Atty. Xorex C. Pugong

24/04/2026

Protecting children starts with awareness. 💻🔍

Online abuse and exploitation can happen quietly—and often, the signs are easy to miss. As parents, guardians, educators, and community members, we all play a role in keeping children safe in digital spaces.

If something feels wrong, trust your instincts and take action.
📢 Report cases to proper authorities:
Rcat-Vawc Cordillera Secretariat - 0910 706 1145
WCPC (PNP) - 0966 725 5961 (Globe) | 0920 907 1717 (Smart)
Baguio CSWDO - 0967 208 4777 (Globe) | 0951 750 5039 (Smart)

24/04/2026

Nagpasya ang na hindi maaaring irehistro ng ISCO Holding Corporation (ISCO) ang logo o marka nitong "NIKON & DESIGN" dahil sa nakalilitong pagkakahawig sa kilalang trademark na "NIKON" ng Nikon Corporation.

Sa desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, isinantabi ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang petisyon ng ISCO at pinagtibay ang naging pasya ng Court of Appeals (CA) na nauna nang tinanggihan ang trademark application ng ISCO.

Nagsumite ang ISCO ng aplikasyon para sa trademark na “NIKON & DESIGN” para sa kanilang mga ibinebenteng gamit pambahay. Tumutol sa aplikasyon ang Nikon Corp., isang dayuhang korporasyon na naunang gumagamit ng rehistradong markang “NIKON” sa Pilipinas. Ikinatwiran nito na may nakakalitong pagkakahawig sa kanilang sariling marka ang ginawa ng ISCO.

Sumang-ayon ang Intellectual Property Office–Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO-BLA) sa Nikon Corp. at tinanggihan ang aplikasyon ng ISCO. Bagaman binaliktad ng IPO Office of the Director General ang desisyong ito, ibinalik ng CA ang desisyon ng IPO-BLA. Dinala ng ISCO ang kaso sa Korte Suprema.

Katwiran ng ISCO, walang kaugnayan ang kanilang mga produkto sa mga produkto ng Nikon Corp. at ang mga pagkakaiba, gaya ng imahe ng isang angkla na nasa loob ng bilog at ang kombinasyon ng mga kulay, ay makaiiwas sa pagkalito ng mga mamimili.

Pinagtibay ng Korte Suprema ang desisyon ng CA at idineklara nito na hindi maaaring irehistro ang marka ng ISCO. Ipinaliwanag nito na ginagamit ang mga trademark para kilalanin at itangi ang mga produkto o serbisyo. Sa ilalim ng Seksyon 147 ng Intellectual Property Code, isa sa mga karapatan ng may-ari ng trademark ay ang pagbawalan ang iba sa paggamit ng kanilang marka sa paraang makalilito sa mga mamimili at magdudulot ng pinsalang pinansiyal sa may-ari.

Kung rehistrado sa Pilipinas ang isang tanyag na trademark, walang iba na maaaring magrehistro ng isang katulad o nakalilitong kaparehong marka kahit pa magkaiba ang mga produkto.

Sa kasong ito, napatunayan ng Korte Suprema na well-known o tanyag ang trademark ng Nikon Corp. Matagal nang ginagamit ang markang "NIKON", ipinu-promote, at nakarehistro sa buong mundo kabilang ang Pilipinas kung saan tinatamasa ng kumpanya ang malaking benta sa pandaigdigang merkado at malakas na presensiya sa industriya.

Nakita rin ng Korte Suprema na isang natatanging trademark ang "NIKON". Isa itong coined o inimbentong salita na walang karaniwang kahulugan sa Ingles o Filipino at hindi karaniwang ginagamit sa Pilipinas maliban bilang isang trademark.

