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25/05/2023

ATTENTION:
The deadline for the submission of the 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟮 𝗔𝗻𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗹 𝗘𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗥𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝗼𝗻 𝗪𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 is on 𝗠𝗮𝘆 𝟯𝟭, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟯.

All private establishments with rank-and-file employees are required to submit this report pursuant to Article 124 of the Labor Code as amended by Republic Act 6727.

𝗧𝗼 𝗿𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿, 𝘀𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗹𝘆 𝗹𝗼𝗴 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗼 https://annualwagereport.nwpc.dole.gov.ph

31/03/2023
29/08/2021

A re-post from a Law Professor/Criminal Law Books Author/Asst. City Prosecutor, Freddie Nojara

PLANTING OF EVIDENCE

In my years of teaching criminal law, many law students find it hard to understand the crime of Incriminatory Machinations – which is a felony under Title 13 (Crimes against Honor) of the Revised Penal Code. Why? Well, this felony, which is a common source of bar exam questions, is admittedly difficult to understand.

What is the crime of Incriminatory Machinations? Is the crime the same with “planting of evidence”?

These questions find relevance in the recent news involving a policeman criticized for “planting” a gun next to a person lying on the ground. Based on the reports (both from the mainstream and social media), the person was allegedly involved in peddling of prohibited substance and was the subject of the “buy-bust” operation. From the video footage, a male person (who was reportedly a police drug operative) is seen firing a gun and placing it beside the person lying on the pavement. Allegedly, it was made to appear that the latter resisted (nanlaban) during the operation.

Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code defines and punishes a crime denominated as “Incriminating innocent person” or simply, incriminatory machinations. The crime exists when the offender performs an act that directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of the crime, and the act does not constitute perjury. The crime refers to planting of evidence, and others, which do not constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecutions. It is thus required that the offender must perform an overt act of imputing to an innocent person the commission of a crime.

Let us consider this: A places a jewelry in B’s pocket for the purpose of making it appear that he (B) took the jewelry by himself. The act of A would tend directly to cause a false prosecution for the crime of theft or robbery against B. Under the facts, A can be prosecuted for Incriminatory Machinations since his act of “planting” the item would impute or incriminate B to the crime of theft or robbery as he is caught in possession of jewelry. In other words, the act of imputing/incriminating a crime to an innocent person is the gravamen of incriminatory machinations.

This crime is distinguished from libel/perjury and defamation.

The crime is incriminatory machination if the offender performs an act which directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of the crime; it is perjury if the offender imputes a false accusation which is in writing and under oath. The gravamen of incriminatory machination is the planting of evidence while the crime of perjury is the giving of false statement under oath or the making of false affidavit imputing to a person the commission of a crime.

In defamation, the offender imputes a crime done publicly through written or spoken words; in incriminatory machination, the offender does not avail himself of written or spoken words in order to incriminate another.

When is “planting of evidence” a crime?

The planting of evidence is the crime itself whereas under Article 363, the act of planting refers to acts of planting evidence which do not constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecution. In other words, the act of planting becomes a crime itself if there is a law specifically punishes it.

There are three (3) laws that punish “planting of evidence” as a crime.

Under RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act), planting of evidence refers to the act of maliciously and surreptitiously inserting, placing, adding or attaching any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical in the person, house, effects or in the immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose of implicating, incriminating or imputing the commission of any violation under RA 9165.

Under RA 10591 (Comprehensive Fi****ms and Ammunition Regulation Act), the law punishes any person who inserts; places, and/or attaches any firearm, or ammunition, or parts thereof in the person, house, effects, or in the immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose of implicating or incriminating the person, or imputing the commission of any violation of the law to said individual.

PD 1866 (Illegal possession of explosives) also punishes any person who commits 'planting' of any explosive or incendiary device or any part, ingredient, machinery, tool or instrument of any explosive or incendiary device, whether chemical, mechanical, electronic, electrical or otherwise.

Reference: Criminal Law Concepts and Jurisprudence, Book II, 2020 Edition, and Special Penal Laws Concepts and Jurisprudence, 2019 edition, F.M. Nojara, Central Bookstore, citing SC decisions.PLANTING OF EVIDENCE

In my years of teaching criminal law, many law students find it hard to understand the crime of Incriminatory Machinations – which is a felony under Title 13 (Crimes against Honor) of the Revised Penal Code. Why? Well, this felony, which is a common source of bar exam questions, is admittedly difficult to understand.

