Valmores and Valmores Law Offices

09/02/2026

MANDATORY REPORTING WITHIN 72 HOURS

The 72-hour reporting rule is a mandatory requirement for Filipino seafarers following their repatriation. Under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), a seafarer must report to their manning agency within 72 hours (3 working days) of arrival at the point of hire.

Key Requirements and Consequences

Purpose:

This reporting period is primarily for a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.

Consequence of Failure:

Failing to report within this timeframe without a valid reason typically results in the forfeiture of the right to claim disability benefits and sickness allowances.

Exceptions:

The Supreme Court has ruled that this is not an absolute "bright-line" rule.

Exceptions may be granted if:

The seafarer is physically incapacitated (e.g., terminally ill or hospitalized) and unable to report personally.

The employer was already fully aware of the medical condition prior to repatriation and effectively refused or neglected the examination.

Alternative Compliance:

If physically unable to report, sending a written notice to the agency within the same 72-hour window is considered valid compliance.

27/11/2025

The Davantes v. C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. case is a Philippine Supreme Court decision from November 2024 that ruled in favor of seafarer Paolo B. Davantes, reinstating his claim for total and permanent disability benefits against the company. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, finding that Davantes was entitled to benefits because he did not intentionally conceal his pre-existing hypertension and the company failed to issue a final medical assessment.

Key aspects of the case

Paolo B. Davantes vs. C.F. Sharp: Davantes, a seafarer, claimed total and permanent disability benefits after suffering a work-related disability, despite having a pre-existing condition.

Court of Appeals' ruling:

The CA had previously overturned a Labor Arbiter and National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) decision in favor of Davantes, annulling his compensation based on the claim that he concealed his hypertension.

Supreme Court's decision:

The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision, ruling that the evidence did not support the claim of intentional concealment. The Court also reiterated that general waivers and quitclaims can be deemed invalid if executed under duress or inequality.

Entitlement to benefits:

The Supreme Court affirmed that Davantes is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because the company-designated physician did not provide a final and definitive assessment, and the initial pre-employment medical exam was not comprehensive enough to prove intentional concealment of the pre-existing condition.

11/11/2025

SC Clarifies Conditions on Seafarer Disability Benefit Claims

Certain conditions must be met before a seafarer can be barred from claiming disability benefits due to concealment of pre-existing illnesses.

Thus ruled the Supreme Court’s Second Division, in a 14-page Decision penned by Justice Mario V. Lopez, granting the petition for review on certiorari filed by Loue B. Mutia. The petition challenged the rulings by the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which had denied the award of disability benefits in favor of Mutia.

In 2014, Mutia, an assistant cook at the vessel M/V Norwegian Jade, owned by C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (C.F. Sharp Crew), filed a claim for total and permanent disability benefits following incidents of severe back pain and vision disorder while on the job which resulted in his repatriation. Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement covering Mutia’s employment, employees were entitled to a maximum benefit of USD 100,000.00 in case of disability resulting in loss of profession.

Mutia claimed that he was incapacitated to perform his duties for more than 120 days and that the company-designated physician failed to make a definitive assessment of his medical condition within 120 days from the time he was repatriated.

In response, C.F. Sharp Crew argued that Mutia was disqualified from claiming permanent total disability benefits because he materially concealed a pre-existing medical condition during his pre-employment medical examination (PEME). C.F. Sharp Crew claimed that Mutia stated he had no pre-existing medical conditions despite earlier being diagnosed with acute otitis media, an infection of the middle ear.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Mutia, rejecting C.F. Sharp Crew’s defense because Mutia’s prior illness, the ear infection, had no causal connection with Mutia’s present medical illnesses, namely: “L5-S1 dessication with annual tear,” “multiple sclerosis,” “blurring of vision,” and “neuromyelitis optica.”

The NLRC, however, reversed the Labor Arbiter, holding that Section 20(E) of the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), which disqualifies seafarers from claiming disability benefits if they conceal their previous medical condition, applies to all pre-existing illnesses or conditions, with no qualification and exception. The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRC’s ruling, prompting Mutia to file his petition before the Supreme Court.

