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Dimaampao Law, Las Piñas (2026)

27/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified the rules on serving notices of dishonor in cases involving Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘉𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬 𝘓𝘢𝘸. The SC formally recognized electronic service as a valid mode of serving notice of dishonor, while requiring safeguards to ensure that service can be reliably proven in court.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 affirmed the conviction of spouses Arnel and Marivic Carlos for six counts of violating BP 22.

The spouses issued six checks to respondent Tire Star, Inc. as payment for car tires. All six checks were dishonored by the bank as the account they were drawn from had been closed.

The prosecution presented evidence that Tire Star’s messenger personally attempted to serve the notice of dishonor at the spouses’ office, and that the spouses refused to receive it, instructed an employee instead to sign for it.

The spouses then claimed before the SC that they should be acquitted because they were not properly served with a notice of dishonor.

The SC rejected the spouses’ argument, emphasizing that an accused cannot defeat a BP 22 prosecution simply by denying receipt of the notice or refusing to accept it. Otherwise, issuers could easily evade liability by avoiding service.

To promote uniformity and reduce disputes, the SC clarified the acceptable modes of serving notices of dishonor.

𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 remains the preferred mode. The notice may be delivered directly to the issuer or, in the case of a business, to an authorized representative. If the issuer cannot be served at the office, the notice may be left at the issuer’s residence with an adult resident between 8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M.

The person serving the notice must execute an affidavit stating when, where, and how service was made. When practicable, service should be documented through photographs or video recordings, subject to proper authentication in court.

If personal service is not practicable, the notice of dishonor may be sent by 𝗿𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹, or where registry service is unavailable, by 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹. The person serving the notice must likewise execute an affidavit explaining why personal service could not be made and attach the supporting postal documents.

The SC also recognized 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗰 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲, ruling that a notice of dishonor may now be served through email as a primary mode of service when the issuer previously provided their email address. Electronic service may likewise be used through platforms such as 𝘝𝘪𝘣𝘦𝘳, 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘔𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳, or similar applications, provided it can be verified that the electronic account belongs to the issuer.

Electronic service may also be used when the issuer refuses to receive the notice, avoids service, or when personal service is otherwise impracticable. In such cases, the electronic notice must be sent within 24 hours after the final unsuccessful attempt at personal service and must state the dates and details of those failed attempts.

The sender must also execute an affidavit and preserve supporting evidence, such as screenshots, messages, delivery or read receipts, or chat histories., stressing that a simple denial of receipt is not enough to invalidate electronic service.

In all instances, to successfully dispute service, the issuer must show that it was physically impossible to have received the notice at the time and place it was served.

The spouses were fined a total of PHP 609,972.58 for the six BP 22 violations, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment. They were also ordered to pay Tire Star the same amount, plus interest.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed that electronic service should not merely be a substitute but a primary mode of service consistent with contemporary means of communication and the Judiciary’s ongoing digital reforms.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172159.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171528.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171527.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/08/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has dismissed the consolidated petitions challenging the 𝘕𝘰 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘈𝘱𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 (𝘕𝘊𝘈𝘗) in Metro Manila, ruling that the issues raised have become moot because of the adoption of a new and uniform traffic enforcement framework under the 𝘔𝘦𝘵𝘳𝘰 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘭𝘢 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 2023 (𝘔𝘔𝘛𝘊 2023). In addition to mootness, the petitions were also dismissed for lack of standing, violation of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, and forum-shopping.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, the SC dismissed the petitions filed by Kilusan sa Pagbabago ng Industriya ng Transportasyon and others. The petitions sought to declare unconstitutional ordinances of Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Quezon City, Valenzuela City, and the City of Manila implementing 𝘔𝘦𝘵𝘳𝘰 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘭𝘢 𝘋𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘈𝘶𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 (𝘔𝘔𝘋𝘈) 𝘙𝘦𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘕𝘰. 16-01, which established NCAP.

The NCAP seeks to ease traffic and reduce corruption through the use of digital cameras to detect traffic violations.

The petitioners argue that NCAP is inconsistent with 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 4136 𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘓𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which contemplates direct, face-to-face apprehension of violators and places responsibility on the actual driver rather than the registered vehicle owner. They also claim that NCAP violates due process because motorists may receive penalties without immediate notice or an opportunity to contest the violation when it occurs, which can result in fines accumulating before they are informed.

The SC ruled that the issues had been overtaken by later developments. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires courts to refrain from resolving constitutional questions where a case may be disposed of on non-constitutional grounds. Here, the traffic enforcement framework has since been changed by MMTC 2023, which is not being challenged in the present set of cases.

