Dagatan Law

19/02/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has issued guidelines in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, clarifying that it must be evaluated based on the person’s true intent and the totality of the circumstances.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC granted the accused’s petition and reduced his sentence, recognizing his surrender as voluntary even if he surrendered after learning of the issuance of arrest warrant against him.

The accused went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to apply for clearance. During processing, his name registered a “hit”, indicating he had a pending case. He admitted this to the NBI officer.

He was instructed to return after one week while the records were being verified. When he came back, the NBI officer confirmed he had a pending bigamy case and an outstanding warrant for his arrest issued 13 years earlier. He then told the officer, “masuko na lang ako” (I will surrender) and asked help in posting bail. The arrest warrant was then served on him.

The NBI later issued a certificate stating that he voluntarily surrendered to their office. However, the return of the warrant and order of release described him as having been “arrested.”

During arraignment, the accused first pleaded not guilty but later entered into a plea bargain, asking the court to consider his voluntary surrender and guilty plea.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted him of bigamy and considered his plea of guilt, but ruled that he did not voluntarily surrender. It relied on the warrant’s return and release order, which stated that he was “arrested,” and noted that the case had been pending for 13 years because he could not be located. The Court of Appeals affirmed this, finding that he went to the NBI not to surrender but to apply for clearance, and that when he said he would surrender, he had no choice because he was already inside the NBI office.

The SC disagreed.

Under Article 13(7) of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, voluntary surrender requires that the offender had not been arrested; they surrendered themselves to a person in authority or its agent; and the surrender was voluntary.

In this case, the accused returned to the NBI and said he would surrender before the arrest warrant was actually served on him. He had not yet been arrested. He also surrendered to an NBI officer, a person in authority.

The SC ruled that voluntary surrender must be viewed with a “more considerate and broad-minded approach” once guilt has been established. It stressed that voluntary surrender must be assessed through the totality of circumstances, laying down the following guiding principles:

1. The voluntariness and spontaneity of the surrender must show that offender either admits their guilt or wish to spare authorities the trouble of searching for and arresting them.

2. The circumstances of the voluntary surrender is independent of the fact of the issuance of the arrest warrant. The mere fact of the arrest warrant’s prior issuance should not be taken against the accused’s claim of voluntary surrender when other circumstances point to the fulfillment of all requirements, including voluntariness. However, knowledge of the accused of the existence of an arrest warrant against them and their continued evasion of justice can negate voluntariness and spontaneity.

3. The lapse of time an accused used to evade the law could be a criterion in negating spontaneity.

4. Voluntariness is not negated by the fact that there is likelihood that the accused may be arrested anytime before they surrendered. Imminence of arrest should be coupled with an indication that the accused fled or could further escape and evade, before it could deny voluntariness.

5. The intention of the accused at the time of surrender must be considered with other circumstances in determining entitlement to mitigating circumstance. The offender is not required to surrender at the first opportunity.

6. If the records do not clearly show that the offender voluntarily surrendered, that doubt cannot be resolved in their favor.

As to the voluntariness of his surrender, the SC emphasized that if he intended to evade arrest, he would not have returned to the NBI. While his first visit was to secure a clearance, his decision to return despite knowing there might be an active case shows his willingness to cooperate with the authorities.

The SC also clarified that while he knew about the pending case, there was no proof that he knew a warrant for his arrest had already been issued. It also noted the absence of any attempt to flee, his open use of his real name, and the fact that he returned to the NBI on his own.

The SC also reminded judges to avoid making quick or premature conclusions, emphasizing:

“What the Court asks and expects of magistrates on the frontlines of justice is to adjudge each case wholly, fully, and fairly as discerning persons learned in the law and literate in life experience, and not as cold-hearted automatons or soulless supercomputers, for even a single judge’s role in the administration of our penal laws can indeed have far-reaching consequences for the parties and for human society as a whole… The law may be harsh, but it need not be harsher.”

The accused’s sentence was reduced from a maximum of six years to a maximum of four years in prison.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160857

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160836

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/258592-formerly-udk-no-17170-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

10/02/2026

The (SC) has ruled that same-sex couples who live together may be recognized as co-owners of property under Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, provided there is proof of actual contribution.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division granted a woman’s complaint for partition of property and recognized her as a co-owner of the house and lot she shared with her same-sex partner.

Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governs the property relations of couples who are living together but cannot legally marry, acknowledging co-ownership based on their actual contributions.

The two women lived together as a couple. A year into their relationship, they purchased a house and lot, and agreed to register the property in one partner’s name to facilitate banking transactions.

Upon separation, they agreed to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally. One partner signed an 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 stating that the other had paid about 50% of the purchase and renovation costs.

However, she later refused to sell the property and denied that her former partner was a co-owner.

To protect her interest, the former partner annotated an adverse claim on the title and demanded partition of the property. When this failed, she filed a case for partition of real estate and damages, relying on the 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 as proof of co-ownership.

The SC granted the complaint for partition of real estate, as it clarified the provisions in the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governing the property relations of unmarried couples living together.

Article 147 applies to unmarried couples who may legally marry. Property acquired during their cohabitation is presumed jointly owned.

Article 148, on the other hand, applies to couples who are not permitted to marry. Only properties obtained through actual contribution are considered common property.

Since the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 only allows marriage between a man and a woman, the SC held that same-sex couples necessarily fall under Article 148.

Here, the SC found that the signed 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, where one partner admitted that the other paid about half of the property costs, was a binding admission and sufficient proof of actual contribution. This established co-ownership.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160462.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160431.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160444.

Read the Concurrence of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160439.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

04/02/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has approved the 𝘈𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘎𝘶𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘝𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘰𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘧𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨, further strengthening the rules on virtual court hearings and remote appearances of parties and witnesses.

In a Resolution dated November 4, 2025, in A.M. No. 24-11-02-SC, the SC introduced key reforms to expand access to videoconferencing, particularly for digitally disadvantaged individuals, and to enable wider participation by individuals abroad.

The 𝘈𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘥 𝘎𝘶𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴 apply to videoconferencing before first- and second-level courts, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals. It covers all actions and proceedings at any stage, including mediation, consultation, deliberation, and the promulgation of decisions and resolutions, when conducted through videoconference.

Courts are now directed to ensure access to videoconferencing for individuals who are digitally disadvantaged, including those in geographically or geopolitically marginalized areas. This may include deploying court personnel to provide temporary or mobile internet access.

Courts may also establish designated “access points” within judicial regions where litigants, witnesses, and other participants can use computers and videoconferencing equipment under court supervision.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160150.

Read the full text of the 𝘈𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘎𝘶𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘝𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘰𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘧𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨 at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/A.M-No.-24-11-02-SC_FINAL.pdf.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

07/01/2026

25/12/2025

Stepping into the holiday spirit! 🎄✨

​The team at Dagatan Rojas & Agramon wishes everyone a season filled with warmth, laughter, and well-deserved rest. From our firm family to yours, Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year! 🥂

08/12/2025

05/11/2025

📢 𝙏𝙊 𝘼𝙇𝙇 𝙏𝘼𝙇𝙄𝙎𝘼𝙔𝙉𝙊𝙉𝙎 affected by Typhoon Tino:

Our office is offering 𝗙𝗥𝗘𝗘 𝗟𝗘𝗚𝗔𝗟 𝗔𝗜𝗗 𝗦𝗘𝗥𝗩𝗜𝗖𝗘𝗦 to help affected individuals and families, including the drafting and notarization of essential documents as follows:

• 𝗔𝗙𝗙𝗜𝗗𝗔𝗩𝗜𝗧 𝗢𝗙 𝗟𝗢𝗦𝗦: For lost or damaged IDs, titles, or property.
• 𝗜𝗡𝗦𝗨𝗥𝗔𝗡𝗖𝗘 𝗖𝗟𝗔𝗜𝗠𝗦: Preparation and documentation for typhoon-related claims.
• 𝗢𝗧𝗛𝗘𝗥 𝗟𝗘𝗚𝗔𝗟 𝗗𝗢𝗖𝗨𝗠𝗘𝗡𝗧𝗦: As needed for matters arising from the typhoon.

We are here to help our community rebuild and support you during this time of need.