Sa pagsusuri ng dalawang marka, napatunayan ng Korte Suprema na may nakalilitong pagkakahawig ang “NIKON & DESIGN” ng ISCO sa "NIKON" na trademark ng Nikon Corporation. Ginamit dito ang Dominancy Test na nakatuon sa pinakapansin-pansin at madaling matandaang bahagi ng mga marka. Hindi binibigyang-halaga ang mga maliliit na pagkakaiba sa disenyo, kulay, o pagkakaayos.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164274.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164266.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

The (SC) has ruled that ISCO Holding Corporation (ISCO) cannot register its “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍 & 𝐃𝐄𝐒𝐈𝐆𝐍” mark as it constitutes Nikon Corporation’s trade name and is confusingly similar to the well-known “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” trademark of the said corporation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division denied ISCO’s petition and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA), which rejected ISCO’s trademark application.

ISCO filed an application for a trademark for its home and household goods containing the design of an anchor enclosed in a circle with the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍”.

Nikon Corp., a foreign corporation and prior registrant and user of the “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍” mark in the Philippines, opposed the application, arguing that ISCO’s mark is confusingly similar to its own mark.

The Intellectual Property Office–Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO‑BLA) agreed with Nikon Corp. and denied ISCO’s application. Although the IPO Office of the Director General later reversed this ruling, the CA reinstated the IPO-BLA’s decision, prompting ISCO to elevate the case to the SC.

ISCO claimed that its goods are unrelated to Nikon Corp.’s and that differences, such as the image of an anchor enclosed in a circle and the color scheme, prevent consumer confusion.

The SC upheld the CA’s ruling and held that ISCO’s mark cannot be registered. It explained that trademarks are used to identify and distinguish goods or services. Under Section 147 of the 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, one of the rights of a trademark owner is to exclude others from using their trademark in a way that would confuse consumers and cause financial harm to the owner.

If a well‑known trademark is registered in the Philippines, no other party may register an identical or confusingly similar mark—even if the goods are different.

In this case, the SC found that Nikon Corp.’s trademark is well‑known. The NIKON mark has long been used, promoted, and registered worldwide, including in the Philippines, with the company enjoying significant global sales and market presence.

The SC also found NIKON to be a highly distinctive trademark. It is a coined or invented word with no ordinary meaning in English or Filipino and is not commonly used in the Philippines except as a trademark.

Analyzing the two marks, the SC found that ISCO’s trademark is confusingly similar to NIKON’s. It applied the 𝐃𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐲 𝐓𝐞𝐬𝐭, which focuses on the most noticeable and memorable part of the marks. Minor differences in design, color, or layout are disregarded.

Both ISCO’s and Nikon Corp.’s marks prominently use the word “𝐍𝐈𝐊𝐎𝐍.” This word is the dominant feature of both marks. They are spelled the same, appear in bold capital letters, and sound exactly the same when pronounced. Because of this, the SC ruled that the two marks create the same visual and auditory impression.

The SC explained that if ISCO were allowed to use its NIKON mark, consumers would likely assume a connection with Nikon Corp. Given its reputation for cameras, the public might believe that ISCO’s household appliances are made, approved, or endorsed by Nikon Corp., or that it has expanded into household products.

The SC also warned that ISCO’s use of the NIKON mark would damage Nikon Corp.’s interests because it would weaken its mark’s ability to uniquely identify a single source of goods. The law protects famous trademarks from such uses to prevent the blurring of their distinctiveness and to preserve their value and reputation.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164274

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164266

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy

22/04/2026

"SUPREME COURT SHOULD ACT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER WE WILL RANKLE THOSE THAT ARE IN POWER"

Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, during oral arguments on the petitions against the unprogrammed appropriations, stressed that the Supreme Court’s duty is not to remain comfortable while the people suffer, nor to allow those in power to abuse their authority while they simply watch.

"Our narrative is that of the motorcycle rider who died while waiting for his few thousand pesos for ayuda in Quezon City a few days ago, not the narrative of those waiting for their cut in the allocation of a government budget amounting to millions. Our narrative should be of the family who lost their homes in a fire in Mia Road in Quezon City, who now desperately seek shelter, not those who have mansions and farm-to-market roads that lead to their mansions or subdivisions they now own."

