Victoriano Aureus Salud & Tiu

06/03/2026

VP DUTERTE IMPEACHMENT: LEGAL HURDLES AND NEXT STEPS

The House Committee on Justice has just completed the first stage of the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte. Two out of the three impeachment complaints filed hurdled the legal requirements of sufficiency in form and substance.

SUFFICIENCY IN FORM

An impeachment complaint is sufficient in form if it is verified (sworn under oath), properly endorsed by a member of the House, and complies with the required formatting and procedural rules such as the one-year bar rule.

The Supreme Court in Duterte vs. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 278353, January 28, 2026) reiterated its ruling in Francisco vs. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003) wherein it defined the “initiation” of impeachment as the moment a complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice.

The one-year bar rule is a procedural shield that protects impeachable officials from harassment, so that they only defend themselves against impeachment once in any twelve-month period and ensures that Congress is not constantly encumbered by impeachment trials which would distract from its primary job of legislation.

The Committee, on March 2, 2026, set aside the impeachment complaint of the Makabayan bloc for violating the one-year bar rule, having been filed four days before the end of the constitutional ban on February 6, 2026.

SUFFICIENCY IN SUBSTANCE

Once form is established, the Committee determines if the complaints are sufficient in substance by examining whether the complaint contains a clear and specific recital of facts that meet the legal definition of impeachable offenses cited in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution, namely: culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.

On March 4, 2026, the Committee on Justice voted that the Third and Fourth complaints against the Vice President met these criteria. The Committee found that the allegations regarding the "assassin" threats and the misuse of confidential funds were described with enough factual detail that, if proven true, they would constitute Betrayal of Public Trust and Culpable Violation of the Constitution.

NEXT STEPS

Since sufficiency in substance has been established, the House is legally required to furnish the Vice President with a copy of the Resolution and the complaints, and issue a Notice to Answer, giving her 10 days from March 4, 2026 (the day the House Committee declared sufficiency of substance) to submit her formal response and counter-affidavits.

If the Vice President chooses not to file a formal Answer, the House Rules state that all material allegations in the complaint are "deemed controverted.” This means the law treats the situation as if she had issued a general denial of all charges. Although it does not count as an admission of guilt, by not filing an Answer, the Vice President waives the opportunity to present her own evidence at the Committee level.

The Committee on Justice will move forward with the Hearing phase regardless of the Vice President’s participation by setting dates to hear the testimony of the complainants and their witnesses. Without an Answer on file, the Vice President's legal team would be limited in their ability to cross-examine witnesses or present a cohesive defense strategy during these initial deliberations.

The Committee will finalize its Formal Report and Resolution based only on the evidence presented by the complainants. This Report is then sent to the Plenary, where the one-third (1/3) vote is required to officially impeach the Vice President and transmit the case to the Senate.

Assuming the Vice President waives her right to participate at the Committee level and the House officially impeaches her, she is not precluded from presenting her evidence at the Senate trial.

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Disclaimer: Op-eds published here express the personal views of the individual lawyers and do not represent the official position or legal advice of VAST Law Firm. Nothing herein should be construed as legal advice or as creating an attorney–client relationship.

28/02/2026

Rest in peace Dean Joey, and safe journey into the great beyond.

It is with deep sadness that we inform the University community of the passing of Atty Jose Maria “Joey” G Hofileña, Dean of the Ateneo Law School, on 26 February 2026.

We request the Ateneo community to keep Joey and his family in your prayers.

Read the obituary: https://go.ateneo.edu/U2526-073

27/02/2026

Puwede bang arestuhin ang isang Pilipino, dito sa Pilipinas, kahit walang warrant mula sa isang Filipino judge?

Yan ang tunay na isyu.

“Inviolable” ang ating right to liberty. Hindi puwedeng damputin ang isang tao basta-basta. Malinaw yan sa Bill of Rights ng ating Saligang Batas. Ang general rule: bawal ang pag-aresto. Ang exception: may warrant of arrest issued “upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge…”

Ngayon, may balita na may alleged ICC warrant laban sa ilang kasalukuyang senador ng Pilipinas.

Ang tanong: ang ICC judge ba ay pasok sa “judge” na tinutukoy ng ating Constitution na maaaring mag-isyu ng warrant na ipatutupad dito sa loob ng Philippine jurisdiction?

