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The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the unilateral imposition of reduced workdays and worker rotation scheme amounts t...
29/05/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the unilateral imposition of reduced workdays and worker rotation scheme amounts to constructive dismissal.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the SC En Banc found a textile manufacturing company liable for constructively dismissing seven of its production workers after reducing their six-day workweek to only two to three days and implementing a work rotation plan without their consent.

Fiber Textile Manufacturing Corp. (FMC) hired the petitioners in 2017 as production workers. Initially working six days a week, their schedules were later reduced to only two to three days a week due to the company’s alleged lack of raw materials.

FMC claimed that they held a meeting with production supervisors and staff to discuss the shortage of raw materials and the implementation of a work rotation schedule. During the meeting, the workers reportedly agreed to the temporary work rotation plan.

The workers filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, claiming that they were effectively dismissed when they were told not to return to work.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the workers, but the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals upheld FMC’s actions as a valid exercise of management prerogative.

The SC disagreed. It emphasized that while employers may adopt flexible work arrangements during economic difficulties or national emergencies, these arrangements must comply with the requirements set out in Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Department Advisory No. 2, Series of 2009.

The SC explained that employers must first consult affected employees and obtain the voluntary support of the majority of workers. Employers must also notify the DOLE before implementing the arrangement and prove that the company is suffering from actual or reasonably imminent economic difficulties.

In this case, the SC held that FMC failed to prove that the workers voluntarily agreed to the reduced workdays and worker rotation scheme. The Court ruled that informing employees of the arrangement does not equate to securing their consent.

FMC also failed to notify the DOLE before implementation and failed to prove that it was suffering from actual or imminent economic difficulties that would justify the reduction of workdays.

The SC emphasized that while employers may adopt flexible work arrangements to prevent business losses, such measures must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of workers.

FMC’s unlawful reduction of workdays amounted to constructive dismissal because it resulted in diminished salaries, making continued employment unreasonable for the workers.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen stressed that the requirement of mutual consent in flexible work arrangements originates from the consensual nature of employment contracts, such that employers cannot unilaterally alter work schedules in a manner that diminishes employees’ pay.

In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa agreed that FMC remained liable for constructive dismissal for failing to prove that the workers voluntarily agreed to the reduced workdays and work rotation plan. However, he emphasized that FMC had no raw materials to work with for several months, significantly affecting production operations. Thus, he stated that FMC faced a reasonably imminent economic difficulty that could justify the temporary adoption of flexible work arrangements. (Courtesy of the SC Office of the Spokesperson)

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166345.
Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166344.

Originally Published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office on May 19, 2026.

LEGAL MIND MONDAY | Episode 10 ⚖️ADULTERY VS. CONCUBINAGE:Why is it generally harder for a wife to sue her cheating husb...
25/05/2026

LEGAL MIND MONDAY | Episode 10 ⚖️

ADULTERY VS. CONCUBINAGE:

Why is it generally harder for a wife to sue her cheating husband than it is for a husband to sue his cheating wife? Under the Revised Penal Code, the bar for "Concubinage" is set much higher than "Adultery."

Adultery (Wife): The husband needs proof of only a single act of infidelity between the wife and the paramour. No living together or public scandal required.

Concubinage (Husband): The wife needs proof of strict conditions, either keeping the mistress in the conjugal home, living together as husband and wife elsewhere, or having s*x under "scandalous circumstances."

Why the unequal treatment? Historically, lawmakers feared that a wife's infidelity could introduce a child of another man into the family estate, or what the law called a "spurious heir."

Where CONCUBINAGE cannot be proven, other legal remedies may still be available to the wife depending on the circumstances of the case. And that is for our next Legal Monday.

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed its previous ruling that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time it is discove...
27/04/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed its previous ruling that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time it is discovered, holding that “cyber libel” is not a new crime but a form of “libel” under Art. 355 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 that is committed through a computer system or other similar means.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

In December 2020, Cotabato Second District Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez filed a cyber libel complaint with the prosecutor against Causing related to Facebook posts accusing Hernandez of pocketing over PHP 200 million in relief goods for Marawi victims. Hernandez stated he discovered the posts on February 4 and April 29, 2019.

Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Causing in May 2021. He filed a motion to quash the Informations, arguing that they were already time-barred under the RPC because more than one year had passed since the posts were uploaded.

The RTC denied the motion, ruling that cyber libel prescribes in 12 years under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵.

Causing appealed to the SC, which clarified that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year from the date of discovery, consistent with traditional libel under the RPC. The Court rejected Causing’s motion to quash the Informations due to insufficient proof that the offense had already prescribed, highlighting that he can present evidence during the trial at the RTC.

Both the OSG and Causing filed separate partial motions for reconsideration.

The OSG argued that the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel under the RPC should not apply to cyber libel. Instead, it should be 15 years under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, as previously decided by the Supreme Court through an unsigned resolution in Tolentino v. People.

Causing, on the other hand, argued that the prescription for cyber libel should start from the publication date rather than from discovery. He contended that online posts are more widespread than traditional forms of publication. If the discovery rule is applied, cyber libel charges could be filed several years after the post was made, as long as the offended party discovered it later.

The SC rejected both arguments.

Under the RPC, written libel prescribes in one year. There is no law that excludes cyber libel from this one-year period, and Congress has consistently treated libel as having a shorter prescriptive period than other crimes, even when penalties are increased.

The SC reiterated that cyber libel is not a separate crime, but rather libel committed through a computer system. The fact that the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposes a higher penalty for cyber libel does not imply that its prescriptive period should be extended beyond that of traditional libel.