16/04/2026

Iginiit ng na ang pagbabawal sa pagdadala ng mga armas sa panahon ng halalan ay nalalapat sa mga baril at mga katulad na regulated na mga armas pero hindi sa mga bladed weapon o matatalas na instrumento tulad ng mga kutsilyo, maliban na lang kung ito ay dinadala sa loob o malapit sa isang polling place o lugar ng botohan.

Sa Resolusyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, binaliktad ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang nauna nitong desisyon na hinatulang nagkasala ang isang lalaki sa paglabag sa Section 261(p) ng Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, o ang Omnibus Election Code (OEC), as amended by Section 32 ng Republic Act No. (RA) 7166. Sinabi ng Korte Suprema na bagaba’t napatunayan na may dalang kutsilyo ang lalaki noong panahon ng halalan, hindi napatunayan na siya ay nasa polling place o nasa may 100 metro malapit dito sa mga araw at oras na ipinagbabawal sa ilalim ng OEC.

Inaresto ang lalaki noong halalan 2018 matapos siyang mahuli ng mga otoridad na may bitbit na kutsilyo sa labas ng kanyang tirahan nang walang awtorisasyon mula sa Commission on Elections.

Parehong guilty ang hatol ng Regional Trial Court at Court of Appeals sa pagdadala ng nakamamatay na armas noong panahon ng halalan at pinagtibay ito ng Korte Suprema.

Pero pinawalang-bisa ito ng Korte Suprema and inabswelto ang lalaki matapos makitang nabigo ang prosekusyon na patunayan ang lahat ng mahahalagang elemento ng pagkakasala.

Nilinaw ng Korte Suprema ang saklaw ng pagbabawal ng armas tuwing halalan. Sa Buella v. People, sinabi nito na hindi saklaw ang mga matatalas na instrumento ng Section 261(q) ng OEC at Section 32 ng RA 7166, na nagbabawal sa pagdadala ng mga baril sa labas ng tirahan o lugar ng negosyo sa panahon ng halalan.

Gayunpaman, saklaw ng Section 261(p) ang ibang pagkakasala, gaya ng pagdadala ng mga deadly weapon o nakamamatay na armas kabilang ang mga kutsilyo, sa isang polling place o malapit dito, sa panahon ng mga partikular na aktibidad na nauugnay sa halalan.

Hindi tulad ng mga baril na ipinagbabawal saanman sa publiko sa panahon ng halalan, ipinagbabawal lamang ang mga kutsilyo sa polling place o nasa may 100 metro malapit sa isang polling place.

Sa kasong ito, habang napatunayan ng prosekusyon na may dalang kutsilyo ang lalaki sa panahon ng halalan, nabigo itong patunayan na ginawa ang pagdadala ng kutsilyo sa isang polling place o sa loob ng 100 metro nito at nangyari ito sa mga araw at oras na partikular na sakop ng Section 261(p). Sa kawalan ng katibayan na siya ay nasa o malapit sa isang polling place sa mga tinukoy na araw sa ilalim ng batas, hindi napatunayan ang pagkakasala ng lalaki.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163156.

Basahin ang buong Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163149.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

The (SC) has reiterated that the prohibition on carrying deadly weapons during elections applies to fi****ms and similar regulated weapons, but not to bladed instruments like knives, unless they are carried inside the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters from it, during election day.

In a Resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division granted the motion for reconsideration (MR) of its earlier ruling that found a man guilty of violating Section 261(p) of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 881, or the 𝘖𝘮𝘯𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘴 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘖𝘌𝘊), as amended by Section 32 of 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘕𝘰. (𝘙𝘈) 7166. The SC held that while the man was found carrying a knife during the election period, there was no proof that he was in a polling place or within 100 meters of one during the days and hours prohibited under the 𝘖𝘌𝘊.

The man was arrested during the 2018 elections after authorities found him carrying a kitchen knife outside his residence without written authorization from the Commission on Elections.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found him guilty of carrying a deadly weapon during the election period.

The SC initially affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.

