Asebias Law Office

Asebias Law Office ☎️ +63 9276856801

10/04/2026

The Supreme Court clarified that disciplining a child, even if it results in physical injury, does not automatically amount to child abuse. There must be clear intent to harm or degrade the child’s dignity.

In a Decision penned by Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the Court’s Second Division upheld the conviction of a father who subjected his children to violent and excessive punishment.

From 2017 to 2018, the father repeatedly beat his children, including kicking, pulling hair, and hitting them with objects, while also verbally abusing them. He claimed these were acts of discipline due to their misbehavior.

The lower courts found him guilty under Republic Act No. 7610, and the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling.

The Court emphasized that while parents have the right to discipline, such actions must not be violent, excessive, or degrading. In this case, the father’s acts showed clear intent to harm the children’s dignity, which constitutes child abuse.

He was sentenced to 4 to 6 years in prison, fined PHP45,000, and ordered to pay PHP180,000 in damages.

Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/268457-###-vs-people-of-the-philippines/

01/04/2026

In observance of the Holy Week, the office will be closed on the following dates: April 2-5, 2026.

Office work will resume on April 6, 2026. Any legal concerns, pa-notaryo, etc. please directly transact to our staff and look for Ms. Jovelyn, at our office in Brgy. Sto. Niño, Quinapondan, Eastern Samar.

Have a prayerful Holy Week to all of us. Damo nga salamat.

28/03/2026

The SupremeCourtPH (SC) has clarified that a complaint or petition may only be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action after an examination of the complaint or information itself, together with its annexes—strictly excluding the pleadings or submissions of other parties, reconciling conflicting rulings on the issue.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that the lower courts erred in dismissing a petition for quieting of title for supposedly failing to state a cause of action and in interchanging this concept with “dismissal for lack of cause of action.”

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another, the three elements of which are:

1. a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;

2. an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and

3. an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

The case arose from a land dispute between the groups of Inocencio Taganile and Filomena Delos Santos Dolar.

Taganile’s group claims that it has occupied a portion of land along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue in Rosario, Pasig City, since 1970. After learning that the land had been registered in the name of Dolar’s group, they filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to challenge the title.

Dolar’s group, on the other hand, claims that Taganile’s group were mere lessees. They filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that it did not state a cause of action because it lacked supporting documents.

The RTC dismissed the case after considering both the petition and the evidence presented by Dolar’s group. It ruled that the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not include proof of the Taganile’s group’s claim to the land. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this ruling.

The SC disagreed. It clarified the difference between failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action.

A cause of action exists when a legal right is violated. Courts cannot hear a civil case unless there is a cause of action. A case may be dismissed if the complaint does not state one, or if the party later fails to prove it with evidence. These are different grounds.

To determine whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court looks only at what is written in the complaint and assumes the allegations are true. If, even assuming those facts are true, the court still cannot grant the relief asked for, it can dismiss the complaint on this ground.

In contrast, to determine whether a case lacks a cause of action, the court looks at the evidence presented.

The SC noted that confusion arose from past rulings that allowed courts, in some instances, to look beyond the complaint, such as when the allegations appear to be legally impossible or unfounded. This blurred the difference between failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action.

To settle the issue, the SC ruled that courts may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action only by examining the complaint and its attachments—nothing more. Courts must not consider other pleadings or submissions at this stage.

The SC explained:

“Once the trial court considers other pleadings submitted by the parties or evidence admitted during the proceedings, it is no longer determining a failure to state a cause of action, but rather the very existence of one. In doing so, the ground for dismissing the complaint or petition ceases to be ‘failure to state a cause of action’ and becomes ‘lack of cause of action.’”

Applying this rule, the SC found that the RTC and CA improperly relied on the submissions and evidence of Dolar’s group. They prematurely ruled on the existence of a cause of action without giving Taganile’s group the chance to present evidence.

The SC also found that, based on the allegations alone, the petition was able to establish a case for quieting of title, noting Taganile group’s claims of long-standing possession and houses built on the property since the 1970s.

