Amon Uy Law Office

06/02/2026

By a unanimous vote of all those participating, the (SC) En Banc, denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the House of Representatives, which sought to reverse the Court’s July 25, 2025 Decision that declared the Articles of Impeachment against Vice President Sara Z. Duterte unconstitutional.

It affirmed that the fourth impeachment complaint transmitted to the Senate on February 5, 2025 was already barred by Article XI, Section 3, subsection (5) of the Constitution. Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa took no part. Associate Justice Maria Filomena Singh was on leave.

The SC clarified the following points:

First, the first three impeachment complaints filed in accordance with the first mode of initiating an impeachment, that is Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2), were not placed in the Order of Business within the required 10 session days.

"Session days" as used in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2) or for purposes of the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint does not mean legislative session days. A session day for purposes of Article XI in the Constitution was given its plain and ordinary sense, which the Court interprets to mean a calendar day in which the House of Representatives holds a session.

Second, the SC reiterated Gutierrez v. House of Representatives. However, it further elaborated that an impeachment complaint filed in accordance with the first mode of impeachment, Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2), is deemed initiated for purposes of the one-year bar in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (5) when:

(a) a properly verified and endorsed impeachment complaint is referred to the Committee on Justice;

(b) a properly verified and endorsed impeachment complaint is not placed in the Order of Business of the House of Representatives within 10 session days, or referred to the Committee on Justice after it has been put in the Order of Business within three session days as required by Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2) of the Constitution; or

(c) no Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to the Senate before the House of Representatives adjourns sine die. This means that the initiation of an impeachment complaint must occur during the term of Congress.

Third, the SC affirmed the power of the House of Representatives to promulgate its own Rules on Impeachment. However, it clarified that Section 2 of the House Rules, as it is currently worded, requires the referral to the Committee on Justice even when filed through the second mode. The second mode is provided in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (4) of the Constitution, where the endorsement of at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives would be sufficient to transmit the Articles of Impeachment.

In view of the current wording of Section 2 of the Rules on Impeachment as drafted and promulgated by the House of Representatives in its 19th and 20th Congress, the House may—optionally upon its own prerogative—refer an impeachment complaint already endorsed by at least one-third of all its members to the Committee on Justice only for the following purposes:

(1) to ensure that the endorsement of the members of the House is verified;

(2) to confirm that the evidence supporting the grounds in the complaint exists, and that every member of the House has been given a copy of the complaint, as well as the evidence supporting it; and

(3) to respect the Committee’s prerogative to consolidate different formulations of the complaint, if any, so that only one complaint is endorsed to the plenary for transmittal to the Senate.

The SC observed that there is a fundamental difference between the first and second modes of initiating impeachment complaints. Thus, Article XI, Section 3, subsections (2) and (3) cover the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint while Article XI, Section 3, subsection (4) covers the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint.

In the first mode, as contemplated under subsections (2) and (3), impeachment is initiated through the regular and deliberative process in the House of Representatives. A verified complaint may be filed either by a member of the House or by a private citizen with the endorsement of a member. Upon filing, the complaint is referred to the House Committee on Justice, which evaluates its sufficiency in form and substance and conducts the appropriate hearings. Only after favorable committee action does the impeachment process proceed further. This mode therefore emphasizes institutional screening and committee review.

By contrast, subsection (4) introduces an alternative and more direct mechanism for initiating impeachment. Under this provision, a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment signed by at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives immediately initiates impeachment proceedings.

These provisions reflect a deliberate constitutional design; subsections (2) and (3) provide a structured and committee-directed approach, while subsection (4) allows a streamlined initiation when a sufficient level of consensus already exists.”

Fourth, the Court affirmed that due process of law applies to the impeachment process. It stated that:

“The phrase ‘right to life, liberty, or property’ should not be read with undue literalism. It must be accorded reasonable flexibility to achieve its intent of protecting inherent and inalienable rights that could not have been exhaustively articulated at the time of its framing. The due process clause embodies the fundamental constitutional commitment to reasonableness, fairness, and non-arbitrariness. It envisions that we cannot have a true democratic and republican/representative state that is arbitrary and unfair.”

However, due process as it applies to the impeachment process is sui generis or a class of its own. Full-blown trial happens at the Senate. At least for the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint, it only requires:

One. The grounds invoked in the complaint or resolution are those contained in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Two. The procedure is governed by the Rules on Impeachment promulgated by the House of Representatives prior to any filing of any impeachment complaint.