However, upon MR, the SC acquitted the man after finding that the prosecution failed to establish all the essential elements of the offense.

The SC clarified the scope of the weapon ban during elections. In 𝘉𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘢 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, it held that bladed instruments are not covered by Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 and Section 32 of 𝘙𝘈 7166, which prohibit the carrying of fi****ms outside one’s residence or place of business during the election period.

However, carrying of deadly weapons in general, including knives, is still punished but under a different provision of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊—Section 261(p)—but only if done in a polling place or near it, and during specific election-related activities.

Unlike Section 261(q) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 which prohibits carrying of 𝐟𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬 everywhere in public during election period, Section 261 (p) of the 𝘖𝘌𝘊 prohibits possession of 𝐝𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐥𝐲 𝐰𝐞𝐚𝐩𝐨𝐧𝐬 in general (including bladed instruments such as knives) only in or near polling places under the law.

In this case, while the prosecution established that the man was carrying a knife during the election period, it failed to prove that the act was committed in a polling place or within 100 meters of one, and that it occurred during the days and hours specifically covered by Section 261(p). In the absence of proof that he was in or near a polling place during the specified days under the law, the man’s guilt was not established.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163156

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163149

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

14/04/2026

SC disbars lawyer for procuring fake nullity of marriage decision and certificate of finality

In 2011, the complainant engaged the services of Atty. X to handle his petition for nullity of marriage, with Atty. X promising expedited proceedings for a fee of ₱275,000.00.

Subsequently, Atty. X provided the complainant with a purported court decision and certificate of finality. However, the complainant discovered discrepancies and, upon inquiry with the court in Cagayan, learned that no such case had ever been filed.

The Supreme Court ruling:
.."Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law. That he turned his back on such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity and general unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court.."
."WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. ### GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant ###, the sum of P270,000.00..

SO ORDERED.¹"

This Court's authority to discipline the members of the legal profession arises from its constitutional prerogative to regulate the practice of law. Moreover, the "power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions."



FOOTNOTES¹
Manalang v. Buendia, (Administrative Case No. 12079, November 10, 2020)

Read the full text in the comment.

13/04/2026

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11/04/2026

𝐖𝐄 𝐀𝐑𝐄 𝐇𝐈𝐑𝐈𝐍𝐆!

Date of recruitment: April 6, 2026
Position Title : Administrative Assistant
No. of Vacancy : 1
Status : Contract of Service
Daily Rate : 933.36
Employment Coverage: April to June 2026
Place of Assignment: Office of the Regional Executive Director
Education : Bachelor’s degree holder
Experience : One year of relevant experience

Documents required:
1. Application letter specifying the position applied for
2. Fully accomplished Personal Data Sheet (PDS) with a recent passport-size picture (download the PDS or CS form 212, revised 2025 at www.csc.gov.ph)
3. Photocopy of certificate of employment from previous employers
4. Photocopy of transcript of records
5. Photocopy of eligibility, if any

Interested and qualified applicants, including persons with disabilities (PWD) and members of indigenous cultural communities, irrespective of sexual orientation and gender identities, may hand in or send through email their signed application letter and required documents not later than April 10, 2026, addressed to:

ENGR. PAQUITO T. MORENO JR., CESO III
Regional Executive Director, DENR-CAR
Email address: [email protected]

11/04/2026

Sa isang sesyon noong Miyerkules, Abril 8, 2026, isinantabi ng En Banc ng ang petisyon para sa certiorari na inihain ni Merson C. Calubag. Layunin ng petisyon na kuwestiyunin ang mga resolusyon ng Commission on Elections (COMELEC) na nagkansela sa kanyang Certificate of Candidacy (COC) para sa posisyon ng Sangguniang Kabataan Chairperson sa Barangay Magtangale, San Francisco, Surigao del Norte noong 2023 Barangay at SK Elections. Ang desisyon ay isinulat ni Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr.