What is the crime of Incriminatory Machinations? Is the crime the same with “planting of evidence”?

These questions find relevance in the recent news involving a policeman criticized for “planting” a gun next to a person lying on the ground. Based on the reports (both from the mainstream and social media), the person was allegedly involved in peddling of prohibited substance and was the subject of the “buy-bust” operation. From the video footage, a male person (who was reportedly a police drug operative) is seen firing a gun and placing it beside the person lying on the pavement. Allegedly, it was made to appear that the latter resisted (nanlaban) during the operation.

Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code defines and punishes a crime denominated as “Incriminating innocent person” or simply, incriminatory machinations. The crime exists when the offender performs an act that directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of the crime, and the act does not constitute perjury. The crime refers to planting of evidence, and others, which do not constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecutions. It is thus required that the offender must perform an overt act of imputing to an innocent person the commission of a crime.

Let us consider this: A places a jewelry in B’s pocket for the purpose of making it appear that he (B) took the jewelry by himself. The act of A would tend directly to cause a false prosecution for the crime of theft or robbery against B. Under the facts, A can be prosecuted for Incriminatory Machinations since his act of “planting” the item would impute or incriminate B to the crime of theft or robbery as he is caught in possession of jewelry. In other words, the act of imputing/incriminating a crime to an innocent person is the gravamen of incriminatory machinations.

This crime is distinguished from libel/perjury and defamation.

The crime is incriminatory machination if the offender performs an act which directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of the crime; it is perjury if the offender imputes a false accusation which is in writing and under oath. The gravamen of incriminatory machination is the planting of evidence while the crime of perjury is the giving of false statement under oath or the making of false affidavit imputing to a person the commission of a crime.

In defamation, the offender imputes a crime done publicly through written or spoken words; in incriminatory machination, the offender does not avail himself of written or spoken words in order to incriminate another.

When is “planting of evidence” a crime?

The planting of evidence is the crime itself whereas under Article 363, the act of planting refers to acts of planting evidence which do not constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause false prosecution. In other words, the act of planting becomes a crime itself if there is a law specifically punishes it.

There are three (3) laws that punish “planting of evidence” as a crime.

Under RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act), planting of evidence refers to the act of maliciously and surreptitiously inserting, placing, adding or attaching any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical in the person, house, effects or in the immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose of implicating, incriminating or imputing the commission of any violation under RA 9165.

Under RA 10591 (Comprehensive Fi****ms and Ammunition Regulation Act), the law punishes any person who inserts; places, and/or attaches any firearm, or ammunition, or parts thereof in the person, house, effects, or in the immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose of implicating or incriminating the person, or imputing the commission of any violation of the law to said individual.

PD 1866 (Illegal possession of explosives) also punishes any person who commits 'planting' of any explosive or incendiary device or any part, ingredient, machinery, tool or instrument of any explosive or incendiary device, whether chemical, mechanical, electronic, electrical or otherwise.

Reference: Criminal Law Concepts and Jurisprudence, Book II, 2020 Edition, and Special Penal Laws Concepts and Jurisprudence, 2019 edition, F.M. Nojara, Central Bookstore, citing SC decisions.

23/08/2021

FAKE NEWS, A CRIME?

We are all aware of “fake news.” Almost every day, we receive “fake news” in different social media platforms. But are you aware that making, posting or sending “fake news” through the social media results in criminal liability? What crimes can an author of fake news be held criminally liable?

Either of these two crimes may arise:

Unlawful use of means of publication

One may commit the crime of Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances under Article 154 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The crime can be committed, among others, “by publishing or causing to be published, by means of printing, lithography or any other means of publication, as news any false news which may endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit the State.” For this crime to exist, it is required that the “fake or false news” would endanger the public, or it may cause damage to the interest or credit of State. Actual damage is not necessary. Mere possibility of causing damages or danger is sufficient.

Cyberlibel

The other crime is the so-called “Online libel” (others call it “cyber libel” or “electronic libel” or “E-libel”). Under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175), this crime may arise when one commits the unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. Under Article 353 of the RPC, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. In other words, if the mode of committing libel is through the computer system (or the internet), the crime becomes “Online Libel” under RA 10175.

The law punishes only the original author of the libelous remarks. The Court held in the case of Disini v. SOJ (G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014) that “abetting or aiding” online libel is unconstitutional. So, if one merely reacts by liking, commenting or sharing the original defamatory post of the original author, he merely abets or aids “online libel.” Thus, he does not incur criminal liability under the Cybercrime law.

Now you know the possible crimes you may be facing should you purvey “fake news”, next time always remember this:

“Think Before You Click!”

Reference: F.M. Nojara, Criminal Law Concepts and Jurisprudence, Book II, F.M. Nojara, 2020 edition, Central Book Store citing SC cases.

03/07/2021

SC declares that in cases of sale governed by the Civil Code of conjugal property by a husband without the consent of the wife, the sale is voidable, not void. Prior jurisprudence to the contrary is now abandoned.

The SC reiterated though that under Family Code (which took effect in 1987) such sales by one spouse without the consent of the other is clearly null and void. The sale in question took place in 1967, or prior to enactment of Family Code.
(Sps. Cueno v. Sps. Bautista, G.R. No. 246445, 2 March 2021 )

11/05/2021

SEPARATION OF POWER

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution, which found in Section 1 of Articles VI, VII, and VIII. Each branches of government exercises powers granted to it by the Constitution and may not control, interfere with or encroach upon the acts done within the constitutional competence of the others.

According to Father Joaquin Bernas, "separation of powers means that legislation belongs to Congress, ex*****on to the executive, settlement of legal controversies to the judiciary.”

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State, with a presidential form of government wherein power is equally divided among its three branches, namely:

(1) LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

In the case of ABAKADA G**o Partylist vs Purisima, from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

(2) EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, that the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and the legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.

(3) JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

In the case of Garcia v. Macaraig, the court ruled that the judge in the Court of First Instance shall not be detailed with the Department of Justice to perform administrative functions as this contravenes the doctrine of separation of powers.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEPARATION OF POWER:

a. Principle of Blending of Powers - is actually sharing of powers of the different departments of government whereby one department helps and coordinates with the other in the exercise of a particular power, function or responsibility. Example, the President prepares a budget and Congress enacts an appropriation bill pursuant to that budget.

b. Principle of Checks and Balances - this allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments. Example, the lawmaking power of the Congress is checked by the President through its veto power, which in turn maybe overturn by the legislature.

c. Delegation of powers – the rule states that what has been delegated cannot further be delegated “potestas delegata non delegari potest”. However, the Constitution provides exceptions to the rule. Example, under section 23 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides the delegation of emergency powers to the President, etc.

06/05/2021

WARRANTLESS or CITIZEN'S ARREST

Under Section 5, Rule 113 of Rules of court provides that the warrantless arrest is lawful under three (3) circumstances:

(1) IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO “Caught in the act”

A peace officer or a private person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

In the case of U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516, the phrase "In his presence", construed that when the officer sees the offense being committed, although at a distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, or when the offense is continuing or has not been consummated at the time the arrest is made, the offense is said to be committed in his presence.

Further, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto, two (2) requisites must concur:

a. the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
b. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

(2) HOT PURSUIT

A peace officer or a private person, when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

In Comerciante v. People, Section 5(b) Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.

In addition, Supreme Court rule that a personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.

(3) ESCAPED PRISONER

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Under Section 5(c), Rule 113, one of the instances when a person may be validly arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant of arrest, is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime of evasion of the service of his sentence.

26/04/2021

RIGHT TO BAIL

Under Section 13, Art III of 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that “All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

In addition, Section 1 Rule 114 of Rules of Criminal Procedure which Bail defined as the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.

When right may be invoked; by whom?

In the case of People v. Fitzgerald, G.R. No. 149723, the Supreme Court explained that the right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in custody of the law who may by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specific circumstances.

Furthermore, in Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil 634 the court ruled that any person under detention, even if no formal charges have yet been filed, can invoke the right to bail.

When bail shall be denied?

In the case of Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 155, when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher and evidence of guilt is strong, then bail shall be denied, as it is neither a matter of right or of discretion.

22/04/2021

CHAIN OF CUSTODY

In section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 “Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In the case of People vs. Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689, The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;

Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer the investigating officer;

Third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and

Fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

The crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting” or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.

