Beluan Law

15/09/2026

“Under AC No. 28-2008, the SC exercises administrative supervision over locally-funded employees, or an individuals employed and paid by the LGU, to first- or second-level courts to help in the administration of justice, during the period of their detail.

“But before they can be detailed to these courts, they must first secure permission from the SC, through the OCA. Because this approval is required, any detail made without it is considered void.

“In the case of Corpuz, SC could not impose the administrative fine because her detail was invalid. Thus, it did not acquire administrative supervision or disciplinary jurisdiction over her. However, it has the inherent power to cite a person in contempt for conduct that tends to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.“

08/09/2026

Suspension of work and court operations in Cebu on September 9, 2026

01/09/2026

"The SC explained that affidavits of desistance by victims of exploitation should be treated with caution, as they may have been made under coercion, pressure, or undue influence. This is especially true when the victims are children, who may not fully understand the consequences of withdrawing their testimony."

The (SC) has ruled that an affidavit of desistance, or a sworn statement withdrawing a complaint, is considered “highly suspect” when made by a victim of exploitation and cannot be used as a basis to dismiss a trafficking case.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division affirmed the conviction of a woman for qualified trafficking in persons involving a minor. The SC sentenced her to life imprisonment, imposed a fine of PHP 2,000,000, and ordered her to pay PHP 600,000 in damages.

The woman, who was the minor’s neighbor, recruited the minor to provide sexual services to a man in exchange for money. The minor received PHP 15,000 from the man for the sexual act, but the woman later took the money. The woman also bought the minor a cellphone and gave her PHP 3,000.

The minor’s mother discovered the incident and filed a complaint against the woman. The minor testified in court but later signed an affidavit of desistance to withdraw the charges.

During cross-examination, the minor admitted that she accepted PHP 30,000 to sign the affidavit prepared by the woman’s counsel. When the trial court questioned her further, the minor maintained that her earlier testimony was true.

Sustaining the woman’s conviction of qualified trafficking in persons under Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, or the 𝗔𝗻𝘁𝗶-𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝗻 𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗔𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝟮𝟬𝟬𝟯, as amended, SC held that human trafficking cases should not be dismissed based on the affidavits of desistance executed by the victims or their parents or legal guardians.

The SC explained that affidavits of desistance by victims of exploitation should be treated with caution, as they may have been made under coercion, pressure, or undue influence. This is especially true when the victims are children, who may not fully understand the consequences of withdrawing their testimony.

The SC further stressed that once a criminal case has been filed in court, the complainant can no longer decide whether the case should proceed.

The State has an interest in prosecuting the crime and is the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action. Thus, an affidavit of desistance, especially one executed while trial is ongoing, does not, by itself, justify dismissal of the case.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172431

Read the full text of the Decision at
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=167240

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25/08/2026

Those whose air travel is merely incidental to their functions are not entitled to Fly Risk Pay (FRP) under RA 776.

The (SC) has ruled that Flying Risk Pay (FRP) under Republic Act No. (RA) 776, or 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘈𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴, may be granted only to Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) personnel whose duties are directly related to flight operations.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of FRP paid to certain CAAP officials and employees whose duties were primarily managerial, administrative, or financial.

Under Section 30 of RA 776, CAAP-licensed airmen and other authorized personnel who are required to make regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties may receive FRP equivalent to 50% of their salary, provided they complete at least four hours of flight time per month.

In 2011, CAAP granted FRP to officials and employees who met the four-hour monthly flight requirement. Some recipients, however, held managerial, administrative, and finance positions and traveled by air mainly to attend conferences, seminars, public hearings, inspections, and similar activities.

COA disallowed PHP 323,579.50 in FRP payments, finding that the benefit was intended for personnel whose duties involved aerial and flight operations.

The recipients argued that they were entitled to FRP because RA 776 covers not only “airmen” but also “other authorized personnel,” even if their duties were not directly related to flight operations.

The SC upheld the disallowance.

Citing RA 776, which defines an “airman” as a pilot, mechanic, flight radio operator, aircraft crew member, or a person responsible for inspecting, maintaining, or repairing aircraft,” the SC clarified that the phrase “other authorized personnel” refers to personnel who are required to perform regular and frequent aerial flights as part of their official duties.

The SC also cited the 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘶𝘢𝘭, which limits FRP to personnel whose duties are inherent in flight operations and excludes those who fly merely as passengers.

In this case, the recipient’s air travel was only incidental to their managerial, administrative, or financial duties. Their flights were for meetings, conferences, inspections, and other administrative activities, rather than for flight operations. As passengers, they were not entitled to FPR.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171845.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165944.

Read the full text of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa’s Concurring Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165939.

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20/08/2026

Pay on Ninoy Aquino Day

18/08/2026

Void marriage, although not judicially declared, and absent additional evidence of its validity, creates reasonable doubt.

The has acquitted a woman of bigamy, ruling that a prior marriage that was void from the beginning (𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘣 𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰) may be raised as a defense even without a prior judicial declaration of nullity.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Pampanga and the Court of Appeals (CA), which had found Ma. Fe Imelda Lapira guilty of bigamy.

Lapira faced a bigamy charge under Article 349 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 for marrying Jimmy Fariscal while still married to Takahiko Sato as evidenced by a marriage certificate from the Office of the Civil Registrar General.

During trial, Lapira argued that her marriage to Sato was void because no ceremony took place and no marriage license had been issued, both of which were required for validity. The Local Civil Registrar confirmed that there was no record of the application for a marriage license for Lapira and Sato.

In acquitting Lapira, the SC applied its ruling in the 2021 case of 𝘗𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘥𝘰 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, which held that an accused in a bigamy case may directly argue that a previous marriage is void as a defense, even without a prior court declaration.

The SC explained that one of the essential elements of bigamy is the existence of a valid prior marriage. If the first marriage was void from the beginning, that element is absent.

In this case, the certification from the Local Civil Registrar sufficiently proved that no marriage license was issued to Lapira and Sato. This certification was enough to counter the presumption of the marriage certificate’s validity.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171178.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165698.

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11/08/2026

“Under Article 294 of the Labor Code, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages and other benefits. The SC explained that they are considered to have remained employed during the period covered by their backwages and are therefore entitled to the rights and benefits that would have accrued during that period.”

The has ruled that employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled not only to full backwages but also to the remittance of their Social Security System (SSS) contributions.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division held that an employer’s obligation to remit SSS contributions continues during the period covered by an employee’s illegal dismissal.

The case involved four employees of Lopez Sugar Corporation (LSC) who were illegally dismissed. LSC was ordered to reinstate them to their former positions and pay them full backwages. After the ruling became final, the employees asked LSC to remit their SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages so they could qualify for retirement benefits.

LSC refused, arguing that under the 𝘚𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997, its obligation to pay SSS contributions ended upon the employees’ separation from employment, regardless of whether their dismissal was legal or illegal.

The Social Security Commission (SSC) rejected LSC’s position and ordered it to pay the contributions. The SSC ruled that because the employees were illegally dismissed, the employer-employee relationship was deemed to have continued during the period they were prevented from working.

Holding that LSC remained obligated to remit the employees’ SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages, the SC stated that under Article 294 of the 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages and other benefits.

The SC explained that such employees are considered to have remained employed during the period covered by their backwages and are therefore entitled to the rights and benefits that would have accrued during that period.

Since LSC failed to remit the illegally dismissed employees’ social security contributions, the SC held that LSC is liable to pay a penalty thereon of three percent per month, reckoned from the date they became due until full payment.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170676.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165713.

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04/08/2026

“While recognizing that combating illegal fishing and protecting the country’s marine resources are legitimate and compelling State interests, the SC emphasized that these objectives cannot justify measures that unnecessarily infringe constitutional rights, particularly when the same goals may be achieved through lawful and less restrictive means.”

The (SC) has declared unconstitutional the Department of Agriculture’s (DA) directive to commercial Philippine-flagged fishing vessels to be tracked and monitored, and to report and send fisheries data, as it violates rights against unreasonable searches, seizures, due process, and equal protection under the law.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 dismissed the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DA and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) No. 266 unconstitutional for failing to pass the rational basis test.

In 2020, the DA, through the BFAR, issued FAO No. 266 requiring all commercial Philippine-flagged fishing vessels to adopt Vessel Monitoring Measures (VMM). These measures include a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) to track and monitor vessels, and an Electronic Reporting System (ERS) to record and transmit fisheries data. FAO No. 266 also mandated the securing of Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers from the National Telecommunications Commission.

Royale Fishing Corporation, Bonanza Fishing and Market Resources, Inc., and RBL Fishing Corporation (Royale Fishing et al.), operators of Philippine commercial fishing vessels, challenged FAO No. 266 before the RTC through a petition for declaratory relief. They argued that the continuous monitoring requirements violated their constitutional rights, exposed confidential business information and trade secrets, and denied them equal protection because only commercial fishing vessels were required to comply, even though the Fisheries Code also covers municipal and distant-water fishing vessels.

The SC upheld the RTC’s ruling that FAO No. 266 is unconstitutional.

It explained that courts apply different standards in reviewing government regulations. While stricter standards apply to regulations affecting fundamental rights and certain classifications, the rational basis test applies to cases that do not fall under those standards.

Under this test, the government must show a legitimate interest and a reasonable connection between that interest and the methods used. The SC found the Republic failed this because it did not adequately prove that the VMS and ERS requirements were reasonably connected to preventing illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

In particular, the SC found that the VMS was not effective in detecting IUU fishing violations other than fishing within protected or restricted areas. It also noted that the expected output from VMS is no longer different from existing reporting requirements already being complied by the fishing vessels.

The SC likewise ruled that FAO No. 266 authorized monitoring beyond what RA 8550, as amended, allows. The Fisheries Code defines “monitoring” as the continuous observation of fishing effort, expressed through factors such as “number of days or hours of fishing, characteristics of fishery resources, and resource yields.”

According to the SC, this definition does not extend to the continuous tracking of the locations or destinations of commercial fishing vessels. It emphasized that RA 10654 does not require operators to disclose their location 24/7, recognizing that fishing grounds constitute proprietary business information.

