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04/03/2026

Grateful for a year of growth, trust, and success. Thank you to everyone who has been part of VnB Law Office’s journey. Here’s to more milestones together! Happy 1st Anniversary, VnB Law Office! ✨🤗

06/08/2025

The invalidated a sale of two parcels of land because the buyer knew that the seller was not the real owner.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division cancelled the sale made by Bayani S. Cerilla (Cerilla) to Edward C. Ciacho (Ciacho). The SC found that Ciacho knew the sold properties did not belong to Cerilla.

The properties were inherited by Adolfo De Guia which were about to be foreclosed due to unpaid debt. De Guia asked Cerilla to pay off the mortgage. They signed a deed of sale, and land titles were transferred to Cerilla’s name.

After a few months, another agreement was signed to re-sell the properties to De Guia. The latter filed adverse claim on the titles.

Cerilla and De Guia entered into a subsequent agreement where Cerilla would buy the properties for PHP 15 Million but only after De Guia ejects the illegal settlers from the properties.

As De Guia failed to remove the illegal settlers, Cerilla had to undertake the same but was not successful in doing so. As a result, Cerilla incurred expenses for ejectment which caused him to obtain a loan from a bank and from Ciacho.

Ciacho agreed to lend Cerilla with the properties as collateral. Because Cerilla could not pay the loan, Ciacho asked him to sign a deed of sale on the properties but with a request from Cerilla not to register the same.

De Guia learned that Ciacho registered the properties under his name. Thus, he filed a case with the RTC to invalidate the sale. After finding in favor of De Guia, the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Both RTC and CA found that Cerilla had no authority to sell the properties as he was just a mere “accommodation party” to avoid foreclosure of the properties but was not the real owner.

The Court agreed with the RTC and CA finding that there was no real intention to transfer ownership from De Guia to Cerilla. Even after the land titles were transferred under his name, Cerilla did not act as if he owned the lands.

Under the Civil Code, for a sale to be valid, the parties must agree to the sale. The parties’ actions during and after the agreement can serve as basis to determine their intent. The seller must also be the owner of the property or has authority to sell.

Here, the re-sale of the properties from Cerilla to De Guia within a short period of time coupled with the fact that Cerilla asked Ciacho not to register the properties under his name, indicate that there was no intention on the part of De Guia to transfer ownership of the properties.

The Court added that Ciacho cannot claim to be an innocent buyer because he was aware of facts that should have raised doubts about Cerilla’s ownership. He knew of the earlier sale between De Guia and Cerilla and the former’s claim as annotated on the titles.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-no-valid-sale-if-buyer-knows-seller-is-not-true-owner/

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/259051-edward-c-ciacho-vs-spouses-adolfo-t-de-guia-and-fe-alma-v-de-guia-et-al/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/259051-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

04/07/2025

The (SC) has clarified that the salaries of public officials can be garnished—or legally collected—by the courts to pay off their debts. These salaries are not exempt from garnishment under current laws and rules.

In a decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division ruled that the salary of Atty. Fred L. Bagbagen, a Baguio City councilor, can be garnished to pay his debt to respondent Anna May F. Perez.

Bagbagen was cleared of criminal charges for estafa, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) still found him civilly liable and ordered him to pay Perez PHP 308,000. The RTC allowed the garnishment of his salary, which was then withheld by the Philippine Veterans Bank.

Bagbagen attempted to stop the garnishment, arguing that his salaries should not be collected due to public policy reasons, and that these funds were still considered government property until spent.

The SC affirmed the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that once a public official’s salary is deposited in their personal bank account, it is no longer considered government money.

It emphasized that there is no law exempting public officials’ salaries from garnishment. Under Rule 39 of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵, salaries – whether in the public or private sector – can be garnished to settle debts.

An exception exists for manual laborers, whose wages are protected to ensure they can still support their families. The SC explained that manual laborers “usually look to the reward of a day’s labor for immediate or present support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any other.”

However, only up to four months’ worth of wages are exempt. Any amount beyond that can still be collected to pay debts.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/44u5fp2s.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/4pzbvsv9.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/06/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a land sale made through a verbal, unwritten agreement can be considered valid and binding—as long as it has been partly or fully carried out.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division upheld the verbal sale of land between Marcos Batara (Batara) and his nephew Benedicto Ocampo (Ocampo). Even without a written contract, the SC found the sale valid because Ocampo had already received the land title, moved into the property, and made improvements on it.

The land was registered in the name of Batara, who passed away in 1974. His children, Noblesa and Ernesto, only learned of their father’s ownership of the property in 2007, when they received a notice to pay unpaid real estate taxes on the land and found out that the same was being occupied by their cousin, Ocampo.