Napag-alaman ng COMELEC na nagbigay si Calubag ng maling pahayag tungkol sa isang mahalagang detalye sa kanyang Certificate of Candidacy. Idineklara niya roon na wala siyang kamag-anak hanggang sa second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity sa sinumang kasalukuyang miyembro ng Sangguniang Barangay ng Barangay Magtangale, kahit na ang kanyang ina ay isa palang miyembro nito.

Ayon sa Seksyon 10 o tinatawag na “Anti-Dynasty clause” ng Republic Act No. 10742 (Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of 2015), ang isang kandidato para sa Sangguniang Kabataan ay wala dapat kaugnayan—hanggang second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity—sa sinumang kasalukuyang halal na opisyal sa pambansa, rehiyonal, panlalawigan, panlungsod, pambayan, o pambarangay na antas sa lugar kung saan siya tatakbo.

Kinilala ng Korte Suprema ang balangkas na itinakda sa RA 10742 bilang hakbang ng lehislatura para pigilan ang pagbuo at paglawak ng mga dinastiyang politikal sa bansa—bilang tugon sa panawagan ng Konstitusyon na bigyang-kahulugan ang political dynasty, kahit man lang sa antas ng barangay at Sangguniang Kabataan. Ayon pa sa Korte, ang ganitong batas ay nagbibigay-buhay sa patakarang nakasaad sa Konstitusyon na naglalayong ipagbawal ang mga dinastiyang politikal.

Basahin ang kabuuan ng Press Briefer sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163046

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

The (SC) En Banc, during its session on Wednesday, April 8, 2026, through the ponencia of Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr, denied the petition for certiorari filed by Merson C. Calubag (Calubag), which challenged the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) Resolutions canceling his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Sangguniang Kabataan Chairperson of Barangay Magtangale, San Francisco, Surigao del Norte, during the 2023 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

The COMELEC found that Calubag falsely stated a material fact in his COC when he declared he was not related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent Sangguniang Barangay member of Barangay Magtangale, despite his mother being a member.

Section 10, or the “Anti-Dynasty clause” of Republic Act No. (RA) 10742 (Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of 2015) requires that a candidate for the position in the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent elected national office, or to any incumbent elected regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, in the locality where they seek to be elected.

The SC “recognized the legislative framework in RA 10742 for preventing the creation and expansion of political dynasties in the country as the Legislative’s answer to the constitutional call to define political dynasties, at least at the barangay and [Sangguniang Kabataan] levels.” It held that such “breathes life to the constitutionally enshrined policy of the sovereign to prohibit political dynasties.”

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163046

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

09/04/2026

WHERE WE ARE NOW IS THE RESULT OF CONSISTENTLY VOTING FOR INCOMPETENCE

What we are seeing today is the result of choosing popularity over competence, and image over substance. And now, ordinary Filipinos are the ones paying the price.

Fuel prices continue to rise at an alarming rate, placing our country among those hardest hit globally. Every increase doesn’t just affect motorists—it drives up transportation costs, inflates the price of basic goods, and squeezes small businesses already struggling to stay afloat. This is not abstract. This is everyday hardship.

And yet, where is the urgency from our leaders?

We hear about massive irregularities—ghost projects allegedly costing taxpayers billions of pesos—yet there is no clear, firm, and visible effort to hold anyone accountable. No decisive action. No sense of outrage from those who are supposed to protect public funds. It is difficult not to feel disillusioned when accountability seems optional.

What makes this even more disheartening is the lack of meaningful relief.

The government continues to impose excise taxes and VAT on fuel—taxes that significantly increase pump prices—while other countries are actively reducing or suspending these to protect their citizens. Why are we not seeing the same level of urgency here? Why does it feel like the burden is simply being passed on to the people?

Where is the plan?

Where is the clear, concrete strategy to ease the suffering of Filipinos? Where are the immediate interventions, the long-term solutions, the transparency, and the leadership we were promised?

At this point, it no longer feels like a question of politics—it feels like a failure to prioritize the very people the government is meant to serve.

This is what happens when leadership is built on popularity rather than preparedness. And it is painful to witness.

