IVCruz Law Office - Notary Public

06/05/2026

Its best to be kept abreast of new Jurisprudence. 😊👍

The has acquitted a man charged with violence against women and their children, or VAWC, for allegedly refusing to provide financial support to a child not proven to be his, emphasizing that a legal duty to provide financial support arises only after filiation or paternity has been established.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division reversed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵).

The case arose from a complaint filed by a woman against her former boyfriend, accusing him of refusing to provide financial support for her child.

The accused consistently denied he was the father, claiming that the child was born only eight months after they last had sexual relations.

During trial, the woman presented the child’s birth certificate as evidence. However, the portion indicating the father’s name, was marked "𝘕/𝘈" and left unsigned.

The woman also admitted in court that the accused refused to give financial support because he doubted that he was the child’s father.

In reversing the accused’s conviction, the SC explained that to convict a person for economic abuse under Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the victim is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the offender’s wife or partner, or someone with whom the offender has a common child; (3) the offender refused to give financial support due; and (4) the refusal was intended to cause mental or emotional suffering.

In this case, the SC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove two essential elements: that the accused and the woman share a common child, and that the refusal to provide support was done to inflict psychological harm.

As the accused’s paternity was not proven in this case, no legal obligation to provide support could be imposed.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164663.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164655.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution.

09/04/2026

Maligayang araw ng kagitingan!

Ating bigyang pugay ang ating mga bayani at beterano na nag alaya ng kanilang buhay para sa ating bayan!

17/03/2026

Atty. Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis, Member of the Philippine Judicial Academy Department of Civil Law, and Dean of the College of Law of Lyceum of the Philippines University, discusses the evolution of the Philippine Supreme Court's interpretation of psychological incapacity in Episode 109: Marriage on Trial: Psychological Incapacity – Law not Diagnosis.

What is Article 36 of the Family Code? How does it treat psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring a marriage void? Who can bring the petition to have the marriage voided on the ground of psychological incapacity?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/1AiWpT7qljJUEMCj4cbhfF

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/episode-109-marriage-on-trial-psychological-incapacity/id1852172756?i=1000755034786

YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04IVBb4Uzfk

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/reel/922545123856906

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

13/03/2026

Be informed.

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has upheld the validity of a Department of Justice (DOJ) circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

In a Decision written by written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 ruled that Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024 containing the 2024 𝘋𝘖𝘑-𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 (𝘋𝘖𝘑 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴), is a valid exercise of the DOJ’s authority over prosecutorial processes.

Under the DOJ Rules’ new standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest, prosecutors must ensure that the evidence to charge a person with a crime must sufficiently establish all the elements and consequently warrant a conviction.

Atty. Hazel L. Meking questioned the DOJ Rules before the SC, claiming that the DOJ encroached on the SC’s constitutional authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. She argued that the DOJ Rules effectively revised Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦, which provides that the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is probable cause.

The SC dismissed her petition and reiterated its ruling in 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, which recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

The SC held that the DOJ Rules govern only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive functions. These Rules, however, do not extend to judicial proceedings as the power to promulgate rules of procedure over them remains under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The SC noted it had already recognized preliminary investigation as the exclusive domain of prosecutors when it revised the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2005.

In 2024, through 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, the SC also ordered the repeal of provisions in Rule 112 which are inconsistent with the DOJ Rules to harmonize them.

The SC’s constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, as well as its power to correct grave abuse of discretion in any prosecutorial rule or action that violates constitutional rights.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

06/03/2026

Be informed.

JUSTICE SAMUEL GAERLAN PENNED CASE!!⚖️👨‍⚖️

Limcoma Labor Organization vs. Limcoma Multi-Purpose Coop
G.R. No. 239746, November 29, 2021

ISSUE: Whether managerial employees are allowed to share concession agreement obtained by labor union.

RULING: The Supreme Court (SC) held that managerial employees cannot be allowed to share in the concessions obtained by the labor union through collective negotiation as this would expose them to the temptation of colluding with the union during the negotiations to the detriment of the employer.

It cited Article 245 of the Labor Code which provides that: managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in the collective bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate collective bargaining units and/or legitimate labor organizations of their own. The rank and file union and the supervisors' union operating within the same establishment may join the same federation or national union.