Noblesa and Ernesto filed a case to reclaim the land from Ocampo, saying they were the rightful heirs. Ocampo, on the other hand, claimed he bought the land from Batara while the latter was still alive. After Batara died, Ocampo kept paying installments to Marcelo, Batara’s brother.

Ocampo admitted that the sale was not evidenced by any written document because Batara died before they could execute the necessary instruments. But Ocampo provided the owner’s copy of land title as proof, claiming Batara gave it to him after the initial payment in 1972.

Ruling in Ocampo’s favor, the SC said that under the Civil Code, a sale of land must be in writing to be enforced in court. This written document serves as proof that both parties agreed to the sale.

However, the sale is still considered valid even without a written contract if it has already been fully or partly carried out. In such cases, a verbal agreement can still be legally binding, and witnesses may be allowed to testify to prove that the sale happened.

In this case, the sale was partially executed as Ocampo had partially paid for the land, taken possession of it, received the land title, and paid real property taxes. The SC thus admitted the testimonies of Ocampo and his witnesses, which proved the sale.

The SC, however, found that Ocampo’s payments to Batara’s brother Marcelo were ineffective because he was not authorized to accept them on behalf of his brother’s heirs.

Therefore, while the sale remains valid, Ocampo must pay the remaining balance of the purchase price, with interest, to Noblesa and Ernesto.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/yeapyzcd.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/msxr7hsd.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

26/06/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a spouse’s inability to love or emotionally connect with their partner, if rooted in a genuine personality disorder, may be considered evidence of psychological incapacity and a ground to declare a marriage void.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division reinstated an earlier ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which declared a couple’s marriage void from the beginning due to the husband’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital duties.

The couple met in 1999 and married in 2002. They did not live together immediately, as the husband worked in Saudi Arabia. They were only physically together for about five years, and their relationship was marked by frequent arguments and periods of separation.

In 2016, the husband filed a petition to nullify the marriage, supported by a psychologist’s diagnosis of his Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder, which made it difficult for him to maintain close relationships. The RTC initially granted his petition, but reversed the same on reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the husband’s appeal.

The SC, however, ruled in favor of the husband, finding that he had sufficiently proven psychological incapacity.

Under Article 36 of the Family Code, a marriage is void if one or both spouses are psychologically unable to fulfill their marital duties—even if the condition becomes evident only after the wedding. The incapacity must be deeply rooted in the person’s character and must have existed before the marriage.

The SC clarified that psychological incapacity can manifest long after the wedding, so a spouse who initially appears capable may later show signs of inability. If this comes from a genuine psychological condition, the marriage can still be declared void.

In this case, the SC found that the husband’s emotional detachment stemmed from a strict and emotionally distant upbringing. While he could provide for his family financially, he struggled to meet his wife’s emotional needs, including basic companionship.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/2zjba472.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/8e67mcme.

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez at https://tinyurl.com/56e9rs43.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/06/2025

The has reiterated that a victim’s admission of being in a relationship with her abuser does not imply consent to s*x. Clear and convincing evidence of consent is still required.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division affirmed the conviction of accused Jhopet Hernandez Toralde for r**e of a 14-year old girl.

In 2017, Toralde showed up at the victim’s house unannounced and forced her to have s*x, threatening to show her family a video of them kissing if she refused. Out of fear, the victim gave in. She then reported the incident to the police.

During trial, the defense claimed that Toralde did not force the victim to have s*xual in*******se as he and the victim were in a romantic relationship—a defense known as the “𝘀𝘄𝗲𝗲𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗼𝗿𝘆.”

The SC, however, rejected Toralde’s sweetheart defense and declared him guilty of r**e under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, citing that all elements of the crime were present, including the use of threats and intimidation to force s*xual in*******se.

The SC rejected Toralde’s sweetheart defense, affirming that being in a relationship does not grant the right to force s*x. The SC stressed that proving a romantic relationship is not enough—there must be clear evidence of consent.

Toralde was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘦𝘵𝘶𝘢, or a maximum of 40 years in prison, and ordered to pay the victim PHP 225,000 in damages.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/nvpvv9fm.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/6tzma4tx

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

23/06/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that a co-owner must give written notice to the other co-owners before selling their share of a property. However, if the other co-owners already knew about the sale and failed to exercise their right to buy the share within 30 days, the written notice is no longer required.

In a Decision written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC’s First Division denied the petition filed by siblings Antonio Azurin, Jr. (Antonio) and Rafael Azurin (Rafael) to buy back a parcel of land registered in the name of Carlito Chua (Chua).

Antonio and Rafael were in possession of a parcel of land which they co-owned with their aunt Adelaida. Adelaida later sold to Chua her portion, which was officially registered in Chua’s name after it was surveyed and divided.