Filipinos deserve more than silence, more than inaction, and more than excuses. We deserve leadership that acts, that protects, and that puts the people first—especially in times like this

I hope that during the 2028 election, we keep this experience in mind and let critical and impartial judgement takes its course when we shade those ballots.

Isunga nu next election, ngaan kayun maki botos if your only basis is "nasimpet" wnu "gwapo" dyay kandidato, nga awan maiparang na nga plataporma na . (Do not vote next election if your only basis in voting is that the nominee is "kind" or "handsome but without any platform to show.)






**Images are from ABS-CBN News and Investor Sight.

07/04/2026

Nilinaw ng ang pagtatangi sa aplikasyon ng acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Republic Act (RA) Blg. 7610, o ang Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, at acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Sa isang Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, pinagtibay ng En Banc ng Korte Suprema ang hatol na guilty kay Jeffrey L. Gramatica (Gramatica) para sa acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Seksyon 5(b) ng RA 7610, pero binago ang hatol sa isa pang akusado, si ###2660399, at inilapat ang acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Artikulo 366 ng Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Sa mga pinagsamang kasong ito na kinasasangkutan ng mga menor de edad na sina AAA, BBB, at CCC, naglatag ang Korte Suprema ng mga patnubay para matiyak ang wastong pagsasakdal ng mga kaso sa ilalim ng dalawang magkaibang batas na ito.

Kinasuhan si Gramatica ng acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Seksyon 5(b) ng RA 7610 dahil sa pakikipagtalik kina AAA at BBB, na kapwa nalulong sa shabu.

Samantala, kinasuhan naman si ###266039 ng kaparehong kaso dahil sa panghihipo sa maseselang bahagi ng katawan ng kanyang apo na si CCC habang ito’y natutulog.

Depensa ni Gramatica, niligawan niya si BBB at nagkaroon sila ng sekswal na pagsasama pero hindi niya alam na isa itong menor de edad. Itinanggi naman ni ###266039 ang mga akusasyon at sinabing ginising lang niya si CCC para humingi ng tulong sa paglagay ng gamot sa mata.

Kapwa nagdesisyon ang Regional Trial Court at Court of Appeals na parehong nagkasala sina Gramatica at ###266039 ng acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Seksyon 5(b) ng RA 7610 laban kina BBB at CCC.

Ang isang menor de edad ay sinasabing ginawan ng iba pang pang-aabusong sekswal kapag sila ay naging biktima ng acts of lasciviousness nang may kasamang pamimilit o impluwensiya ng nakatatanda. Sa kasong ito, 14 lang si BBB at 17 si CCC noong nangyari ang insidente. Si Gramatica ay 23, samantalang si ###266039 ay 62.

Pinagtibay ng Korte Suprema ang hatol kay Gramatica sa ilalim ng RA 7610, ngunit binago ang hatol ni ###266039 sa acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Revised Penal Code (RPC). Ayon sa Korte, hindi angkop ang RA 7610 kung ang menor de edad ay ganap na walang kamalayan, pinilit lang, o walang kamalay-malay, dahil sa ganitong sitwasyon, hindi maituturing na sumang-ayon ang biktima sa pakikipagtalik.

Sa ilalim ng Seksyon 5 ng RA 7610, ang mga batang biktima ay sumailalim sa iba pang anyo ng sekswal na pang-aabuso bilang nakikilahok sa pakikipagtalik o malisyosong gawaing sekswal dahil sa pamimilit o impluwensiya ng isang nakatatanda.

Para malinaw ang saklaw ng acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng RA 7610 at sa ibang kaugnay na krimen sa ilalim ng RPC, naglatag ang Korte Suprema ng mga patnubay at isinasaalang-alang din ang RA 11648 na nagtaas ng edad ng sexual consent sa 16 taong gulang.

Una, angkop ang Seksyon 5(b) sa mga batang may edad 16 hanggang mas mababa sa 18 na sumasailalim sa sekswal na pang-aabuso.