May dalawang pananaw.

Unang Panig: sapat na raw ang ICC warrant.

Hindi raw dinistinguish ng Constitution (Art III, Sec 2) kung Filipino o foreign “judge” ang tinutukoy ng Bill of Rights natin. And when the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Yan ang kanilang pananaw.

Pero dito pumapasok ang problema.

Ang Constitution mismo ang nagde-define kung sino ang maaaring maging judge. Context is key. Ayon sa Art VIII, Sec 7: walang maaaring ma-appoint na judge kung hindi siya 1.) citizen ng Pilipinas at 2.) miyembro ng Philippine Bar.

ICC judges ba ay Filipino citizens? Miyembro ba sila ng Philippine Bar?

Hindi.

Puwede ba sila mag issue ng warrant na maaring ma-enforce dito sa Pilipinas na walang local warrant issued by a Filipino judge?

Kung susundin natin ang logic na sapat na ang foreign warrant dahil hindi raw “nag-distinguish” ang Constitution, lalabas ang absurdity. Example: kapag sinabing President sa Constitution, puwede bang foreign President? Kapag sinabing Senate, puwede bang foreign Senate? Maraming beses din yan hindi rin dinistinguish kung Philippine or foreign.

Pero malinaw ang sagot dahil malinaw ang context. Philippine Constitution ito. Para sa Philippine institutions ito.

Kapag power to declare martial law, President of the Philippines yan. Kapag concurrence sa treaties, Senate of the Philippines yan. Hindi na kailangang lagyan ng adjective dahil malinaw na sa context.

Ang tunay na isyu dito ay enforceability sa loob ng ating teritoryo. Hindi sapat ang sabihing “may warrant.” Ang tanong ay: kaninong warrant ang may bisa sa loob ng Pilipinas?

Mahalagang linawin: hindi ito usapin kung may foreign warrant o wala.

Ang usapin ay kung may domestic legal mechanism na nagbibigay dito ng bisa—isang batas o malinaw na proseso na dumaraan sa Philippine courts.

Sa ngayon, wala tayong probisyon na nagsasabing ang foreign warrant, by itself, ay automatically enforceable dito nang hindi dumadaan sa isang Filipino court at judge.

Kapag tinanggap natin na puwedeng i-bypass ang Philippine courts dahil lamang sa hyper-literal reading ng salitang “judge,” binubuksan natin ang pinto sa isang mapanganib na prinsipyo: na ang sarili nating judicial system ay maaaring isantabi sa pag-aresto ng mga Pilipino sa loob ng sariling bansa.

At dito pumapasok ang usapin ng sovereignty.

Sovereignty means supremacy within our own territory and people. And it includes the principle of non-interference. Sa usapin ng pag-aresto, pagpapatupad ng batas, at dispensation of justice sa loob ng Pilipinas, okay lang bas sa atin na tanggalin sa equation yung involvement ng Philippine justice system, particularly our courts and judges?

At kung sagot ay oo, ito ba ay isang pagpapatibay, o pagsuko ng ating soberanya?

Dagdag pa natin, pinapayagan ba ito ng Bill of Rights ng ating Saligang Batas?

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Disclaimer: Op-eds published here express the personal views of the individual lawyers and do not represent the official position or legal advice of VAST Law Firm. Nothing herein should be construed as legal advice or as creating an attorney–client relationship.

26/02/2026

When “Local Justice” Falls Short: The ICC’s Rationale for Proceeding vs. Duterte.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) operates on the principle of complementarity. Under this foundational rule, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction if a national legal system is genuinely unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute international crimes. If domestic courts are actively and adequately handling a case, the ICC must defer to local sovereignty.

The ICC has historically established strict parameters for determining this "unwillingness." In past rulings, such as those regarding the situation in Venezuela, the Court established a clear precedent: the domestic prosecution of low-ranking officers, while ignoring the high-level officials who allegedly orchestrated the systemic policies, does not satisfy the requirements of genuine justice. In such instances, the state is deemed unwilling, and the ICC retains jurisdiction.

In the case of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, the application of this same standard has been central. Following his presidency, no domestic criminal cases were filed against Duterte in the Philippines concerning allegations of crimes against humanity or mass killings related to the national anti-drug campaign.

