11/07/2023
JUST IN
Is cyber libel included in the phrase "similar means" under Article 355 (Libel) of the Revised Penal Code?
This was the issue resolved by the Supreme Court in a decision released yesterday.
In the 2014 Disini v. Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court emphasized categorically that "cyber libel is ... not a new crime." All the while, we were under the impression that cyber libel under RA 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act, is just a qualifying circumstance of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. This is for the simple reason that the elements of libel are also the same elements of cyber libel with the additional element of the use of computer system. Under RA 10175, it is provided that if the defamatory statement is made "through a computer system or any similar means which may be devised in the future," the penalty would be imposed one higher degree than that of the penalty of the traditional form of libel under Art. 355 of the RPC.
In expounding on the salient distinctions between cyber libel and libel, the Court, through Justice Leonen, held that:
"In Article 355, the associated words are "writing," "printing," "lithography," "engraving," "radio," "phonograph," "painting," "theatrical exhibition," and "cinematographic exhibition," clearly excluding "computer systems which may be derived in the future added in Sec. 4(c) (4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
"If it were true that Art. 355 of the RPC already includes libel made through computer systems, then Congress had no need to legislate the Cybercrime Prevention Act for the latter provisions will be superfluous.
"That Congress had to legislate Art. 4(c)(4) means that libel done through computer systems, i.e. cyber libel, is an additional means of committing a libel, punishable only under the Cybercrime Prevention Act."
It concluded that any libelous Facebook post may only be punished under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, not Article 355 of the RPC.
(Penalosa v. Ocampo, April 26, 2023)