While recognizing that combating illegal fishing and protecting the country’s marine resources are legitimate and compelling State interests, the SC emphasized that these objectives cannot justify measures that unnecessarily infringe constitutional rights, particularly when the same goals may be achieved through lawful and less restrictive means.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170021

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169871

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169872

Read the Separate Opinion of Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169884

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169898

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169910

Read the Concurrence and Dissent of Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169918

Read the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169926

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28/07/2026

A Deed of Sale may be corrected to reflect the true agreement of the parties.

The (SC) has ruled that a sale of land remains valid even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. The deed may then be corrected to match what the parties actually agreed to.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the sale of a 491-square-meter parcel of land in Cebu City between buyers Genara and Felipe Abay, Sr. (the Abays) and sellers Crispin Caballes and the heirs of Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (the Gallardos), despite the mistake in the designation of the lot number in the deed of sale.

The property formed part of the estate of Margarita Lopez, who had nine children, including Crispin and Trinidad.

The Abays visited the site with Crispin and Tomas Gallardo, one of Trinidad’s heirs before buying the property. During the visit, they were showed them the land’s boundaries. Tomas even helped the Abays build a concrete fence around it.

The Abays openly occupied the property for about 20 years until their possession was disrupted when workers of spouses Jacinto and Chiok Ngo Lim Young (the Youngs), who are claiming ownership over the property, entered it, destroyed the fence, and built their own posts.

The Abays discovered that a title over the property had been issued in the Youngs’ name. This prompted them to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the title.

The Gallardos challenged this, arguing that the documents the Abays presented referred to a different lot, Lot No. 6036-B, and not the lot they were occupying, which was Lot No. 7. While both lots were located in the same area, they were separate properties and were not beside each other. The Youngs supported the Gallardos’ position and maintained that they were buyers in good faith.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Abays which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that the documents presented by the Abays showed that they purchased Lot No. 6036-B and not Lot No. 7, which they claimed to own and possess.

The SC disagreed and reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases upholding the validity of the sale and allowing the correction of a contract to reflect the parties’ true agreement in instances where the deed of sale failed to accurately describe the land intended by the parties.

The SC stressed that a person buys property based on what they see on the ground, such as its boundaries, landmarks, and improvements, and not by its technical lot number. Ordinary buyers cannot be expected to identify property based only on survey descriptions or legal documents.

Under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a written document may be corrected when, because of a mistake, it does not express the parties’ actual agreement.

The SC explained that a contract may be reformed or corrected if: (1) the parties agreed on the transaction; (2) the written document does not express their true agreement; and (3) the error was caused by a mistake, fraud, accident, or unfair conduct.

In this case, all these requirements were present.

Thus, the Court declared deemed reformed the Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale by changing the designation of the property sold from “Lot No. 6036-B” to “Lot 7” and the Abays as absolute owners of such property.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/266298-spouses-genera-and-felipe-abay-sr-et-al-vs-spouses-jacinto-s-young-et-al/

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22/07/2026

Actual payment of ransom money is not important.

The (SC) has reiterated that the loss or non-presentation of ransom money in court does not prevent a conviction for kidnapping for ransom, so long as the prosecution is able to prove that ransom was demanded for the victim’s release.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division affirmed the conviction of Jose Olbato, PO3 Clayton Patingan, and others (the accused), except for SPO4 Romeo Ayson who died during the pendency of the appeal, for kidnapping for ransom.

PO3 Patingan and SPO4 Ayson flagged Genevieve Ong Sy (Sy) while she was on board her car and, together with the other accused, forcibly took her and detained her in a house. They demanded PHP 50 million from her father in exchange for her release. After negotiations, the amount was reduced to PHP 500,000.

Acting under police surveillance, Sy’s family driver delivered marked ransom money to the accused. The police then rescued Sy, arrested the accused, and recovered the marked money.

The Regional Trial Court found that the accused worked together to kidnap and detain Sy for ransom. It rejected their defenses of denial and alibi. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Before the SC, the accused argued that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to present the ransom money in court after it was allegedly lost while in police custody.

The SC disagreed and explained that kidnapping for ransom is committed when a private individual illegally kidnaps, detains, or deprives another of liberty for the purpose of demanding ransom.

The SC stressed that actual payment or receipt of the ransom money is not important to prove the crime.

In this case, the SC found that the prosecution proved that ransom was demanded, negotiated, and delivered. Sy’s father testified that the kidnappers called him repeatedly, demanding PHP 50 million for his daughter’s release, later reducing the amount to PHP 500,000 after negotiations. Evidence also showed that the ransom money was delivered and received during the police operation.

The SC emphasized that the failure to present the ransom money in court did not disprove that ransom had been demanded and paid since the evidence clearly established both.

The accused were sentenced to 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘦𝘵𝘶𝘢 or up to 40 years in prison. They were also ordered to pay the victim PHP 300,000 in civil indemnity and damages.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169311

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/276833-people-of-the-philippines-vs-jose-olbato-y-aurella-et-al/

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