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Solibaga Law Office, 617 Ground Floor, CCM Bldg. , J. Navarro Street, Ormoc City (2026)

27/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified the rules on serving notices of dishonor in cases involving Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘉𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬 𝘓𝘢𝘸. The SC formally recognized electronic service as a valid mode of serving notice of dishonor, while requiring safeguards to ensure that service can be reliably proven in court.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 affirmed the conviction of spouses Arnel and Marivic Carlos for six counts of violating BP 22.

The spouses issued six checks to respondent Tire Star, Inc. as payment for car tires. All six checks were dishonored by the bank as the account they were drawn from had been closed.

The prosecution presented evidence that Tire Star’s messenger personally attempted to serve the notice of dishonor at the spouses’ office, and that the spouses refused to receive it, instructed an employee instead to sign for it.

The spouses then claimed before the SC that they should be acquitted because they were not properly served with a notice of dishonor.

The SC rejected the spouses’ argument, emphasizing that an accused cannot defeat a BP 22 prosecution simply by denying receipt of the notice or refusing to accept it. Otherwise, issuers could easily evade liability by avoiding service.

To promote uniformity and reduce disputes, the SC clarified the acceptable modes of serving notices of dishonor.

𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 remains the preferred mode. The notice may be delivered directly to the issuer or, in the case of a business, to an authorized representative. If the issuer cannot be served at the office, the notice may be left at the issuer’s residence with an adult resident between 8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M.

The person serving the notice must execute an affidavit stating when, where, and how service was made. When practicable, service should be documented through photographs or video recordings, subject to proper authentication in court.

If personal service is not practicable, the notice of dishonor may be sent by 𝗿𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹, or where registry service is unavailable, by 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹. The person serving the notice must likewise execute an affidavit explaining why personal service could not be made and attach the supporting postal documents.

The SC also recognized 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗰 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲, ruling that a notice of dishonor may now be served through email as a primary mode of service when the issuer previously provided their email address. Electronic service may likewise be used through platforms such as 𝘝𝘪𝘣𝘦𝘳, 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘔𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳, or similar applications, provided it can be verified that the electronic account belongs to the issuer.

Electronic service may also be used when the issuer refuses to receive the notice, avoids service, or when personal service is otherwise impracticable. In such cases, the electronic notice must be sent within 24 hours after the final unsuccessful attempt at personal service and must state the dates and details of those failed attempts.

The sender must also execute an affidavit and preserve supporting evidence, such as screenshots, messages, delivery or read receipts, or chat histories., stressing that a simple denial of receipt is not enough to invalidate electronic service.

In all instances, to successfully dispute service, the issuer must show that it was physically impossible to have received the notice at the time and place it was served.

The spouses were fined a total of PHP 609,972.58 for the six BP 22 violations, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment. They were also ordered to pay Tire Star the same amount, plus interest.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed that electronic service should not merely be a substitute but a primary mode of service consistent with contemporary means of communication and the Judiciary’s ongoing digital reforms.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172159.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171528.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171527.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

17/08/2026

The has acquitted a woman of bigamy, ruling that a prior marriage that was void from the beginning (𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘣 𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰) may be raised as a defense even without a prior judicial declaration of nullity.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Pampanga and the Court of Appeals (CA), which had found Ma. Fe Imelda Lapira guilty of bigamy.

Lapira faced a bigamy charge under Article 349 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 for marrying Jimmy Fariscal while still married to Takahiko Sato as evidenced by a marriage certificate from the Office of the Civil Registrar General.

During trial, Lapira argued that her marriage to Sato was void because no ceremony took place and no marriage license had been issued, both of which were required for validity. The Local Civil Registrar confirmed that there was no record of the application for a marriage license for Lapira and Sato.

In acquitting Lapira, the SC applied its ruling in the 2021 case of 𝘗𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘥𝘰 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, which held that an accused in a bigamy case may directly argue that a previous marriage is void as a defense, even without a prior court declaration.

The SC explained that one of the essential elements of bigamy is the existence of a valid prior marriage. If the first marriage was void from the beginning, that element is absent.

In this case, the certification from the Local Civil Registrar sufficiently proved that no marriage license was issued to Lapira and Sato. This certification was enough to counter the presumption of the marriage certificate’s validity.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171178.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165698.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

07/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified that a Precautionary Hold Departure Order (PHDO) may be issued only in cases involving crimes punishable by a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment, or when the respondent is a foreigner, regardless of the penalty.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that a PHDO cannot be maintained when the crime under investigation does not meet these requirements.

The case arose from a complaint for 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 and violation of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 22 (BP 22) filed against petitioner Faustine Feliz Abad (Abad) in connection with her purchase of airline tickets from respondent GHT Travel and Tours (GHT).

The City Prosecutor found probable cause to charge Abad with two counts of violation of BP 22, but found insufficient evidence to charge her with 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢. Two Informations for BP 22 were then filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.

The prosecution also sought a PHDO against Abad with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming that she was a flight risk. The RTC granted the request.

Abad later sought to have the PHDO lifted. The RTC denied her request, noting, among others, that GHT had appealed the dismissal of the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge to the Secretary of Justice and that Abad was a permanent resident of the United States.