Nevertheless, the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure. It is therefore the Court who has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence.

13/04/2021

SEXUAL HARASSMENT
By Justice Marivic Leonen


The concept of s*xual harassment began in the context of unwanted s*xual relations imposed by superiors on subordinates in the workplace. As early as 1887, the plight of women working in factories and the extortion vis-a-vis s*xual favors that they experience have been noted by several commentators. In 1840, women's moral reform societies in the United States started petition drives for statutes penalizing seduction, in response to what were then inadequate legal protection of women against s*xual predation at work. In the decade before the American Civil War, women's rights movement began pursuing discussions on women's socioeconomic conditions which make them vulnerable to s*xual coercion. Women's rights advocates publicized the case of domestic servant Hester Vaughn who was held guilty of infanticide. After being fired by her employer who impregnated her, Vaughn gave birth alone and impoverished, and left her infant dead. Vaughn's case propelled efforts by women's groups to institute legal reforms to protect women from s*xual predation, and to enable other modes of collective self-help, such as organizing labor unions for women.

These developments made by the early feminist and labor movements were sustained in the 1970s by several lawyers and activists representing women in courts. It was during this time that a concerted retaliation against s*xual harassment was pursued by advocates. The term "s*xual harassment" was coined by Lin Farley during a consciousness-raising session for a Cornell University course on women and work, where the women in the discussion group repeatedly described being fired or quitting a job because they were harassed and intimidated by men. In her works, Farley recognized the s*xual coercion women experienced at work as a "social order that situates s*xual relations between men and women in relations of economic dependency." In April 1975, Farley testified before the New York City Human Rights Commission Hearings on Women and Work, and defined s*xual harassment as "unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's s*x role over her function as a worker." Inspired by the case of Carmita Dickerson Wood, an administrative assistant at Cornell University who quit her position due to harassment by her supervisor, Farley and other women activists at Cornell formed the Working Women United, a women's rights organization that sought to combat s*xual harassment of women in the workplace.

In 1979, Catharine MacKinnon published her book "Sexual Harassment of Working Women" which propelled the adoption of laws on s*xual harassment in the United States. Her central argument was that s*xual harassment was s*x discrimination: "Sexual harassment is discrimination 'based on s*x' within the social meaning of s*x, as the concept is socially incarnated in s*x roles. Pervasive and 'accepted' as they are, these rigid roles have no place in the allocation of social and economic resources." Through the works of Lin Farley and Catharine MacKinnon, the discourse on s*xual harassment translated into that of anti-discrimination.

In 1964, in the United States, the Civil Rights Act prohibited acts of discrimination on the basis of s*x, among others. American jurisprudence subsequently recognized two (2) categories of s*xual harassment: first, quid pro quo; and second, hostile environment s*xual harassment. Quid pro quo harassment conditions employment or job benefits on s*xual favors; while hostile environment s*xual harassment results from s*xual advances which make the working environment hostile or abusive to the employee.

The two types of s*xual harassment recognized in American jurisprudence are akin to s*xual harassment as defined under RA no. 7877. Section 3(a)(l) similarly recognizes that s*xual harassment is committed when a s*xual favor is made a condition for employment or for the grant of certain benefits. Likewise, Section 3(a)(3) recognizes s*xual harassment as committed when the offender's advances result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

In the Philippines, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 is a relatively new law. Although the Revised Penal Code, enacted in 1930, already penalized offenses relating to violations of chastity, Congress saw it fit to enact a new law specifically punishing s*xual harassment committed in an "employment, education, or training environment."

The original provisions of the Revised Penal Code on R**e (prior to its amendment in 1997) already punished a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman under specified circumstances. That the crime is committed in an employment, school, or training environment was not an element. This is also true for other crimes centering on a perpetrator's lascivious, harassing or otherwise vexatious conduct, such as Acts of Lasciviousness, Seduction, and Unjust vexation. These offenses pertain to acts which are not necessarily committed in an employment, training, or school environment.

Under RA no. 7877, an act of s*xual harassment may result in three distinct liabilities: criminal, civil, and administrative. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. In a criminal action, the accused is prosecuted for a wrong committed against society itself or the State whose law he or she violated. In a civil action, a defendant is sued by the plaintiff in an effort to correct a private wrong. The purpose of an administrative action, on the other hand, is to protect the public service by imposing administrative sanctions to an erring public officer.

Sexual harassment as defined and penalized under RA no. 7877 requires three elements for an accused to be convicted: (1) that the employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence, or moral-ascendancy over another; (2) the authority, influence, or moral ascendancy exists in a work-related, training-related, or education-related environment, and (3) the employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who has authority, influence, or moral-ascendancy over another makes a demand, request, or requirement of a s*xual favor.

The key elements which distinguish s*xual harassment, as penalized by Republic Act 7877, from other chastity-related and vexatious offenses are: first, its setting; and second, the person who may commit it. As to its setting, the offense may only be committed in a work-related, training-related, or education-related environment. As to the perpetrator, it may be committed by a person who exercises authority, influence, or moral ascendancy over another.

Since RA no. 7877 is a special criminal statute, the offense of s*xual harassment is malum prohibitum. Thus, in prosecuting an offender for s*xual harassment, intent is immaterial. Mere commission is sufficient to warrant a conviction. The Court explained in Narvasa v. Sanchez the reason why, even without intent, s*xual harassment is penalized: Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate RA No. 7877, his attempt to kiss petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial — that intimate physical contact between individuals must be consensual. Respondent's defiance of custom and lack of respect for the opposite s*x were more appalling because he was a married man. Respondent's act showed a low regard for women and disrespect for petitioner's honor and dignity.

This is in contrast with crimes mala in se, which are so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members. In crimes mala in se, the intent governs; but in mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether the law has been violated.

Vedana v. Judge Valencia explained that the criminalization of s*xual harassment was in keeping with "humanity's march towards a more refined sense of civilization": In the community of nations, there was a time when discrimination was institutionalized through the legalization of now prohibited practices. Indeed, even within this century, persons were discriminated against merely because of gender, creed or the color of their skin, to the extent that the validity of human beings being treated as mere chattel was judicially upheld in other jurisdictions. But in humanity's march towards a more refined sense of civilization, the law has stepped in and seen it fit to condemn this type of conduct for, at bottom, history reveals that the moving force of civilization has been to realize and secure a more humane existence. Ultimately, this is what humanity as a whole seeks to attain as we strive for a better quality of life or higher standard of living. Thus, in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of s*xual harassment or hazing, acts previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal.

Conviction under RA no. 7877 subjects the offender to criminal penalties. Under Section 7, any person who violates the law shall, upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or a fine of not less than P10,000.00 nor more than P20,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. Since in a criminal action, the State prosecutes the accused for an act or omission punishable by law, the action is commenced by filing the complaint with the regular courts or the office of prosecutor. The criminal action arising from violation of the provisions of RA no. 7877 prescribes in three (3) years.

Criminal liability for s*xual harassment notwithstanding, the offended party may pursue a separate civil action. As stated in Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 7877: Nothing in this Act shall preclude the victim of work, education, or training-related s*xual harassment from instituting a separate and independent action for damages and other affirmative relief.

Section 6 is consistent with Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that, "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable." The rationale for this was explained in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada: Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.

Civil liability arises from the damage or injury caused by the felonious act. Thus, in a civil action, the real party plaintiff is the offended party, while in a criminal action, the plaintiff is the "People of the Philippines." Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in a civil action is mere "preponderance of evidence," in contrast to "proof beyond reasonable doubt" which is required for conviction in a criminal action.

Being independent from criminal action, the conviction or acquittal of the accused is not a bar to an independent suit for damages in a civil action. Accordingly, in London v. Bagnio Country Club, this Court allowed an independent action for damages against the accused despite the existence of an ongoing criminal case.

Aside from the actual perpetrator, the employer, or the head of office or institution may also be impleaded in an independent action for damages. They would be solidarily liable for damages if they did not take immediate action on a s*xual harassment complaint.

Section 4 of RA no. 7877 requires the employer or head of office to promulgate appropriate rules and regulations to prevent the commission of acts of s*xual harassment and to provide procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of s*xual harassment.

In the government, the Civil Service Commission promulgated CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, otherwise known as the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases, which apply to all government officials and employees. For the private sector, each organization's rules promulgated in accordance with Section 4 shall apply.

Section 4(b) of RA no. 7877 further requires employers and heads of offices to create a "committee on decorum and investigation of cases on s*xual harassment." Pursuant to this, all national or local agencies of the government, state colleges and universities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, were required to create their own Committee on Decorum and Investigation.