The SC added that when laws on the prescription of crimes are unclear, they must be interpreted in favor of the accused. Since the RPC sets a one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel, it prevails over the 15-year period set in the case of Tolentino v. People, which is an unsigned resolution.

The SC also affirmed that prescription begins upon discovery of the offense, not upon publication. The law clearly states that prescription runs from the time the crime is discovered by the offended party or the authorities.

Seven other Justices joined Justice Inting in the majority. They are:
• Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo
• Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
• Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
• Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
• Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan
• Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez
• Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen argued that the one-year prescription period should apply only to libel cases against private individuals. He added that libel against public figures should be decriminalized, as punishing comments and criticisms directed at public officials discourages free and uninhibited discussion about how those in public office conduct themselves.

In his Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa stressed that the prescriptive period for libel has always been fixed at one or two years, never at 10 or more years.

Meanwhile, six other Justices joined Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. in his dissent:
• Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando
• Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
• Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario
• Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez
• Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
• Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva

In his Concurring and Dissenting opinion, Justice Kho, Jr. agreed with the majority that unsigned resolutions do not lay down doctrines of law but disagreed on the prescriptive period for cyber libel. Since cyber libel is committed through computer systems and is punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, it is a separate crime from libel and the one-year prescriptive period for libel does not apply.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163671

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163636

Originally Published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office on April 20, 2026.

Today, we celebrate another year of your life and the invaluable presence you bring to our team. ✨ Wishing you a birthda...
23/04/2026

Today, we celebrate another year of your life and the invaluable presence you bring to our team. ✨ Wishing you a birthday filled with joy, gratitude, and continued success.

Happy Birthday, Kaye Renelle! From your Calamba Law Family ❤️

08/04/2026

𝑨 𝒏𝒆𝒘 𝒔𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒆, 𝒂 𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒘𝒆𝒅 𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒆 ✨

Today, we celebrated the office dedication of Calamba Law Firm—committed to service, integrity, and justice.

This milestone marks another step forward in our continued commitment to delivering legal services with excellence and professionalism.

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed the validity of DOJ Circular No. 15, which elevates the standard of proof in prelimi...
30/03/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed the validity of DOJ Circular No. 15, which elevates the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

Previously, prosecutors relied on probable cause to determine whether to file charges. Under the above-mentioned circular, the required standard is now prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction—a stricter threshold aimed at ensuring that only well-founded cases proceed to court.

The SC upheld this change, recognizing the Department of Justice’s authority to refine prosecutorial standards in pursuit of fairness, efficiency, and the protection of accused persons from weak or baseless charges.

This development marks a significant shift in criminal procedure, emphasizing stronger evidentiary foundations before initiating full-blown prosecutions.

Read the full text of DOJ Circular No. 15 at
https://www.doj.gov.ph/files/2024/DC_2024/DC%2015%20series%20of%202024.pdf

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Originally Published by the Supreme Court Public Information Office on March 11, 2026.

LEGAL MIND MONDAY | Episode 9 ⚖️Did you know that not all arrests require a warrant?While the general rule is that arres...
09/03/2026

LEGAL MIND MONDAY | Episode 9 ⚖️

Did you know that not all arrests require a warrant?

While the general rule is that arrests must be made pursuant to a warrant, the Rules of Court recognize certain exceptions. A warrantless arrest may be lawful in the following instances:

1. When a crime is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
2. When an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed it; and
3. When the person to be arrested has escaped from jail or detention.

Understanding these exceptions is essential in safeguarding both public order and constitutional rights.

Here’s to the strong, fearless, and inspiring women who continue to shape history. Happy Women’s History Month! 🌸
06/03/2026

Here’s to the strong, fearless, and inspiring women who continue to shape history. Happy Women’s History Month! 🌸

We proudly celebrate our very own 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐲. 𝐀𝐧𝐝𝐫𝐞𝐚 𝐆𝐚𝐲𝐥𝐞 𝐁𝐞𝐧𝐢𝐬𝐚𝐧𝐨, 𝑻𝒐𝒑 5 𝒐𝒇 𝑩𝒂𝒕𝒄𝒉 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒌𝒂𝒕𝒊 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍 ...
26/02/2026

We proudly celebrate our very own 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐲. 𝐀𝐧𝐝𝐫𝐞𝐚 𝐆𝐚𝐲𝐥𝐞 𝐁𝐞𝐧𝐢𝐬𝐚𝐧𝐨, 𝑻𝒐𝒑 5 𝒐𝒇 𝑩𝒂𝒕𝒄𝒉 𝑻𝒉𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒐𝒇 𝑴𝒂𝒌𝒂𝒕𝒊 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍 𝒐𝒇 𝑳𝒂𝒘, on the occasion of her testimonial dinner. ✨

This moment is a testament to your hard work, perseverance, and dedication—now a full-fledged lawyer, ready to make your mark in the legal profession! ⚖️

Congratulations, Atty. Benisano, from your Calamba Law Family! 💛

We are seeking a Senior Associate (Litigation) with at least five (5) years of relevant litigation experience to join ou...
25/02/2026

We are seeking a Senior Associate (Litigation) with at least five (5) years of relevant litigation experience to join our growing team.

Qualifications:
1. Member in good standing of the Philippine Bar
2. Strong litigation, research, and drafting skills
3. Capable of independently handling hearings and court appearances
4. Professional, diligent, and team-oriented
Interested applicants may send their CV to: [email protected]
Subject: Application – Senior Associate (Litigation)

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