Atty. Melchor L Mapalo

03/09/2025

Iginiit ng ang mga angkop na legal na paraan para sa pagbawi ng lupa depende sa kung ito ay para sa posesyon (possession) at/o pagmamay-ari (ownership) nito, gayundin ang mga nalalapat na prescriptive period. Kasama sa mga remedyong ito ang accion interdictal o ejectment, accion publiciana, at accion reivindicatoria.

Sa Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, sinabi ng En Banc ng Korte Suprema na tama si Lea Victa-Espinosa (Espinosa) sa paghain ng accion publiciana para mabawi ang posesyon ng kanyang lupain. Sa pangkalahatan, maaari lang ihain ang accion publiciana kapag higit sa isang taon na ang lumipas mula sa pagkakaalis ng posesyon. Pero maaari pa rin itong ihain nang mas maaga kung nangyari ito nang walang halong puwersa, pananakot, pagbabanta, diskarte, o panlilinlang.

Nagpasya din ang Korte Suprema na hindi isang accion reivindicatoria ang inihain ni Espinosa dahil hindi niya hiniling sa kanyang reklamo ang pagbawi ng pagmamay-ari ng lupa.

Matapos bilhin ang ari-arian, nalaman ni Espinosa na inuokupa ang isang bahagi nito ng mag-asawang Noel at Leny Agullo. Nang tumanggi silang umalis sa kabila ng kanyang kahilingan, nagsampa si Espinosa ng reklamo para sa pagbawi ng posesyon ng lupa sa Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Tinanggihan ng RTC ang reklamo nang walang paglilitis at nagpasya na masyadong maaga itong isinampa. Ipinaliwanag nito na mayroon pa ring opsyon si Espinosa na magsampa ng kaso ng ejectment na dapat gawin sa loob ng isang taon mula nang matuklasan niya ang hindi awtorisadong pag-okupa sa kanyang lupain. Napaaga ang reklamo dahil maaari lang umano ihain ang isang accion publiciana sa pangkalahatan pagkatapos lumipas ang isang taon.

Gayunpaman, binaliktad ng Court of Appeals ang desisyon ng RTC. Nakita nito na hindi isang accion publiciana kundi isang accion reivindicatoria ang reklamo ni Espinosa dahil sinikap niyang mabawi ang lupa batay sa kanyang pagmamay-ari ng ari-arian.

Sa kanilang Petisyon sa Korte Suprema, iginiit ng mag-asawang Agullo na isang accion publiciana na maagang isinampa ang kaso ni Espinosa dahil wala pang isang taon ang lumipas mula nang mawala sa kanila ang posesyon ng lupa.

Tinanggihan ng Korte Suprema ang Petisyon. Nilinaw nito ang iba't ibang legal na aksyon na magagamit para sa mga paghahabol na may kaugnayan sa lupa:
• Accion interdictal o isang summary ejectment case;
• Accion publiciana; at
• Accion reivindicatoria.

Inihahain ang summary ejectment case para mabawi ang pisikal na posesyon ng lupa kapag ang pag-aalis ay dahil sa puwersa, pananakot, pagbabanta, diskarte, o pagnanakaw at hindi pa tumatagal ng higit sa isang taon.

Inihahain naman ang isang accion publiciana para mabawi ang posesyon ng lupa kapag higit sa isang taon ang lumipas mula nang mapunta sa iba ang lupa, o kahit wala pang isang taon kung walang ginamit na puwersa o katulad na pamamaraan.

Sa kabilang banda, inihahain ang isang accion reivindicatoria para mabawi ang parehong pagmamay-ari at posesyon batay sa pagmamay-ari na iyon.

Paliwanag ng Korte Suprema, sa accion publiciana, ang isyu ay kung sino ang may mas mabuting karapatan na angkinin ang lupa nang hindi kinakailangang mag-claim ng pagmamay-ari. Sa kabaliktaran, sa accion reivindicatoria, tinutukoy kung sino ang nagmamay-ari ng lupa, at ang posesyon ng lupa ay ibinibigay sa nararapat na may-ari.

