Atty. Rene A. Ballo, CPA

19/02/2026

Josef vs. Ursua
G.R. No. 267469
February 05, 2025

Facts.

Jennifer C. Josef and Evalyn G. Ursua lived together as homosexual couple. During their relationship, they able to acquire a real property. Ursua acknowedged in a document recognizing 50% share of Josef. However, Ursua emphasized that the Acknowledgment stated that Josef's interest over the property was subject to the determination of the actual percentage of interest based on records and documents. However, records were bereft of proof that Josef contributed to the acquisition of the subject property.

Issue.

Whether Josef is entitled to a share of the real property.

Ruling.

Yes, Josef is entitled to a share of the real property. Ursua is estopped to question the contribution of Josef having already acknowledged the contribution of Josef. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, Josef is entitled to a 50% share of the real property.

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My personal view and opinion.

First, I agree with the interpretation of the SC that homosexual couples can take shelter under Article 148 of the Family Code. It is not incorporated in the FC for the exclusive use of heterosexual couples.

Second, It appears from the close reading of the case, the basis of the SC in coming up with a conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to a 50% share is the admission by the respondent in the Acknowledgment that the petitioner actually contributed to the acquisition of the subject real property. It just so happened that the agreement of the parties in this case provides for an equal share or 50%. But for proper understanding and application of Article 148 of the FC, it is crucial to cross upon the following questions:

1.) How about if there was no admission by a party and a party was able to prove less or more than 50% contribution, how much is a party entitled to the property?
2.) How about if only the fact of actual contribution is proven with amount actually contributed is undetermined, how much is a party entitled to the property?

To answer the above questions, it is necessary to examine closely Article 148 of the FC.

"Article 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

###xx."

As can be clearly understood from the above provision, it is clear that the parties are entitled only to a proportionate share of their actual contribution. This is clearly stated in a phrase "shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions". Therefore, using this provision, we can already answer question number 1. If there is proof of actual amount of contribution, then a party is entitled to the extent of an actual contribution. So a sharing could be 10% for one party and 90% to the other or on any percentage of share between parties provided there is proof actual contribution and the contribution is capable of quantification for the determination of proportionate share over the property.

Now, the second sentence of the same paragraph is somewhat controversial as it may be interpreted differently. My humble interpretation of the sentence "In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal." is that when there is proof of common ownership of the property but the parties could not agree or determine their respective percentage of share, the provision will govern as a matter of presumption by provision of law.

Thus, the answer to question number 2 is that when the parties agree of a common ownership or an existence of it is proven but the parties could not agree and/or determine what percentage they actually contributed to the property as basis of the determination of their proportionate share, the law presumes the contribution to be on equal share.

So, my humble conclusion is this: Article 148 of the FC provides for an actual proportionate share based on actual contribution and in case of incapability of determining the actual contribution as basis of proportionate share, only then the presumption of equal share arises.

Proof of actual contribution however may be sourced from a documentary evidence showing expenses, and of an agreement between the parties which may contain admissions that will trigger operation of the doctrine of estoppel as in the case above.

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30/01/2026

Nacague vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.
G.R. NO. 172589
AUGUST 08, 2010

Facts.

Respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio Lines) hired Nacague as "hepe de viaje" or the representative of Sulpicio Lines on board its vessel M/V Princess of the World (the ship). Sulpicio Lines sent a notice of investigation to Nacague informing him of the charges against him for use of illegal drugs and threatening a co-employee.

When the ship docked in the port of Manila, some crew members of the ship, together with Nacague, were subjected to a random drug test. The result of the random drug test revealed that Nacague was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Sulpicio Lines subjected Nacague to a formal investigation. Nacague denied using illegal drugs. Nacague went to Chong Hua Hospital in Cebu City to undergo a voluntary drug test. The drug test with Chong Hua Hospital yielded a negative result. Nacague submitted this test result to Sulpicio Lines. Sulpicio Lines sent a memorandum to Nacague terminating him from the service.