For assistance, message our Official page or visit us at:

𝐃𝐀𝐆𝐀𝐓𝐀𝐍 𝐑𝐎𝐉𝐀𝐒 & 𝐀𝐆𝐑𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐍
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𝗟𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗺𝗮𝗿𝗸: Across Talisay City Hall back gate

25/09/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that banks may be held liable for moral damages suffered by depositors due to negligence, even if there is no proof of bad faith or malice.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division ordered Banco de Oro (BDO) to pay Remedios and Angelita Antonino (Antoninos) the proceeds of their time deposit, including PHP 100,000 in moral damages.

The Antoninos, who are U.S. green card holders living abroad, made three time deposit placements totaling over USD 150,000 at BDO’s San Lorenzo Branch in Makati City (BDO San Lorenzo). They had an arrangement with the branch manager that if the deposits were not withdrawn at maturity, they would automatically roll over into interest-bearing savings accounts. The time deposit certificates (TDCs) were not redeemed and were stored in a Banco Filipino deposit box for safekeeping.

Later, Banco Filipino declared bankruptcy and was taken over by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). It took the Antoninos some time to retrieve their TDCs from the PDIC.
BDO San Lorenzo then ceased operations and closed down without notifying the Antoninos, who only discovered the closure when they tried to withdraw their investments.

They sent several demand letters to BDO, but the bank claimed the deposits had already been withdrawn, citing a demand draft allegedly signed by Angelita. Angelita denied signing the document.

The Antoninos filed a complaint against BDO seeking payment of their time deposit placements.

Ruling in favor of the Antoninos, the SC cited Section 9 of BDO’s terms and conditions for time deposit placements, which requires the surrender of TDCs when withdrawing deposits. Since the Antoninos still had the certificates, the SC concluded that the funds were not withdrawn.

The SC noted that the PNP expert said the signature on the demand draft was likely forged. Immigration and passport records also showed Angelita could not have been in the country to sign the draft. Further, BDO failed to verify the identity of the person who withdrew the funds.

The SC held that these lapses showed BDO’s failure to exercise the required diligence, especially given the large amount involved.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152203.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=152187.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/09/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that preventing employees from entering company premises and doing their jobs, without a valid reason, is considered illegal dismissal.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division upheld the labor arbiters’ ruling that 12 workers from Constant Packaging Corporation (Constant Packaging), a company that prints packaging materials, were illegally dismissed.

Constant Packaging hired the workers as sorters and packers on a 𝘱𝘢𝘬𝘺𝘢𝘸 basis (paid per output).

The workers later raised concerns about their below-minimum wage earnings, 12-hour work day, 7-day work week, non-remittance of their SSS, PhilHealth, and PAG-IBIG contributions, and delay in the release of their salaries. Constant Packaging responded by telling them to leave if they were unhappy with their working conditions.

The workers filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment. Soon after, the company security guard prevented them from entering the company premises, leading the workers to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Ruling in favor of the workers, the SC clarified that an employee who is able and willing to work is considered illegally dismissed if they are prevented from entering the workplace without a valid or lawful reason.

In this case, the company’s security guard blocked the workers from entering the company premises without any valid reason. This action amounts to dismissal.

Moreover, as the workers were suddenly dismissed without following the required procedures, their dismissal was unlawful.

The SC thus ordered Constant Packaging to pay the workers separation pay, back wages, service incentive leave, and holiday pay.

However, since the workers were hired on a 𝘱𝘢𝘬𝘺𝘢𝘸 basis, the SC ruled that they are not entitled to 13th month pay.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-preventing-employees-from-reporting-to-work-without-valid-reason-is-illegal-dismissal/.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph?p=152126.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

28/08/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) automatically ceases upon the death of the person who granted it, and any acts carried out by the agent afterwards are void, unless covered by narrow exceptions under the law.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division held that Jessica Alova Uberas lost her authority under the SPA to act on behalf of her father, Meliton Alova, upon his death in 1998.