Unlike in criminal and civil actions which are brought before regular courts, an administrative action is commenced by filing a complaint with the disciplining authority or agency, or with the Committee on Decorum and Investigation, which shall receive and investigate s*xual harassment complaints.

CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 3 defines s*xual harassment as follows: For the purpose of these Rules, the administrative offense of s*xual harassment is an act, or a series of acts, involving any unwelcome s*xual advance, request or demand for a s*xual favor, or other verbal or physical behavior of a s*xual nature, committed by a government employee or official in a work-related, training or education related environment of the person complained of.

(a) Work-related s*xual harassment is committed under the following circumstances:

(1) submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as a basis for any employment decision (including, but not limited to, matters related to hiring, promotion, raise in salary, job security, benefits and any other personnel action) affecting Jc the applicant/employee; or

(2) the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the complainant's work performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment; or
(3) the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination, insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a co- employee, applicant, customer, or ward of the person complained of.

(b) Education or training-related s*xual harassment is committed against one who is under the actual or constructive care, custody or supervision of the offender, or against one whose education, training, apprenticeship, internship or tutorship is directly or constructively entrusted to, or is provided by, the offender, when:

(1) submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts as a basis for any decision affecting the complainant, including, but not limited to, the giving of a grade, the granting of honors or a scholarship, the payment of a stipend or allowance, or the giving of any benefit, privilege or consideration.

(2) the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive academic environment of the complainant; or

(3) the act or series of acts might reasonably expected to cause discrimination, insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a trainee, apprentice, intern, tutee or ward of the person complained of.

CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 4 further gives examples on where and how s*xual harassment may take place:
1. in the premises of the workplace or office or of the school or training institution;
2. in any place where the parties were found as a result of work or education or training responsibilities or relations;
3. at work or education or training-related social functions;
4. while on official business outside the office or school or training institution or during work or school or training- related travel;
5. at official conferences, fora, symposia or training sessions; or
6. by telephone, cellular phone, fax machine or electronic mail.
CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 5 enumerates illustrative forms of s*xual harassment:

a) Physical
i. Malicious Touching;
ii. Overt s*xual advances;
iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation.

b) Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for s*xual favors, and lurid remarks;

c) Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or writing notes with s*xual underpinnings;

d) Other forms analogous to the foregoing.
Casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or special occasions and with other people present, do not constitute s*xual harassment.

Accordingly, in Aquino v. Acosta, the Court agreed with the report of the investigating Justice that the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a 'beso-beso' fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill motive. The Court explained:

In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be understood in the context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of the latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design.

Unlike in a criminal action where the penalty is a fine, imprisonment, or both, the penalty in an administrative action is, at most, dismissal, from the service. This is because an administrative action seeks to protect the public service by imposing administrative sanctions to the erring public officer. As has been explained: Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline; thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, and utmost devotion and dedication to duty, respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good.

In addition to RA No. 7877, Congress has since enacted Republic Act No. 11313, otherwise known as the Safe Spaces Act. Signed into law on July 15, 2019, it penalizes gender-based s*xual harassment, and is founded on, among others, the recognition that "both men and women must have equality, security and safety not only in private, but also on the streets, public spaces, online, workplaces and educational an training and training institutions."[115] It addresses four (4) categories of gender-based s*xual harassment: gender-based streets and public spaces s*xual harassment; gender-based online s*xual harassment; gender-based s*xual harassment in the workplace; and, gender-based s*xual harassment in educational and training institutions.

In line with fundamental constitutional provisions regarding human dignity and human rights, the Safe Spaces Act expands the concept of discrimination and protects persons of diverse s*xual orientation, gender identity and/or expression. It thus recognizes gender-based s*xual-harassment as including, among others, "misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic and s*xist slurs."

The Safe Spaces Act does not undo or abandon the definition of s*xual harassment under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995. The gravamen of the offenses punished under the Safe Spaces Act is the act of s*xually harassing a person on the basis of the his/her s*xual orientation, gender identity and/or expression, while that of the offense punished under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 is abuse of one's authority, influence or moral ascendancy so as to enable the s*xual harassment of a subordinate.

See: Escandor vs. People, G.R. No. 211962, July 06, 2020

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