Ruling that the PHDO should have been lifted, the SC cited the Rule on PHDO that it issued on August 7, 2018, which provides that a PHDO may be issued while a criminal complaint is undergoing preliminary investigation when the crime involved carries a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment. It may also be issued against a foreigner regardless of the penalty.

The SC explained that the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge, which could have carried a penalty exceeding six years and one day, was dismissed for lack of probable cause. The only charges filed against Abad were two counts of BP 22 violations, each punishable by imprisonment of 30 days to one year.

Thus, the BP 22 charges did not meet the penalty requirement for the issuance of a PHDO.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170320.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165691.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

21/07/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that the loss or non-presentation of ransom money in court does not prevent a conviction for kidnapping for ransom, so long as the prosecution is able to prove that ransom was demanded for the victim’s release.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division affirmed the conviction of Jose Olbato, PO3 Clayton Patingan, and others (the accused), except for SPO4 Romeo Ayson who died during the pendency of the appeal, for kidnapping for ransom.

PO3 Patingan and SPO4 Ayson flagged Genevieve Ong Sy (Sy) while she was on board her car and, together with the other accused, forcibly took her and detained her in a house. They demanded PHP 50 million from her father in exchange for her release. After negotiations, the amount was reduced to PHP 500,000.

Acting under police surveillance, Sy’s family driver delivered marked ransom money to the accused. The police then rescued Sy, arrested the accused, and recovered the marked money.

The Regional Trial Court found that the accused worked together to kidnap and detain Sy for ransom. It rejected their defenses of denial and alibi. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Before the SC, the accused argued that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to present the ransom money in court after it was allegedly lost while in police custody.

The SC disagreed and explained that kidnapping for ransom is committed when a private individual illegally kidnaps, detains, or deprives another of liberty for the purpose of demanding ransom.

The SC stressed that actual payment or receipt of the ransom money is not important to prove the crime.

In this case, the SC found that the prosecution proved that ransom was demanded, negotiated, and delivered. Sy’s father testified that the kidnappers called him repeatedly, demanding PHP 50 million for his daughter’s release, later reducing the amount to PHP 500,000 after negotiations. Evidence also showed that the ransom money was delivered and received during the police operation.

The SC emphasized that the failure to present the ransom money in court did not disprove that ransom had been demanded and paid since the evidence clearly established both.

The accused were sentenced to 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘦𝘵𝘶𝘢 or up to 40 years in prison. They were also ordered to pay the victim PHP 300,000 in civil indemnity and damages.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169311

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/276833-people-of-the-philippines-vs-jose-olbato-y-aurella-et-al/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

07/05/2026

The has disbarred a lawyer for using a false Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance number in his pleadings.

In a 𝘗𝘦𝘳 𝘊𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘮 Decision, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 disbarred Atty. Jose R. Hidalgo (Atty. Hidalgo) for dishonest conduct in violation of the 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 (𝘊𝘗𝘙𝘈).

Atty. Hidalgo represented the defendant in a malicious prosecution case pending before Branch 153, Regional Trial Court, Biñan City. In the answer he filed for his client, Atty. Hidalgo included his MCLE compliance number, which is required for lawyers.

The plaintiff's lawyer filed a motion to expunge Atty. Hidalgo's answer from the records, claiming that he did not actually comply with the MCLE requirements. Attached to the motion was a Certification from the MCLE Office stating that Atty. Hidalgo had not complied from the first compliance period up to the present.

In ordering the disbarment of Atty. Hidalgo, the SC emphasized that Canon II of the 𝘊𝘗𝘙𝘈 requires lawyers to act with propriety and maintain the appearance of propriety in personal and professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and courtesy, and uphold the dignity of the legal profession consistent with the highest standards of ethical behavior.

Lawyers are also required under Canon III to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for laws and legal processes.

The SC held that Atty. Hidalgo violated these Canons, stating that his act of indicating false information in the pleadings he filed “constitutes bad faith and dishonesty, and shows blatant disrespect of the courts and its rules.”

The SC also fined Atty. Hidalgo PHP 35,000 for willful disobedience, a less serious offense, for ignoring the IBP's order when he did not submit an answer and a verified position paper.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164745.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164728.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution.

29/04/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session today, April 29, 2026, dismissed the petition for mandamus filed by Catalino Aldea Generillo, Jr., which sought to compel the Senate to immediately convene as an impeachment court to try the charges against Vice President Sara Duterte.

In a 14-0-1 Decision written by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, the SC held that mandamus, which is meant to enforce a clear legal duty, was not the proper remedy. It ruled that the Senate’s actions within its sphere cannot be revised or controlled by the judicial department through mandamus. As a co-equal constitutional body, the Senate’s exercise of its duties is beyond the SC’s power of review, except in cases of grave abuse of discretion.

However, specifically for this case and in the interest of equity, the SC treated the petition as one for certiorari and proceeded to determine whether the Senate acted unlawfully or abused its discretion when it did not convene immediately as an impeachment court during its session break.

Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the SC found that the Senate acted on the impeachment complaint in a timely manner.

While the Constitution requires the House of Representatives to act within a certain number of session days on an impeachment complaint, it does not specify a fixed timeframe for the Senate to start an impeachment trial. It simply provides that the trial “shall forthwith proceed,” leaving the timing to the Senate’s discretion.

The SC clarified that the term “forthwith” in Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution means within a reasonable time, which may be longer or shorter, depending on the circumstances of each case. This allows the Senate to make the necessary preparations to convene as an impeachment court.

While the Constitution does not set an exact date for the trial, the Senate must avoid undue delay to uphold the principle that public officers must at all times be accountable to the people.

The SC considered the petition moot because the Senate had begun impeachment preparations, and the Articles of Impeachment against Vice President Duterte were nullified by the SC’s July 25, 2025 Decision and January 28, 2026 Resolution in Duterte v. House of Representatives. A case is moot when subsequent events remove any issues, making court rulings unnecessary. Since no Articles of Impeachment remained, the SC had no reason to order the Senate to convene as an impeachment court.

Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen concurred only in the result, that the petition was moot. However he was of the position that the impeachment court should have been convened immediately and that the impeachment court—not merely the Senate President—should have taken charge of organizing that court. (Updated as of April 29, 2026, 5:30 p.m.)

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa took no part.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164510

The full text of the Decision will be uploaded to the SC website once available.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy.

22/04/2026

HOW THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES VOTED ON THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR CYBER LIBEL

G.R. No. 258524 (Berteni Cataluña Causing vs. People of the Philippines, et al.)

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General.

The SC, by an 8-7 vote, held that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is governed by the same provision under the Revised Penal Code on written libel.

In this , see how the Justices voted 8-7 in favor of declaring a one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel.

For more, read the press release and full text of the Decision, and the opinions of the Justices:

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163671

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163636

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163642

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-admin/post.php?p=163650

Read the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163661

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

20/04/2026

The (SC) has affirmed its previous ruling that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time it is discovered, holding that “cyber libel” is not a new crime but a form of “libel” under Art. 355 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 that is committed through a computer system or other similar means.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

In December 2020, Cotabato Second District Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez filed a cyber libel complaint with the prosecutor against Causing related to Facebook posts accusing Hernandez of pocketing over PHP 200 million in relief goods for Marawi victims. Hernandez stated he discovered the posts on February 4 and April 29, 2019.

Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Causing in May 2021. He filed a motion to quash the Informations, arguing that they were already time-barred under the RPC because more than one year had passed since the posts were uploaded.

The RTC denied the motion, ruling that cyber libel prescribes in 12 years under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵.

Causing appealed to the SC, which clarified that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year from the date of discovery, consistent with traditional libel under the RPC. The Court rejected Causing’s motion to quash the Informations due to insufficient proof that the offense had already prescribed, highlighting that he can present evidence during the trial at the RTC.

Both the OSG and Causing filed separate partial motions for reconsideration.

The OSG argued that the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel under the RPC should not apply to cyber libel. Instead, it should be 15 years under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, as previously decided by the Supreme Court through an unsigned resolution in Tolentino v. People.

Causing, on the other hand, argued that the prescription for cyber libel should start from the publication date rather than from discovery. He contended that online posts are more widespread than traditional forms of publication. If the discovery rule is applied, cyber libel charges could be filed several years after the post was made, as long as the offended party discovered it later.

The SC rejected both arguments.

Under the RPC, written libel prescribes in one year. There is no law that excludes cyber libel from this one-year period, and Congress has consistently treated libel as having a shorter prescriptive period than other crimes, even when penalties are increased.

The SC reiterated that cyber libel is not a separate crime, but rather libel committed through a computer system. The fact that the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposes a higher penalty for cyber libel does not imply that its prescriptive period should be extended beyond that of traditional libel.

The SC added that when laws on the prescription of crimes are unclear, they must be interpreted in favor of the accused. Since the RPC sets a one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel, it prevails over the 15-year period set in the case of Tolentino v. People, which is an unsigned resolution.

The SC also affirmed that prescription begins upon discovery of the offense, not upon publication. The law clearly states that prescription runs from the time the crime is discovered by the offended party or the authorities.

Seven other Justices joined Justice Inting in the majority. They are:
• Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo
• Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
• Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
• Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
• Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan
• Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez
• Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen argued that the one-year prescription period should apply only to libel cases against private individuals. He added that libel against public figures should be decriminalized, as punishing comments and criticisms directed at public officials discourages free and uninhibited discussion about how those in public office conduct themselves.

In his Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa stressed that the prescriptive period for libel has always been fixed at one or two years, never at 10 or more years.

Meanwhile, six other Justices joined Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. in his dissent:
• Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando
• Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
• Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario
• Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez
• Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
• Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva

In his Concurring and Dissenting opinion, Justice Kho, Jr. agreed with the majority that unsigned resolutions do not lay down doctrines of law but disagreed on the prescriptive period for cyber libel. Since cyber libel is committed through computer systems and is punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, it is a separate crime from libel and the one-year prescriptive period for libel does not apply.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163671

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163636

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163642

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-admin/post.php?p=163650

Read the Concurring and Dissenting OpinionOpinion of Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163661

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

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