Years later, Antonio and Rafael attempted to buy back the land from Chua by filing a complaint for legal redemption before the trial court. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals denied the complaint, on the ground that the case was filed years after the sale and well beyond the 30-day period allowed by the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

Antonio and Rafael appealed to the SC, but the SC denied their appeal.

The SC said that under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a co-owner intending to sell their share to a third party must notify the other co-owners in writing about the sale. The other co-owners then have 30 days from receipt of the written notice to redeem or buy back the portion sold. If they fail to do so within the period, they lose the right to redeem the sold portion.

The SC, however, added that the requirement of written notice can be waived if (1) unusual circumstances have made the co-owners aware of the sale, and (2) the co-owners did not take action or were negligent in their right to redeem the property, a situation referred to in law as laches.

In this case, the SC found that Antonio and Rafael were aware of the sale. They were in actual possession of the land and, therefore, were informed about the survey conducted on it. Additionally, they received Chua’s legal complaint to recover possession.

However, they waited more than six years before trying to redeem the property.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/68yxczhw.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/35tpwuye.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

20/06/2025

The (SC) has affirmed a Court of Appeals (CA) ruling finding that Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) did not sufficiently prove payment of salaries and 13th month pay to its former pilots. To prove salary payment through banks, the Court held that employers must show that the payroll was submitted to and received by the bank.

In a Decision penned by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC’s First Division remanded to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) the labor claims of 18 former PAL pilots, to determine the exact amount and to make a detailed computation of the monetary benefits due to them.

It found that the Payroll Listing and 13th Month Pay Payroll Register presented by PAL were not sufficient proof of payment, as they did not provide proof of actual receipt of payment by the employees.

The case stemmed from a 1998 strike by 49 PAL pilots, who later filed a complaint with the NLRC against PAL alleging illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and non-payment of various monetary benefits such as salaries, allowances, and bonuses.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the claims of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. As for the monetary claims, PAL presented payroll documents to prove payment, which were accepted by both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

The CA, however, reversed the NLRC. stating that the documents presented by PAL were not sufficient proof of payment.

The SC affirmed the CA, emphasizing that payroll records and vouchers can only be considered strong proof of payment if they clearly show that the employees actually received the money and when the payment was made.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/ac5kehbk.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/c4dpa3sj.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/06/2025

The (SC) has ruled that when a Filipino asks a Philippine court to recognize a foreign divorce, they only need to prove the law of the country where the divorce was obtained – not the law of their foreign spouse’s nationality.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division sent a case back to the Court of Appeals (CA) to give a Filipina a chance to properly prove the divorce laws of Kentucky, United States of America (U.S.A).

The Filipina married a Peruvian citizen in New Jersey, U.S.A; they later settled in Kentucky. Due to marital issues, the husband ended the marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Kentucky court.

The Filipina then filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court in the Philippines to have the divorce recognized. She submitted a copy of the divorce decree, along with printouts of Kentucky and Peruvian marriage laws.

The SC clarified that in recognition of foreign divorce cases, what matters is the law of the country that issued the divorce decree. Since the divorce was granted in Kentucky, only Kentucky law needed to be proven.

The SC explained that under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, a Filipino may remarry if their foreign spouse gets a valid divorce abroad that allows them to remarry. Philippine courts must first determine if the divorce was valid under the applicable foreign law, and the Filipino spouse must prove this law.

The SC also emphasized the relevance of the international law principle of comity of nations. This principle allows judicial acts of one country – such as court rulings or decrees – to be recognized in another, based on mutual respect between states. It also acknowledges the authority of a foreign state not only over its citizens but also over other individuals under its jurisdiction, like legal residents.

However, the SC returned the case to the CA to give the Filipina, who submitted a mere printout of Kentucky law, a chance to submit the proper documents.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/4jhyh8vv.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/ympmypuz.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

29/05/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a freeze order issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) for suspected money laundering activities may cover related accounts, subject to certain guidelines to protect the rights of account owners.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC En Banc upheld Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), which allows the CA to freeze related and materially linked accounts, if they are included in the application and the amount of the funds or value of the property is identified in the freeze order.

The ruling is in connection to the corruption and plunder charges filed against former Vice President Jejomar Binay and other government officials over the alleged overpricing of the New Makati City Parking II Building.

The SC ruled that the AMLA allows related accounts to be frozen, even if the exact term “related accounts” is not stated in the law. These accounts fall under the broader phrase “monetary instrument or property related to unlawful activity” under Section 10.

However, the SC emphasized that a freeze order can only be issued if the CA finds probable cause, meaning there must be enough reason to believe the assets are linked to illegal activity. This ensures that the rights to privacy and protection from unlawful searches remain respected.