Ikalawa, saklaw nito ang mga sitwasyon kung saan may depektibong pahintulot. Maaaring tila sumasang-ayon ang menor de edad, ngunit hindi ito bunga ng malayang kalooban kundi dahil sa pamimilit o impluwensiya ng isang nakatatanda. Kaya’t isang krimen ang pakikipagtalik sa batang pinagsamantalahan sa prostitusyon o sumailalim sa sekswal na pang-aabuso, kahit pa tila may pahintulot.

Ikatlo, hindi ito naaangkop kung ang akto ay may kasamang puwersa, pananakot, panlilinlang, pag-alis ng katinuan, kawalan ng malay, o matinding pang-aabuso ng awtoridad. Sa ganitong mga kaso, ang krimen ay papasok sa acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng RPC.

Ikaapat, kung ang biktima ay wala pang 12 o wala pang 16 taong gulang, at hindi saklaw ng Seksyon 5(b), ang krimen ay r**e o acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng RPC.

Sa kasong ito, si BBB ay isang batang pinagsamantalahan sa prostitusyon o iba pang sekswal na pang-aabuso dahil nakipagtalik siya kay Gramatica kapalit ng isang konsiderasyon, ang shabu, kaya may kriminal na pananagutan si Gramatica sa ilalim ng Seksyon 5(b) ng RA 7610.

Samantala, hindi naaangkop ang Seksyon 5(b) ng RA 7610 kay ###266039. Nilinaw ng Korte Suprema na hindi saklaw ng RA 7610 ang lahat ng acts of lasciviousness laban sa mga menor de edad na may edad 12 hanggang mas mababa sa 18. Ang batas ay naaangkop lamang kapag ang mga menor de edad ay nagbigay ng depektibong pahintulot sa gawaing sekswal.

Sa kasong ito, hindi sumang-ayon si CCC sa acts of lasciviousness dahil natutulog siya at wala siyang malay. Hindi ginamit ni ###266039 ang pamimilit o impluwensiya, kundi umasa sa kanyang moral na awtoridad bilang lolo niya, na itinuturing bilang pananakot. Dahil dito, pananagutan ni ###266039 ang acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Artikulo 336 ng RPC, sa halip na RA 7610.

Para sa acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Seksyon 5(b) na kinasasangkutan si BBB, hinatulan si Gramatica ng maximum na 17 taon, apat na buwan, at isang araw na pagkakakulong at iniutos na magbayad kay BBB ng PHP 150,000 bilang kabayaran at danyos, pati na rin ng multa na PHP 15,000.

Para sa acts of lasciviousness sa ilalim ng Artikulo 336 ng RPC, hinatulan si ###266039 ng maximum na anim na taon na pagkakakulong at iniutos na magbayad kay CCC ng PHP 450,000 bilang kabayaran at danyos na may karampatang interes.

Kinilala ng Korte Suprema na sa ilalim ng kasalukuyang mga batas, si ###266039, na gumawa ng kasuklam-suklam at asal-hayop na gawain laban sa kanyang menor de edad na apo, ay nahaharap sa mas mababang parusa kumpara sa RA 7610. Hinimok nito ang lehislatura na amyendahan ang umiiral na mga batas upang mas maprotektahang mabuti ang mga bata.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162863.

Basahin ang buong Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162842.

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/.

Basahin ang Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/.

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-rodil-v-zalameda/.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

The (SC) clarified the application of lascivious conduct under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 (𝘙𝘈) 𝘕𝘰. 7610, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘈𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘌𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘋𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵, in relation to acts of lasciviousness under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld Jeffrey L. Gramatica’s conviction for lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, but modified another accused’s (###2660399) conviction for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 366 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊.

In these consolidated cases involving minors, AAA, BBB, and CCC, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines to ensure the proper prosecution of cases under these two distinct laws.

AAA and BBB, both addicted to shabu, engaged in sexual acts with Gramatica and another man in exchange for the drug. Gramatica was later arrested and prosecuted for violation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, which penalizes lascivious conduct committed against a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse.

In the other case, CCC was victimized by her grandfather, ###266039, who touched her private parts while she was sleeping. ###266039 was also charged under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610.

In his defense, Gramatica claimed that he courted BBB and had a sexual relationship with her but did not know she was a minor because she looked mature. For his part, ###266039 denied the charges and claimed he merely woke CCC up to ask her for help applying his eye medicine.

The Regional Trial Court found both Gramatica and ###266039 guilty of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 towards BBB and CCC, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions.

A minor is considered to have been subjected to other sexual abuse when they are a victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an adult. In this case, BBB was 14 and CCC was 17 at the time of the incident. Gramatica was 23, and ###266039 was 62.

Both courts found that Gramatica took advantage of BBB’s youth and vulnerable situation, using his influence over her to make her submit to his sexual demands. Meanwhile, ###266039, due to his age and relationship as CCC’s grandfather, was able to exert control over her and exploit her trust.

The SC affirmed Gramatica’s conviction under RA 7610, but modified ###266039’s conviction from acts of lasciviousness under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 to acts of lasciviousness under the RPC explaining that RA 7610 does not apply where the minor is entirely unaware, coerced or unconscious as the victim in that instance is not considered to have “indulged” in the sexual in*******se.

A plain and straightforward interpretation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 provides a clear definition of children subjected to other sexual abuse as those who indulge in sexual in*******se or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult.

The SC clarified the scope of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 and distinguished it from related crimes under the RPC. To ensure uniform and consistent prosecution of cases, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines, considering also RA 11648, which raised the age of sexual consent to 16 years old.

𝙁𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 applies to children who are 12 years of age (now 16 years old following the amendment under RA 11648) to below 18 who are subjected to sexual abuse.

𝙎𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it covers situations where consent is present but defective. The minor may seem to “indulge” or agree, but does so not out of free will, but because of coercion or influence by an adult. Thus, engaging in sexual acts with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse is a criminal act, regardless of apparent consent.

𝙏𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it does not apply when the act involves force, intimidation, fraud, deprivation of reason, unconsciousness, or grave abuse of authority. In such cases, the crime falls under acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

𝙁𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩𝙝, if the victim is under 12 or under 16, and the case does not fit Section 5(b), the crime is r**e or acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

These principles, which distinguish force and intimidation on one hand, and coercion and influence on the other, and limit RA 7610 to minors who are exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, also apply to other sexual crimes, including r**e.

In this case, BBB was a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse because she had sexual in*******se with Gramatica in exchange for some consideration, namely shabu, which makes him criminally liable under Section 5(b).

Meanwhile, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 does not apply to ###266039.

The Supreme Court clarified that not all acts of lasciviousness against minors aged 12 to under 18 are covered by RA 7610. The law applies only when minors are subjected to sexual abuse, such as when they “indulge” or give defective consent to the conduct.

Here, CCC did not indulge in lascivious conduct, as she was asleep and unconscious during the incident. ###266039 did not use coercion or influence, but relied on his moral ascendancy as her grandfather, which counts as intimidation. These circumstances make ###266039 liable for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, rather than RA 7610.

For lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) involving BBB, Gramatica was sentenced to a maximum of 17 years, four months, and one day in prison and ordered to pay BBB PHP 150,000 in civil indemnity and damages, as well as a PHP 15,000 fine.

For acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, ###266039 was sentenced to a maximum of six years in prison and ordered to pay CCC PHP450,000 in civil indemnity and damages with interest.

The SC acknowledged that under current laws, ###266039, “who committed abhorrent and be***al acts against his minor granddaughter,” faces a penalty lower than that under RA 7610, and called on the legislature to amend existing laws to better protect children.

The SC calls the legislature to review and amend current laws protecting children, thus:

“𝘐𝘯 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘷𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵’𝘴 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘱𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘦𝘨𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵, 𝘢𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘵𝘺, 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘭𝘦𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘴𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘯 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺, 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭-𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯.”

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162863

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162842

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-rodil-v-zalameda/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution