JMClerigo & Associates Law Office, 5th Floor, Builder's Center Building 170 Salcedo Street , Legaspi Village, Makati (2026)

27/07/2015

Who is a natural born Filipino citizen?
by Atty. Joel Raymond A. Baguio

Article IV Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

“Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.”

Concomitantly, paragraph (3), Section 1 of Article IV of the Philippine Constitution provides:

“Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;”

Out of these provisions, there are two kinds of Natural born citizen of the Philippines:

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship; and,

2) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

On 29 August 2003, Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003” took effect.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 provides that:

“Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.”

Now, the question is: Are those natural born citizens, who re-acquired Philippine citizenship, using the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225 still considered as natural born Filipino citizens under the Constitution?

Remember these:

1. Taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic is an act;

2. This act (taking an oath of allegiance) is for the purpose of re-acquiring Philippine citizenship; and

3. Republic Act No. 9225 mentions of re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship only, it did not say that the applicant will enjoy the privilege of being a natural born Filipino citizen.

27/05/2015

Quitclaims held valid
by Atty. Je Froilan M. Clerigo

We have read of numerous cases where the NLRC or National Labor Relations Commission disregarded a quitclaim (which we knew were voluntarily signed by the employee) and declared the management guilty of illegal dismissal. However, we still advise our clients to have their resigning employees sign a quitclaim simply because it is not in all instances that the decision of the NLRC is upheld. Take for instance the case of Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 117240, October 2, 1997:

“Due to financial difficulties, between April and May, 1991, PNCC implemented a Voluntary Separation Program. The individual complainants took advantage of the offer and, after signing individual quitclaims, were paid an equivalent of one-and-a-half month's pay for every year of credited service as well as a 30-day advance salary. Consequently, they were not given any mid-year bonus because as of June 1, 1991, PNCC no longer considered them as its employees. The aggrieved employees then filed a claim for non-payment of mid-year bonus before the Labor Arbiter, who, in a decision dated March 29, 1993, ruled in their favor and ordered the payment of their mid-year bonuses.”

When it reached the Supreme Court, it upheld the quitclaims and then said:

“We have held that once an employee resigns and executes a quitclaim in favor of the employer, he is thereby estopped from filing any further money claims against the employer arising from his employment. Such money claims may be given due course only when the voluntariness of the ex*****on of the quitclaim or release is put in issue, or when it is established that there is an unwritten agreement between the employer and employee which would entitle the employee to other renumeration or benefits upon his or her resignation.[4] In this case, the voluntariness of the ex*****on of the quitclaim was never put in issue and, as such, must be treated as a valid and binding agreement between the complainants and PNCC.

“Complainants further argue that when they executed the quitclaim they had no intention of waiving their mid-year bonus. In signing the quitclaim, however, the necessary implication is that the release would cover any and all claims arising out of the employment relationship.

“From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the complainants voluntarily resigned from PNCC for a valuable consideration. The quitclaim they executed in favor of PNCC amounts to a legitimate compromise agreement. We, therefore, sustain the validity of said agreement.”

04/05/2015

Resignations must be accepted; The Why
by Atty. Je Froilan M. Clerigo

Why is it that it is only an “accepted” resignation that severs the employment? In Philippine Today, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112965, January 30, 1997, the Supreme Court said that “(o)bviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee `finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment’. If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the contract of employment.

And what happens if the employee changes his mind after his or her resignation is accepted? The Court continued that “(a) resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply therefor, and he shall have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an appointment. He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave. To allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his basic right to choose whom to employ. Such is tantamount to undue oppression of the employer. It has been held that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment including hiring. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.”

23/04/2015

Resignations must be accepted
by Atty. Je Froilan M. Clerigo

An employee’s letter of resignation must be accepted by management. Just a notation on the letter itself that says “Resignation Accepted” will be enough. If you overlook accepting it, the severance from employment may be considered incomplete and the employee may change his mind and insist on having his or her job back. In BMG Records (Phils.), Inc., et al. vs. Aparecio, et al., G.R. No. 153290, September 5, 2007, it was said that “the acceptance by (management) of (the employee’s resignation rendered (the resignation). Upon such acceptance, it may not be unilaterally withdrawn without the consent of (management). When the employee later signified the intention of continuing his or her work, it was already up to the employer to accept the withdrawal of his or her resignation. The mere fact that the withdrawal was not accepted does not constitute illegal dismissal, the acceptance of the withdrawal of the resignation being the employer's sole prerogative.”

17/04/2015

Resignation in employee’s own writing
by Atty. Je Froilan M. Clerigo

We have clients who have forms for everything, even a form for resignation letters for resigning employees. It is, however, advisable to have your employee personally write his or her own resignation letter. This was stressed in the case of Globe Telecom vs. Jenette Marie Crisologo, G.R. No. 174644. August 10, 2007. The resignation letter in that case read:

“This is to inform you that as per my doctor’s advice, I have to take a long rest due to a very difficult pregnancy and other health reasons. I am therefore tendering my resignation effective 30 May 2002 and would like to request that I be allowed to exhaust all leaves due to me until such date. Furthermore, I hereby undertake to turn over all my pending work to other lawyers until said effective date of my termination.

Thank you very much.”

She later complained to the NLRC that she was forced to resign. The court there ruled:

“Respondent personally drafted her resignation letter in a clear, concise and categorical language. Its content, as quoted above, confirmed her unequivocal intent to resign.
An employee of respondent's accomplished educational background and professional standing (she was, by the way, a lawyer) will not easily relinquish her legal rights unless she intends to. Respondent's resignation letter without doubt proved petitioners' assertion that she voluntarily resigned from her job.”

13/04/2015

Relaxation of Rules? - Annulment
by Atty. Joel Raymond A. Baguio

On 13 February 1997, the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.), as follows:

(1) The Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Since then (almost 18 years), this was observed by trial courts in deciding petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Court. Each and every decision of trial courts has to conform to these guidelines; otherwise their decision would almost certainly face a complete reversal once appealed to the higher courts.

In the recent case of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357, 14 January 2015) however, the Supreme Court revisited these guidelines and stated that:

“The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.”

With these guidelines having been revisited, the trial court no longer has to “robotically” rely on these guidelines in arriving at a decision. The trial court now has to do its job; to try cases. This is the essence of the directive of the Supreme Court when it continued in Kalaw case that:

“Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in the recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu ###.”

With this apparent relaxation of the rules in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Court, trial court will have more freedom and independence in deciding a case based on the totality of evidence before it without fear of being reversed on appeal.

On caveat however, the Republic case is still relevant. The guidelines are still in force. It takes a trial judge to decide a case and it takes an advocate to argue your case.

31/03/2015

Relaxation of Rules - Annulment
by Atty. Joel Raymond A. Baguio

May an innocent diversion of playing mahjong be declared as ground for declaration of nullity of marriage?
Before 14 January 2014, the answer is a resounding NO.

But beginning 14 January 2015 playing mahjong may be declared as ground for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the declaration of the Supreme Court in the case of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357, 14 January 2015).

The reason?

”The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.”

In essence, it is because of the party’s wanton disregard for his/her children’s moral and mental development.

Marriage as it seems, does not only involve two persons, it revolves around a family.

16/03/2015

Parental authority
by Atty. Je Froilan M. Clerigo

On the question of whether to strip a father of his parental authority over his children, is the fact that he has an illicit affair with another woman sufficient to deprive him of such authority? HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 said that, by itself, this is not sufficient. The Supreme Court said:

“Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father. Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a `bad’ husband does not necessarily make a `bad’ father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children.”

Of course, in this case there was evidence that the father still cared for his children, sending them financial support and corresponding with them and expressing his love for them.

JMClerigo & Associates Law Office

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