To protect innocent account holders, the SC also laid down clear guidelines for how related accounts may be included in a freeze order. These procedures aim to avoid freezing accounts that have no connection to money laundering or other criminal activity:

1. The AMLC shall file a freeze order petition before the CA covering monetary instruments or properties related in any way to an unlawful activity. The petition shall state if it includes related and materially–linked accounts defined under the IRR, with a specific description of all stated accounts, including their amounts.

2. The CA shall make an independent finding of probable cause that a monetary instrument or property, including the related and materially-linked accounts, are in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined under the AMLA.

3. The freeze order shall be limited to, and cannot go beyond, the amount of cash or monetary instrument or value of property that the court finds probable cause to be considered proceeds of a predicate offense.

4. The freeze order shall be effective immediately, for a period of 20 days. During this period, the CA must conduct a summary hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine whether or not to modify or lift the freeze order or extend its effectivity, which should not exceed six months.

5. A person whose account has been frozen may file a motion to lift the freeze order and the court must resolve this motion before the expiration of the freeze order.

6. If there is no case filed against a person whose account has been frozen within the period determined by the CA, which in no case shall exceed six months, the freeze order shall be deemed automatically lifted.

7. The person whose property or funds have been frozen may withdraw such sums as the AMLC determines reasonable for monthly family needs and sustenance, including the services of counsel and family medical needs.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/y9ha27kf.

The full text of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in G.R. No. 222312, Manganip v. Republic of the Philippines, shall be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

13/05/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a duplicate or photocopy of original documents, whether in paper or electronic form, can be admitted as evidence in court, provided there is no genuine question regarding the original’s authenticity or fairness in using the copy.

In a Decision written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC’s First Division upheld the conviction of Ybo Lastimosa (Lastimosa) for the murder of Ildefonso Vega, Jr. (Vega) in a case involving the use of a photocopy of Vega’s death certificate as key evidence.

Witnesses testified during trial that Lastimosa shot Vega in the head outside a cockpit in Cebu City. Vega’s wife also testified that Vega was already dead when she found him at the hospital. To support her testimony, the prosecution presented a photocopy of Vega’s death certificate, which confirmed that he died from gunshot wounds.

Convicted by the trial court of homicide and by the Court of Appeals of murder, Lastimosa argued before the SC that the prosecution failed to prove that the crime was committed because the original death certificate was not presented. He claimed that a photocopy, without comparison to the original for authentication, should not have been admitted as evidence.

The SC affirmed the Court of Appeals, sentencing Lastimoso to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay PHP 275,000 in civil indemnity and damages. It explained that under Rule 130, Section 4(c) of the 2019 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘌𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦, a duplicate is admissible as the original unless there is a genuine question about the original’s authenticity or it would be unfair to use the duplicate.

This rule applies to both paper-based and electronic documents, reflecting the modern reality where duplicates are often as reliable as originals.

However, the SC emphasized that while a photocopy may be admissible, its weight or value depends on how well it corroborates or supports other available evidence.

In this case, the photocopy of the death certificate, combined with the testimonies of Vega’s wife and other eyewitnesses, sufficiently established that Vega died from gunshot wounds and that Lastimosa was responsible.

Read the full text of the Press Release at
https://tinyurl.com/36r9m76u.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/mwe35fhe.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

02/05/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that while notarized documents are presumed authentic, they will be invalidated if proven to be fake.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC’s Second Division cleared Gil Chua (Chua) of liability for Interbrand Logistics and Distribution, Inc.’s (Interbrand) unpaid PHP 150 million loan from the Bank of Commerce (Bank).

The loan was secured by promissory notes and notarized Continuing Surety Agreements (CSAs) signed by several of Interbrand’s officers. Chua was listed as one of the sureties, but unlike the other signatories, he was not an officer, director, or shareholder of the company. When Interbrand failed to pay the loans, the Bank sued the company and all the sureties.

Chua denied any involvement, saying he never signed a CSA nor appeared before a notary public. The Bank, however, insisted that the CSA, as a notarized document, is presumed valid.

Emphasizing that notarization does not cure a forged or fabricated document, the SC ruled that the notarized CAS was questionable and that Chua was not bound by it.

The SC found that Chua successfully challenged the validity of the CSA. He consistently denied signing the document or appearing before a notary. He held no position or interest in Interbrand, and the Bank had no specimen of his signature to verify the CSA.

Additionally, his CSA and another were allegedly signed on the same day in far-apart locations but had identical witnesses, which raised doubts as to their authenticity. The notary public who supposedly notarized the CSA was also never presented in court.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/2zz7wmbd.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/5t4dxh45.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

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