13/03/2025
LEGAL UPDATES BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
EVOLUTION OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL INSTITUTION
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:
“Section 1. How instituted. For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal actions shall be as follows:
(a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
(b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint or information directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal’s office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged.”
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“Section 1. Institution of criminal actions.—Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:
(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to section 1 of Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation.
(b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.
Prior to the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, there are three principles involving institution of criminal action: (1) Franciso case interpreting the word “complaint” in Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Zaldivia case interpreting the words “judicial proceedings” in Act No. 3326; and (3) Zalvia case recognizing that the old Rule on Summary Procedure is an exception to the general rule on institution of criminal action under the old Rule on Criminal Procedure.
FRANCISCO PRINCIPLE AND ARTICLE 91 OF THE RPC
Prescription of felony is governed by Article 91 of the RPC, which provides “the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.” According to the case of Francisco vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, May 30, 1983, which affirmed the principle in People vs. Olarte, G.R. No. L-22465, February 28, 1967, the filling of complaint for preliminary investigation in the prosecutor’s office interrupts the running of prescription of simple slander because Article 91 does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed in the prosecutor’s office for preliminary investigation or in court for action on the merit. If the complaint filed with the prosecutor’s office will not interrupt the running of prescription, it will unjustly deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of prosecutor’s delays in resolving the preliminary investigation that are not under his control. Moreover, the filing of complaint for preliminary investigation already represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender.
The 1988 amendment inserted “in all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged” in Section 1, Rule 110 of 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. According to CA Justice Oscar Herrera, the 1988 amendment adopted the Francisco principle. (See: Remedial Law, Vol. IV, by Oscar Herrera, p. 59)
Under 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the institution of criminal action that will interrupt the running of prescription shall be by filing of a complaint with appropriate officer (now the prosecutor) for preliminary investigation or complaint with the office of the city prosecutor. In sum, the old Rule and New Rule on Criminal Procedure adopted the Francico doctrine, which ruled the filling of complaint for preliminary investigation in the prosecutor’s office interrupts the running of prescription.
ZALDIVIA, PANAGUITON AND ACT NO. 3326
Under Act No. 3326, the prescription shall be interrupted when judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment are instituted against the guilty person.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, the filling of complaint for preliminary investigation in the prosecutor’s office would not interrupt the running of prescription for violation of ordinance because the proceedings in Act No. 3326 are “judicial proceedings,” which does not include administrative proceedings or preliminary investigation.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal procedure adopted the Zaldivia’s interpretation by adding the phrase “unless otherwise provided in special laws” in Section 1, Rule 110. The words “special laws” pertain to Act No. 3326 as interpreted by Zaldivia and other laws that may be enacted by Congress.
According to CA Justice Oscar Herrera, in view of the ruling of Zaldivia that the rules cannot amend special laws and under Act No. 3326, the period of prescription for offense punishable by special laws shall only be interrupted upon the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure has accordingly been amended to except therefrom offenses punishable by special laws so far as a prescription is concerned. (See: Remedial Law, Vol. IV, by Oscar Herrera, p. 59-60)
However, the Supreme Court in Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, expressly abandoned the Zaldivia interpretation. It was held that under Act No. 3326, the running of the prescription of an offense punishable under special law shall be interrupted when “judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment” are instituted against the guilty person. The proceeding is described as “judicial” since when Act No. 3326 was passed on December 4, 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace. Considering that preliminary investigation in a criminal case for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term “proceedings” should now be understood either as executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. Hence, the institution of a proceeding, whether executive or judicial, interrupts the running of the prescriptive period.
Applying the Panaguiton principle, the commencement of the following proceedings for the prosecution of the accused effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offense charged:
1. Preliminary investigation by the Office of the City Prosecutor for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008; People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012) or for sexual harassment with the prosecutor’s office. (People vs. Lee, G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019)
2. Investigation by the Securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act (SEC v. Interport Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008); and
3. Preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman for violation of RA No. 3019 (Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 and 174764-65, September 11, 2013; Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 245862, November 3, 2020)
ZALDIVIA AND RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1964 Rules of Court provides that all criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or information. This provision did not provide an exception to the rule on institution of criminal action. At the time, there was no rule on summary procedure. However, the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure provided a different rule on commencement of criminal action. Section 9 of the old Rule on Summary Procedure provides:
“Section 9 - The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.”
Under Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, “for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases,” the institution of criminal actions shall be complaint with appropriate officer (now the fiscal) for preliminary investigation in RTC cases; or complaint with the fiscal’s office or complaint or information in court for MTC or MCTC cases; or complaint with the fiscal’s office for MTC or MCTC cases in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities. In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged. The phrase “for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases” is added in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in recognition of the different rule on criminal institution under the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, the filling of complaint for preliminary investigation in the prosecutor’s office would not interrupt the running of prescription for violation of ordinance on two grounds: (1) The proceedings in Act No. 3326 are “judicial proceedings,” which does not include administrative proceedings or preliminary investigation; and (2) The rule that institution of criminal action by filing complaint for preliminary investigation under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not apply to cases involving violation of ordinance since these cases are covered by the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure, which requires filing of complaint or information in court to commence criminal action. In sum for violation of ordinance, the running of prescription for violation of ordinance will only be interrupted by the institution of judicial proceeding or filing of complaint or information in court. It should be noted the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was not involved in the Zaldivia case because the information in this case was filed in 1990.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-discussed adopted the Zaldivia in connection with the interpretation of words “judicial proceedings” in Act No. 3326. However, the Panaguiton case abandoned the Zaldivia interpretation. On the other hand, according to CA Justice Oscara Herrera, and Ruben Agpalao, by deleting the phrase “for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases” found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect abandoned the Zaldivia principle, which excepted cases covered by the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure from the general rule on criminal institution under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Agpalo explained that the deletion of the phrase “For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases” in Section 1 and the addition of the phrase “or complaint with the office of the prosecutor” in Section 1 (b) have abandoned the rule (Zaldivia principle) that the filing offenses governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure is interrupted only by the filling of complaint or information in court. (Handbook on Criminal Procedure, by Ruben Agpalo, p. 23).
Herrera explained that the opening phrase in the former rule – “For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases” was deleted. This phrase was one of the basis of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes excluding offenses subject to summary procedure from the general rule on the interruption of the period of prescription. Under the amendment, “the institution of all criminal actions shall be the same.”
It should be noted that the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure modified the rule on criminal institution under the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure. Section 11 of the former provides:
“The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.”
While the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure used the phrase “by complaint x x x filed directly in court,” the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure used the word “complaint” without expressly distinguishing if the complaint is filed in court or in the prosecutor’s office. The use of word “complaint” without distinction in the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure seems to justify the Herrera and Agpalo theory that the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect abandoned the Zaldivia principle excluding cases covered the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure from the general rule on criminal institution.
Section 1, Rule III-B of the 2022 Rules on Expediated Procedure in the First Level Court provides
“Section 1. How commenced; fi ling and service. – The fi ling of criminal cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure shall either be by complaint or by information.”
Under the 2022 Rules on Expediated Procedure in the First Level Court, the rule on institution of criminal action under the Rule on Summary Procedure also used the word “complaint” without distinction.
In Reodica vs. CA, G.R. No. 125066, July 8, 1998, the case involved reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. The Supreme Court adopted the Fransico interpretation of the word “complaint” in Article 91 of the RPC. Thus, the filing of complaint with the prosecutor’s office interrupted the running of prescription even though the case is covered by the rule on summary procedure. In People vs. Bautista, G.R. NO. 168641, April 27, 2007, the Supreme Court also applied the Francisco principle to slight physical injuries, which was covered by the rule on summary procedure.
JADEWELL, DESIERTO AND CORPUS
Prior to the cases of Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua, Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013, Republic vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, January 16, 2023 and Corpus vs. People, G.R. No. 255740, August 16, 2023, the rule is that the filing of complaint with the prosecutor’s office interrupted the running of prescription regardless of whether the crime is a felony under the RPC or offense punishable under special law (People v. Pangilinan, supra) and even though the case is covered by the rule on summary procedure. (Reodica vs. CA, supra; People vs. Bautista, supra). However, the Jadewell, Desierto and Corpus modified the rule on institution of criminal action.
In Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua, Sr., supra, the Supreme Court affirmed the Zaldivia principle, which interpreted the words “institution of judicial proceedings,” in Act No. 3326 as filling of information in court. Moreover, the provision in the old Rules on Criminal Procedure regarding the interruption of prescription by institution of criminal action is not applicable to violation of ordinance because case involving this crime is covered by the old Rules on Summary Procedure, which provides that only the filing of an information (or complaint) in court will commence criminal action that tolls the prescriptive period. Hence, the filing of complaint involving violation of ordinance for preliminary investigation with the prosecutor’s office will not interrupt the running of 2-month prescription for violation of ordinance.
The Jadewell case, which affirmed the Zaldivia interpretation of the phrase “institution of judicial proceedings,” is not compatible with Panaguiton case, Pangilinan case, Perez case and other cases which rejected the Zaldivia interpretation. Because of this incompatibility, the Supreme Court in People vs. Lee, G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019 ruled that Jadewell case applies only to violation of ordinance while Pangalinan case applies to violation of special law. However, Republic vs. Desierto, supra, the Supreme Court modified the Lee principle and expanded the coverage of the Jadewell by applying it to case involving offense under special law such as violation of BP Blg. 22, which is covered by the rule on summary procedure. However, Panaguiton case, Pangalinan case, and Perez case will still apply to special laws such as a violation of RA 3019, which are not covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. It was ruled in Desierto that:
“Hence, for special laws within the scope of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the principle laid down in Zaldivia and Jadewell is controlling, i.e. violations of municipal or city ordinance, and BP 22. Accordingly, the ruling in Panaguiton with respect to interruption of prescription of BP 22 shall govern only those acts committed when BP 22 is not yet covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, i.e. before the effectivity of A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC on April 15, 2003. Thus, for acts committed on April 15, 2003 onwards, the filing of complaint or information in court shall interrupt the running of the prescriptive period and not the institution of the preliminary investigation by investigating agencies or the filing of a complaint before such investigating agencies. However, in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, only the filing of Information in court shall toll the running of the prescriptive period.
“As to other special laws not covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, such as a violation of RA3019, the rule is that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation. Plainly, the ruling laid down in Perez and Pangilinan, as well as the justification elucidated. in Panaguiton, are relevant and appropriate in the case at bar.”
The Zaldivia and Jadewell, and Desierto involved the interpretation of Act No. 3326, which governed interruption of prescription for violation of ordinance and offense punishable under special laws, and not Article 91 of the RPC, which governed interruption of prescription of felony. However, in the case of People vs. Corpus, supra, the Supreme Court expanded the coverage of Zaldivia and Jadewell and Desierto by applying it to case involving a felony, which is covered by the rule on summary procedure. In Corpus, it was ruled that
“Nonetheless, this Court clarified in the more recent case of Republic v. Desierto (Desierto) that for crimes falling under the Rules of Summary Procedure and within the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Manila, the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 of the RPC is that which is filed in the proper court and not the complaint lodged by the offended party before the prosecutor's office: x x x
“As a final note, despite the filing of the Complaint-Affidavit by Roberto on January 8, 2018 before the prosecutor's office, it took the latter more than four months, or only on May 21 , 201 8, to file the Information before the MeTC. While this Court now acquits Pastor on the basis thereof, there is truth in the precept we have laid down in Panaguiton that aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
"In this connection, the court exhorts prosecutors to diligently discharge their functions by keeping in mind the prescriptive period of the crimes contained in the complaints lodged before them, and on the basis thereof, timely file the necessary Information before the proper court.”
In summary, the rules on institution of criminal action that interrupts the running of prescription will depend on the applicable procedural rule.
If the case involving offense under special law is covered by the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Panaguiton’s interpretation of the words “judicial proceedings” in Act No. 3326 applies. Judicial proceeding includes administrative proceeding or preliminary investigation. Hence, the filing of complaint with the prosecutor’s office for preliminary investigation interrupts the running of prescriptive period.
If the case involving violation of ordinance and offense under special law is covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, the Zaldivia’s, Jadewel’s and Desierto’s interpretation of the words “judicial proceedings” in Act No. 3326 applies. Judicial proceedings do not include administrative proceedings or preliminary investigations. Hence, the filing of complaint with the prosecutor’s office for preliminary investigation will not interrupt the running of prescriptive period.
If the case involving felony under the RPC is covered by the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Francisco’s interpretation of the word “complaint” in Article 91 of RPC applies. The said complaint includes that filed with the prosecutor’s office for preliminary investigation. Hence, the filing of complaint with the prosecutor’s office for preliminary investigation interrupts the running of prescriptive period.
If the case involving felony under the RPC is covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, the Corpuz’s interpretation of the word “complaint” in Article 91 of RPC applies. The said complaint does not include that filed with the prosecutor’s office for preliminary investigation. Hence, the filing of complaint with the prosecutor’s office for preliminary investigation will not interrupt the running of prescriptive period.
DEBATE
Several years ago, there was already a debate on the rule involving the interruption of the running of prescription. At that time, the old Rules of Court did not expressly provide a rule on interruption of the running of prescription, and there was no rule on summary procedure. In People vs. Tayco, G.R. Nos. L-48707-48709, December 5, 1941, People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960 and People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963, the Supreme Court ruled that the complaint in Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is that filed in court for action on the merits. However, the Supreme Court in Olarte in 1967 overruled the principle in Del Rosario, Coquia, and Tayco and held that the filing of the complaint for purposes of investigation should interrupt the period of prescription of criminal responsibility. In Francisco in 1983, the Supreme Court affirmed the Olarte doctrine. In Cuaresma 1989 (G.R. No. L-67787, April 18, 1989, Reodica), Reodica in 1988 and Bautista in 2007 affirmed the Olarte and Francisco. After forty-four years, the Supreme Court in Corpus in 2023 modified the landmark case of Olarte.
Several cases affirmed the 2008 case of Panaguiton, and yet, Jadewell in 2013 and Desierto in 2023 modified the Panaguiton.
There is also a debate among experts on the subject issues. Some sided with Jadewell case, Desierto case and Corpus case. The opinion of this writer however is different from the rulings in Jadewell case, Desierto case and Corpus case. With due respect to the Supreme Court, this writer humbly opined that the Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and Act No. 3326, which are not subject to judicial modification for being substantive laws, should be interpreted “uniformly” regardless of whether the cases are covered by the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rules on Summary Procedure. This writer side with the statement in Pangilinan case that:
“There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription.”
However, for purpose of the bar exam, the principles in Jadewell case, Desierto case and Corpus case should be followed.