In the case at bar, there was nowhere in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that prohibits the herein employer to give relatively higher benefit to other employees not covered by the CBA. The SC noted that the grant of a bonus is basically a management prerogative and there is nothing to prevent the employer from granting benefits to managerial employees equal to or higher than those afforded to union members.

06/03/2026

Be informed.

JUSTICE SAMUEL GAERLAN PENNED CASE!!⚖️👨‍⚖️

Carlu Alfonso Realiza vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 228745, August 26, 2020

ISSUE: Whether community service may be imposed as penalty in lieu of imprisonment for petty crimes.

RULING: The Supreme Court (SC) held that the penalty of community service may be imposed in lieu of service in jail for offenses that have penalties of arresto menor and arresto mayor, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the case. Community service shall consist of any actual physical activity which inculcates civic consciousness, and is intended towards the improvement of a public work or promotion of a public service. The privilege of rendering community service in lieu of service in jail shall be availed of only once.

It cited R.A. No. 11362, also known as the Community Service Act, which provides that the court in its discretion may, in lieu of service in jail, require that the penalties of arresto menor and arresto mayor be served by the defendant by rendering community service in the place where the crime was committed, under such terms as the court shall determine, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the case, which shall be under the supervision of a probation officer. The SC emphasized that the imposition of the penalty of community service is merely a privilege since the offended cannot choose it over imprisonment as a matter of right. The law's objective is to uphold the State's policy of promoting restorative justice & decongesting overcrowded jails.

06/03/2026

Be informed.

SC Rules Forgery Cannot Be Presumed, Finds Deed of Donation Used by Municipality Was Forged

After examining the signatures appearing on the documents, the Court agreed with the CA that the signature on the Deed of Donation was forged.

The Court reiterated that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In determining whether forgery exists, courts are not bound by the opinion of handwriting experts. Judges may conduct their own visual comparison of the questioned signature and authentic signatures appearing on other documents in the record.

Read the full story in the comment section.

06/03/2026

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The (SC) has reiterated that corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the manning agency for the payment of disability benefits to seafarers under Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Special First Division granted the motion for partial reconsideration of its earlier Decision, which had held that only Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) and Princess Cruises Ltd. (Princess Cruises) are liable for the disability benefits of its seafarer. The SC ruled that Magsaysay Fleet Director Sorwin Joy G. Rivera (Rivera) is also solidarily liable, meaning he can be made to pay the full amount due.

Magsaysay, a manning agency, hired Ruthgar T. Parce as an electrical fitter for its foreign principal, Princess Cruises. After he was injured while working on board, he was sent back to Manila, where the company-designated doctor diagnosed him with rotator tendinitis in his shoulder and recommended physical therapy.

Months later, Parce was told he had reached the maximum medical treatment and that his sickness allowance would be discontinued. Based on this, Princess Cruises found him fit to work.

Parce continued to feel pain, so he sought a second medical opinion. The doctor he consulted found him unfit for sea duty. Parce then requested Magsaysay for a referral to a third doctor, as required under the rules, and for copies of his medical records. Magsaysay refused and asked instead for a copy of the second doctor’s report to explore a possible settlement. Parce then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses.

The LA ruled in his favor, ordering Magsaysay and Princess Cruises to pay Parce USD 60,000 in disability benefits. The LA considered the company-designated doctor’s report incomplete because it failed to clearly state that Parce was fit to work. The National Labor Relations Commission upheld the LA and also stated that Rivera was liable alongside Magsaysay and Princess Cruises.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, noting that Parce did not immediately question his medical assessment, which weakened his case.

The SC disagreed. It held Magsaysay and Princess Cruises liable because the company-designated doctor’s report was incomplete, giving Parce nothing to properly contest. The SC affirmed the LA’s ruling that he was already deemed permanently disabled under the law.

Parce filed a motion for partial reconsideration, asking the SC to also declare Rivera solidarily liable with the companies. The SC granted the motion.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, clearly provides that when a recruitment agency is a corporation or partnership, its officers, directors, or partners are liable with the company for any money claims awarded to overseas Filipino workers.

The SC explained that while corporate officers are generally not personally liable for contracts entered into by their company, an exception applies when a law specifically makes them accountable. In this case, Rivera, a corporate officer of Magsaysay, was held solidarily liable with the company for Parce’s permanent disability benefits. Rivera was named in the complaint as “Owner/President/Manager” and had signed the employment contract on behalf of the company.