Feeling aggrieved, Nacague filed a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and for reinstatement with backwages.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Nacague and declared that Sulpicio Lines illegally dismissed Nacague. The termination of employment of employees found positive for using illegal drugs should not be exercised indiscriminately and thoughtlessly. The Labor Arbiter agreed with Nacague that the drug test result from S.M. Lazo Clinic was questionable because the clinic is not accredited by the Dangerous Drug Board and not under its supervision. The Labor Arbiter gave more weight to the drug test performed by Chong Hua Hospital because it was accredited by the Dangerous Drug Board. The Labor Arbiter said that doubts must be resolved in favor of the employee. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that reinstatement is no longer viable due to the strained relations between Nacague and Sulpicio Lines and, thus, awarded separation pay to Nacague. Sulpicio Lines appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC found Nacague guilty of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence The Sulpicio Lines' Code of Conduct[16] specified that the penalty for the use and illegal possession of prohibited drugs is dismissal. The NLRC also said that there is a presumption that S.M. Lazo Clinic is an accredited drug testing center and that it was incumbent upon Nacague to show otherwise.
Nacague filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals declared that the evidence presented by Sulpicio Lines was sufficient to justify the conclusion that Nacague committed serious misconduct and a breach of trust and confidence warranting his dismissal from employment. The Court of Appeals agreed with the NLRC that Nacague failed to prove his allegation that S.M. Lazo Clinic lacks accreditation. On the procedural requirements, the Court of Appeals found that Sulpicio Lines complied with the twin-notice requirements and conducted a formal hearing.

Issue.

Whether Nacague was illegally dismissed.

Ruling.

Yes, Nacague was illegally dismissed.

Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. The Labor Arbiter was correct in pointing out that the lack of accreditation of S.M. Lazo Clinic made its drug test results doubtful. Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165 provides that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers. Moreover, Section 36 also prescribes that drug testing shall consist of both the screening test and the confirmatory test.

When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. Nacague's reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations thus separation pay should instead be granted.

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13/01/2026

Andrie Nicholette Sagarino vs. Toplis Solutions Inc.
G.R. No. 267379
October 15, 2025

Facts.

Andrie, while on a probationary period of employment by Toplis Solutions Inc., a legitimate independent contractor, was placed on a floating status for not having qualified with the standard performance evaluation. She filed a case for constructive dismissal, arguing that her evaluation was tampered with and that there was no reasonable standard set for the regularization of employment. She was issued later with a general return-to-work order by Toplis but refused to heed it.

Issue.

Whether Andrie was constructively dismissed.

Ruling.

Yes, Andrie was constructively dismissed. Under the Labor Code, probationary employees enjoy tenure security. They can only be dismissed on just and authorized causes or when they fail to qualify the performance standard, which standard must be reasonable and fully communicated to the probationary employee. Here, Andrie was placed on a floating status for her alleged failure to pass the performance evaluation. However, there was no reasonable standard established to gauge her performance.

On the other hand, while there was a return-to-work order issued by TOPLIS, the said order was general and not specific. In several labor cases, a general return-to-work order is insufficient. The order must be specific, that is, to report to a particular entity-client of the employer.

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07/01/2026

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02/01/2026

21/12/2025

Sarigumba vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 263615
August 19, 2025

On December 20, 2014, the Law Department of the CFU of the COMELEC filed a motu proprio Complaint against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 100 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7166, in relation to Section 262 of the same Code.

On July 27, 2021, the COMELEC Law Department found
probable cause to hold petitioner for trial and recommended the filing of an Information against him. On July· 28, 2021, the COMELEC En Banc adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to the SC alleging inordinate delay in the disposition of the case against the respondent. The respondent contended that there is no delay as the reckoning point was the submission by the petitioner of his counter-affidavit and other evidence. Petitioner never submitted a counter-affidavit. The COMELEC notes that petitioner submitted an Explanation dated November 27, 2014 to the head of the CFU regarding his campaign expenditures. However, said Explanation is not the counter-affidavit contemplated by Rule 3, Section 8 of the CO~LEC Rules of Procedure.

Issue.

Whether there was inordinate delay in the disposition of the case.

Ruling.

Yes, there was inordinate delay in the disposition of the case. Based on the timeline of the proceedings before the COMELEC, petitioner's preliminary investigation and resolution of the Complaint before the COMELEC lasted from December 20, 2014 until July 28, 2021 or six years and over seven months from the date the motu proprio Complaint was filed. Notably, it took the COMELEC six years and over one month from the time that petitioner was ordered to file his counter-affidavit through the Order dated June 11, 2015 to resolve the motu proprio Complaint against petitioner.

The COMELEC's contention that the period to resolve the case has never began to run has no merit.

Rule 34, Section 8 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not be
read in isolation but must be read together with Rule 34, Section 6 of the same rules. The import of the two provisions is that the failure of a respondent to file a counter-affidavit does not give the COMELEC the unbridled license to indefinitely toll or delay the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the rendition of a resolution on the case.

Notably, Rule 34, Section 8 provides that the preliminary investigation must be terminated within 20 days after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and the resolution thereof shall be made within five days thereafter. On the other hand, Rule 34, Section 6 provides that if the respondent does not submit counter-affidavits within the 10-day period from receipt of the subpoena requiring him to do so, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.

Harmonizing Sections 6 and 8 of Rule 34, in the event of failure to file a counter-affidavit, the 20-day period within which to conclude the preliminary investigation must be counted from the time that the period to file the counter-affidavit lapsed without one being filed.

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20/12/2025

Maynilad Water Supervisors Association vs. Maynilad Water Services
G.R. No. 198935, November 27, 2013

Facts

Petitioner Maynilad Water Supervisors Association (MWSA) is an association composed of former supervisory employees of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). These employees claim that during their employment with MWSS, they were receiving a monthly cost of living allowance (COLA) equivalent to 40% of their basic pay.

The payment of these allowances and other additional compensation, including the COLA were, however, discontinued without qualification effective 1 November 1989 when the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (CCC No. 10).

In 1997, MWSS was privatized and part of it, MWSS West, was acquired by Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (Maynilad). Some of the employees of MWSS, which included members of MWSA, were absorbed by Maynilad subject to the terms and conditions of a Concession Agreement. The payment of COLA was not among those listed as benefits.

In 1998, the Supreme Court promulgated a Decision declaring DBM CCC No.10 ineffective for failure to comply with the publication requirement. Consequently, MWSS partially released the COLA payments for its employees, including members of MWSA, covering the years 1989 to 1997, and up to year 1999 for its retained employees.

In 2002, MWSA filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter praying for the payment of their COLA from the year 1997, the time its members were absorbed by Maynilad, up to the present. MWSA argued that since DBM CCC No. 10 was rendered ineffective, the COLA should be paid as part of the benefits enjoyed by their members at the time of their separation from MWSS, and which should form part of their salaries and benefits with Maynilad.

The Labor Arbiter granted MWSA's claim and directed Maynilad to pay the COLA . The NLRC granted Maynilad's motion and reversed on appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The CA Ninth Division annulled and set aside the decision of the NLRC. It thus reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

However, upon Motion for Reconsideration, the CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE its own decision, and the Resolution of the NLRC are AFFIRMED, and are thus REINSTATED.

ISSUE.

Whether Maynilad bound itself under the Concession Agreement to pay the COLA of the employees it absorbed from MWSS.

RULING.

No, Maynilad is not bound itself under the Concession Agreement to pay the COLA of the employees it absorbed from MWSS. A careful review of the Concession Agreement led us to conclude that both MWSS and Maynilad never intended to include COLA as one of the benefits to be granted to the absorbed employees.

It is clear from the agreement that COLA is not among the benefits to be received by the absorbed employees. Contrary to the contention of MWSA, the declaration by the Court of the ineffectiveness of DBM CCC No. 10 due to its non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, did not give rise to the employee's right to demand payment of the subject benefit from Maynilad.

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29/11/2025

Benjie Y. Tandayag vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., and/or Gary M. Castillo
G.R. No. 256183
May 19, 2025

Facts.

In 2015, Tandayag was hired as a laundry steward by Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation for its foreign principal Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd.. While onboard the vessel Caribbean Princess in 2016, Tandayag experienced extreme pain on his left knee.

After several medical examinations, he filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board a complaint for payment of total and permanent disability benefits, with claims for damages and attorney's fees, against respondents. The Board referred the case to the Office of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (Panel), which, on December 29, 2017, decided in favor of Tandayag. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals held that the Panel did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of Tandayag's complaint. Under Article 274 of the Labor Code, voluntary arbitrators or panels of voluntary arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over "the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.".

Based on the terms of Tandayag's employment contract with respondents, there was no collective bargaining agreement between the parties; Tandayag also failed to show proof that such an agreement existed. The case also did not involve any interpretations or enforcements of company personnel policies.

Issue.

Whether or not the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators had jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling.

The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators had no jurisdiction over the case. Section 10 of R.A. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act, in relation to Articles 217 ( c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Since there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement, the said provisions of law along with the jurisprudences interpreting it , are inapplicable.