In 1998, Meliton executed an SPA in favor of Jessica over the subject conjugal property. He died later that year. Despite the death of his father, Jessica still used the same SPA in 2003 to execute a mortgage over the said property in favor of San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI) to secure her loan from the company. Jessica failed to pay the loan and the property was foreclosed where SMFI emerged as the winning bidder.

Felicidad Alova and Decelyn Alova Pution, the widow and other daughter of Meliton, filed a case to nullify the mortgage and the foreclosure sale.

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) determined that Meliton’s death ended the agency. However, the RTC found that because the SPA had the conformity of Felicidad, Meliton’s wife, the mortgage was valid on her ½ share of the conjugal property. On the other hand, the CA declared the mortgage invalid, citing that it was not executed on behalf of Spouses Meliton and Felicidad.

SMFI appealed to the SC, which partly ruled in its favor. The Court upheld the agency’s termination but validated the mortgage and foreclosure sale with respect to Jessica’s undivided share in the property.

The SC explained that under an SPA, which is a contract of agency, a principal authorizes an agent to act on his or her behalf in transactions with third persons. Agency is personal, representative, and derivative, and it ends upon the death of either the principal or the agent.

Any act by the agent after the principal’s death is void, unless it falls under two Civil Code exceptions: (1) when the agency was for the parties’ common interest, and (2) when the agent, unaware of the death or agency’s end, contracted with a third party in good faith.

In this case, there was no showing that these exceptions were applicable. Jessica was fully aware of her father’s death, and the SPA was not made for their mutual benefit.

The SC also reiterated that for an agent’s act to bind the principal, the deed must clearly be made, signed, and sealed in the principal’s name.

Here, although Jessica was described in the beginning of the deed as Meliton’s attorney-in-fact, the mortgage was signed by Jessica in her personal capacity, as it was neither executed nor sealed in Meliton’s name, and without indication that she was acting as attorney-in-fact.

The Court also ruled that Meliton’s wife, Felicidad, was not bound as a principal under the SPA, as she only provided her marital conformity.

However, the Court clarified that the mortgage and foreclosure sale were not entirely void. Jessica automatically became a co-owner of the property after her father’s death. When she signed the mortgage, she encumbered her share in the property to secure her obligation to SMFI. Therefore, the mortgage and foreclosure sale were valid only for Jessica’s share.

The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine Jessica’s share in the subject property and to annotate the shares of Meliton’s other heirs, and that of SMFI which acquired Jessica’s interest.

Read the full text of the press release at https://tinyurl.com/27t9k6vy

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260071-san-miguel-foods-inc-vs-felicidad-d-alova-and-decelyn-alova-pution/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/08/2025

Wishing a very Happy Birthday to Atty. Wayne Justine Agramon! 🎂🥳

Thank you for bringing light, warmth, and good energy to the office. May your day be as inspiring and joyful as you are. 😊

15/07/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that hiding one’s homosexuality from a spouse can be considered fraud and may be used as a ground to annul a marriage.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division annulled the marriage of a woman whose husband concealed his homosexuality before they got married.

The couple met on social media. On their first date, the woman noticed that the man seemed distant. The man also avoided sitting beside her. When asked about this, the man said he was just shy and lacked confidence.

The two kept a long-distance relationship as the man worked overseas. Notwithstanding this, they got married two years later.

But the man continued to avoid intimacy and often started arguments to avoid his wife. Just two months after the wedding, he returned overseas and stopped communicating with her.

Later, the woman found magazines with half-naked and naked male models among her husband’s things. When she confronted him, he admitted that he was homosexual. The woman then filed for annulment of their marriage.

The SC ruled that the woman’s consent to the marriage was obtained through fraud, and that the marriage must be annulled on the ground of fraudulent concealment of sexuality, following Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

Article 45 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 states that a marriage can be annulled if one party’s consent was obtained through fraud, as long as the couple did not continue living together after discovering the fraud. Article 46 further specifies that hiding one’s homosexuality or lesbianism from a spouse is considered fraud.

The SC gave credence to the woman’s allegations, noting that the man’s admission and his unexplained silence when his sexuality was being questioned could not be ignored. It found that the husband intentionally hid his homosexuality to persuade the woman to stay and marry him.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/ywadbxwp.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/yjn9a89f.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.