Alvina Law Office

11/03/2026

Pinagtibay ng En Banc ng ang legalidad ng isang circular ng Department of Justice (DOJ) na nagtaas sa antas ng ebidensiyang kailangan sa mga preliminary investigation at inquest proceeding. Mula sa dating probable cause, kailangan na ngayon ang prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction (may makatwirang katiyakan na hahantong sa pagkakahatol ng may sala).

Nagpasya ang En Banc ng Korte na ang Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024, na naglalaman ng 2024 DOJ–National Prosecution Service Rules on Preliminary Investigation and Inquest Proceedings (DOJ Rules), ay isang lehitimong paggamit ng kapangyarihan ng DOJ sa pangangasiwa at pagpapatakbo ng mga prosesong pamprosekusyon.

Sa ilalim ng bagong pamantayan ng ebidensiya sa preliminary investigation at inquest na itinakda ng DOJ Rules, kailangang tiyakin ng mga piskal na ang ebidensiyang gagamitin para kasuhan ang isang tao ay sapat na nagpapatunay sa lahat ng elemento ng krimen at, dahil dito, may matibay na batayan para humantong sa hatol na pagkakasala.

Kinuwestiyon ni Atty. Hazel L. Meking sa Korte Suprema ang DOJ Rules, at iginiit na lumampas umano ang DOJ sa saklaw ng kapangyarihan nito at nakialam sa konstitusyunal na awtoridad ng Korte Suprema na magtakda ng mga tuntunin sa pleading, practice, at procedure sa lahat ng hukuman. Ayon sa kanya, sa bisa ng DOJ Rules ay tila binago ang Rule 112, Section 3(a) ng Rules of Criminal Procedure, na nagsasaad na probable cause ang kinakailangang antas ng ebidensiya sa mga preliminary investigation.

Hindi pinagbigyan ng Korte ang kanyang petisyon at muling pinagtibay ang naging pasya nito sa A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC, kung saan kinilala nito ang kapangyarihan ng DOJ na maglabas ng sarili nitong mga tuntunin para sa mga preliminary investigation at inquest proceeding.

Ayon sa Korte, ang DOJ Rules ay sumasaklaw lamang sa paraan ng pagsasagawa ng preliminary investigation at inquest ng mga piskal, na itinuturing na mga tungkuling nasa ilalim ng ehekutibong sangay ng pamahalaan. Gayunman, hindi ito umaabot sa mga judicial proceeding, dahil nananatili sa Korte Suprema ang kapangyarihang magtakda ng mga tuntunin ng pamamaraan para sa mga ito.

Binanggit ng Korte na kinilala na nito noon pa na ang preliminary investigation ay nasa eksklusibong saklaw ng mga piskal, nang rebisahin nito ang Rules of Criminal Procedure noong 2005.

Noong 2024, sa pamamagitan ng A.M. No. 24-02-09-SC, iniutos din ng Korte ang pagbasura sa mga probisyon ng Rule 112 na hindi naaayon sa DOJ Rules, para mapag-isa at maging magkatugma ang mga ito.

Nananatiling pinakamataas ang konstitusyunal na kapangyarihan ng Korte na magtakda ng mga tuntunin para sa mga judicial proceeding, gayundin ang kapangyarihan nitong itama ang grave abuse of discretion sa anumang tuntunin o hakbang ng prosekusyon na lumalabag sa mga karapatang itinatakda ng Konstitusyon.

Basahin ang kabuuan ng Press Release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Basahin ang kabuuang teksto ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

11/03/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has upheld the validity of a Department of Justice (DOJ) circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

In a Decision written by written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 ruled that Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024 containing the 2024 𝘋𝘖𝘑-𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 (𝘋𝘖𝘑 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴), is a valid exercise of the DOJ’s authority over prosecutorial processes.

Under the DOJ Rules’ new standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest, prosecutors must ensure that the evidence to charge a person with a crime must sufficiently establish all the elements and consequently warrant a conviction.

Atty. Hazel L. Meking questioned the DOJ Rules before the SC, claiming that the DOJ encroached on the SC’s constitutional authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. She argued that the DOJ Rules effectively revised Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦, which provides that the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is probable cause.

The SC dismissed her petition and reiterated its ruling in 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, which recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

The SC held that the DOJ Rules govern only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive functions. These Rules, however, do not extend to judicial proceedings as the power to promulgate rules of procedure over them remains under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The SC noted it had already recognized preliminary investigation as the exclusive domain of prosecutors when it revised the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2005.

