SISON LAW

27/04/2026

The (SC) has acquitted a mother of parricide over her daughter’s death, exempting her from criminal liability after finding that she has schizophrenia and her mental state deprived her of the capacity to recognize the wrongfulness of her act.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division granted a mother’s appeal and overturned her parricide conviction on the ground of legal insanity due to schizophrenia, an exempting circumstance under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

The mother was charged with parricide for the killing of her five-year old daughter after she was seen embracing the child and simultaneously jumping off a bridge into a river with her, which led to her daughter’s death. While a man aboard a styrofoam banca was able to save the mother, he was unable to locate the child. The daughter’s lifeless body was found in the river the next day.

The mother claimed she was not in her right mind at the time. She could only remember walking with her daughter and had no memory of the incident itself. She said she only regained consciousness while floating in the water.

A licensed physician from the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) testified that the mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) brushed aside the claim of insanity as she entered into a plea of “not guilty” and raised insanity as a defense only after the prosecution rested its case. The RTC convicted the mother and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua after finding that she was sane at the time of the incident.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision.

The SC disagreed. It ruled that the mother was not criminally liable because her mental condition during the incident prevented her from understanding the nature and wrongfulness of her actions.

Insanity is defined as a disease or defect of the brain manifested in language or conduct. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, it is one of the circumstances that exempts a person from criminal liability.

In 𝙋𝙚𝙤𝙥𝙡𝙚 𝙫. 𝙋𝙖ñ𝙖, the SC laid down a three-way test to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance:

• 𝙛𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, the insanity must be present at the time of the commission of the crime;
• 𝙨𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it must be medically proven; and
• 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it must render the accused incapable of appreciating the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of the act.

Insanity must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Because it involves a person’s state of mind, courts look at overt acts or outward behavior. As a rule, insanity must be supported by medical evidence, unless there are extraordinary circumstances where such evidence is not available. While people who know the accused may testify about their observations, courts give greater weight to the findings and evaluations of qualified medical experts.

In this case, the SC determined that the mother was able to medically prove that she was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the crime based on the testimony and mental status examination reports from psychiatrists.

The SC further explained that schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by the inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality. Often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions, the medical condition deprives a person of discernment, satisfying the third requisite in the 𝘗𝘢ñ𝘢 𝘥𝘰𝘤𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘦.

Here, the psychiatrist testified that the mother was mentally disturbed at the time of the incident, showing signs of paranoia and perceiving threats, gossip, and envy directed at her.

While the SC exempted the mother from criminal liability, it still held her civilly liable and ordered her to pay the victim’s heirs PHP 75,000 in civil indemnity and PHP 200,000 in moral, exemplary, and temperate damages.

The SC also ordered the mother’s immediate transfer from the Correctional Institution for Women to the NCMH for her treatment. She will be released only upon the order of the RTC based on a recommendation from her attending physician at the hospital.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164320

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164308

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy.

21/04/2026

The (SC) has affirmed its previous ruling that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time it is discovered, holding that “cyber libel” is not a new crime but a form of “libel” under Art. 355 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 that is committed through a computer system or other similar means.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

In December 2020, Cotabato Second District Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez filed a cyber libel complaint with the prosecutor against Causing related to Facebook posts accusing Hernandez of pocketing over PHP 200 million in relief goods for Marawi victims. Hernandez stated he discovered the posts on February 4 and April 29, 2019.

Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Causing in May 2021. He filed a motion to quash the Informations, arguing that they were already time-barred under the RPC because more than one year had passed since the posts were uploaded.

The RTC denied the motion, ruling that cyber libel prescribes in 12 years under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵.

Causing appealed to the SC, which clarified that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year from the date of discovery, consistent with traditional libel under the RPC. The Court rejected Causing’s motion to quash the Informations due to insufficient proof that the offense had already prescribed, highlighting that he can present evidence during the trial at the RTC.

Both the OSG and Causing filed separate partial motions for reconsideration.

The OSG argued that the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel under the RPC should not apply to cyber libel. Instead, it should be 15 years under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, as previously decided by the Supreme Court through an unsigned resolution in Tolentino v. People.

Causing, on the other hand, argued that the prescription for cyber libel should start from the publication date rather than from discovery. He contended that online posts are more widespread than traditional forms of publication. If the discovery rule is applied, cyber libel charges could be filed several years after the post was made, as long as the offended party discovered it later.

The SC rejected both arguments.

Under the RPC, written libel prescribes in one year. There is no law that excludes cyber libel from this one-year period, and Congress has consistently treated libel as having a shorter prescriptive period than other crimes, even when penalties are increased.

The SC reiterated that cyber libel is not a separate crime, but rather libel committed through a computer system. The fact that the Cybercrime Prevention Act imposes a higher penalty for cyber libel does not imply that its prescriptive period should be extended beyond that of traditional libel.

The SC added that when laws on the prescription of crimes are unclear, they must be interpreted in favor of the accused. Since the RPC sets a one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel, it prevails over the 15-year period set in the case of Tolentino v. People, which is an unsigned resolution.

The SC also affirmed that prescription begins upon discovery of the offense, not upon publication. The law clearly states that prescription runs from the time the crime is discovered by the offended party or the authorities.

Seven other Justices joined Justice Inting in the majority. They are:
• Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo
• Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
• Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
• Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
• Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan
• Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez
• Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen argued that the one-year prescription period should apply only to libel cases against private individuals. He added that libel against public figures should be decriminalized, as punishing comments and criticisms directed at public officials discourages free and uninhibited discussion about how those in public office conduct themselves.

In his Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa stressed that the prescriptive period for libel has always been fixed at one or two years, never at 10 or more years.

Meanwhile, six other Justices joined Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. in his dissent:
• Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando
• Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
• Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario
• Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez
• Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
• Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva

In his Concurring and Dissenting opinion, Justice Kho, Jr. agreed with the majority that unsigned resolutions do not lay down doctrines of law but disagreed on the prescriptive period for cyber libel. Since cyber libel is committed through computer systems and is punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, it is a separate crime from libel and the one-year prescriptive period for libel does not apply.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163671

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163636

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163642

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-admin/post.php?p=163650

Read the Concurring and Dissenting OpinionOpinion of Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr. at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163661

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14/04/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that the prohibition on carrying deadly weapons during elections applies to fi****ms and similar regulated weapons, but not to bladed instruments like knives, unless they are carried inside the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters from it, during election day.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division granted the motion for reconsideration (MR) of its earlier ruling that found a man guilty of violating Section 261(p) of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 881, or the 𝘖𝘮𝘯𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘴 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘖𝘌𝘊), as amended by Section 32 of 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 7166. The SC held that while the man was found carrying a knife during the election period, there was no proof that he was in a polling place or within 100 meters of one during the days and hours prohibited under the 𝘖𝘌𝘊.

The man was arrested during the 2018 elections after authorities found him carrying a kitchen knife outside his residence without written authorization from the Commission on Elections.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found him guilty of carrying a deadly weapon during the election period.

The SC initially affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.

However, upon MR, the SC acquitted the man after finding that the prosecution failed to establish all the essential elements of the offense.

The SC clarified the scope of the weapon ban during elections. In 𝘉𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘢 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, it held that bladed instruments are not covered by Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 and Section 32 of 𝘙𝘈 7166, which prohibit the carrying of fi****ms outside one’s residence or place of business during the election period.

However, carrying of deadly weapons in general, including knives, is still punished but under a different provision of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊—Section 261(p)—but only if done in a polling place or near it, and during specific election-related activities.

Unlike Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 which prohibits carrying of 𝐟𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬 everywhere in public during election period, Section 261 (p) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 prohibits possession of 𝐝𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐥𝐲 𝐰𝐞𝐚𝐩𝐨𝐧𝐬 in general (including bladed instruments such as knives) only in or near polling places under the law.

In this case, while the prosecution established that the man was carrying a knife during the election period, it failed to prove that the act was committed in a polling place or within 100 meters of one, and that it occurred during the days and hours specifically covered by Section 261(p). In the absence of proof that he was in or near a polling place during the specified days under the law, the man’s guilt was not established.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163156

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163149

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

13/04/2026

13/04/2026

10/04/2026

𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 𝒕𝒐 𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒚. 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒏 𝑭𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒐 𝑩. 𝑺𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒔 𝒂 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒓 𝒂𝒕 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒇𝒖𝒍 𝒘𝒆𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒓 𝒐𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑺𝒂𝒇𝒆 𝑺𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝑨𝒄𝒕 (𝑹.𝑨. 𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟏𝟑), 𝒉𝒆𝒍𝒅 𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒕 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒄𝒉 𝟐𝟔, 𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟔. 🎉

𝐒𝐢𝐬𝐨𝐧 𝐋𝐚𝐰 𝐢𝐬 𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐟𝐮𝐥 𝐭𝐨 𝐍𝐔 𝐁𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐰𝐚𝐠 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐠𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐲. 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐢𝐧 𝐅𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐨 𝐁. 𝐒𝐢𝐬𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐩𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞 𝐭𝐨 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐦𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐟𝐮𝐥 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐥𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐬𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐬. 💛💙

09/04/2026

09/04/2026

"In issuing the writ, the SC applied the precautionary principle based on technical findings showing that the respondents’ activities have significantly increased surface runoff, erosion, and sedimentation within the watershed system. Reports indicated that these activities have destroyed cultivated crops, vegetation, and fruit-bearing trees that serve as wildlife habitats.