In ruling in favor of Mutia, the Supreme Court clarified that C.F. Sharp Crew did not dispute that Mutia’s medical conditions were work-related and acquired during the term of his contract. It was also established that the company-designated physician failed to issue a final medical assessment within the prescribed period of 120 days from the time Mutia was repatriated, which makes his disability permanent and total following the Court’s 2015 ruling in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils. v. Quiogue, Jr. Hence, the only issue was whether Mutia was barred from his disability claim under Section 20(E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC for concealing a pre-existing medical condition.

In resolving the issue, the Court held that Section 20(E) must be interpreted in harmony with the other provisions of the 2010 POEA-SEC.

The Court noted that Section 20(A) states that the employer shall be liable when a seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness during the contract term.

Further, Section 1(A)4 requires that the principal/employer/master/company must provide a seaworthy ship and take all reasonable precautions to prevent accident, injury, or sickness to the seafarer. Section 1(A)6 also requires them to provide a workplace conducive for the promotion and protection of the health of the seafarers in accordance with the Maritime Labor Convention 2006, which states that seafarers should be “protected from the financial consequences of sickness, injury or death occurring in connection with their employment.”

Harmonizing all these provisions, the Court held that the reasonable interpretation of Section 20(E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC would be that the concealed illness must be related to the present disability claim for injury or illness. A contrary interpretation would lead to an absurd situation where employers are absolved from liability arising from a work-related illness or injury even if they are negligent in their duties, leaving seafarers disadvantaged, said the Court.

The Court also stressed that consistent with the constitutional policy guaranteeing the full protection of labor, the 2010 POEA-SEC provisions must be construed fairly, reasonably, and liberally in favor of the seafarer.

The Court thus laid down the following conditions that must be complied with before an employer can be freed from liability for a seafarer’s disability arising from a pre-concealed illness or injury:

The seafarer is suffering from a pre-existing illness or injury as defined under Item 11(b) of the 2010 POEA-SEC;
The seafarer intentionally concealed the illness or injury; and
The concealed pre-existing illness or injury has a causal or reasonable connection with the illness or injury suffered during the seafarer’s contract.
“In the absence of these conditions, the employers remain liable for work-related injury or illness consistent with their duties to provide a seaworthy ship and to take precautions to avoid the seafarer’s accident,” said the Court.

In the case of Mutia, the Court found that all the three conditions were not met.

Under Item 11(b) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, pre-existing illness refers to a continuing illness or condition that cannot be diagnosed during the PEME. In the case of Mutia, however, there was no proof that Mutia’s ear condition still persisted at the time of the PEME. In addition, the PEME itself diagnosed Mutia as having “mild hearing loss.” Hence, Mutia’s ear infection did not qualify as a pre-existing illness, the Court ruled.

On the second condition, the Court held that the unrelatedness of Mutia’s prior ear illness and his present medical conditions negated an intent to profit from the concealment.

Finally, the third condition was likewise absent since it was not established by C.F. Sharp Crew that Mutia’s prior ear condition caused or aggravated his present medical illnesses of “L5-S1 dessication with annual tear,” “multiple sclerosis,” “blurring of vision,” and “neuromyelitis optica.”

The Court concluded that Mutia is therefore entitled to a total and permanent disability benefit of USD 100,000.00 under the CBA, plus 10% attorney’s fees, with a legal interest of 6% upon finality of the decision until fully paid.

FULL TEXT OF G.R. NO. 242928 dated June 27, 2022 at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/242928-loue-b-mutia-vs-c-f-sharp-crew-mgt-inc-norwegian-cruise-lines-m-v-norwegian-jade-and-juan-jose-p-rocha/

(Courtesy of the Supreme Court Public Information Office)

10/07/2025

SEAFARER DEATH AND BENEFITS
By Atty. Ma. Cristina A. Ramos-Beltran

Majority of the cases decided by the Philippine Supreme Court involving seafarers deal with death, disability and sickness benefits. Hence, I have decided to write about the commonly litigated like seafarer's death compensable, benefits in work-related death.

Work-related death.

The 'Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships' (POEA Contract) defines 'work-related illness' and 'work-related injury'. However, no definition of 'work-related' death is provided. Following the definition of 'work-related injury', i.e., "injury arising out of and in the course of employment," 'work-related death' may be defined as 'death arising out of and in the course of employment.'

When death compensable.

Instead of providing for a definition of 'work-related death', the POEA Contract sets out rules to determine if the death of a seafarer is compensable or not:

1. If the seafarer dies during the term of his contract, the death must be work-related to be compensable. The question of whether the death of a seafarer is work-related or not has been a perennial issue in court cases. In resolving the issue of compensability of death, the guiding principle is whether the death arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, it is not enough that the seafarer dies during the term of his contract. The claimant (seafarer's beneficiary) has the duty to show the causal connection between the seafarer's death and his work;

2. Death caused by warlike activity while the ship is sailing within a declared war zone or war risk area is compensable;

3. If the seafarer dies during, or even after, the term of his contract as a result of an occupational disease, his death is compensable if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

• The seafarer's work must involve the risks described in Section 32-A as appertaining to the occupational disease that resulted in his death. If the death is caused by a disease not listed in Section 32-A, such disease is disputably presumed as 'work-related' or occupational;
• The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
• The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and,
• There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

It is also important that the seafarer did not knowingly conceal a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). Section 20(E) of the POEA Contract provides that such concealment disqualifies the seafarer/beneficiary from any compensation and benefits. It is, of course, the duty of the employer to prove that the seafarer had knowingly concealed a pre-existing illness or condition.

4. Death which is directly caused by sexually transmitted disease or arose from complications thereof is not compensable.

5. If the seafarer's death is a result of his wilful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, his death is not compensable. However, it is the duty of the employer to prove that the seafarer's death is attributable to the seafarer.

Compensation and benefits.
If the seafarer's death is compensable, what benefits his beneficiary can get?

1. In case of work-related death during the term of his contract, the beneficiary of the seafarer shall get whichever is higher between the benefits under the applicable CBA or the following:

• US$50,000
• US$7,000 for each child under 21 years of age, but not exceeding four (4) children
• US$1000 for burial expenses and
• All outstanding obligations due the seafarer under his contract, i.e., unpaid wages, earned leave pay, etc.
These benefits shall be paid in Philippine currency at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, not the exchange rate at the time of the incident or death.

2. Where the death of the seafarer is caused by warlike activity while sailing within a declared war zone or war risk area, the compensation payable shall be doubled.

3. The above benefits shall be on top of or in addition to Social Security System (SSS), Overseas Worker Welfare Administration (OWWA), Employee's Compensation Commission (ECC), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) and Pag-ibig Fund benefits which the seafarer is entitled to.

4. The employer shall also shoulder the cost of transporting the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines. But the employer is not obliged to cause the transport of the remains of the seafarer if such transport is prohibited by the law of the port or place where the death occurred.

05/11/2024

Contract termination and medical repatriation in compensation cases


A seafarer is entitled to compensation even if he finished his contract as long as he already had medical conditions while onboard during his employment.

The issue of repatriation due to contract termination and not on medical grounds was one of the defenses raised by the company in the case of Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. vs Clarito Manzano ( G.R. No. 210329 March 18 2021).

While the seafarer was working aboard the vessel , he slipped and fell from an elevated height and initially landed on his right knee. Consequently, he suffered from severe pain on his right knee, the right side of his body, and his lumbar region, which prompted him to request to consult a doctor.

He was brought to a hospital in New Jersey, USA where he was found to be suffering from "soft tissue injury, arthralgia, effusion.”
Upon follow-up check-up, he was found to be suffering from a sprained knee.

Before he was repatriated for end of contract, he also consulted a company-designated physician in Oman and was found suffering from “costochondritis and myalgia in his right shoulder.”
Upon his arrival in Manila, the company designated physician ordered for an MRl on his right upper extremity.

He was found to be suffering from “supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendinosis; increased signal intensity in the labrum indicative of tear; moderate acromioclavicular joint hypertrophy; and had minimal fluid in his subacromial-subdeltoid bursa.”

Another MRl on lumbosacral spine showed that he was suffering from “degenerative disk disease at L3-L4 and L5-S1; mild posterior disk bulge with encroachment into the right neural canal at L3-L4.”

His condition did not improve despite undergoing treatments for several months,

He then opted to consult another doctor who found him suffering from “a swollen right knee with inability to squat; atrophy of quadriceps and calf muscles; limited movement of right shoulder because of pain; limited shoulder abduction which only reached 90 degrees; tensed and spastic paraspinal muscles; and limited trunk movement.”

The employer denied liability for disability benefits on the grounds that the seafarer finished his contract and was not medically repatriated.

Since one of the requirements for an illness or death to be compensable is that the seafarer suffered said illness during the effectivity of the POEA contract, it is imperative that his condition or symptoms must be documented while he is on board the vessel.

Otherwise, his claim for benefits might be denied due to failure to prove that said illness occurred while his contract is still in force.

The benefits are coterminous with the existence of the contract they sign every time they are rehired and is terminated when the contract expires.

The contract commences from the time when the seafarer actually departs from Philippines, either airport or seaport, for employment. It shall cease when he completes his period of contractual service aboard the ship, signs-off from the ship and arrives at the point of hire.

The Supreme Court downplayed the employer’s argument noting that while it is true that the seafarer was repatriated because his contract had already ended, the injuries he complained of initially manifested while on board the vessel .

The Court cited the ruling in the case of Ventis Maritime Corp. v. Salenga ( GR. No. 238578, June 8, 2020) where it was ruled that the seafarer may still claim disability benefits even if his illnesses manifested or were discovered after the term of the contract.

“In instances where the illness manifests itself or is discovered after the term of the seafarer's contract, the illness may either be (I) an occupational illness listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, in which case, it is categorized as a work-related illness if it complies with the conditions stated in Section 32-A, or (2) an illness not listed as an occupational illness under Section 32-A but is reasonably linked to the work of the seafarer”, the Court said.

A seafarer who was repatriated for end of contract and had no medical condition during his employment but later suffers from an illness which manifested only after the end of his employment can still be entitled to disability benefits provided, he can prove that the illness suffered is reasonably linked to the work performed on board.

The Court stressed in the instant Manzano case that it is absurd to say that the seafarer, who was repatriated for end of contract but already had medical conditions while onboard during his employment, is not entitled to disability benefits while a seafarer, who was likewise repatriated for end of contract but suffered from an illness which manifested only after repatriation, is entitled to the same benefits.

(CTTO pinoymarinorights.blogspot)

05/11/2024

GUIDELINES GOVERNING SEAFARERS’ CLAIMS FOR PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS

In the case of Jebsens’ Maritime Inc., et al. vs. Florvin G. Rapiz (G.R. No. 218871, 11 January 2017), the Supreme Court reiterated the guidelines governing seafarers’ claims for permanent and total disability benefits:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

Jebsens Maritime Inc., et al. vs. Florvin G. Rapiz
(G.R. No. 218871, 11 January 2017)

17/07/2024

SC: Only Legal Spouse, Children May Receive Seafarer Death Benefits

The Supreme Court has ruled that benefits arising from a seafarer’s death under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) contract should be awarded only to the surviving legitimate spouse, despite being long estranged from the seafarer, alongside the seafarer’s legitimate and illegitimate children.

Thus held the Supreme Court’s Third Division in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa ordering the release of death benefits due the heirs of deceased seafarer Pedrito G. Macalinao (Pedrito).

Pedrito married Cerena in 1981. They had one child, Cindy. However, the spouses separated in fact after four years.

In 1990, with his marriage to Cerena still subsisting, Pedrito married Elenita. They had two children, Kenneth and Kristel.

Cerena herself contracted a second marriage in 1992, with Rene Paredes.

Elenita and Pedrito, a seafarer, lived together until his death in 2015 onboard the vessel of Excel Marine Co. Ltd./Fair Shipping Corporation (Excel Marine). His death benefits amounted to PHP 4,506,309.52, the only property he left upon his death.

In 2016, Cerena and Cindy filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the settlement of Pedrito’s estate, which included as a secondary issue the declaration of nullity of Pedrito and Elenita’s marriage.

The RTC ruled that the death benefits formed part of Pedrito’s estate and that under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of 2010 (POEA MC), they shall be divided among the beneficiaries in accordance with the rules on succession. The RTC held that Elenita, despite being the nominated beneficiary, is not entitled to Pedrito’s death benefits since their marriage is bigamous and void.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

The Supreme Court, however, held that the death benefits do not form part of Pedrito’s estate. Under Article 781 of the Civil Code, what forms part of the estate is property existing at the time of death.

However, in the case of the death benefits from the employment contract between Excel Marine and Pedrito, these benefits only arose upon Pedrito’s death and did not exist at the time of his death.

As to the division of the proceeds from the death benefits, Section 20.B.(3) of the POEA MC states that benefits for the seafarer’s death are payable to the seafarer’s beneficiaries consistent with the rules of succession under the Civil Code.

Such benefits are payable to the legal heirs not as inheritance but as proceeds from a death benefit.

The beneficiaries, however, must be determined in accordance with the rules of compulsory and intestate succession.

The Court held that Elenita is disqualified as a beneficiary since she is not Pedrito’s legal spouse, and their marriage was clearly bigamous and void from the beginning. Elenita’s supposed lack of knowledge of Pedrito’s subsisting marriage to Cerena is not a defense.

That Cerena herself entered into a bigamous marriage with another does not validate Pedrito and Elenita’s bigamous marriage. This, along with the fact that Cerena has been separated from Pedrito for 30 years, likewise does not disqualify Cerena, Pedrito’s legal wife, as one of his beneficiaries.

The Court acknowledged that, unlike the Social Security Act, Government Service Insurance System Law, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the POEA MC does not apply the test of dependency in determining the qualified beneficiary. However, this perceived gap in the law is for Congress to address, not the Court.

As to the distribution of the benefits among the legal heirs, the Court clarified that when the concurring primary compulsory heirs are the surviving spouse, one legitimate child, and illegitimate children, Article 892 of the Civil Code shall apply, subject to Article 895 of the same law, as amended by Article 176 of the Family Code.

Under Article 892, if only one legitimate child survives, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-fourth of the estate. On the other hand, Article 895, as amended by the Family Code, provides that if illegitimate children survive with legitimate children, the shares for each of the former shall consist of one-half of the share of each legitimate child, provided that the share of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied.

The Court further clarified that the correct approach would be to determine and satisfy first the share of each legitimate child/ren, then the share of the surviving spouse in relation to the number of legitimate children. Finally, the share of the illegitimate child/ren will be taken from the remaining free portion of the hereditary estate.

Thus, in the present case, the Court ordered that the proceeds from Pedrito’s death benefits be distributed as follows: one-fourth to Cerena; one-half to Cindy; one-eighth to Kenneth; and one-eighth to Kristel. (Courtesy of the Supreme Court Public Information Office)

16/11/2023

SC Upholds Disability Claims of Seafarer Injured while Playing Basketball

The Supreme Court has ordered a ship management company and its corporate officers to pay US$90,000 as total and permanent disability benefits to its seafarer employee who suffered an injury while playing basketball on board a ship during his free time.

In a 21-page Decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the Court granted the petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Rosell R. Arguilles (Arguilles) which sought to annul and set aside the January 24, 2020 Decision and November 9, 2020 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). The said issuances of the CA affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Resolution which, in turn, reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter in favor of Arguilles in a complaint for disability benefits against his former employer, respondents Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc., its principal Wilhelmsen Ship Management Ltd., and Fausto R. Preysler, Jr.

Arguilles, a Seaman, suffered an ankle injury on December 26, 2016, while playing basketball on board the vessel M/V Toronto. Despite medical repatriation and surgery, his disability claims which were initially granted by the Labor Arbiter was later reversed by the NLRC, a decision affirmed by the CA. The Supreme Court, however, ruled in favor of Arguilles, emphasizing that playing basketball was an employer-sanctioned activity and not a reckless or deliberate act, making the injury compensable. The Court emphasized the relevance of the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract and the collective bargaining agreement in determining Arguilles' claims, stating that the injury fell within the definition of a work-related injury. Additionally, the Court highlighted the duty of employers to provide a seaworthy ship and take precautions to prevent accidents and injuries to the crew, as outlined in the POEA SEC.

The Court also held that Arguilles' entitlement to full disability benefits had lapsed due to the absence of a certification within specified periods, and it declared the corporate officers jointly and severally liable with the ship management company for the total judgment award, citing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

Read more at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-upholds-disability-claims-of-seafarer-injured-while-playing-basketball/. Read the Decision in full at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/254586-rosell-r-arguilles-vs-wilhelmsen-smith-bell-manning-inc-wilhelmsen-ship-management-ltd-and-fausto-r-preysler-jr/.

13/04/2023

DOLE’s NCMB Seafarers’ resolves claims through conciliation-mediation

NCMB Executive Director Reynaldo R. Ubaldo reported to Labor and Employment Secretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz the settlement through conciliation of the complaint filed by the family of a seafarer who died while on seafaring duty.

The complaint, involving Adfil Shipmanning and Management Corporation, was filed by the family of Resty G. Artuz who was a bosun on board the MV Unta.

The company hired Artuz for a period of ten months. While on board the vessel, he fell to the waters and his body was not recovered.

Artuz’s wife, Rosita, and their son, Renald, accompanied by Atty. Romulo P. Valmores, came to the NCMB NCR regional office to request assistance in claiming the death benefits of the deceased bosun, including attorney’s fees and other damages.

On the same day, Rosita and Renald and the representatives of Adfil Shipmanning and Management Corporation mutually agreed to the amount of $91,882 as full and complete settlement of the complainants’ claims.
The complainants received the amount of $72,655.98 (roughly P3 M) after deducting advance payments of $19,226.02 made by the AMOSUP and AMWA. They also signed their quitclaim in favor of the company on the same day.

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27/03/2023

In case the Court finds illegal dismissal, how much should be awarded to the seafarer.

Two factors are to be considered in such an award:

1) the unexpired portion of the contract and;

2) the computation of the monthly salaries to be awarded.

Unexpired portion of the contract
The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 (RA 8042) provides for the rule on the entitlement of an overseas Filipino worker (OFW, such as a seafarer) in the event that dismissal from employment is illegal:

"Sec. 10. Money Claims. - . . . In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."

Starting with Marsaman Manning Agency v. NLRC (1999), the Supreme Court had interpreted the said provision to mean that if an OFW is illegally dismissed from employment, and his employment contract is for one year or more, he may be awarded unearned salaries for the remainder of the unexpired portion of the contract or three months salaries whichever is less. However, if the employment contract is less than one year, an illegally dismissed OFW shall be entitled to the unearned wages corresponding to his unexpired portion of his contract.

By way of example, if Mr. A was hired for a period of 2 years to work overseas and he was illegally dismissed on his 17th month of employment, he will only be entitled to three months salaries although there is an unexpired portion of his contract equivalent to 7 months. On the other hand, if Mr. B was hired for a period of 10 months and he was illegally dismissed on the 2nd month of employment, he would be entitled to his 8 months wages for the unexpired portion of his contract.

This scheme persisted until 2009 when the Supreme Court in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. declared the provision "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" of RA 8042 to be unconstitutional as it violates the Constitution's equal protection clause. In this case, the seafarer was awarded wages for the unexpired portion of his contract equivalent to 9 months and 23 days although the original employment contract was for 1 year.

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