The fact that there was existence of a submission agreement made by the parties did not vests the Panel jurisdiction since it is clear from the records that the respondents consistently contested and objected to the voluntary arbitrator's jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings. Therefore, it is the labor arbiter that has jurisdiction over the case as provided under Article 224 (227) of the Labor Code.

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23/11/2025

Pascua vs. Bankwise, Inc. and Phil. Veterans Bank
G.R. No. 191460
January 31, 2018

Facts.

Pascua was employed by Bankwise as its Executive Vice President for Marketing. Philippine Veterans Bank purchased Bankwise's entire outstanding capital stock. Pascua was reassigned to a Special Accounts Unit but his duties, functions, and responsibilities were not clearly delineated or defined. He was informed by Roberto A. Buhain (Buhain), President of Bankwise, that as part of the merger or trade-off agreement with Philippine Veterans Bank, he should tender his resignation. Buhain assured Pascua that he would be paid all his money claims during this transition. Instead of tendering his resignation, Pascua wrote a letter, wherein he pleaded, among others, that he stay in office until the end of the year.

Seeing as Pascua had yet to submit his resignation, Vicente Campa (Campa), a director of Bankwise, told him that it was imperative that he submit his resignation and assured his continued service with Philippine Veterans Bank. Based on Campa's assurance, Pascua tendered his resignation.

Due to the inaction of Philippine Veterans Bank and Bankwise, Pascua sent Buhain, demanding the early settlement of his money claim. The demand was not heeded. Thus, Pascua filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay, retirement benefits, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against Bankwise and Philippine Veterans Bank.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint on the ground that Pascua had voluntarily resigned. The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter's findings and held that Pascua was constructively dismissed.

The Court of Appeals found that Pascua was constructively dismissed but held that only Bankwise should be made liable to Pascua for his money claims.

Issue.

Whether or not Pascua was constructively dismissed.

Ruling.

Pascua was not constructively dismissed. His resignation letter was unconditional. It contained no reservations that it was premised on his subsequent claim for severance pay and other benefits. His resignation was also accepted by his employers. Thus, he is not considered to have been constructively dismissed. An employee who voluntarily resigns is not entitled to separation pay unless it was previously stipulated in the employment contract or has become established company policy or practice.

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31/10/2025

Heirs of Cipriano vs. Transco
G.R. No. 255113
August 06, 2025

Facts.

Heirs of Cipriano filed a Complaint for Inverse Condemnation Proceeding or Claim for Just Compensation against National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) as the successor of electrical transmission functions of the National Power Corporation over the use of the two lots over which high-tension transmission lines were constructed. Trasco argued that just compensation must be reckoned at the time of the taking. RTC grant the payment of just compensation reckoned at the time of the filing of the complaint. CA reversed the RTC's decision and ruled that just compensation must be reckoned from the time of taking.

Issue.

Whether just compensation is reckoned at the time of taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint.

Ruling.

Just compensation is reckoned at the time of taking as there was no special circumstances that warrants exception to the general rule. The transmission lines are visible such that petitioners could not have not known their construction. However, the just compensation shall be computed in accordance with the present value formula.

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27/10/2025

Is Article 280 (now 295) of the Labor Code which defines regular employment as work that is necessary or desirable in the employer's business, regardless of the agreement between the parties, can be used as a criterion to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship?

No, in the recent case of Villaruel (G.R. 220087, dated August 11, 2025), the SC held that Article 280 (now 295) of the Labor Code which defines regular employment as work that is necessary or desirable in the employer's business, regardless of the agreement between the parties, cannot be used as a criterion to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. It merely distinguishes between two kinds of employees, i.e., regular employees and casual employees, for purposes of determining the
right of an employee to certain benefits, to join or form a union, or to security of tenure. It does not apply where the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute.

What governs the determination of employer-employee relationship is the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the employer's power to select and engage the employee, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power of dismissal, and (4) the power of control over the employee's conduct, with the power of control being the most crucial factor.

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25/10/2025

Is the principal offender in a crime of coup d'etat should be an active military or a police officer?

No, it is not necessary that the principal offender in a crime of coup d'etat is an active military or a police officer. Under Article 134-A of the RPC, the crime of coup d'etat may also be committed by a person or persons holding any public office or employment.

What is the purpose of the attack in a crime of coup d'etat?

The purpose is to seize or diminish State power. Therefore, it must be directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or military camp or installation, communication networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power.