Atty. VA Zara O. Dollolasa-Estoque

Atty. VA Zara O. Dollolasa-Estoque Bearer of Truth☝️and Justice ⚖️

25/04/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that the prohibition on carrying deadly weapons during elections applies to fi****ms and similar regulated weapons, but not to bladed instruments like knives, unless they are carried inside the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters from it, during election day.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division granted the motion for reconsideration (MR) of its earlier ruling that found a man guilty of violating Section 261(p) of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 881, or the 𝘖𝘮𝘯𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘴 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘖𝘌𝘊), as amended by Section 32 of 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 7166. The SC held that while the man was found carrying a knife during the election period, there was no proof that he was in a polling place or within 100 meters of one during the days and hours prohibited under the 𝘖𝘌𝘊.

The man was arrested during the 2018 elections after authorities found him carrying a kitchen knife outside his residence without written authorization from the Commission on Elections.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found him guilty of carrying a deadly weapon during the election period.

The SC initially affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.

However, upon MR, the SC acquitted the man after finding that the prosecution failed to establish all the essential elements of the offense.

The SC clarified the scope of the weapon ban during elections. In 𝘉𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘢 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, it held that bladed instruments are not covered by Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 and Section 32 of 𝘙𝘈 7166, which prohibit the carrying of fi****ms outside one’s residence or place of business during the election period.

However, carrying of deadly weapons in general, including knives, is still punished but under a different provision of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊—Section 261(p)—but only if done in a polling place or near it, and during specific election-related activities.

Unlike Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 which prohibits carrying of 𝐟𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬 everywhere in public during election period, Section 261 (p) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 prohibits possession of 𝐝𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐥𝐲 𝐰𝐞𝐚𝐩𝐨𝐧𝐬 in general (including bladed instruments such as knives) only in or near polling places under the law.

In this case, while the prosecution established that the man was carrying a knife during the election period, it failed to prove that the act was committed in a polling place or within 100 meters of one, and that it occurred during the days and hours specifically covered by Section 261(p). In the absence of proof that he was in or near a polling place during the specified days under the law, the man’s guilt was not established.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163156

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163149

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/04/2026

The (SC) has ruled that sounds incident to the operation of an educational institution, those arising from a school’s regular activities, are not considered a nuisance and cannot make the school liable for damages.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division granted the petition of Couples for Christ School of the Morning Star (School) and reversed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) ruling that awarded damages to residents of Saint Joseph Subdivision in Barangay Villa Kananga, Butuan City, where the school is located.

Wideline I. Malonda and others, who are residents of the Subdivision, claimed they were often exposed to loud noises from the School, such as drums and bugles being played, teachers speaking through microphones and megaphones, and students running, cheering and shouting during games played at the multipurpose center.

The residents claimed that these sounds, heard day and night, disturbed their sleep and peace at home.

In its defense, the School said it has been operating since 2012 with the necessary permits and clearances and that any noise comes only from regular classes. It added that the City Environment and Natural Resources Office conducted a test and found the noise to be within the allowed limits for residential areas. The School also claimed it took steps to reduce noise, such as building higher fences, planting trees, using small speakers, and limiting activities to 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on weekdays.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the residents’ complaint, ruling that they failed to prove they were harmed by the noise. The RTC also found that the School did not intend to harm the residents and acted in good faith by taking steps to reduce the noise.

On appeal, the CA ruled in the residents’ favor, holding that the School’s noise, which came not only from classes but also from other social functions in the multi-purpose hall, was a nuisance that caused discomfort and annoyance to the residents.

The SC overturned the CA’s ruling. It held that academic noise, or sounds from legitimate school activities, is not a nuisance.

Nuisance includes any disturbance that interferes with a person, property or comfort and enjoyment of all citizens. The SC ruled that the determination of whether a noise is a nuisance requires more than just considering the location, environment, and its effect on residents.

Thus, for noise to be considered nuisance, the SC considered in the 𝘍𝘳𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘊𝘰𝘳𝘱. 𝘷. 𝘈𝘊 𝘌𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘐𝘯𝘤. the:

1. reliability of the noise pollution tests conducted,
2. introduction by the defendant of measures or improvements to mitigate the noise,
3. allowable noise levels,
4. defendant’s intention (or lack thereof) to cause harm to the plaintiff,
5. number of complaining witnesses,
6. representativeness of the plaintiff, and
7. actions of the plaintiff to alleviate his or her plight.

Adopting the framework, the SC finds that the sounds emanating from the School arose from its ordinary operations as an educational institution, and that the respondents are hardly representative of the community.

The SC also ruled that the residents failed to prove that the noise was unreasonably disturbing and that it worsened their health conditions. The residents’ statements showed only minor discomforts, not serious harm.