In 2024, through 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, the SC also ordered the repeal of provisions in Rule 112 which are inconsistent with the DOJ Rules to harmonize them.

The SC’s constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, as well as its power to correct grave abuse of discretion in any prosecutorial rule or action that violates constitutional rights.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/02/2026

25/02/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that search made after a lawful arrest extends to the surroundings within the immediate control of the accused and evidence obtained during such search is admissible even if they are not within the “plain view” of the arresting officers.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division upheld the conviction of Jeryl Bautista for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165, or the 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘋𝘳𝘶𝘨𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2002, as amended.

During a buy-bust operation, a police officer posed as a buyer and received from Bautista 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 in exchange for PHP 500. After the officer made a pre-arranged signal, the rest of the arresting team rushed to the place of the transaction.

Bautista was arrested and a representative from the Department of Justice, and two barangay kagawads arrived shortly after.

Subsequently, the officer searched Bautista and found three more sachets of suspected 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. The officer also found a cellphone, screwdriver, weighing scale, and marked money. The police then marked the four sachets, prepared an inventory of the seized items, and took photographs.

Bautista argued that the additional sachets should not be admitted as evidence because they were not within the plain view of the police officers when seized during his arrest.

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both convicted Bautista of illegal possession of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶.

The SC upheld Bautista’s conviction and rejected his argument. It explained that the plain view doctrine is not the only justification for a warrantless search, as the search could be done to a person who has just been lawfully arrested.

Searches and seizures generally require a warrant. If police perform a search or seize property without a valid warrant, any evidence obtained cannot be used in court and is considered inadmissible. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule.

One of these is the plain view doctrine, which allows police officers to seize evidence in plain sight when: (1) the officer has a lawful reason to be in the place where the item is seen, (2) the discovery of the item is unplanned or incidental, and (3) it is immediately obvious that the item is connected to a crime or is illegal.

Another recognized exception is a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. To be valid, it must meet these conditions: (1) the accused is lawfully arrested, (2) the arresting officers subsequently made a warrantless search, (3) the search is limited to the person of the accused and the area within the accused’s immediate control, and (4) the search is performed at the place of the arrest.

In this case, Bautista was arrested during a buy-bust operation. He was frisked as part of the arrest. While the sachets hidden inside his cellphone charger were not in the officers’ plain view, the SC held that the warrantless search remained valid because it was done as part of a lawful arrest and the search extended to those that are within the immediate control of the accused at the time of the arrest.

To convict a person of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the drug, that the possession was not authorized by law, and that it was done knowingly and freely.

The SC found that all these elements were present. The search revealed three additional sachets of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. Bautista could not explain why he had the drugs nor show any authority allowing him to possess them. His act of hiding the sachets inside the charger also showed his intent to keep them.

Bautista was sentenced to a maximum of 16 years in prison and ordered to pay a fine of PHP 300,000.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161226

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161221

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/02/2026

Muling iginiit ng na ang paghahalughog matapos ang isang legal na pag-aresto ay maaring sumakop sa mga bagay na nasa agarang kontrol ng akusado. Maaaring tanggapin ng hukuman ang anumang mga ebidensiyang makukuha sa paghahalughog kahit hindi ito lantad sa paningin ng mga umarestong pulis.

Sa isang Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, pinagtibay ng Unang Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang hatol na pagkakasala kay Jeryl Bautista dahil sa illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165, o ang Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended.

Naaresto sa isang buy-bust operation si Bautista. Matapos mahuli, kinapkapan siya ng mga pulis at nakuhanan siya ng tatlong sachet ng hinihinalang shabu na nakatago sa loob ng isang cellphone charger.

Depensa ni Bautista, hindi dapat tanggapin bilang ebidensiya ang mga karagdagang sachet dahil hindi ito lantad sa paningin ng mga pulis nang kumpiskahin ito noong siya’y naaresto.

Pinagtibay ng Korte Suprema ang hatol na pagkakasala ng Regional Trial Court at Court of Appeals at isinantabi ang kanyang argumento. Paliwanag nito, hindi lamang ang plain view doctrine ang batayan para maging wasto ang isang warrantless search dahil maaari ring magsagawa ng paghahalughog sa isang taong naaresto nang naaayon sa batas.