Sa kasong ito, ang aksyon ay publiciana at hindi reinvindicatoria dahil ang hiniling sa reklamo ay mabawi ang posesyon at hindi ang pagmamay-ari ng lupa. Dagdag pa nito, hindi kwinestiyon ng mag-asawang Agullo ang titulo ni Espinosa.

Sinabi ng Korte na hindi napaaga ang aksyon dahil maaaring magsampa ang isang accion publiciana kahit sa loob ng isang taon mula sa pagkakaalis sa lupa kung walang puwersa, pananakot, pagbabanta, diskarte, o panlilinlang na ginamit. Dahil hindi sinabi ni Espinosa na ginamit ng mag-asawang Agullo ang alinman sa mga paraan na ito, wastong naihain ang aksyon.

Inutusan ng Korte Suprema ang RTC na magpatuloy sa paglilitis at pagdesisyunan ang kaso.

Basahin ang press release sa https://tinyurl.com/y7nr9hzx.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://tinyurl.com/38e2xzfa.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

28/08/2025

The (SC) has ruled that a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) automatically ceases upon the death of the person who granted it, and any acts carried out by the agent afterwards are void, unless covered by narrow exceptions under the law.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division held that Jessica Alova Uberas lost her authority under the SPA to act on behalf of her father, Meliton Alova, upon his death in 1998.

In 1998, Meliton executed an SPA in favor of Jessica over the subject conjugal property. He died later that year. Despite the death of his father, Jessica still used the same SPA in 2003 to execute a mortgage over the said property in favor of San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI) to secure her loan from the company. Jessica failed to pay the loan and the property was foreclosed where SMFI emerged as the winning bidder.

Felicidad Alova and Decelyn Alova Pution, the widow and other daughter of Meliton, filed a case to nullify the mortgage and the foreclosure sale.

Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) determined that Meliton’s death ended the agency. However, the RTC found that because the SPA had the conformity of Felicidad, Meliton’s wife, the mortgage was valid on her ½ share of the conjugal property. On the other hand, the CA declared the mortgage invalid, citing that it was not executed on behalf of Spouses Meliton and Felicidad.

SMFI appealed to the SC, which partly ruled in its favor. The Court upheld the agency’s termination but validated the mortgage and foreclosure sale with respect to Jessica’s undivided share in the property.

The SC explained that under an SPA, which is a contract of agency, a principal authorizes an agent to act on his or her behalf in transactions with third persons. Agency is personal, representative, and derivative, and it ends upon the death of either the principal or the agent.

Any act by the agent after the principal’s death is void, unless it falls under two Civil Code exceptions: (1) when the agency was for the parties’ common interest, and (2) when the agent, unaware of the death or agency’s end, contracted with a third party in good faith.

In this case, there was no showing that these exceptions were applicable. Jessica was fully aware of her father’s death, and the SPA was not made for their mutual benefit.

The SC also reiterated that for an agent’s act to bind the principal, the deed must clearly be made, signed, and sealed in the principal’s name.

Here, although Jessica was described in the beginning of the deed as Meliton’s attorney-in-fact, the mortgage was signed by Jessica in her personal capacity, as it was neither executed nor sealed in Meliton’s name, and without indication that she was acting as attorney-in-fact.

The Court also ruled that Meliton’s wife, Felicidad, was not bound as a principal under the SPA, as she only provided her marital conformity.

However, the Court clarified that the mortgage and foreclosure sale were not entirely void. Jessica automatically became a co-owner of the property after her father’s death. When she signed the mortgage, she encumbered her share in the property to secure her obligation to SMFI. Therefore, the mortgage and foreclosure sale were valid only for Jessica’s share.

The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine Jessica’s share in the subject property and to annotate the shares of Meliton’s other heirs, and that of SMFI which acquired Jessica’s interest.

Read the full text of the press release at https://tinyurl.com/27t9k6vy

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260071-san-miguel-foods-inc-vs-felicidad-d-alova-and-decelyn-alova-pution/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

19/08/2025

SUPREME COURT TAKES ACTION ON BARANGAY, SK ELECTIONS POSTPONEMENT

JUST IN: The Supreme Court (SC) En Banc has ordered the Senate, House of Representatives, Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin, and COMELEC to respond to the petition filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal, which sought to question the constitutionality of the law that postponed the December 2025 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections (BSKE).

In a statement, SC spokesperson Atty. Camille Sue Mae Ting said that the respondents are given a non-extendable period of 10 days from receipt of notice.

19/08/2025

Nagpasya ang na ang pagkakabawi ng isang na-carnap na sasakyan ay hindi hadlang para matanggap ng may-ari ang kabuuang bayad sa ilalim ng insurance policy.

Sa Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, inatasan ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. (UCPВ) na bayaran si Wilfrido C. Wijangco (Wilfrido) para sa pagkawala ng kanyang ninakaw na sasakyan.

Tinutukan ng patalim ang anak ni Wilfrido na si Andrew sa isang paradahan ng mga armadong lalaki na tinangay ang sasakyan matapos siyang pagbantaan. Iniulat sa pulisya ang pagnanakaw at nagsampa si Wilfrido ng insurance claim sa UCPB at nagsumite ng lahat ng kinakailangang dokumento.

Sa kabila ng paulit-ulit na follow-up na ginawa ni Wilfrido, hindi inaprubahan ng UCPB ang kanyang paghahabol. Nagprotesta si Wilfrido sa pagkaantala at gumawa ng pormal na kahilingan laban sa UCPB.

Ipinaalam kalaunan ng UCPB kay Wilfrido na nabawi ang sasakyan ng Traffic Management Group (TMG) at ititigil ang kanyang claim hangga’t hindi naiisumite ang TMG clearance. Nang hindi umusad ang kanyang claim, nagsampa ng kaso si Wilfrido laban sa UCPB.

Pinagbigyan ang insurance claim ng Regional Trial Court (RTC) na nagsabing nagdulot ang pagnanakaw ng pananagutan sa UCPB kahit na nabawi pa ito. Nang binaliktad ng Court of Appeals (CA) ang desisyon, iniakyat ang kaso sa Korte Suprema.

Ibinalik ng Korte Suprema ang desisyon ng RTC. Binigyang-diin nito na may nagawa nang pagnanakaw kapag labag sa batas ang pagkuha ng sasakyan. Hindi nabubura ng pagkakabawi ng sasakyan ang mismong pagnanakaw.

Sa ilalim ng Seksyon 249 ng Insurance Code, inaatasan ang mga insurer na magbayad ng mga claim sa loob ng takdang panahan matapos matanggap ang patunay ng pagkawala. Sa sandaling lumipas ang panahong ito at bago mabawi ang insured na sasakyan, magiging pinal ang pagbabayad ng insurer para sa pagkawala at hindi maaaring pilitin ang insured na tanggapin ang nabawing sasakyan.

Sa kasong ito, inihain ni Wilfrido ang kanyang katibayan ng pagkawala noong Oktubre 10, 2006, ngunit ipinaalam sa kanya ng UCPB ang pagbawi pagkalipas ng 162 na araw – higit pa sa 90-araw na legal na palugit. Hindi rin magamit ang sasakyan dahil nawawala ang ilang bahagi at may matinding pinsala kahit pa nabawi ito.

Inatasan ng Korte Suprema ang UCPB na magbayad kay Wilfrido ng PHP 1.8 milyon na insurance proceeds, kasama ang dobleng interes sa halaga. Inatasan din ang UPCB na magbayad ng PHP 180,000 bilang attorney’s fee at PHP 200,000 bilang danyos.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-recovery-of-carnapped-vehicle-does-not-bar-insurance-claim/.

Basahin ang buong Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/257086-wilfredo-c-wijangco-represented-by-his-son-andrew-c-wijanco-vs-ucpb-general-insurance-co-inc/.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

19/08/2025

Correction of Parent’s Citizenship in Birth Certificates Requires Court Petition

In the case of Uy-Belleza v. Civil Registrar of Tacloban City, G.R. No. 218354, September 15, 2021, the Supreme Court the change of citizenship of the mother of the petitioner from “Chinese” to “Filipino” after the presentation of competent supporting evidence to prove such citizenship at the time of birth of the petitioner.

The Supreme Court found that the Philippine passport of the petitioner’s mother, as well as the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner’s brother indicating their mother’s citizenship as “Fil,” were sufficient to justify the correction of said entry.

FULL ARTICLE: https://www.mpeclaw.com/articles/how-to-correct-citizenship-of-parents-in-birth-certificates

19/08/2025

Where to File: Venue Rules for Recognizing Foreign Divorce in the Philippines

In the case of Johansen vs. Office of the Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 256951, November 29, 2021, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan when the latter dismissed the petition for recognition of foreign decree of divorce for lack of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held:

"It is undisputed that the petition filed in the RTC sought two reliefs, namely: (1) recognition of foreign decree of divorce and the corresponding (2) change or correction of entry in the civil register. Hence, petitioner must not only establish the foreign judgment as a fact in accordance with the Rules on Evidence but must also comply with the specific requirements of Rule 108. This, petitioner failed to do.

Per the Decision of the RTC, the Report of Marriage in this case is found either in the DFA or the OCRG, that is, in Pasay City or Quezon City, respectively. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 108, the petition must be filed in the RTC where the corresponding civil registry is located. However, petitioner filed the case in the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan because it is convenient for her as she is residing in San Miguel, Bulacan. Thus, venue was improperly laid.

In fine, considering the foregoing defects in the petition, the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan did not err in dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction.”

FULL ARTICLE: https://www.mpeclaw.com/articles/proper-venue-in-filing-a-petition-for-recognition-of-foreign-decree-of-divorce

07/08/2025

The invalidated a sale of two parcels of land because the buyer knew that the seller was not the real owner.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division cancelled the sale made by Bayani S. Cerilla (Cerilla) to Edward C. Ciacho (Ciacho). The SC found that Ciacho knew the sold properties did not belong to Cerilla.

The properties were inherited by Adolfo De Guia which were about to be foreclosed due to unpaid debt. De Guia asked Cerilla to pay off the mortgage. They signed a deed of sale, and land titles were transferred to Cerilla’s name.

After a few months, another agreement was signed to re-sell the properties to De Guia. The latter filed adverse claim on the titles.

Cerilla and De Guia entered into a subsequent agreement where Cerilla would buy the properties for PHP 15 Million but only after De Guia ejects the illegal settlers from the properties.

As De Guia failed to remove the illegal settlers, Cerilla had to undertake the same but was not successful in doing so. As a result, Cerilla incurred expenses for ejectment which caused him to obtain a loan from a bank and from Ciacho.

Ciacho agreed to lend Cerilla with the properties as collateral. Because Cerilla could not pay the loan, Ciacho asked him to sign a deed of sale on the properties but with a request from Cerilla not to register the same.

De Guia learned that Ciacho registered the properties under his name. Thus, he filed a case with the RTC to invalidate the sale. After finding in favor of De Guia, the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Both RTC and CA found that Cerilla had no authority to sell the properties as he was just a mere “accommodation party” to avoid foreclosure of the properties but was not the real owner.

The Court agreed with the RTC and CA finding that there was no real intention to transfer ownership from De Guia to Cerilla. Even after the land titles were transferred under his name, Cerilla did not act as if he owned the lands.

Under the Civil Code, for a sale to be valid, the parties must agree to the sale. The parties’ actions during and after the agreement can serve as basis to determine their intent. The seller must also be the owner of the property or has authority to sell.

Here, the re-sale of the properties from Cerilla to De Guia within a short period of time coupled with the fact that Cerilla asked Ciacho not to register the properties under his name, indicate that there was no intention on the part of De Guia to transfer ownership of the properties.

The Court added that Ciacho cannot claim to be an innocent buyer because he was aware of facts that should have raised doubts about Cerilla’s ownership. He knew of the earlier sale between De Guia and Cerilla and the former’s claim as annotated on the titles.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-no-valid-sale-if-buyer-knows-seller-is-not-true-owner/

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/259051-edward-c-ciacho-vs-spouses-adolfo-t-de-guia-and-fe-alma-v-de-guia-et-al/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/259051-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

03/08/2025