Three. As already provided by the current House Rules on Impeachment, all endorsing members should have been given a copy of the complaint and all its supporting evidence.

The Court also noted that the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment should be done in a plenary session of the House of Representatives, providing all the members of the House of Representatives with full copies of the complaint and its accompanying evidence mentioned in Rule IV, Section 14 of the House Rules on Impeachment.

Transmittal to the Senate, however, requires only a vote of one-third of its members for the first mode of initiating a complaint, or proof of the endorsement of a complaint by one-third of its members for the second mode.

Fifth, the operative fact doctrine cannot be invoked by the party directly responsible in the commission of an unconstitutional act. Thus, it does not apply in this case.

Finally, the Court noted all the motions for intervention and pleadings filed by individuals who were not parties to the case.

The Resolution is immediately executory upon digital service on all parties.

No further pleadings will be allowed.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159965

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-sara-z-duterte-vs-house-of-representatives-et-al-atty-israelito-p-torreon-et-al-vs-house-of-representatives-et-al/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-ramon-paul-l-hernando-2/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-henri-jean-paul-b-inting-2/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-ricardo-r-rosario/

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-opinion-justice-amy-c-lazaro-javier/

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-opinion-justice-raul-b-villanueva/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

31/12/2025

Happy New Year!

To all our clients, thank you for your support and trust! We will continue to uplift our services and offer the highest standards of professionalism in all our dealings and transactions.💙 May 2026 brings us peace joy and prosperity. 🙏

11/12/2025

HOW THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES VOTED IN THE PHILHEALTH DECISION

G.R. No. 274778, Aquilino Pimentel III et al. v. House of Representatives et al.
G.R. No. 275405, Bayan Muna Chairman Neri Colmenares et al. v. Executive Secretary Lucas P. Bersamin et al.
G.R. No. 276233, 1Sambayan Coalition et al. v. House of Representatives et al.

On December 3, 2025, the unanimously ordered the return to PhilHealth of PHP 60 Billion funds previously transferred to the National Treasury and permanently prohibited the transfer of the remaining PHP 29.9 billion fund balance.

In this , see how the Justices voted on the other issues discussed in the ruling.

For more, read the press release and full text of the Decision, and the opinions of the Justices:

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156834

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156755

Read the Separate Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156760

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156766

Read the Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156771

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156776

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156781

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156786

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156792

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156797

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156802

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156807

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156812

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156820

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/12/2025

G.R. No. 274778, Aquilino Pimentel III et al. v. House of Representatives et al.
G.R. No. 275405, Bayan Muna Chairman Neri Colmenares et al. v. Executive Secretary Lucas P. Bersamin et al.
G.R. No. 276233, 1Sambayan Coalition et al. v. House of Representatives et al.

The , during its session on December 3, 2025, unanimously ordered the return of PhilHealth funds previously transferred to the National Treasury in the amount of PHP 60 billion and permanently prohibited the transfer of the remaining PHP 29.9 billion fund balance.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the Court En Banc, by a majority vote, also declared void Special Provision 1(d), Chapter XLIII of the 2024 General Appropriations Act (2024 GAA), and Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 003-2024 for having been issued and implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Special Provision 1(d) authorized the return of the fund balance or the excess reserve funds of government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) to the National Treasury to fund unprogrammed appropriations under the 2024 GAA.

The DOF issued Circular No. 003-2024, directing the transfer of PHP 89.8 billion to the National Treasury, representing the fund balance or excess reserve funds of the PhilHealth. In compliance, the PhilHealth remitted PHP 60 billion to the National Treasury in three tranches.

The SC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the transfer of the remaining PHP 29.9 billion PhilHealth funds and the further implementation of Special Provision 1(d) of the 2024 GAA and DOF Circular No. 003-2024.

The SC struck down Special Provision 1(d) of the 2024 GAA for being a rider—a provision not germane or related to the bill’s purpose. The Constitution requires all provisions of the GAA to be germane to its purpose to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature and to fairly inform the people of the bills’ subject.

While Special Provision 1(d) is particular in that it relates to the unprogrammed appropriations in the GAA, the Court found the provision ambiguous because it introduced the concept of a “fund balance”—a term not defined in the 2024 GAA.

The SC also ruled that Special Provision (1)d is unconstitutional because it impliedly repeals Section 11 of the Universal Health Care Act (UHCA) and the Sin Tax Laws.

The SC ruled that reallocating PhilHealth’s supposed “excess reserve funds” through Special Provision 1(d) and DOF Circular No. 003-2024 makes compliance with Section 11 impossible as they undermine the very nature of PhilHealth funds as pooled resources for social health insurance, among others.

The SC stressed that Congress cannot repeal Section 11 through the General Appropriations Act.

The SC further found that Special Provision 1(d) contradicts the Sin Tax Laws, which earmark specific percentages of excise taxes on sweetened beverages, alcohol, and to***co products exclusively for the UHCA.

The SC also ruled that the Finance Secretary cannot, in any capacity, augment any item in the GAA because this power belongs to the President.

The SC also ruled that the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he certified as urgent House Bill No. 8980, now the 2024 GAA, which dispensed with the requirement of reading on three separate days and the printing and distribution of copies in advance.

The SC also denied the petitioners’ request to determine the liability of the DOF Secretary for technical malversation and/or plunder, ruling that such matters are improper for resolution in this case. The only issue properly before it is the validity of the issuances and whether they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Justices who submitted their respective separate opinions also noted that no criminal liability can attach to the Finance Secretary, who they found to have acted in good faith in implementing Special Provision 1(d).

The SC ordered that the remitted funds amounting to PHP 60 billion be returned to PhilHealth through the 2026 GAA.

Separate Opinions

Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen held that the presidential declaration of urgency should be considered invalid, noting that no emergency or public calamity justified dispensing with the constitutional requirement of three readings on separate days.

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa emphasized that Congress exceeded its authority when it increased the unprogrammed appropriations proposed by the President, describing the move as a deliberate attempt to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against increasing the President’s proposed appropriations.

Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando held that unprogrammed appropriations in the GAA are unconstitutional and that the entire amount should be removed.

Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting stated that the President’s certification of the bill as urgent was based on a reasonable assessment of the country’s needs and not an act of grave abuse of discretion.

Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda expressed reservation on the wholesale invalidation of Special Provision No. 1 (d) and DOF Circular No. 003-2024, saying that while he agreed that the transfer was unconstitutional, he held that the government may nonetheless be considered to have acted in good faith.

Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan held that declaring the issuances invalid does not negate the good faith of the Finance Secretary in implementing Special Provision No. 1 (d) through DOF Circular No. 003-2024, nor does it automatically create a basis for his liability.

Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario emphasized that a finding of grave abuse of discretion by a public official does not equate to criminal liability.

Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez disagreed with striking down Special Provision No. 1 (d) and DOF Circular No. 003-2024 in their entirety, asserting that the ruling should be limited solely to the transfer of PhilHealth funds.

Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao held that the wholesale invalidation of Special Provision No. 1 (d) and DOF Circular No. 003-2024 should be avoided as these can be reconciled with the UHCA and the Sin Tax Laws.

Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez likewise disagreed with the broad invalidation of the issuances. He held that Special Provision No. 1 (d) enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and should be harmonized with the Constitution.

Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh noted that the transfer diverted funds intended for indigents, senior citizens, and persons with disabilities, weakening PhilHealth’s capacity to provide universal healthcare and marginalized Filipinos of essential support.

Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva disagreed with declaring Special Provision No. 1 (d) unconstitutional, arguing that it did not directly repeal the UHCA and Sin Tax Laws. He added that Special Provision No. 1 (d) should be applied to GOCCs whose charters do not prohibit such transfer of funds.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156834

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156755

Read the Separate Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156760

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156766

Read the Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156771

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156776

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156781

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156786

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156792

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156797

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156802

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156807

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156812

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156820

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

17/11/2025

Permi isiguro nga ug mupalit ug luna nga naay basak ipasubay una sa mga ahensya nga konektado sa CARPER Law sama sa DAR ug Landbank. Makuha pod sa atong Provincial Assessors Office ang certified true copy sa titolo ug makita usab sa maong titolo kung grant or hinatag ba kini sa benepesyaryo pinaagi sa CARPER law o Expanded Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Lorenzo R. dela Rosa, a member of the Remedial Law Department of the Philippine Judicial Academy, discusses
mortgage and sale of properties under RA 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, in Episode 94: When Agrarian Land is Mortgaged or Sold.

What is Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988? What is the logic and wisdom behind the prohibition on the sale or transfer of awarded lands within 10 years of the award?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/6YH60c0erH64qWOV3ABchQ?si=CVMIysfiSJ-0pRet8wGwnw

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/supreme-court-ph-podcast/id1852172756?i=1000736719029

YouTube: https://youtu.be/MkfL9RK92hw

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/19rssC3zrQ/

13/09/2025

Give your all 2025 Bar Takers!💪

09/09/2025

2nd Day reminder:
Let your faith be stronger, than your fear. 💪

09/09/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a public institution must vacate the land it occupies if it lacks permission from the rightful owner and the owner has a better right of possession.

In a Decision written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the SC’s Second Division ordered the Department of Education (DepEd) to vacate and return a parcel of land to its owner, Princess Joama Marcosa A. Caleda (Caleda).

In 2014, Caleda bought a 10,637 square meter rice land in Cagayan through an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale signed by the heirs of the registered owner, Bueno Gallebo (Gallebo).

However, when Caleda later visited the land for a relocation survey, she discovered that it was being occupied by the Solana Fresh Water Fishery School (the School), a public institution under DepEd Regional Office 2.

Caleda sent several demand letters for DepEd to vacate the land, but received no reply. She then filed a case to recover possession of the land and remove any structures built on it.

DepEd argued that government agencies cannot be evicted from land already used for public purposes. It claimed it had the right to take over the property through its power of eminent domain, and that Caleda’s only remedy was to ask for just compensation.

Ruling in favor of Caleda, the SC found that the latter had clearly proven her better right to the property. Her land title was valid and accurately described the land, unlike the School’s deed of sale, which referred to an adjacent lot.

The SC emphasized that while the government can take private property for public use through its power of eminent domain, this must be done through proper legal proceedings and with payment of just compensation. Because no expropriation process was initiated in this case, the School could not retain the land simply by offering to pay for it.

The SC also clarified that a public institution can only prevent eviction if the property owner fails to assert their rights in time, which is considered an implied acceptance.

In this case, Caleda acted quickly—sending demand letters, talking to DepEd, registering her claims, and filing a case within two years of discovering the School’s occupation of the property.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://tinyurl.com/y35skjpf.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/58ja5trh.

06/09/2025

You are destined for greatness. Rest now and conquer tomorrow. Never doubt yourself💪

May the force be with you all 2025 Bar Takers!

06/09/2025

The (SC) has reiterated that the donation of subdivision land to a local government unit (LGU) must be in writing and acceptance must be in the same deed or a separate instrument for ownership to be transferred.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division ruled that the Quezon City (QC) LGU failed to establish that the open spaces and road lots in Capital Park Homes Subdivision (CPHS) had been donated to the city for public use as it was not able to show a copy of any deed of donation as well as any proof of acceptance of such donation.

Rainier L. Madrid, a resident of subdivision behind CPHS and QC taxpayer, filed a petition to determine the nature and ownership of open spaces and road lots of CPHS. Originally intended for the exclusive use of CPHS homeowners, these properties have become accessible to the public.

Madrid alleged that the QC LGU use substantial public funds for the improvement of these properties while they were privately owned. He pointed out that VV Soliven, CPHS’ developer, failed to present proof that the properties had been donated to the QC LGU. He stressed that without proof of donation, the properties remain private and cannot be treated as public property.

The QC LGU maintained that under QC Ordinance No. 5852, series of 1964, subdivisions must dedicate 6% of their total open spaces for public use and turn these over to the city before any subdivision plan can be approved. It noted that CPHS’ subdivision plan was approved in August 1969, indicating that CPHS had complied with the ordinance.

Capital Park Homeowners Association, Inc. (CPHAI) admitted the absence of deed of donation but cited a board resolution stating that the properties were donated to the QC LGU.

CPHAI also questioned Madrid’s standing to file the petition, as he was allegedly not directly affected.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action and declared Madrid as not a real party-in-interest.

The Court of Appeals (CA) disagreed and recognized Madrid’s right to file the case since he could be affected by the alleged misuse of public funds. It held that the areas in question remain private property as there was no proof that the subdivision developer had donated them to the QC LGU.

The SC upheld the CA’s ruling, emphasizing that the QC LGU must prove a valid transfer of property in its favor. However, the LGU did not provide a deed of donation or any proof of acceptance, as required under the Civil Code.

The SC clarified that open spaces and road lots in subdivisions do not automatically become government property. LGUs cannot rely solely on ordinances or laws to claim ownership. A written donation is required to transfer ownership. Without it, the property remains private and cannot be claimed by the local government.

Read the full text of the press release at https://tinyurl.com/499tc8hm

Read the full text of the Decision at https://tinyurl.com/bde7hv7u

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.