Sa pangkalahatan, kinakailangan ang warrant sa paghahalughog at pagsamsam ng anumang ebidensiya. Kapag nagsagawa ang pulisya ng paghahalughog o pagsamsam nang walang wastong warrant, hindi maaaring gamitin sa hukuman ang mga ebidensiyang makukuha. Gayunman, may mga kinikilalang exception o pagpapaliban sa patakarang ito.

Isa sa mga ito ang plain view doctrine na nagpapahintulot sa pagsamsam ng ebidensiyang lantad sa paningin kung: (1) may legal na dahilan ang pulis na naroroon sa lugar kung saan nakita ang bagay; (2) hindi planado ang pagkakadiskubre nito; at (3) agad na malinaw na ang bagay ay may kaugnayan sa krimen o labag sa batas.

Isa pang kinikilalang exception ang warrantless search na kaugnay ng isang legal na pag-aresto. Para maging wasto, kinakailangang: (1) legal ang pag-aresto sa akusado; (2) isinagawa ang paghahalughog nang walang warrant matapos ang pag-aresto; (3) limitado ang paghahalughog sa katawan ng akusado at sa mga bagay na nasa kanyang agarang kontrol; at (4) isinagawa ito sa lugar ng pag-aresto.

Sa kasong ito, inaresto si Bautista sa isang buy-bust operation at siniyasat bilang bahagi ng pagkakaaresto sa kanya. Bagaman hindi lantad sa paningin ng mga pulis ang mga sachet na nakatago sa loob ng cellphone charger, sinabi ng Korte Suprema na wasto pa rin ang paghahalughog dahil isinagawa ito bilang bahagi ng isang legal na pag-aresto at sumasaklaw sa mga bagay na nasa agarang kontrol ng akusado sa oras ng pag-aresto.

Dahil napatunayan ng prosekusyon na: (1) may droga sa kanyang pag-iingat; (2) walang pahintulot ng batas ang naturang pag-iingat; at (3) ginawa ito nang may kaalaman at kusang-loob, hinatulan ng Korte si Bautista ng pagkakakulong ng hanggang 16 na taon at pinagmulta ng PHP 300,000.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161226.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161221.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

02/02/2026

When Silence Sides With the Aggressor: Why the ‘Tsinadors’ Must Be Called Out

February 2, 2026

In moments that test a nation’s spine, history is rarely kind to those who choose equivocation over courage. Ronald Llamas’ searing use of the term “Tsinadors”—a label coined by Filipino netizens and amplified through News5 and his Philippine Star opinion—cuts precisely to that moral fault line. It is not a casual insult; it is a political judgment rooted in documented behavior: nine senators’ refusal to sign a Senate resolution condemning the Chinese embassy’s public attacks on Philippine officials amid escalating tensions in the West Philippine Sea.

At the center of this controversy stands Senator Robin Padilla, whom Llamas explicitly identifies—by name and quotation—as the leading figure of this bloc. Leadership, after all, is measured not by rhetoric alone but by the signal one sends when the nation’s sovereignty is challenged.

The facts are plain and undisputed. Fifteen senators signed a resolution urging firm diplomatic pushback. Nine did not. This abstention occurred against a backdrop of repeated, well-documented incidents involving Filipino fisherfolk and frontliners facing harassment in the West Philippine Sea, and amid a Chinese embassy that publicly scolded Philippine officials for defending national positions.

Llamas’ critique—circulated by News5 captions and articulated in his Philstar column—argues that declining to stand with a clear, collective Senate response is not neutrality; it is political signaling. When the Senate’s institutional voice is needed to uphold sovereignty and protect frontliners, silence functions as alignment—whether intended or not.

Padilla’s role, as Llamas underscores, is emblematic. In public statements cited by Llamas, Padilla framed the embassy’s reaction as provoked and urged “de-escalation,” at times directing restraint inward rather than squarely at the foreign power asserting pressure at sea. Llamas challenges the logic and proportion of this stance: cartoons and speech are not equivalent to water-cannoning boats, shadowing resupply missions, or coercive maritime behavior documented by Philippine authorities and international reporting.

Calling for calm is laudable; misplacing accountability is not. The charge here is not criminality but judgment—a question of whether elected officials are meeting the constitutional duty to defend national interest with clarity and resolve.

The term “Tsinador,” as Llamas explains, is a form of political accountability through language. It names a pattern: reluctance to condemn coercive acts, hesitation to back institutional rebuke, and rhetorical framing that blurs aggressor and aggrieved.

This is why the label resonates online and why it unsettles. Democracies rely on sunlight. Public officials, especially senators entrusted with foreign-policy oversight and national dignity, must expect scrutiny when their actions—or refusals—carry geopolitical meaning.

The consequences of failing to call this out are not abstract. Normalizing equivocation weakens deterrence, confuses allies, demoralizes frontliners, and teaches future leaders that strategic silence bears no cost. It invites a politics where sovereignty becomes negotiable, where the burden of restraint falls disproportionately on the victim, and where institutions hesitate at the very moment unity is required.

Llamas’ warning is therefore civic, not personal: when leaders blur lines, citizens must sharpen them.

Standing with Llamas is not about partisanship; it is about standing with the Philippine Coast Guard, with fisherfolk, with diplomats and officials who assert lawful rights under international norms, and with the constitutional mandate to protect national territory.

Calling out the nine senators—especially Padilla as the acknowledged leader of this bloc—is an insistence on standards: that elected leaders clearly condemn coercion, support institutional responses, and refuse narratives that dilute accountability. This is how democracies defend themselves—not with silence, but with principled speech grounded in fact.

The republic does not demand unanimity of thought; it demands clarity of duty. When that duty wavers, the public has the right—indeed, the obligation—to name it. In that sense, the debate over “Tsinadors” is not name-calling; it is democratic reckoning.

02/02/2026

Maps Don’t Make Rights—Law Does: Why Carpio and the Coast Guard Are Right, and Why Marcoleta Is Fatally Wrong

February 2, 2026

What Justice Antonio Carpio and Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela have done—calmly, relentlessly, and with legal precision—is defend the Republic using the only currency that matters in the modern world: law, facts, and international consensus.

Against this stands Senator Rodante Marcoleta’s fixation on names, ancient maps, and manufactured doubt—an approach that does not advance Philippine interests but instead mirrors the very talking points long deployed by Beijing to evade accountability under international law. This is not a debate about semantics; it is a test of whether the Philippines stands by its lawful victory or erodes it from within.

Carpio’s core argument is devastatingly simple and unassailable. Maritime rights do not arise from old charts or romanticized labels; they arise from UNCLOS, the treaty that governs the world’s oceans and to which both the Philippines and China are parties.

Under UNCLOS, coastal states are entitled to a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) measured from their baselines. Those entitlements are defined in law, not by whether a name appears on a centuries-old map.

The 2016 Arbitral Award—binding, final, and authoritative—applied that law and ruled unequivocally: China’s so-called “historic rights” claim has no legal basis, and its dashed-line map is a legal nullity. Demanding “coordinates” for the West Philippine Sea while ignoring that China has never produced coordinates for its 10-dash line is not rigor; it is selective skepticism designed to confuse.

Commodore Tarriela’s intervention brings the same clarity from the front lines. The West Philippine Sea is not a figment of imagination; it is the Philippines’ official administrative designation (AO No. 29, 2012) for maritime areas where the country exercises sovereign rights under UNCLOS. Names organize governance; law confers rights.

When a Filipino official publicly declares that the WPS “does not exist,” the damage is real: it weakens diplomatic messaging, muddles public understanding, and hands adversaries a sound bite they did not have to invent. Tarriela is right to warn that such rhetoric is a disservice—not because dissent is forbidden, but because precision matters when sovereignty is contested.

Marcoleta’s repeated insistence that the WPS is a “fabrication” and that our claims lack clarity collapses under scrutiny. The EEZ’s legal contours are defined by treaty and confirmed by arbitration.

The irony Carpio highlights is fatal to Marcoleta’s case: the only claim in this dispute that truly lacks coordinates, legal definition, and international recognition is China’s dashed line. To relativize that asymmetry—to suggest “sharing” with an intruder while questioning the owner’s title—is to invert the logic of law. As Carpio memorably put it, you do not bargain with a squatter over your living room; you enforce your rights.

The consequences of letting this confusion stand are grave. It normalizes the rejection of a hard-won legal victory. It shifts the burden of “de-escalation” onto the victim rather than the violator. It trains the public to doubt law and trust intimidation. And it signals to allies and partners that the Philippines is unsure of its own case—precisely when unity and clarity are our greatest strengths.

The international community has repeatedly affirmed the 2016 ruling. To undercut it domestically is to do Beijing’s rhetorical work for free.

Standing with Carpio and Tarriela is not about personalities; it is about statecraft. It means choosing law over lore, rights over fear, and coherence over noise. It means telling our children that sovereignty is defended by knowledge and courage, not by surrender dressed up as “realism.”

The Philippines does not need ancient maps to prove what modern law already guarantees. What it needs is the resolve to speak plainly, act consistently, and reject narratives that weaken our hand. On this, the law is clear—and so should we be.

22/01/2026

Eto na yun? Siya lang uli? At 90k lang ang piyansa?

Huwag sanang maulit ang nangyari noon na inabot ng pitong taon bago naresolba ang kaso.

Dapat pabilisin ng Korte ang mga kasong ng katiwalian: hanggang tatlong taon lang dapat ang paglilitis, at dalawang taon sa apela.

Naghihintay ang taumbayan. Panagutin ang mga tunay na big fish sa maanomalyang flood control projects!

📸 GMA News

22/01/2026

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session today, January 21, 2026, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican seeking to lift his preventive suspension from the practice of law and restore his pension and retirement benefits.

In denying Dicdican’s motion for reconsideration, the SC stressed that the preventive sanctions were not meant to punish him, but to serve as precautionary measures.

In 2025, the SC formally charged Justice Dicdican with gross misconduct for his alleged involvement in the murder of Atty. Joey Luis B. Wee, who was shot and killed on November 23, 2020 in Cebu City.

Following the filing of the charge, the SC ordered Justice Dicdican’s preventive suspension from the practice of law and the discontinuation of his pension and retirement benefits pending the resolution of his administrative case.

The SC explained that preventive suspension is necessary because Justice Dicdican, having practiced law and served as a Court of Appeals Justice in Cebu, may have possible influence that could obstruct the ongoing criminal and administrative cases against him.

Under the 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺, preventive suspension is imposed to prevent interference with an investigation. This includes tampering, hiding, or destroying evidence, and intimidating witnesses.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159464

The full text of the Supreme Court 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 Resolution in A.M. No. 25-03-03-CA (𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵 𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘔𝘶𝘳𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘊𝘢𝘴𝘦 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘦𝘥 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵, 𝘈𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘨 𝘖𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘈𝘱𝘱𝘦𝘢𝘭𝘴 𝘑𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘐𝘴𝘢𝘪𝘢𝘴 𝘗. 𝘋𝘪𝘤𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘯 [𝘙𝘦𝘵𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘥]) shall be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

14/01/2026

28/12/2025

SC Clarifies Rules on Fugitive Status and holds that such fugitives are barred from seeking judicial relief until they surrender or are placed under custody.

The Supreme Court En Banc has laid down clear guidelines on when courts may declare an accused a fugitive from justice and on the consequences of such a declaration.

Read more in the comments section.

25/12/2025

The Dangers of a "live in" Relationship

1. It is a bad investment. Can you imagine giving yourself and investing your time and effort to someone who can just walk away anytime with no legal repercussions?

2. Speaking of legal repercussions, in case of adultery, you have no legal protection. Your partner can sleep with anyone anytime with or without your knowledge and it's all the same. Even if your cry blood, he or she ain't going to jail.

3. Your kids with that person are legally illegitimate. If he leaves you and married another, their kids have more right to his estate than your kids even if they're older.

Live in relationships only benefit men since it provides them with an escape route while it only causes damage to women since they're spending their prime years that could never be recovered while having no legal protections and privileges whatsoever.

Personally, I once knew a woman who acted like a housewife to a man who won't marry her and she did that for almost 2 decades then the guy just left her. Now, she's a depressed menopausal 45 year old lady living alone in an apartment with dogs. She wasted her prime years to something unworthy and now she's alone.

I wouldn't want that fate to my daughter or any man's daughter. So, what I'll say to our young women is this, don't put yourself in such a situation. Don't lower yourself just for a guy's affection. Want a boyfriend? Go ahead. But don't live with the guy unless you guys are married. Don't waste your prime years on a man who won't willingly tie himself to you and can walk out on you on a whim. Don't believe the naysayers that spread the nonsense that marriage is just a paper or that it is a chain that will enslave you... Because no, it is not. Marriage is an institution that will protect you and is designed to make you bloom into the homemaker that you're meant to be. A live-in arrangement won't give you that. All it would give you is a make-believe fantasy of a married life that can be shattered instantly. Why be a pretend wife if you can be an actual wife with all the rights and privileges of being one?