The Limits of Domestic Investigations:

While the Philippine government initially asserted its domestic judicial system was capable—pointing to the successful prosecution of a select number of low-ranking police officers—admissions from within the government highlighted severe systemic limitations. Officials in the Marcos Jr. administration publicly acknowledged hurdles in prosecuting the drug war locally. Notably, then-Justice Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla stated that gathering evidence and building cases is extremely difficult because "those who need to speak are involved in the crime."

The ICC's Jurisdictional Rulings:

Applying its established precedents, the ICC evaluated whether the Philippines' local efforts met the Rome Statute's threshold.

January 2023 Pre-Trial Chamber Decision: The Chamber concluded the domestic initiatives did not sufficiently mirror the scope of the ICC's investigation, as they failed to investigate the systemic nature of the campaign or the high-ranking officials involved.

July 2023 Appeals Chamber Judgment: In a definitive 3-2 ruling, the Appeals Chamber rejected Manila's appeal, cementing the Court's jurisdiction based on the state's lack of genuine investigations into the campaign's architects.

These jurisdictional rulings regarding complementarity formed the legal basis for the ICC arrest warrant, leading to Duterte's transfer to The Hague in March 2025. Today, as the confirmation of charges hearings proceed in February 2026, the case provides a strict, factual illustration of how the ICC interprets domestic inaction under the complementarity principle.

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Disclaimer: Op-eds published here express the personal views of the individual lawyers and do not represent the official position or legal advice of VAST Law Firm. Nothing herein should be construed as legal advice or as creating an attorney–client relationship.

25/12/2025

25/12/2025

Ipinag-utos ng ang pagtanggal sa serbisyo at pagdisbar kay Judge Oscar D. Tomarong, Presiding Judge ng Branch 28, Regional Trial Court (RTC) sa Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, dahil sa pag-utos sa pagpaslang sa kapwa hukom noong 2019.

Naglabas ang Korte Suprema ng desisyon matapos ang mga pagdinig ng Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) na nag-ugat sa kriminal na hatol kay Judge Tomarong dahil sa pagpaplano sa pagpatay kay Judge Reymar L. Lacaya, na noo’y Presiding Judge ng Branch 11, RTC sa Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.

Noong 2019, ipinag-utos ng Korte Suprema ang pagpalit ng sangay ng korte ng dalawang hukom. Matapos ang pagdinig sa Branch 28 at habang naglalakad si Judge Lacaya patungo sa kanyang sasakyang nakaparada sa likod ng gusali ng korte, may narinig na mga putok ng baril. Kalaunan, natagpuan siyang patay sa tabi ng kanyang sasakyan.

Sa paglilitis sa kasong murder, tumestigo si Juliber Cabating (Cabating), isang empleyado ng public works na nagsilbi ring aide ni Judge Tomarong, na inutusan umano siya ni Judge Tomarong na maghanap ng mga bayarang mamamatay-tao para ipapatay si Judge Lacaya. Ayon kay Cabating, sa kanya idinaan ni Judge Tomarong ang PHP 250,000 na bayad sa mga pumatay kay Judge Lacaya.

Tinanggal sa serbisyo ng Korte Suprema si Judge Tomarong at kinumpiska ang kanyang mga benepisyo sa pagreretiro. Dinisbar din siya o tinanggal sa pagpa-praktis ng abogasya, at pinagbawalan sa muling pagpasok sa anumang posisyon sa pamahalaan.

Binigyang-diin ng Korte Suprema na ang murder o pagpaslang ay isang krimeng may moral turpitude, isang mabigat na kasalanan na nagbibigay-katwiran sa pagkakatanggal sa ilalim ng Rules of Court. Tumutukoy ang moral turpitude sa mga gawaing labis na imoral, hindi tapat, at salungat sa tungkulin ng isang tao sa lipunan.

Inilarawan ng Korte Suprema ang mga ginawa ni Judge Tomarong bilang kabilang sa pinakamabibigat na paglabag sa tungkulin ng isang hukom.

Bagama’t naka-apela pa ang hatol na kriminal laban kay Judge Tomarong, nagpasya ang Korte Suprema na hindi kinakailangan ang pinal na hatol para magpataw ng mga parusang administratibo. Sa mga kasong pandisiplina, sapat na ang substantial evidence para patunayan na nakagawa ng krimen ang isang hukom.