The SC added that while location and environment are important in determining a nuisance, they must be weighed against whether the noise is normally expected from the activity involved. Here, the sounds complained of did not go beyond what could be reasonably expected from a school.

The SC emphasized that there is no nuisance if an ordinary person would not find the sound disturbing, even if someone else is unusually sensitive to it.

The SC explained:

“𝘓𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯 𝘢 𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘭𝘺 𝘱𝘰𝘱𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘺 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘩 𝘢𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴, 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘤𝘭𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘹𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘺, 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘱𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦’𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘯𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘦. 𝘏𝘰𝘸𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳, 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘭𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦. 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘳𝘭𝘺, 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘳𝘥𝘴 𝘯𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘯𝘶𝘪𝘴𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘰𝘯𝘭𝘺 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘯 𝘪𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘤𝘩𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘪𝘯𝘫𝘶𝘳𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘦𝘢𝘭𝘵𝘩 𝘰𝘳 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘰𝘳 𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘺𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘴.”

The SC also denied the claim for damages since the School did not intend to harm or annoy the residents and had taken steps to reduce the noise. There was no evidence that the school caused the noise willfully, with malice or bad faith.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163502

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163486

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278875-formerly-udk-no-18061-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/04/2026

Atty. Maria Zarah R. Villanueva-Castro, Bar Examiner in Commercial Law (2022) and in Commercial and Taxation Laws (2024), and Vice-President and Head of Corporate Legal of MERALCO, discusses the validity of incorporation in Episode 113: Fraud that Warrants Revocation of Incorporation.

What is incorporation? How is a corporation formed, and what are the minimum requirements? What constitutes fraud in incorporation?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/6b80JVKCjFWRdIgBbrrb2S?si=WTaA3-JUQYSk8NhqLCM-uQ

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/supreme-court-ph-podcast/id1852172756?i=1000761953974

YouTube: https://youtu.be/VoVQDYahcZg

Facebook: https://web.facebook.com/share/v/1J7WxcZWpJ/

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

25/04/2026

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session today, April 22,2026, acted on G.R. No. E-05860 (𝘗𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘰𝘯 𝘋. 𝘈𝘭𝘷𝘢𝘳𝘦𝘻, 𝘝𝘪𝘳𝘨𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘰 𝘙. 𝘎𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘪𝘢, 𝘑𝘶𝘢𝘯 𝘊. 𝘙𝘢ñ𝘢, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘙𝘢𝘺𝘮𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘰 𝘓. 𝘑𝘶𝘯𝘪𝘢 𝘷. 𝘍𝘦𝘳𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘙. 𝘔𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘰𝘴, 𝘑𝘳., 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘙𝘢𝘭𝘱𝘩 𝘎. 𝘙𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘰, 𝘪𝘯 𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘢𝘱𝘢𝘤𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘌𝘹𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘺) by directing the respondents to comment on the petition for writ of 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘶𝘴 filed by Pantaleon D. Alvarez and his co-petitioners.

The petition seeks the issuance of a writ of 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘶𝘴 directing the President to submit himself to physical and mental examination, including a hair follicle drug test.

The petition also seeks to direct the President to disclose and publish the medical report indicating the results of the examination, including medical and clinical confirmation of his physical and medical fitness to discharge the powers and duties of the Presidency.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163942.

A copy of the available pleadings may be downloaded from the Current Cases section of the Supreme Court website at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/public-pleadings/.

25/04/2026

KATAS NG FLOOD CONTROL?

The Court of Appeals has issued a freeze order on dozens of assets linked to former House Speaker and Leyte Representative Martin Romualdez in connection with alleged anomalies in flood control projects, according to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC).

25/04/2026

The (SC) has ruled that ISCO Holding Corporation (ISCO) cannot register its “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍 & 𝐃𝐄𝐒𝐈𝐆𝐍” mark as it constitutes Nikon Corporation’s trade name and is confusingly similar to the well-known “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” trademark of the said corporation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division denied ISCO’s petition and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA), which rejected ISCO’s trademark application.

ISCO filed an application for a trademark for its home and household goods containing the design of an anchor enclosed in a circle with the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍”.

Nikon Corp., a foreign corporation and prior registrant and user of the “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” mark in the Philippines, opposed the application, arguing that ISCO’s mark is confusingly similar to its own mark.

The Intellectual Property Office–Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO‑BLA) agreed with Nikon Corp. and denied ISCO’s application. Although the IPO Office of the Director General later reversed this ruling, the CA reinstated the IPO-BLA’s decision, prompting ISCO to elevate the case to the SC.

ISCO claimed that its goods are unrelated to Nikon Corp.’s and that differences, such as the image of an anchor enclosed in a circle and the color scheme, prevent consumer confusion.

The SC upheld the CA’s ruling and held that ISCO’s mark cannot be registered. It explained that trademarks are used to identify and distinguish goods or services. Under Section 147 of the 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, one of the rights of a trademark owner is to exclude others from using their trademark in a way that would confuse consumers and cause financial harm to the owner.