The SC noted that a change in the natural landscape of just a portion of a protected forest reserve threatens the stability of the Angat River-Bustos Dam watershed, posing serious risks to the life, health, and property of inhabitants in several provinces."

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session today, April 8, 2026, through the ponencia of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, issued a 𝘸𝘳𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘬𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘬𝘢𝘴𝘢𝘯 against respondents Halrey Construction, Inc. and other persons acting on their behalf, for conducting illegal quarrying activities within the Angat River-Bustos Dam Forest Reserve in Banaban, Angat, Bulacan.

It also granted petitioner Narciso A. De Leon’s prayer for a temporary environmental protection order, ordering respondents to immediately stop quarrying, excavation, earth extraction, or similar activities within the watershed area. Respondents are further prohibited from committing acts that may cause additional damage to the environment.

In issuing the writ, the SC applied the precautionary principle based on technical findings showing that the respondents’ activities have significantly increased surface runoff, erosion, and sedimentation within the watershed system. Reports indicated that these activities have destroyed cultivated crops, vegetation, and fruit-bearing trees that serve as wildlife habitats.

The SC noted that a change in the natural landscape of just a portion of a protected forest reserve threatens the stability of the Angat River-Bustos Dam watershed, posing serious risks to the life, health, and property of inhabitants in several provinces.

The Angat River-Bustos Dam Forest Reserve was declared protected forest land under Proclamation No. 573.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162980.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

07/04/2026

The (SC) clarified the application of lascivious conduct under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 (𝘙𝘈) 𝘕𝘰. 7610, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘈𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘌𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘋𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵, in relation to acts of lasciviousness under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld Jeffrey L. Gramatica’s conviction for lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, but modified another accused’s (###2660399) conviction for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 366 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊.

In these consolidated cases involving minors, AAA, BBB, and CCC, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines to ensure the proper prosecution of cases under these two distinct laws.

AAA and BBB, both addicted to shabu, engaged in sexual acts with Gramatica and another man in exchange for the drug. Gramatica was later arrested and prosecuted for violation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, which penalizes lascivious conduct committed against a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse.

In the other case, CCC was victimized by her grandfather, ###266039, who touched her private parts while she was sleeping. ###266039 was also charged under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610.

In his defense, Gramatica claimed that he courted BBB and had a sexual relationship with her but did not know she was a minor because she looked mature. For his part, ###266039 denied the charges and claimed he merely woke CCC up to ask her for help applying his eye medicine.

The Regional Trial Court found both Gramatica and ###266039 guilty of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 towards BBB and CCC, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions.

A minor is considered to have been subjected to other sexual abuse when they are a victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an adult. In this case, BBB was 14 and CCC was 17 at the time of the incident. Gramatica was 23, and ###266039 was 62.

Both courts found that Gramatica took advantage of BBB’s youth and vulnerable situation, using his influence over her to make her submit to his sexual demands. Meanwhile, ###266039, due to his age and relationship as CCC’s grandfather, was able to exert control over her and exploit her trust.

The SC affirmed Gramatica’s conviction under RA 7610, but modified ###266039’s conviction from acts of lasciviousness under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 to acts of lasciviousness under the RPC explaining that RA 7610 does not apply where the minor is entirely unaware, coerced or unconscious as the victim in that instance is not considered to have “indulged” in the sexual in*******se.

A plain and straightforward interpretation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 provides a clear definition of children subjected to other sexual abuse as those who indulge in sexual in*******se or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult.

The SC clarified the scope of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 and distinguished it from related crimes under the RPC. To ensure uniform and consistent prosecution of cases, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines, considering also RA 11648, which raised the age of sexual consent to 16 years old.

𝙁𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 applies to children who are 12 years of age (now 16 years old following the amendment under RA 11648) to below 18 who are subjected to sexual abuse.

𝙎𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it covers situations where consent is present but defective. The minor may seem to “indulge” or agree, but does so not out of free will, but because of coercion or influence by an adult. Thus, engaging in sexual acts with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse is a criminal act, regardless of apparent consent.

𝙏𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it does not apply when the act involves force, intimidation, fraud, deprivation of reason, unconsciousness, or grave abuse of authority. In such cases, the crime falls under acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

𝙁𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩𝙝, if the victim is under 12 or under 16, and the case does not fit Section 5(b), the crime is r**e or acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

These principles, which distinguish force and intimidation on one hand, and coercion and influence on the other, and limit RA 7610 to minors who are exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, also apply to other sexual crimes, including r**e.

In this case, BBB was a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse because she had sexual in*******se with Gramatica in exchange for some consideration, namely shabu, which makes him criminally liable under Section 5(b).

Meanwhile, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 does not apply to ###266039.

The Supreme Court clarified that not all acts of lasciviousness against minors aged 12 to under 18 are covered by RA 7610. The law applies only when minors are subjected to sexual abuse, such as when they “indulge” or give defective consent to the conduct.

Here, CCC did not indulge in lascivious conduct, as she was asleep and unconscious during the incident. ###266039 did not use coercion or influence, but relied on his moral ascendancy as her grandfather, which counts as intimidation. These circumstances make ###266039 liable for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, rather than RA 7610.

For lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) involving BBB, Gramatica was sentenced to a maximum of 17 years, four months, and one day in prison and ordered to pay BBB PHP 150,000 in civil indemnity and damages, as well as a PHP 15,000 fine.

For acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, ###266039 was sentenced to a maximum of six years in prison and ordered to pay CCC PHP450,000 in civil indemnity and damages with interest.

The SC acknowledged that under current laws, ###266039, “who committed abhorrent and be***al acts against his minor granddaughter,” faces a penalty lower than that under RA 7610, and called on the legislature to amend existing laws to better protect children.

The SC calls the legislature to review and amend current laws protecting children, thus:

“𝘐𝘯 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘷𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵’𝘴 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘱𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘦𝘨𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵, 𝘢𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘵𝘺, 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘭𝘦𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘴𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘯 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺, 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭-𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯.”

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162863

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162842

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-rodil-v-zalameda/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

01/04/2026

📢 HOLY WEEK SCHEDULE ADVISORY

In observance of the Lenten season, our office will be on break from April 2 to April 5, 2026.

🗓️ Resume Operations: Monday, April 6, 2026.

For emergency concerns, you may leave us a message, and we will attend to them as soon as we return.

Wishing everyone a solemn and meaningful Holy Week.

31/03/2026

WORK SUSPENSION: All first- and second-level courts suspend work starting at 12:00 P.M. on April 1, 2026, to provide government employees full opportunity to properly observe Maundy Thursday and Good Friday and to allow them to travel across the country.
Work-from-home arrangement shall be adopted from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M.

25/03/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption is required even when the child is voluntarily surrendered by the mother.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division upheld the Regional Trial Court (RTC)’s dismissal of an adoption petition because it did not include a certification from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).

The case began when a mother, soon after giving birth, left her baby in the care of Eleazar Robiso (Robiso) and his parents. A year later, Robiso filed a petition for adoption before the RTC.

To support his petition, Robiso submitted an 𝘈𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘈𝘥𝘰𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘎𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘰𝘥𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥, executed by the mother. In the affidavit, the mother said she could not financially support her child. She entrusted the child and her parental authority to Robiso.

When both the RTC and the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition for lack of a DSWD certification clearing the child legally available for adoption, as required by RA 9523, Robiso filed a petition for review on 𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘳𝘪 before the SC, arguing that the certification was required only for abandoned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children.

The SC disagreed and denied Robiso’s petition.

In adoption cases, RA 9523 requires a DSWD certification declaring a child legally available for adoption. The law’s implementing rules clarified that the requirement applies to surrendered, abandoned, neglected, and dependent children.

Although the law does not define a 𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥, it defines a 𝘷𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 as one whose parents or legal guardian knowingly and willingly give up parental authority to the DSWD or an accredited child-placement or child-caring agency. The law's implementing rules adopt the same definition for a surrendered child.

The SC added that the law should be read together with Article 154 of Presidential Decree No. 603, or the 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘠𝘰𝘶𝘵𝘩 𝘞𝘦𝘭𝘧𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which treats a child surrendered to an individual as a voluntarily committed child.

It explained: “When a parent—often a mother acting under difficult circumstances, as in this case—entrusts her child to another's care, the child is legally considered voluntarily committed. For purpose of adoption, the prospective adopter must therefore first secure the necessary DSWD certification.”

However, the SC clarified that Robiso may still pursue the proper remedy, including the streamlined administrative adoption process under RA 11642, or the 𝘋𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘥𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘈𝘥𝘰𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘭𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 𝘊𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘈𝘤𝘵, which took effect in 2022.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162472.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162466.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.