Atty. Mai Ugay

05/03/2026

❤️

The (SC) has reiterated that corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the manning agency for the payment of disability benefits to seafarers under Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Special First Division granted the motion for partial reconsideration of its earlier Decision, which had held that only Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) and Princess Cruises Ltd. (Princess Cruises) are liable for the disability benefits of its seafarer. The SC ruled that Magsaysay Fleet Director Sorwin Joy G. Rivera (Rivera) is also solidarily liable, meaning he can be made to pay the full amount due.

Magsaysay, a manning agency, hired Ruthgar T. Parce as an electrical fitter for its foreign principal, Princess Cruises. After he was injured while working on board, he was sent back to Manila, where the company-designated doctor diagnosed him with rotator tendinitis in his shoulder and recommended physical therapy.

Months later, Parce was told he had reached the maximum medical treatment and that his sickness allowance would be discontinued. Based on this, Princess Cruises found him fit to work.

Parce continued to feel pain, so he sought a second medical opinion. The doctor he consulted found him unfit for sea duty. Parce then requested Magsaysay for a referral to a third doctor, as required under the rules, and for copies of his medical records. Magsaysay refused and asked instead for a copy of the second doctor’s report to explore a possible settlement. Parce then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses.

The LA ruled in his favor, ordering Magsaysay and Princess Cruises to pay Parce USD 60,000 in disability benefits. The LA considered the company-designated doctor’s report incomplete because it failed to clearly state that Parce was fit to work. The National Labor Relations Commission upheld the LA and also stated that Rivera was liable alongside Magsaysay and Princess Cruises.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, noting that Parce did not immediately question his medical assessment, which weakened his case.

The SC disagreed. It held Magsaysay and Princess Cruises liable because the company-designated doctor’s report was incomplete, giving Parce nothing to properly contest. The SC affirmed the LA’s ruling that he was already deemed permanently disabled under the law.

Parce filed a motion for partial reconsideration, asking the SC to also declare Rivera solidarily liable with the companies. The SC granted the motion.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, clearly provides that when a recruitment agency is a corporation or partnership, its officers, directors, or partners are liable with the company for any money claims awarded to overseas Filipino workers.

The SC explained that while corporate officers are generally not personally liable for contracts entered into by their company, an exception applies when a law specifically makes them accountable. In this case, Rivera, a corporate officer of Magsaysay, was held solidarily liable with the company for Parce’s permanent disability benefits. Rivera was named in the complaint as “Owner/President/Manager” and had signed the employment contract on behalf of the company.

The SC added that when Magsaysay applied for its license to operate as a manning agency, its officers and directors were required, under Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Rules, to submit a verified undertaking, making them solidarily liable for claims arising from the employer-employee relationship.

The SC emphasized that Section 10 of RA 8042 and the relevant POEA Rules are considered part of every seafarer’s employment contract. “These provisions are in line with the State’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating the workers’ plight and are meant to assure overseas Filipino workers immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them,” the SC said.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161450

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161442

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

03/03/2026

27/02/2026

We hear you and we're kinda busy. 😍💖
Thank you. 😊
Merz Yhamzkie

Music not mine.

26/02/2026

Buksan Mo, Papasukin Ako😍
Makisabay ta!

14/02/2026

What a day! 😍
Now, my heart is full.💖
Happy Hearts!!! ❤️❤️❤️

13/02/2026

SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS CONVICTION OF FATHER FOR ABUSE OF DAUGHTER

The Supreme Court (SC) has found a father guilty of lascivious conduct, as it held that courts do not automatically disregard credible testimony because a witness later withdrew or changed it, especially in r**e or sexual abuse cases.

In a decision penned by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division upheld the conviction of a father for lascivious conduct under Republic Act No. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act, involving his 14-year-old daughter.

Court records showed that the victim and her nine-year-old brother were sleeping beside their father on a mattress when, around midnight, she awoke to find him attempting to remove her clothing. She managed to protect herself, and when her brother moved, the father stopped and threatened her not to tell anyone.

The following day, the victim reported the incident to her teacher, who informed the girl’s mother, then working abroad in Singapore. The teacher accompanied the victim to the police to file a report and undergo a medico-legal examination. Subsequently, the victim filed a complaint for r**e.

During the trial, the victim testified about the abuse but later withdrew her testimony, stating that she had invented the allegations because her father was strict and she did not fully understand the consequences. She maintained that her decision was voluntary and aimed at “putting things in order” for her family’s peace.

The RTC convicted the father of qualified r**e, citing the consistency and detail of her original testimony. The Court of Appeals later reduced the conviction to lascivious conduct under RA 7610, noting that the prosecution had not proven sexual in*******se. This prompted the accused to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In affirming his conviction, the SC noted that despite the recantation, it does not automatically invalidate the victim's testimony, noting that the victim’s change in testimony was weak and unconvincing compared to her original testimony.

It also noted that no young girl would invent a story of sexual abuse, publicly admit to it, allow her private parts to be examined, and endure the trauma and humiliation of a public trial were it not true.

"She had wept uncontrollably during her testimony, clearly showing she had suffered greatly at the hands of her own father," the Supreme Court said.

It said that trial court judges are in the best position to assess a witness’ credibility, having directly observed the witness during testimony. It also said that findings of trial courts will not be overturned without compelling reasons, particularly when affirmed by the appellate court.

"The SC warned that automatically accepting withdrawn statements ignores the possibility that a witness may have been pressured or improperly influenced."

It added that under the rules implementing RA 7610, sexual abuse includes intentional touching of a child’s private parts or inserting any object into them to satisfy the perpetrator’s sexual desire.

The SC sentenced the father to reclusion perpetua, or 20 to 40 years in prison, and ordered him to pay the victim P225,000 in damages.

13/02/2026

"MAIN PLUNDERER DOCTRINE MADE PLUNDER MORE DIFFICULT TO PROSECUTE"

Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen emphasized that the “main plunderer doctrine” laid down by the high court ruling in the 2017 case of Macapagal-Arroyo has ultimately made plunder more difficult to prosecute and, consequently, promoted the culture of impunity among corrupt politicians.

Leonen opined this in his concurring opinion to the recent SC En Banc decision that dismissed Senator Jinggoy Estrada's petition to dismiss charges in connection with the PDAF scam, citing his acquittal of plunder. The high court noted that Estrada should be tried separately for graft and corruption despite the dismissal of his plunder charges.

The senior associate justice noted that now that ghost projects and corrupt politicians have once again caught the public eye, there is a palpable fear that once again there will be no accountability at the end of it, regardless of the blatant misuse of stolen public funds.

In the Macapagal-Arroyo landmark ruling, the SC introduced what is now known as the “main plunderer doctrine,” which requires the prosecution to identify and prove beyond reasonable doubt a "main plunderer" or primary mastermind responsible for orchestrating the plunder scheme.

11/02/2026

⚖️ 📜

The (SC) has ruled that same-sex couples who live together may be recognized as co-owners of property under Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, provided there is proof of actual contribution.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division granted a woman’s complaint for partition of property and recognized her as a co-owner of the house and lot she shared with her same-sex partner.

Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governs the property relations of couples who are living together but cannot legally marry, acknowledging co-ownership based on their actual contributions.

The two women lived together as a couple. A year into their relationship, they purchased a house and lot, and agreed to register the property in one partner’s name to facilitate banking transactions.

Upon separation, they agreed to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally. One partner signed an 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 stating that the other had paid about 50% of the purchase and renovation costs.

However, she later refused to sell the property and denied that her former partner was a co-owner.

To protect her interest, the former partner annotated an adverse claim on the title and demanded partition of the property. When this failed, she filed a case for partition of real estate and damages, relying on the 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 as proof of co-ownership.

The SC granted the complaint for partition of real estate, as it clarified the provisions in the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governing the property relations of unmarried couples living together.

Article 147 applies to unmarried couples who may legally marry. Property acquired during their cohabitation is presumed jointly owned.

Article 148, on the other hand, applies to couples who are not permitted to marry. Only properties obtained through actual contribution are considered common property.

Since the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 only allows marriage between a man and a woman, the SC held that same-sex couples necessarily fall under Article 148.

Here, the SC found that the signed 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, where one partner admitted that the other paid about half of the property costs, was a binding admission and sufficient proof of actual contribution. This established co-ownership.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160462.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160431.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160444.

Read the Concurrence of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160439.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

03/02/2026

♥️

23/01/2026

Did you know? 🤔

Non-marital children or children born outside marriage can use the surname of their father.

Music not mine. No copyright infringement intended.