Nagpasya rin ang Korte Suprema na hindi karapat-dapat si Judge Tomarong na magpraktis ng abogasya, at binigyang-diin na ipinagbabawal ng Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability ang mga abogado na makilahok sa mga gawaing labag sa batas, hindi tapat, o imoral. Dagdag nito, hindi maaaring manatiling kasapi ng propesyon ng batas ang isang abogado na nagpapakita ng lubos na kawalang-galang sa buhay ng tao.

Binigyang-diin din ng Korte Suprema na walang sinuman ang nakahihigit sa batas, kabilang na ang mga kasapi ng Hudikatura, at nasisira ang tiwala ng publiko sa sistema ng katarungan kapag nilalabag ng mga hukom ang mismong mga batas na sinumpaan nilang ipatupad.

Pinaalalahanan ng Korte Suprema ang lahat ng hukuman sa kanilang obligasyon na agarang iulat sa JIB—na kilala na ngayon bilang Judicial Integrity Office—ang anumang hatol na kriminal laban sa mga hukom at kawani ng korte, alinsunod sa Rules of Court.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=158390.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=158384.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/12/2025

Bullied — But Allowed to Kill Them in Their Sleep?

The Christmas Eve shooting at a car dealership along Commonwealth Avenue is unsettling not only because two lives were lost, but because of the question it inevitably raises: Can alleged workplace bullying ever justify killing? More sharply: can it justify killing co-workers while they sleep?

According to police accounts, a 24-year-old security guard allegedly shot and killed two fellow guards inside the dealership lounge. He claimed the victims had bullied him. Earlier that day, there had reportedly been a fistfight. Later that night, however, the accused waited until the two men had fallen asleep before firing at them. He had allegedly told a sales executive beforehand that he was “ready to kill somebody” after holding back for a long time.

He fled after the shooting. He was arrested the next morning. Murder charges are now expected.

But when the law is applied, where does this story really lead?

Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, self-defense hinges first and foremost on unlawful aggression. And so the most basic question must be asked: Does unlawful aggression exist at the moment of the killing when the alleged aggressors are asleep? Can a sleeping person pose an imminent threat that must be repelled? Can yesterday’s fistfight legally justify today’s gunfire?

Self-defense, after all, is not about settling scores. It exists to repel a danger that is real, immediate, and ongoing. If the threat has already ended — if the supposed aggressors are unconscious — what exactly is being defended against?

Then comes the second requirement: Was there reasonable necessity in the means employed? Even assuming bullying occurred, even assuming earlier physical violence, is a firearm a necessary response to men who are asleep? If fists were involved earlier, does the law allow bullets later? Where does proportionality fit into this narrative?

And what of provocation? Can the act still be framed as self-defense if the accused himself waited, prepared, and chose the timing of the attack? Does waiting for victims to fall asleep suggest fear — or calculation?

This manner of attack leads to another unavoidable question: Is this not treachery? When victims are killed in a state where they cannot defend themselves, where no warning is given, and where the attacker faces no risk, does this not fit squarely within the definition of alevosia under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code?

If the victims were asleep, unaware, and defenseless, what chance did they have to resist? And if there was none, how can the crime be anything less than murder?

The circumstances also invite questions about intent. What does it suggest when someone allegedly announces beforehand that he is ready to kill, waits for a specific moment, and then flees afterward? Are these the acts of a person acting on sudden impulse — or of someone who has made a decision?

Bullying, if proven, is not imaginary. It is serious. It can be cruel. But the law must still ask: Does suffering, no matter how real, convert retaliation into justification? Or does it merely explain motive without erasing criminal liability?

Finally, one must ask: What lawful paths were available but not taken? Could the matter have been reported to management? Could incidents have been documented? Could intervention have been sought before violence escalated? And if aggression truly occurred, should the response not have been limited to what was necessary to repel it — no more, no less?

These questions matter because the law is not designed to reward vengeance, only necessity. It draws a sharp line between defending oneself and exacting revenge. And when that line is crossed — especially against sleeping, defenseless victims — the consequences are severe.

So the question lingers, long after the gunshots faded into Christmas morning: If there was no unlawful aggression at the moment of the killing, what defense truly remains?

What are your thoughts?

DISCLAIMER: This post is NOT legal advice nor a legal opinion. No lawyer-client relationship is created by viewing or engaging with this content. It is intended only as general reflection and discussion on current events and what the law generally provides.

Photo from: QCPD

25/12/2025

25/12/2025

Murder on Christmas Morning

Christmas in the Philippines is often described as a season of reconciliation and rest. Yet jurisprudence reminds us that the law does not pause for holidays, nor does violence observe festive boundaries. People v. Lao-as (G.R. No. 126396, June 29, 2001) stands as a sobering illustration of this truth—a murder committed in the quiet hours of Christmas morning, born not of a heated quarrel, but of a sudden and inexplicable act.

On December 24, 1988, Leonardo Bastuten invited several acquaintances to his home in Tabing Ilog, Marilao, Bulacan, to celebrate Christmas. All of them, including the accused Felixberto Lao-as, were from Bacolod City. Drinking began in the afternoon and continued until early morning. The guests consumed several bottles of liquor, but Bastuten himself did not participate. He went to sleep at around ten in the evening while his guests continued drinking.

At around five o’clock on Christmas morning, Bastuten woke up and briefly went outside. He spoke to one of his guests, Armando Ramirez, and then returned upstairs to sleep. Shortly after, at around 5:30 a.m., Bastuten went downstairs again. According to the Supreme Court’s findings, he did nothing provocative. Without warning or exchange of words, Lao-as—then intoxicated—drew a balisong concealed in his sock and stabbed Bastuten.

Ramirez, who was only about two feet away, witnessed the attack. He managed to parry a second thrust, suffering a wound to his thumb. Lao-as then fled. Ramirez testified that there had been no prior altercation between the accused and the victim. This eyewitness account was not effectively contradicted.

Inside the house, another witness, Demetrio Candilosas, heard Bastuten cry out that he had been stabbed. When Candilosas asked who attacked him, Bastuten named Lao-as. The victim was rushed to the hospital but later died on December 27, 1988 from septicemia and shock caused by the stab wounds.

At trial, Lao-as denied stabbing the victim, yet alternately claimed self-defense and accident—positions the Court later described as mutually inconsistent.

The Supreme Court emphasized that accident presupposes lack of intent, while self-defense presumes a conscious act justified by necessity. One cannot plausibly claim both, much less deny awareness of inflicting a fatal wound.

The Court gave full credence to the testimony of Ramirez, noting his lack of improper motive and his proximity to the incident. It also ruled that Bastuten’s statement identifying his assailant was admissible, either as a dying declaration or as part of the res gestae, having been made immediately after the stabbing and under the stress of the occurrence.

Motive, the Court stressed, was immaterial. Proof of motive becomes essential only when the identity of the assailant is doubtful. Here, it was not. The attack was sudden, unexpected, and carried out against an unarmed victim who had given no provocation. The concealment of the weapon and the timing of the assault—just as the victim descended from his house—constituted treachery. This qualified the killing as murder under the Revised Penal Code.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentenced Lao-as to reclusion perpetua, ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim ₱50,000 as death indemnity with interest. Christmas, the Court implicitly reminded, does not excuse violence, nor does intoxication diminish criminal responsibility when treachery is present.

25/12/2025

A Season of Hope, A Future of Peace

Christmas marks the birth of Christ, the Prince of Peace: a light that shines brightest even in the face of adversity. In this sacred season, we are reminded that true peace is inseparable from justice.

It is the hope that sustains us through the challenges we have faced and the uncertainties that the coming year may bring.

As we look toward the New Year, let us hold onto the promise of better days ahead — for our personal lives, our families, and our country. At Victoriano Aureus Salud & Tiu, our commitment to you remains steadfast: we walk the path towards justice with you.

May your heart be filled with the warmth of the season and the certain hope of a brighter tomorrow.

Merry Christmas and a Grace-filled 2026!

22/12/2025

Victoriano Aureus Salud & Tiu Law Firm officially opens its new office.

Thank you to the family, friends, and clients who attended the official launch and continue to trust us throughout the years. Merry Christmas, and we look forward to the new year 2026!

Until then, happy holidays!