The SC noted that MMTC 2023 adopted by the Metro Manila Council established a uniform framework for traffic regulation and NCAP implementation across Metro Manila. It provides a uniform traffic adjudication system, procedures before traffic adjudication boards, periods for settling notices of violation, guidelines for tagging violations in the Land Transportation Office’s (LTO) Land Transportation Management System, data privacy safeguards, uniform fines and penalties, recognized online payment platforms, and rules on the mandatory authorization process.

The MMDA later issued 𝘔𝘦𝘮𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘮 𝘊𝘪𝘳𝘤𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘳 𝘕𝘰. 10, 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 2025, to implement MMTC 2023, which was adopted by Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Quezon City, and Valenzuela City through new ordinances. The City of Manila also enacted an ordinance adopting the MMTC 2023, except the provision on the establishment of a Traffic Adjudication Board since its own Traffic Adjudication Board continues to perform its functions.

The SC said these developments effectively replaced the fragmented NCAP systems challenged in the petitions. Since neither MMTC 2023 nor the new ordinances were being challenged before the Court, any ruling on the validity of the old ordinances would have no practical or legal effect.

Although exceptions exist to allow the Court to resolve an otherwise moot case, such as when there is a grave violation of the Constitution, significant public interest, a need to formulate guiding principles, or when the case is likely to recur and evade review, none of these were present in this case.

The SC added that the dismissal does not bar future challenges if the revised NCAP system later gives rise to an actual controversy.

The SC also lifted the temporary restraining order it issued on August 30, 2022, against the City of Manila, Quezon City, Valenzuela City, Parañaque City, Muntinlupa City, the LTO, and all parties acting for and on their behalf.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168727

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168686

Read the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168702

Read the Separate Opinion of Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168712

Read the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Japar B. Dimaampao at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168707

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that the infliction of psychological violence, if done through Facebook, is considered done through information and communications technology, which warrants the imposition of a higher penalty pursuant to Section 6 of RA 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012.

In a Resolution penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed with modification its October 22, 2025 Decision (assailed Decision), which upheld the conviction of an individual (###) for committing psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act) against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on Facebook.

The SC, however, resolved to raise the penalty by one degree, considering that the offense was committed through Facebook, as adequately alleged in the Information and established during trial.

AAA filed the VAWC case against her former partner ### after he posted a statement on Facebook calling her a dirty woman and an animal, and threatening to box her when he sees her. He repeated the insults in the comments to the post, which was public.

During trial, AAA presented screenshots of the Facebook post and testified that she had created for ### the Facebook account which made the post. Her two siblings testified that the account was ###’s and that they received messages from him through the same account.

Despite ###’s denial, the SC, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the decisions of the Family Court and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicting ###, stressing that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender. The SC also upheld the penalty imposed by the CA, consisting of imprisonment for six months and one day to eight years and one day, a fine of PHP 100,000, and psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Resolving ###’s Motion for Reconsideration, the SC held that ###’s authorship of the Facebook post was established beyond reasonable doubt, using the guideposts it established in its assailed Decision:

𝟏. 𝐀𝐝𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩;
𝟐. 𝐁𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭;
𝟑. 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐫 𝐚 𝐟𝐞𝐰 𝐩𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐥𝐞;
𝟒. 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫’𝐬 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬;
𝟓. 𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫, 𝐭𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲, 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐦𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐞, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐜 𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫;
𝟔. 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐮𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬; 𝐨𝐫
𝟕. 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩, 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬, 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩.

The authorship of the Facebook post and all the elements of psychological violence having been established, the SC said Section 6 of the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012 applies, which mandates the imposition of a penalty higher by one degree for crimes and offenses committed using ICT. The use of ICT can enable offenders to evade liability, reach more victims, or cause greater harm.

Citing the definition of ICT, the Court ruled that social media platforms, such as Facebook, qualify as ICT systems because they allow users to generate, send, receive, store, and process electronic data messages through computers, mobile phones, or similar electronic devices.

In this case, the Information alleged that ### made the Facebook post using his "Facebook Messenger Account… which was set to public view." The SC ruled that this statement constitutes a sufficient allegation of the use of ICT as a qualifying circumstance. Even if the term "ICT" was not stated, the Information adequately informed ### that he is being charged of inflicting psychological violence upon AAA through Facebook, which falls under the contemplation of an ICT system.

The allegation was established by the prosecution during trial.

Thus, the Court increased the penalty by one degree from six months and one day to eight years and one day to imprisonment of six years and one day to 14 years, eight months, and one day, but retained the fined PHP 100,000. He was likewise ordered to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168987

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168968

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sale of land remains valid even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. The deed may then be corrected to match what the parties actually agreed to.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the sale of a 491-square-meter parcel of land in Cebu City between buyers Genara and Felipe Abay, Sr. (the Abays) and sellers Crispin Caballes and the heirs of Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (the Gallardos), despite the mistake in the designation of the lot number in the deed of sale.

The property formed part of the estate of Margarita Lopez, who had nine children, including Crispin and Trinidad.

The Abays visited the site with Crispin and Tomas Gallardo, one of Trinidad’s heirs before buying the property. During the visit, they were showed them the land’s boundaries. Tomas even helped the Abays build a concrete fence around it.

The Abays openly occupied the property for about 20 years until their possession was disrupted when workers of spouses Jacinto and Chiok Ngo Lim Young (the Youngs), who are claiming ownership over the property, entered it, destroyed the fence, and built their own posts.

The Abays discovered that a title over the property had been issued in the Youngs’ name. This prompted them to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the title.

The Gallardos challenged this, arguing that the documents the Abays presented referred to a different lot, Lot No. 6036-B, and not the lot they were occupying, which was Lot No. 7. While both lots were located in the same area, they were separate properties and were not beside each other. The Youngs supported the Gallardos’ position and maintained that they were buyers in good faith.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Abays which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that the documents presented by the Abays showed that they purchased Lot No. 6036-B and not Lot No. 7, which they claimed to own and possess.

The SC disagreed and reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases upholding the validity of the sale and allowing the correction of a contract to reflect the parties’ true agreement in instances where the deed of sale failed to accurately describe the land intended by the parties.

The SC stressed that a person buys property based on what they see on the ground, such as its boundaries, landmarks, and improvements, and not by its technical lot number. Ordinary buyers cannot be expected to identify property based only on survey descriptions or legal documents.

Under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a written document may be corrected when, because of a mistake, it does not express the parties’ actual agreement.

The SC explained that a contract may be reformed or corrected if: (1) the parties agreed on the transaction; (2) the written document does not express their true agreement; and (3) the error was caused by a mistake, fraud, accident, or unfair conduct.

In this case, all these requirements were present.

Thus, the Court declared deemed reformed the Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale by changing the designation of the property sold from “Lot No. 6036-B” to “Lot 7” and the Abays as absolute owners of such property.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/266298-spouses-genera-and-felipe-abay-sr-et-al-vs-spouses-jacinto-s-young-et-al/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

25/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified that a Precautionary Hold Departure Order (PHDO) may be issued only in cases involving crimes punishable by a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment, or when the respondent is a foreigner, regardless of the penalty.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that a PHDO cannot be maintained when the crime under investigation does not meet these requirements.

The case arose from a complaint for 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 and violation of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 22 (BP 22) filed against petitioner Faustine Feliz Abad (Abad) in connection with her purchase of airline tickets from respondent GHT Travel and Tours (GHT).

The City Prosecutor found probable cause to charge Abad with two counts of violation of BP 22, but found insufficient evidence to charge her with 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢. Two Informations for BP 22 were then filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.

The prosecution also sought a PHDO against Abad with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming that she was a flight risk. The RTC granted the request.

Abad later sought to have the PHDO lifted. The RTC denied her request, noting, among others, that GHT had appealed the dismissal of the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge to the Secretary of Justice and that Abad was a permanent resident of the United States.

Ruling that the PHDO should have been lifted, the SC cited the Rule on PHDO that it issued on August 7, 2018, which provides that a PHDO may be issued while a criminal complaint is undergoing preliminary investigation when the crime involved carries a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment. It may also be issued against a foreigner regardless of the penalty.

The SC explained that the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge, which could have carried a penalty exceeding six years and one day, was dismissed for lack of probable cause. The only charges filed against Abad were two counts of BP 22 violations, each punishable by imprisonment of 30 days to one year.

Thus, the BP 22 charges did not meet the penalty requirement for the issuance of a PHDO.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170320.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165691.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/08/2026

The has ruled that employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled not only to full backwages but also to the remittance of their Social Security System (SSS) contributions.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division held that an employer’s obligation to remit SSS contributions continues during the period covered by an employee’s illegal dismissal.

The case involved four employees of Lopez Sugar Corporation (LSC) who were illegally dismissed. LSC was ordered to reinstate them to their former positions and pay them full backwages. After the ruling became final, the employees asked LSC to remit their SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages so they could qualify for retirement benefits.

LSC refused, arguing that under the 𝘚𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997, its obligation to pay SSS contributions ended upon the employees’ separation from employment, regardless of whether their dismissal was legal or illegal.

The Social Security Commission (SSC) rejected LSC’s position and ordered it to pay the contributions. The SSC ruled that because the employees were illegally dismissed, the employer-employee relationship was deemed to have continued during the period they were prevented from working.

Holding that LSC remained obligated to remit the employees’ SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages, the SC stated that under Article 294 of the 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages and other benefits.

The SC explained that such employees are considered to have remained employed during the period covered by their backwages and are therefore entitled to the rights and benefits that would have accrued during that period.

Since LSC failed to remit the illegally dismissed employees’ social security contributions, the SC held that LSC is liable to pay a penalty thereon of three percent per month, reckoned from the date they became due until full payment.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170676.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165713.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

25/08/2026

The has acquitted a woman of bigamy, ruling that a prior marriage that was void from the beginning (𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘣 𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰) may be raised as a defense even without a prior judicial declaration of nullity.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Pampanga and the Court of Appeals (CA), which had found Ma. Fe Imelda Lapira guilty of bigamy.

Lapira faced a bigamy charge under Article 349 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 for marrying Jimmy Fariscal while still married to Takahiko Sato as evidenced by a marriage certificate from the Office of the Civil Registrar General.

During trial, Lapira argued that her marriage to Sato was void because no ceremony took place and no marriage license had been issued, both of which were required for validity. The Local Civil Registrar confirmed that there was no record of the application for a marriage license for Lapira and Sato.

In acquitting Lapira, the SC applied its ruling in the 2021 case of 𝘗𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘥𝘰 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, which held that an accused in a bigamy case may directly argue that a previous marriage is void as a defense, even without a prior court declaration.

The SC explained that one of the essential elements of bigamy is the existence of a valid prior marriage. If the first marriage was void from the beginning, that element is absent.

In this case, the certification from the Local Civil Registrar sufficiently proved that no marriage license was issued to Lapira and Sato. This certification was enough to counter the presumption of the marriage certificate’s validity.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171178.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165698.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

25/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sales agent’s promise to issue a Contract to Sell after payment of reservation fee is not an “advertisement” under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, or the 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦, that would form part of developer’s warranties. However, the developer may still be required to refund a buyer if it fails to honor that promise.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ordered Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) to refund the payments made by John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) after it failed to issue the promised Contract to Sell.

Bautista paid Empire East for a residential unit PHP 130,000, consisting of a PHP 20,000 reservation fee and PHP 110,000 in additional payments. He claimed he made the payments because Empire East’s sales agent promised to issue a Contract to Sell once he paid the reservation fee. When more than a year passed without the contract being issued, Bautista stopped making payments and demanded a refund.

The SC, agreeing with both the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) and the Court of Appeals which ruled in Bautista’s favor, held that Bautista was entitled to a refund but clarified that the sales agent’s promise did not fall under Section 19 of PD 957.

The SC clarified that Section 19, which mandates truthful and non-misleading advertisements and sales materials, applies only to materials intended for the general public, such as those in those in newspapers, radio, TV, or similar mass communication channels. It does not cover promises made by a sales agent to individual buyers.

The SC emphasized that buyers remain protected, as developers may still be held liable under their contractual obligations and other applicable laws.

The SC ordered Empire East to refund Bautista the PHP 130,000 with interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint in 2012, as well as to pay PHP 260,000 in exemplary damages, which courts award to discourage wrongful conduct and warn against similar actions.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/272556-1.pdf.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

25/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that courts may determine whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case when necessary to resolve who has the right to possess a property. However, this finding is only provisional and applies solely to the ejectment case.

In a Decision written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC’s First Division emphasized this ruling as it denied the appeal filed by Belinda E. Soriano and her relatives (collectively, Belinda and others) in an ejectment case filed against them by Antonio V. Estrella (Estrella).

Estrella claimed ownership of a property in Quezon City where Belinda and others lived with his permission. When they refused his demand in 2012 to vacate the property so he could renovate it, Estrella filed an unlawful detainer case.

Belinda and others argued that the case should be dismissed because Estrella supposedly lacked the legal capacity to sue, having died in 1990. They provided his death certificate as evidence.

Ruling in Estrella’s favor, the SC held that Estrella had successfully overcome the presumption created by his death certificate. The parties themselves acknowledged that the Estrella who filed the case was the same Estrella named in the property’s title. Belinda and others never claimed that he was an impostor or disputed his identity. This, along with Estrella’s living presence, confirmed his legal capacity to sue.

The SC clarified that while the proper remedy to cancel a death certificate or correct a civil registry entry is to file a petition for cancellation, this does not prevent courts hearing ejectment cases from provisionally determining whether a party is alive or dead when necessary to resolve the issue of possession.

Accordingly, the SC held that a court’s finding on whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case is limited to determining that party’s legal capacity to sue and right to physical possession of the property.

The SC also ruled that the requirements for unlawful detainer were met. Belinda and others initially had lawful possession of the property; however, it became unlawful once Estrella demanded that they vacate and they refused, leading him to file the case within the one-year period required by law.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171407.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/236333-belinda-e-soriano-et-al-vs-antonio-v-estrella/.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

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