failure to render accounts, she was sentenced to up to six months in prison and fined PHP 40,000.

The SC emphasized that malversation under Article 217 of the RPC is committed once an accountable officer entrusted with public funds misuses them and cannot satisfactorily explain why they are missing.

Even if there is no direct proof of misuse, it is enough to show there is a shortage in the accounts that the officer cannot explain. In such cases, the law presumes the funds were used for personal gain unless the officer can prove otherwise.

In this case, Soliva failed to overturn this presumption. She ignored repeated demands, gave no explanation for the missing funds, and admitted she presented no evidence in her defense.

The SC also clarified that partial repayment does not erase criminal liability for malversation.

The SC also affirmed her conviction for failure to render accounts under Article 218 of the RPC, explaining that the offense is committed once an accountable officer fails to submit the required accounting on time.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162598.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162579.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution.

28/03/2026

MCLE attended with IBP Albay Chapter. Grateful for the learning and insights.⚖️⚖️⚖️

28/03/2026

The SupremeCourtPH (SC) has clarified that a complaint or petition may only be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action after an examination of the complaint or information itself, together with its annexes—strictly excluding the pleadings or submissions of other parties, reconciling conflicting rulings on the issue.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that the lower courts erred in dismissing a petition for quieting of title for supposedly failing to state a cause of action and in interchanging this concept with “dismissal for lack of cause of action.”

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another, the three elements of which are:

1. a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;

2. an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and

3. an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

The case arose from a land dispute between the groups of Inocencio Taganile and Filomena Delos Santos Dolar.

Taganile’s group claims that it has occupied a portion of land along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue in Rosario, Pasig City, since 1970. After learning that the land had been registered in the name of Dolar’s group, they filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to challenge the title.

Dolar’s group, on the other hand, claims that Taganile’s group were mere lessees. They filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that it did not state a cause of action because it lacked supporting documents.

The RTC dismissed the case after considering both the petition and the evidence presented by Dolar’s group. It ruled that the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not include proof of the Taganile’s group’s claim to the land. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this ruling.

The SC disagreed. It clarified the difference between failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action.

A cause of action exists when a legal right is violated. Courts cannot hear a civil case unless there is a cause of action. A case may be dismissed if the complaint does not state one, or if the party later fails to prove it with evidence. These are different grounds.

To determine whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court looks only at what is written in the complaint and assumes the allegations are true. If, even assuming those facts are true, the court still cannot grant the relief asked for, it can dismiss the complaint on this ground.

In contrast, to determine whether a case lacks a cause of action, the court looks at the evidence presented.

The SC noted that confusion arose from past rulings that allowed courts, in some instances, to look beyond the complaint, such as when the allegations appear to be legally impossible or unfounded. This blurred the difference between failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action.

To settle the issue, the SC ruled that courts may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action only by examining the complaint and its attachments—nothing more. Courts must not consider other pleadings or submissions at this stage.

The SC explained:

“Once the trial court considers other pleadings submitted by the parties or evidence admitted during the proceedings, it is no longer determining a failure to state a cause of action, but rather the very existence of one. In doing so, the ground for dismissing the complaint or petition ceases to be ‘failure to state a cause of action’ and becomes ‘lack of cause of action.’”

Applying this rule, the SC found that the RTC and CA improperly relied on the submissions and evidence of Dolar’s group. They prematurely ruled on the existence of a cause of action without giving Taganile’s group the chance to present evidence.

The SC also found that, based on the allegations alone, the petition was able to establish a case for quieting of title, noting Taganile group’s claims of long-standing possession and houses built on the property since the 1970s.

The SC directed that the case be returned to the RTC to continue the proceedings and receive evidence on the parties’ claims.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162612

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162606

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution