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P. Abad Law and Co., 3/F Abad Centre Bloc, South Road , Ward-I, Minglanilla (2026)

24/05/2026

IS PARTITION OF COMMON PROPERTIES A PRE-REQUISITE TO DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE?

Here are the commonly-asked questions on property relations in respect to void marriages:

1) Do void marriages have a property regime?

No. When the marriage is void, the parties do not have a property regime. “Void marriages are no marriages. Thus, the provisions of the Family Code on property relations between husband and wife- the systems of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, and separation of property- do not apply in disposing of properties that may have been acquired during the parties’ cohabitation.”(Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021).

2) What governs property relations of couples in a void marriage?

The rules on co-ownership under the Civil Code. “Pertinently, the rules on co-ownership, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, govern the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the common properties of spouses, whose marriage is declared void under Article 36 of the same Code.” (Chan Tee Ten v. Tee Ten, G.R. No. 259322, August 6, 2025)

3) How can couples in a void marriage partition their commonly-acquired properties?

What governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by couples in a void marriage are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. (Diño v. Diño, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011).

4) May the decree of absolute nullity of marriage be issued even without prior liquidation of common properties of couples in a void marriage?

Yes. As a consequence, “the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.” (Diño v. Diño, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011).

5) Is partition required before a marriage can be declared void by the court?

No. It is also settled that it is not necessary to liquidate the common properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. (Chan Tee Ten v. Tee Ten, G.R. No. 259322, August 6, 2025) In a more recent case, it was concluded that “Thus, the Court finds no reason to reverse the RTC and the CA rulings, which did not order the partition of the co-owned properties as a prerequisite for the nullity of the marriage. The partition of the co-owned properties is not a precondition but is merely incidental to, and is a consequence of, the nullity of the marriage. To reiterate, since the petitioner’s and the respondent’s properties are governed by the rules on co-ownership, the parties are free to choose whether they intend to partition the properties through agreement or by judicial proceeding. The court deems it unnecessary to preempt this choice by mandating the partition of the properties in this case.” (Soto v. Reyes-Soto, G.R. No. 249759, April 22, 2026)

11/05/2026

SUPREME COURT: DARAB JURISDICTION LIMITED TO AGRARIAN DISPUTES, EXCLUDES ORDINARY LOAN TRANSACTIONS

The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) exercises primary and exclusive jurisdiction only over "agrarian disputes," which require the existence of a tenurial arrangement such as tenancy or leasehold between the parties and do not extend to ordinary loan transactions.

In an 18-page decision penned by Chief Justice Alexander Gesmundo, the SC's First Division reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that invalidated the previous decision of the DARAB, as it ruled that DARAB adjudicators had no jurisdiction over the case because the reallocation of land is an administrative matter under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR secretary.

The case stemmed from the action filed by Carmelita Mercado for the annulment of the transfer certificate of title emancipation patent No. against the heirs of Serafin De Guzman. The dispute involves an 8,212-square-meter portion of a larger agricultural land covered by the said title, which is registered in the name of the heirs of De Guzman.

Mercado claimed that this portion was erroneously included in De Guzman's title. She relied on a December 20, 1994, decision by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), which ordered the segregation of the portion and the generation of an Emancipation Patent in her favor. Mercado argued that this 1994 PARAD decision had already attained finality and was therefore immutable.

The Heirs of De Guzman countered that one of the heirs, Rogelio, merely lent the disputed portion to Mercado to finance the hospitalization of his daughter. They executed a waiver of rights due to an inability to pay the loan, but the heirs maintained that they had fully paid the land amortization to the Land Bank of the Philippines.

The Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) dismissed Mercado's complaint, ruling that the 1994 RARAD decision was void for violating due process and that Mercado was not a rightful reallocatee because the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) never issued an order of reallocation.

On appeal, the DARAB set aside the previous decisions, ruling that the DARAB (and its adjudicators) had no jurisdiction over the case because the reallocation of land is an administrative matter under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.

The CA reversed the DARAB, ruling that the DARAB had jurisdiction over the cancellation of registered emancipation patents. The CA also ruled that the doctrine of immutability of judgment did not apply to the 1994 PARAD decision because agrarian quasi-judicial agencies are not bound by technical rules of procedure. This paved the way for Mercado to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In reversing the appellate court ruling, the high court held that DARAB had no jurisdiction over the case. The DARAB exercises primary and exclusive jurisdiction only over "agrarian disputes," which require the existence of a tenurial arrangement (such as tenancy or leasehold) between the parties.

It explained that in this case, there was no tenurial arrangement between Mercado and the heirs of De Guzman; the transaction was merely a loan to finance a hospitalization.

The highest bench also disagreed with the CA's reasoning as to the application of the 1994 PARAD decision. It clarified that the doctrine of immutability of judgment does apply to quasi-judicial agencies like the DARAB. However, the 1994 PARAD decision cannot be enforced as it falls under a recognized exception, being a void judgment.

"A void judgment produces no legal or binding effect, never attains finality, and can be challenged at any time," the Supreme Court said.

13/04/2026

SC issues guidelines on who qualifies as an “indigent” for free legal assistance

The Supreme Court (SC) has issued comprehensive guidelines establishing clear and uniform standards for determining who qualifies as an “indigent” or “qualified beneficiary” entitled to free legal assistance.

These guidelines apply the following tests: (i) basic necessities test, (ii) income test, (iii) property test, and (iv) catch-all or special categories. The Court also cited the landmark ruling in Algura v. City of Naga to guide both the bench and the bar.

11/03/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the manning agency for the payment of disability benefits to seafarers under Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Special First Division granted the motion for partial reconsideration of its earlier Decision, which had held that only Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) and Princess Cruises Ltd. (Princess Cruises) are liable for the disability benefits of its seafarer. The SC ruled that Magsaysay Fleet Director Sorwin Joy G. Rivera (Rivera) is also solidarily liable, meaning he can be made to pay the full amount due.

Magsaysay, a manning agency, hired Ruthgar T. Parce as an electrical fitter for its foreign principal, Princess Cruises. After he was injured while working on board, he was sent back to Manila, where the company-designated doctor diagnosed him with rotator tendinitis in his shoulder and recommended physical therapy.

Months later, Parce was told he had reached the maximum medical treatment and that his sickness allowance would be discontinued. Based on this, Princess Cruises found him fit to work.

Parce continued to feel pain, so he sought a second medical opinion. The doctor he consulted found him unfit for sea duty. Parce then requested Magsaysay for a referral to a third doctor, as required under the rules, and for copies of his medical records. Magsaysay refused and asked instead for a copy of the second doctor’s report to explore a possible settlement. Parce then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses.

The LA ruled in his favor, ordering Magsaysay and Princess Cruises to pay Parce USD 60,000 in disability benefits. The LA considered the company-designated doctor’s report incomplete because it failed to clearly state that Parce was fit to work. The National Labor Relations Commission upheld the LA and also stated that Rivera was liable alongside Magsaysay and Princess Cruises.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, noting that Parce did not immediately question his medical assessment, which weakened his case.

The SC disagreed. It held Magsaysay and Princess Cruises liable because the company-designated doctor’s report was incomplete, giving Parce nothing to properly contest. The SC affirmed the LA’s ruling that he was already deemed permanently disabled under the law.

Parce filed a motion for partial reconsideration, asking the SC to also declare Rivera solidarily liable with the companies. The SC granted the motion.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, clearly provides that when a recruitment agency is a corporation or partnership, its officers, directors, or partners are liable with the company for any money claims awarded to overseas Filipino workers.

The SC explained that while corporate officers are generally not personally liable for contracts entered into by their company, an exception applies when a law specifically makes them accountable. In this case, Rivera, a corporate officer of Magsaysay, was held solidarily liable with the company for Parce’s permanent disability benefits. Rivera was named in the complaint as “Owner/President/Manager” and had signed the employment contract on behalf of the company.

The SC added that when Magsaysay applied for its license to operate as a manning agency, its officers and directors were required, under Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Rules, to submit a verified undertaking, making them solidarily liable for claims arising from the employer-employee relationship.

The SC emphasized that Section 10 of RA 8042 and the relevant POEA Rules are considered part of every seafarer’s employment contract. “These provisions are in line with the State’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating the workers’ plight and are meant to assure overseas Filipino workers immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them,” the SC said.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161450

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161442

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

11/03/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has upheld the validity of a Department of Justice (DOJ) circular that raised the standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings from probable cause to prima facie evidence with reasonable certainty of conviction.

In a Decision written by written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 ruled that Department Circular No. 15, series of 2024 containing the 2024 𝘋𝘖𝘑-𝘕𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘐𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐𝘯𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 (𝘋𝘖𝘑 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴), is a valid exercise of the DOJ’s authority over prosecutorial processes.

Under the DOJ Rules’ new standard of proof in preliminary investigations and inquest, prosecutors must ensure that the evidence to charge a person with a crime must sufficiently establish all the elements and consequently warrant a conviction.

Atty. Hazel L. Meking questioned the DOJ Rules before the SC, claiming that the DOJ encroached on the SC’s constitutional authority to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. She argued that the DOJ Rules effectively revised Rule 112, Section 3(a) of the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦, which provides that the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is probable cause.

The SC dismissed her petition and reiterated its ruling in 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, which recognized the DOJ’s authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigations and inquest proceedings.

The SC held that the DOJ Rules govern only the conduct of preliminary investigations and inquests by prosecutors, which are executive functions. These Rules, however, do not extend to judicial proceedings as the power to promulgate rules of procedure over them remains under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The SC noted it had already recognized preliminary investigation as the exclusive domain of prosecutors when it revised the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2005.

In 2024, through 𝘈.𝘔. 𝘕𝘰. 24-02-09-𝘚𝘊, the SC also ordered the repeal of provisions in Rule 112 which are inconsistent with the DOJ Rules to harmonize them.

The SC’s constitutional rule-making authority over judicial proceedings remains supreme, as well as its power to correct grave abuse of discretion in any prosecutorial rule or action that violates constitutional rights.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161871

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161853

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161858

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

24/01/2026

SUPREME COURT REVERSES DISMISSAL OF EX-NLRC COMMISSIONER DUE TO LACK OF EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION

The Supreme Court (SC) has reversed the dismissal from service of former National Labor Relations Commission Commissioner Angelo Palaña and ordered the payment of his back wages and retirement benefits.

In a 17-page decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel Gaerlan, the SC En Banc granted Palaña's second motion for reconsideration assailing the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, which found him guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from service.

The administrative case stemmed from the P100,000 deposit in Palaña’s bank account, which the complainant, Atty. Rebene Carrera alleged it was an unpaid loan that Palaña wanted to be “goodwill money.”

The Ombudsman found Palaña guilty of grave misconduct based on the deposit and the fact that a third party knew his bank account number when there was no reason to know this information. It dismissed Palaña from the service.

The said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Initially, the Supreme Court also sustained the decision, prompting Palaña to file a motion for reconsideration, which was subsequently dismissed.

Aggrieved, Palaña filed her second motion for reconsideration, citing Carrera’s disbarment in another case for gross immorality, which calls into question his credibility. In granting the second appeal, it explained that while usually a prohibited pleading, second motions for reconsideration may be allowed in the higher interest of justice if the ruling is shown to be legally erroneous and patently unjust.

The SC said the evidence against Palaña was insufficient and took judicial notice of its 2021 resolution where he was acquitted of the criminal case arising from the same incident.

“The Court finds that the finding of grave misconduct against him was tainted with arbitrariness to such a degree that he was inevitably denied due process. Thus, his dismissal from the service must be set aside,” the Supreme Court said.

It emphasized that the Ombudsman’s Field Investigation Office failed to show that Carrera deposited P100,000 in Palaña’s bank account at the latter’s behest and that this was done to perpetuate corruption.

The highest bench also took into consideration its ruling in the criminal case where it was found that the P100,000 was deposited by former NLRC Commissioner Nieves De Castro, who testified that it was payment for the jewelry she bought from Palaña’s wife, Shirley. The bank account was jointly held by Palaña and Shirley.

It underscored that the deposit had a legitimate purpose. While Carrera’s secretary issued an affidavit stating that she instructed an office staff member to deposit the P100,000 to Palaña’s account, there was no evidence that Palaña was aware of it and that the amount was intended as goodwill money for future cases before the NLRC.

The SC also noted that the staff member who allegedly made the actual deposit did not execute an affidavit as well. Thus, in the absence of any evidence that Palaña was aware of, and consented to, the deposit, it cannot be concluded that he committed a corrupt act that would render him administratively liable for grave misconduct.

It added that there is no civil service rule that punishes the mere deposit of money in the bank account of a public officer.

“On this score, there being a dearth of evidence to prove corruption, it was an error for the Ombudsman and the CA to rule Palaña liable for grave misconduct,” it said.

24/01/2026

SUPREME COURT DECLARES 94 GMA TALENTS AS REGULAR EMPLOYEES IN AN 11-YEAR LANDMARK CASE

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed the Court of Appeals ruling that declared 94 talent workers of broadcast giant GMA Network as regular employees, not mere “independent contractors,” ending the group’s 11-year fight for separation pay and back wages.

In a ruling promulgated by the SC's Third Division, it found that the employees who are members of the Talent Association of GMA (TAG), mostly from the news and public affairs department had already acquired regular employment status and were illegally terminated from employment absent just cause.

The employees had been rendering essential work to GMA without attaining regular employment status for up to 15 years when they first took the matter before the National Labor Relations Commission in 2014. As contractual workers, they did not have access to SSS, Pag-IBIG, and PhilHealth benefits and did not have security of tenure.

Initially, the NLRC affirmed that the members were regular employees in 2015, which was eventually upheld by the Court of Appeals in 2019. This prompted GMA to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In affirming the appellate court's decision, the high court said that the existence of an employer-employee relationship between GMA and the employees is clear as broad daylight. It emphasized that it was unjust for the TV network to refuse to recognize them as regular employees.

The highest bench also acted in another petition filed by GMA on the illegal dismissal case that went in favor as well to the workers before the CA in 2020.

In partially granting the motion, it said that the respondents, whose contracts were either terminated or not renewed while awaiting resolution of the case, are entitled to reinstatement “without loss of seniority rights and other privileges,” citing “higher talent fees” and lack of “control” as they were bound only by the “Talent Agreement.”

The SC ordered GMA to pay the employees their full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, with computation “from the time their compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement.” But should reinstatement no longer be an option, the former employees shall be granted separation pay equivalent to one month’s pay for every year of their service to the company.

19/01/2026

AMBIGUITY IN LOAN CONTRACT MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST THE BANK THAT CAUSED IT—SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that ambiguity in the loan contract, particularly in the inclusion of the dragnet clause, should be taken against the bank, stressing that the latter cannot conveniently invoke dragnet clauses when their terms are ambiguous and no connection can be established between the original loan and the subsequent loan.

In a 14-page decision penned by Associate Justice Jose Midas Marquez, the SC First Division reinstated the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decision invalidating the application of the dragnet clause to the second loan purportedly obtained by spouses Wilson and Elsie Sademas through the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by spouses Gabriel and Luisa Duero.

The spouses Duero are the registered owners of a parcel of land subject to a title. In 2004, spouses Duero executed an SPA appointing spouses Sademas as attorneys-in-fact and authorized them to obtain a loan in an amount not exceeding Php550,000 from Green Bank of Caraga.

To secure the loan, Gabriel and spouse Sademas executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (REM) using the property as collateral in favor of Green Bank. In 2006, more than a year prior to the loan's maturity date, spouses Sademas paid the loan in full. However, despite repeated demands, Green Bank did not return the land title.

Three months after payment of the loan, Green Bank extended another loan (second loan) in the amount of Php150,000 to spouses Sademas, who in turn executed another promissory note.

On November 2, 2006, Green Bank filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of REM in view of spouses Sademas' failure to settle the second loan.

Spouses Duero opposed the foreclosure. They argued that the first loan had already been paid, making the subject REM extinguished, and the land title with its tax declaration should have been returned to them.

For its part, Green Bank claimed that while it is true that spouses Sadernas had already paid the first loan in full, the second loan they obtained using the same SPA and collateral remained unpaid despite repeated demands.

Subsequently, foreclosure proceedings ensued, and Green Bank emerged as the highest bidder of the subject property. The land title under the name of spouses Duero was then cancelled, and a new one was issued in the name of Green Bank. Aggrieved, spouses Duero filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceedings.

The RTC ruled in spouses Duero favor, noting that since the first loan was already paid in full more than a year earlier than the due date, and the second loan was obtained thereafter, the subject REM could no longer be utilized to secure the second loan because it was deemed extinguished from the time the first loan was paid.

The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceedings. It noted that the "dragnet clause" stipulated in the subject REM expressly stated that it will secure future loans, which included the second loan in the amount of PHP 150,000. This paved the way for spouse Duero to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In ruling in their favor, the high court agreed with the RTC, emphasizing that by the time the second loan was obtained by the spouses Sademas, the first loan had already been fully paid. Consequently, the REM executed by the spouses Duero had already been extinguished upon payment of the original debt and could no longer cover the second loan.

It underscored that, as a general rule, a mortgage is constituted to secure a specific debt and will not be extended to cover subsequently incurred obligations unless such debts are of the same class or so related to the primary debt that the mortgagor’s assent may be inferred.

The highest bench defined the "blanket mortgage" or "dragnet clause" as a stipulation extending the coverage of a mortgage to advances or loans other than those already obtained or specified in the contract.

In this case, the subject REM contains the dragnet clause: "That as security for the payment of the loan or advance in the principal sum of [Php550,000] and such other loans or advances already obtained, or still to be obtained."

The high court rejected East West’s argument that the subject REM secured the second loan by virtue of a dragnet clause. While a REM may, in principle, secure future loans or advances, it held that the stipulation relied upon was too ambiguous considering that there was no specific clause stating that the second loan was secured by the prior mortgage, nor did the second promissory note expressly indicate that it was covered by the REM.

It underscored that absent such clear and unequivocal indications, the dragnet clause could not be enforced to secure the second loan, adding that Green Bank could have avoided the ambiguity had it exercised a little more prudence in drafting the instrument.

The SC said that since Green Bank drafted the contract and created the ambiguity, it should be construed prejudicially against the party that caused it.

P. Abad Law and Co.

24/05/2026

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