The SC directed that the case be returned to the RTC to continue the proceedings and receive evidence on the parties’ claims.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162612

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162606

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

20/03/2026
15/03/2026

📣📢. We are looking for an Office Secretary/Staff (PART-TIME ONLY) who can start soon. Fresh graduates can apply but having a working experience in an office setting is an advantage. Location of the office is at 📍Brgy. Sto. Niño, Quinapondan, Eastern Samar. For those interested, you can send your Resume or Personal Data Sheet (even if not notarized) to [email protected], or you can contact this number 09276856801. Details of the employment will be discussed during interview.

Damo nga salamat‼️

14/03/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has upheld the validity of a Department of Justice (DOJ) circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

In a Decision written by written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 ruled that Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024 containing the 2024 𝘋𝘖𝘑-𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 (𝘋𝘖𝘑 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴), is a valid exercise of the DOJ’s authority over prosecutorial processes.

Under the DOJ Rules’ new standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest, prosecutors must ensure that the evidence to charge a person with a crime must sufficiently establish all the elements and consequently warrant a conviction.

Atty. Hazel L. Meking questioned the DOJ Rules before the SC, claiming that the DOJ encroached on the SC’s constitutional authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. She argued that the DOJ Rules effectively revised Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦, which provides that the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is probable cause.

The SC dismissed her petition and reiterated its ruling in 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, which recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

The SC held that the DOJ Rules govern only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive functions. These Rules, however, do not extend to judicial proceedings as the power to promulgate rules of procedure over them remains under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The SC noted it had already recognized preliminary investigation as the exclusive domain of prosecutors when it revised the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2005.

In 2024, through 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, the SC also ordered the repeal of provisions in Rule 112 which are inconsistent with the DOJ Rules to harmonize them.

The SC’s constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, as well as its power to correct grave abuse of discretion in any prosecutorial rule or action that violates constitutional rights.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

07/03/2026

Good day!

Starting March 21, 2026, our office in Brgy. 3 Poblacion, Quinapondan will be closed. It will be transferred to Brgy. Sto. Niño, Quinapondan, Eastern Samar. For your inquiries, you can chat us here, or contact this number 09276856801. Have a good day ahead. Thank you.

25/02/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that search made after a lawful arrest extends to the surroundings within the immediate control of the accused and evidence obtained during such search is admissible even if they are not within the “plain view” of the arresting officers.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division upheld the conviction of Jeryl Bautista for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165, or the 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘋𝘳𝘶𝘨𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2002, as amended.

During a buy-bust operation, a police officer posed as a buyer and received from Bautista 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 in exchange for PHP 500. After the officer made a pre-arranged signal, the rest of the arresting team rushed to the place of the transaction.

Bautista was arrested and a representative from the Department of Justice, and two barangay kagawads arrived shortly after.

Subsequently, the officer searched Bautista and found three more sachets of suspected 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. The officer also found a cellphone, screwdriver, weighing scale, and marked money. The police then marked the four sachets, prepared an inventory of the seized items, and took photographs.

Bautista argued that the additional sachets should not be admitted as evidence because they were not within the plain view of the police officers when seized during his arrest.

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both convicted Bautista of illegal possession of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶.

The SC upheld Bautista’s conviction and rejected his argument. It explained that the plain view doctrine is not the only justification for a warrantless search, as the search could be done to a person who has just been lawfully arrested.

Searches and seizures generally require a warrant. If police perform a search or seize property without a valid warrant, any evidence obtained cannot be used in court and is considered inadmissible. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule.

One of these is the plain view doctrine, which allows police officers to seize evidence in plain sight when: (1) the officer has a lawful reason to be in the place where the item is seen, (2) the discovery of the item is unplanned or incidental, and (3) it is immediately obvious that the item is connected to a crime or is illegal.

Another recognized exception is a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. To be valid, it must meet these conditions: (1) the accused is lawfully arrested, (2) the arresting officers subsequently made a warrantless search, (3) the search is limited to the person of the accused and the area within the accused’s immediate control, and (4) the search is performed at the place of the arrest.