The SC added that when Magsaysay applied for its license to operate as a manning agency, its officers and directors were required, under Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Rules, to submit a verified undertaking, making them solidarily liable for claims arising from the employer-employee relationship.

The SC emphasized that Section 10 of RA 8042 and the relevant POEA Rules are considered part of every seafarer’s employment contract. “These provisions are in line with the State’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating the workers’ plight and are meant to assure overseas Filipino workers immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them,” the SC said.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161450

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161442

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

06/03/2026

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The (SC) has reiterated that search made after a lawful arrest extends to the surroundings within the immediate control of the accused and evidence obtained during such search is admissible even if they are not within the “plain view” of the arresting officers.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division upheld the conviction of Jeryl Bautista for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165, or the 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘋𝘳𝘶𝘨𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2002, as amended.

During a buy-bust operation, a police officer posed as a buyer and received from Bautista 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 in exchange for PHP 500. After the officer made a pre-arranged signal, the rest of the arresting team rushed to the place of the transaction.

Bautista was arrested and a representative from the Department of Justice, and two barangay kagawads arrived shortly after.

Subsequently, the officer searched Bautista and found three more sachets of suspected 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. The officer also found a cellphone, screwdriver, weighing scale, and marked money. The police then marked the four sachets, prepared an inventory of the seized items, and took photographs.

Bautista argued that the additional sachets should not be admitted as evidence because they were not within the plain view of the police officers when seized during his arrest.

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both convicted Bautista of illegal possession of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶.

The SC upheld Bautista’s conviction and rejected his argument. It explained that the plain view doctrine is not the only justification for a warrantless search, as the search could be done to a person who has just been lawfully arrested.

Searches and seizures generally require a warrant. If police perform a search or seize property without a valid warrant, any evidence obtained cannot be used in court and is considered inadmissible. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule.

One of these is the plain view doctrine, which allows police officers to seize evidence in plain sight when: (1) the officer has a lawful reason to be in the place where the item is seen, (2) the discovery of the item is unplanned or incidental, and (3) it is immediately obvious that the item is connected to a crime or is illegal.

Another recognized exception is a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. To be valid, it must meet these conditions: (1) the accused is lawfully arrested, (2) the arresting officers subsequently made a warrantless search, (3) the search is limited to the person of the accused and the area within the accused’s immediate control, and (4) the search is performed at the place of the arrest.

In this case, Bautista was arrested during a buy-bust operation. He was frisked as part of the arrest. While the sachets hidden inside his cellphone charger were not in the officers’ plain view, the SC held that the warrantless search remained valid because it was done as part of a lawful arrest and the search extended to those that are within the immediate control of the accused at the time of the arrest.

To convict a person of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the drug, that the possession was not authorized by law, and that it was done knowingly and freely.

The SC found that all these elements were present. The search revealed three additional sachets of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. Bautista could not explain why he had the drugs nor show any authority allowing him to possess them. His act of hiding the sachets inside the charger also showed his intent to keep them.

Bautista was sentenced to a maximum of 16 years in prison and ordered to pay a fine of PHP 300,000.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161226

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161221

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

06/03/2026

Great Read. Be informed.

JUSTICE SAMUEL GAERLAN PENNED CASE!!⚖️👨‍⚖️

Lucilo Bayron, Et Al. vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 253127, November 29, 2022

ISSUE: Whether local government units can create supplementary retirement plan for its employees.

RULING: The Supreme Court (SC) held that local government units (LGU's) are barred from creating separate, parallel, and supplementary early retirement plan by virtue of a mere local ordinance for an LGU's officials and employees. It cited Section 28(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, which provides that no supplementary retirement or pension plans other than the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) shall exist in any government office or instrumentality.

Here, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued a notice of disallowance of over ₱89 million in payments made under the early and voluntary retirement program of the Puerto Princesa City government and declared the same null and void for being ultra vires and contrary to national law. The high court affirmed the COA findings as it ruled that the program functioned as a supplementary retirement scheme and cannot be considered as “early and voluntary separation” because of these reasons: (1) The benefits were pegged to years of service and last salary; (2) The program explicitly rewarded loyalty and satisfactory service; and (3) The incentives were granted in addition to GSIS and other statutory benefits. It added that while local government units possess autonomy, the Court emphasized that their powers remain subject to national legislation. Municipal ordinances must not contravene statutes enacted by Congress.