If a well‑known trademark is registered in the Philippines, no other party may register an identical or confusingly similar mark—even if the goods are different.

In this case, the SC found that Nikon Corp.’s trademark is well‑known. The NIKON mark has long been used, promoted, and registered worldwide, including in the Philippines, with the company enjoying significant global sales and market presence.

The SC also found NIKON to be a highly distinctive trademark. It is a coined or invented word with no ordinary meaning in English or Filipino and is not commonly used in the Philippines except as a trademark.

Analyzing the two marks, the SC found that ISCO’s trademark is confusingly similar to NIKON’s. It applied the 𝐃𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐲 𝐓𝐞𝐬𝐭, which focuses on the most noticeable and memorable part of the marks. Minor differences in design, color, or layout are disregarded.

Both ISCO’s and Nikon Corp.’s marks prominently use the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍.” This word is the dominant feature of both marks. They are spelled the same, appear in bold capital letters, and sound exactly the same when pronounced. Because of this, the SC ruled that the two marks create the same visual and auditory impression.

The SC explained that if ISCO were allowed to use its NIKON mark, consumers would likely assume a connection with Nikon Corp. Given its reputation for cameras, the public might believe that ISCO’s household appliances are made, approved, or endorsed by Nikon Corp., or that it has expanded into household products.

The SC also warned that ISCO’s use of the NIKON mark would damage Nikon Corp.’s interests because it would weaken its mark’s ability to uniquely identify a single source of goods. The law protects famous trademarks from such uses to prevent the blurring of their distinctiveness and to preserve their value and reputation.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164274

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164266

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy

26/03/2026

PROCUREMENT IRREGULARITIES ALONE DO NOT PROVE GRAFT — SUPREME COURT ACQUITS PUBLIC OFFICIALS

“Findings of violations of procurement laws… do not automatically lead to conviction under R.A. 3019.” - SC, En Banc

Read the full text in the comment.

26/03/2026

Atty. Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis, Member of the Philippine Judicial Academy Department of Civil Law, and Dean of the College of Law of Lyceum of the Philippines University, talks about annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage, highlighting their differences and how they affect the legitimacy of children in Episode 108: Void or Annulled Marriage? The Effect on Children’s Legitimacy.

What is the difference between a void marriage and a voidable marriage, and what are the grounds for each? If a marriage is either annulled or declared null and void, what happens to the legitimacy of the children?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/5gVa0XDWrLVaTyvY60wu7W?si=RhxcBDiZTuiP-VcIbaeJ2g

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/supreme-court-ph-podcast/id1852172756?i=1000753545512

YouTube: https://youtu.be/65dAgU-fE4g

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1AjTUHhPaS/

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

26/03/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has upheld the validity of a Department of Justice (DOJ) circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

In a Decision written by written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 ruled that Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024 containing the 2024 𝘋𝘖𝘑-𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 (𝘋𝘖𝘑 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴), is a valid exercise of the DOJ’s authority over prosecutorial processes.

Under the DOJ Rules’ new standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest, prosecutors must ensure that the evidence to charge a person with a crime must sufficiently establish all the elements and consequently warrant a conviction.

Atty. Hazel L. Meking questioned the DOJ Rules before the SC, claiming that the DOJ encroached on the SC’s constitutional authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. She argued that the DOJ Rules effectively revised Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦, which provides that the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is probable cause.

The SC dismissed her petition and reiterated its ruling in 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, which recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

The SC held that the DOJ Rules govern only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive functions. These Rules, however, do not extend to judicial proceedings as the power to promulgate rules of procedure over them remains under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The SC noted it had already recognized preliminary investigation as the exclusive domain of prosecutors when it revised the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2005.

In 2024, through 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, the SC also ordered the repeal of provisions in Rule 112 which are inconsistent with the DOJ Rules to harmonize them.

The SC’s constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, as well as its power to correct grave abuse of discretion in any prosecutorial rule or action that violates constitutional rights.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

26/03/2026

Atty. Ma. Soledad Deriquito-Mawis, Member of the Philippine Judicial Academy Department of Civil Law, and Dean of the College of Law of Lyceum of the Philippines University, discusses the evolution of the Philippine Supreme Court's interpretation of psychological incapacity in Episode 109: Marriage on Trial: Psychological Incapacity – Law not Diagnosis.

What is Article 36 of the Family Code? How does it treat psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring a marriage void? Who can bring the petition to have the marriage voided on the ground of psychological incapacity?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/1AiWpT7qljJUEMCj4cbhfF

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/episode-109-marriage-on-trial-psychological-incapacity/id1852172756?i=1000755034786

YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04IVBb4Uzfk

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/reel/922545123856906

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/

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