In this case, Bautista was arrested during a buy-bust operation. He was frisked as part of the arrest. While the sachets hidden inside his cellphone charger were not in the officers’ plain view, the SC held that the warrantless search remained valid because it was done as part of a lawful arrest and the search extended to those that are within the immediate control of the accused at the time of the arrest.

To convict a person of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the drug, that the possession was not authorized by law, and that it was done knowingly and freely.

The SC found that all these elements were present. The search revealed three additional sachets of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. Bautista could not explain why he had the drugs nor show any authority allowing him to possess them. His act of hiding the sachets inside the charger also showed his intent to keep them.

Bautista was sentenced to a maximum of 16 years in prison and ordered to pay a fine of PHP 300,000.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161226

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161221

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

01/01/2026

The Supreme Court acquitted one suspect and upheld the conviction of another for estafa over a P17 million payment for a party-list nomination that never materialized.

27/12/2025
06/12/2025

G.R. No. 274778, Aquilino Pimentel III et al. v. House of Representatives et al.
G.R. No. 275405, Bayan Muna Chairman Neri Colmenares et al. v. Executive Secretary Lucas P. Bersamin et al.
G.R. No. 276233, 1Sambayan Coalition et al. v. House of Representatives et al.

Nagkakaisang ipinag-utos ng , sa sesyon nito noong December 3, 2025, na ibalik ang 60-bilyong pisong pondo ng PhilHealth na naunang inilipat sa National Treasury. Permanente namang ipinagbawal ang paglilipat ng natitirang balanse ng pondo na nagkakahalaga ng 29.9 bilyong piso.

Sa Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, pinawalang-bisa rin ng mayorya ng En Banc ang Special Provision 1(d), Chapter XLIII ng 2024 General Appropriations Act (2024 GAA), at Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 003-2024, na siyang naging basehan para sa paglilipat ng pondo.

Pinahintulutan ng Special Provision 1(d) ang pagbabalik ng balanse ng pondo o ng sobrang reserbang pondo ng mga government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) sa National Treasury para pondohan ang mga unprogrammed appropriations sa ilalim ng 2024 GAA.

Naglabas naman ang DOF ng Circular No. 003-2024 na nag-aatas ng paglilipat ng 89.8-bilyong piso sa National Treasury pero ang kabuuang na-remit ng PhilHealth sa National Treasury bago ito ipatigil ng Korte Suprema ay 60 bilyong piso, sa tatlong yugto o tranches.

Idineklara ng Korte na labag sa Konstitusyon ang Special Provision 1(d) ng 2024 GAA dahil ito ay isang rider—isang probisyong hindi kaugnay o walang kinalaman sa layunin ng panukalang batas, na ipinagbabawal sa Saligang Batas. Malabo ang probisyon dahil naghain ito ng konsepto ng “fund balance” na hindi naman tinukoy sa 2024 GAA.

Nagpasya rin ang Korte na ang Special Provision (1)d ay labag sa Konstitusyon dahil pinapawalang-bisa nito ang Section 11 ng Universal Health Care Act (UHCA) at ang Sin Tax Laws.

Dagdag pa ng Korte, hindi maaaring magdagdag ang Kalihim ng DOF ng anumang item sa GAA dahil nasa Pangulo ang kapangyarihang ito.

Wala namang nakita ang Korte Suprema na pag-abuso sa diskresyon ng Pangulo nang sertipikahan niya bilang urgent ang House Bill No. 8980, na ngayon ay ang 2024 GAA.

Tinanggihan naman ng Korte Suprema na tukuyin ang pananagutan ng DOF Secretary sa mga kasong technical malversation at/o plunder dahil hindi umano ito nararapat na resolbahin. Ang tanging isyu na nararapat na harapin ay ang bisa ng mga inilabas na kautusan at kung ang mga ito ba ay inisyu nang may pag-abuso sa diskresyon. Pero may mga mahistrado na nagsabing walang kriminal na pananagutan ang DOF Secretary, na kumilos nang may mabuting hangarin sa pagpapatupad ng Special Provision 1(d).

Iniutos ng Korte na ibalik sa PhilHealth ang pondong nagkakahalaga ng 60 bilyong piso sa pamamagitan ng 2026 GAA.

Mga Hiwalay na Opinyon:

Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen: Walang bisa ang presidential declaration of urgency dahil walang emergency o pampublikong kalamidad ang magbibigay-katwiran sa pag-aalis ng constitutional requirement ng tatlong pagbasa sa magkakahiwalay na araw.

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa: Nagmalabis ang Kongreso sa kanyang kapangyarihan nang dagdagan nito ang unprogrammed appropriations na iminungkahi ng Pangulo, na sadya umanong pagtatangkang iwasan ang pagbabawal sa Konstitusyon laban sa pagtaas ng mga iminungkahing appropriation ng Pangulo.

Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando: Labag sa Konstitusyon ang mga unprogrammed appropriations sa GAA at dapat alisin ang buong halaga nito.

Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting: Ang sertipikasyon ng Pangulo sa panukalang batas bilang urgent ay nakabatay sa makatwirang pagtatasa sa mga pangangailangan ng bansa at hindi isang matinding pag-abuso sa kapangyarihan.

Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda: Bagaman sumasang-ayon siya na labag sa Konstitusyon ang paglilipat ng pondo, naniniwala siya na maaaring ituring pa rin na kumilos ang pamahalaan nang may mabuting layunin kaya may pag-aalinlangan siya sa ganap na pagpapawalang-bisa sa Special Provision No. 1(d) at DOF Circular No. 003-2024.

Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan: Ang pagpapawalang-bisa sa mga inilabas na kautusan ay hindi nagpapawalang-bisa sa mabuting layunin ng Kalihim ng DOF sa pagpapatupad ng Special Provision No. 1(d) sa pamamagitan ng DOF Circular No. 003-2024, at hindi rin nito awtomatikong nagiging batayan ng kanyang pananagutan.

Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario: Hindi katumbas ng kriminal na pananagutan ang malubhang pag-abuso sa kapangyarihan ng isang opisyal ng pamahalaan.

Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez: Hindi siya sang-ayon sa ganap na pagpapawalang-bisa ng Special Provision No. 1(d) at DOF Circular No. 003-2024 at iginiit na ang desisyon ay dapat limitado lamang sa paglilipat ng pondo ng PhilHealth.

Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao: Hindi nararapat ang ganap na pagpapawalang-bisa ng Special Provision No. 1(d) at DOF Circular No. 003-2024 dahil maaari itong itugma sa UHCA at sa Sin Tax Laws.

Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez: Hindi siya sang-ayon sa malawakang pagpapawalang-bisa sa mga inilabas na kautusan. Binigyang-diin niya na ang Special Provision No. 1 (d) ay may presumption of constitutionality at dapat na iayon sa Konstitusyon.

Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh: Ang paglilipat ay naglilihis ng mga pondong nakalaan para sa mga mahihirap, senior citizen, at mga taong may kapansanan, na nagpahina sa kakayahan ng PhilHealth na magbigay ng pangkalahatang pangangalagang pangkalusugan at mahahalagang suporta sa mga mahihirap na Pilipino.

Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva: Hindi siya sang-ayon sa pagdedeklarang labag sa Konstitusyon ang Special Provision No. 1 (d), na iginiit niyang hindi naman tuwirang nagpawalang-bisa sa UHCA at Sin Tax Laws. Idinagdag niya na dapat ilapat ang Special Provision No. 1 (d) sa mga GOCCs na ang mga charter ay hindi nagbabawal sa ganitong paglilipat ng pondo.

Basahin ang kabuuan ng press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156834

Basahin ang Kabuuan ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156755

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Opinyon ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156760

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156766

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring at Dissenting Opinion ni Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156771

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156776

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156781

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156786

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156792

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156797

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Opinyon ni Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156802

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Opinyon ni Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156807

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156812

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Opinyon ni Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156820

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.


Address

Quinapondan, Eastern Samar
Quinapondan

Opening Hours

Monday 9am - 4pm
Tuesday 9am - 4pm
Wednesday 9am - 4pm
Thursday 9am - 4pm
Friday 9am - 4pm

Website

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when Asebias Law Office posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Share