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Legal Digest, Kiangan, Kiangan (2026)

01/05/2026

THE DOCTRINE OF “UNFOLDING OF EVENTS” IN TREACHERY

At around 7:12 p.m., witness Salvador was fishing at a creek when he heard a loud noise coming from the house of Joseph (victim). He looked over the concrete fence towards the victim's kitchen and saw the accused, Badillo, stabbing him several times on the upper portion of the stomach. The victim died as a result of the stabbing.

The accused was charged with murder qualified by treachery. The trial court convicted him which was affirmed by the appellate court.

Is there treachery?

The Court said in the negative. The trial court erred in appreciating treachery based on its perception that the attack was sudden and the victim was unarmed.

The Court held that it is not enough that the attack was "sudden" and "unexpected" to constitute treachery. Rather, there must also be a showing that the offender purposely adopted this particular mode of attack to insure its ex*****on without risk to himself or herself, which is utterly lacking in this case.

Here, none of the prosecution witnesses had seen how the assault had commenced. There was no testimony on how the incident began or how the attack was carried out by Badillo. Witness Salvador only witnessed the act of Badillo stabbing the victim.

Even where all indicia tend to support the conclusion that the attack was sudden and unexpected, yet no precise data on this point exists, treachery cannot be taken into account.
(People v. Badillo, G.R. No. 249382, Nov. 13, 2024)

18/04/2026

VAWC | THE INTERNET LINGO "LOL" NEGATES THE OFFENSE OF HARASSMENT
-Fiscal Fred Nojara

The offense of harassment is committed by an intimate partner as a form of psychological violence under VAWC. In a case, to successfully prosecute this offense, the Court added the fourth element:

"the offender acted for the purpose of alarming or causing substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman, or knowing that their conduct will alarm or cause substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman, or the offender acted recklessly, in conscious disregard of the risk that the act or series of acts of harassment will alarm or cause substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman."

Thus, if the victim was not all alarmed by the act as when she posted on her social media account (Instagram) showing that the incident is a mere "tampuhan" or "is one of a romantic relationship turned sour," there is no crime of harassment.

According to the Court, her posts on IG "nagmahal nasaktan pinakulong" and "Diba ang saya mo na. Lol" negate that she was alarmed by the alleged threats of the accused online.

The Court observed that this is not normal behavior of a victim of abuse. A victim frightened for her life would not agitate her aggressor by posting his embarassment online, appearing to even laugh at him through internet acronyms or lingo.

In this case, the Court acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove the fourth element. In this case, the victim posted on her social media account showing that she did not suffer distress as a result of the text messages posted by the accused.
(###263779 v. People, G.R. No. 263779, December 3, 2025)

17/04/2026

PROOF THAT THE VICTIM BECAME INSANE NOT REQUIRED IN PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE

The Supreme Court (SC), speaking through Associate Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier, ruled that proof of intent on the part of the husband in cases of psychological violence due to infidelity under Republic Act No. 9262 is not necessary for conviction, as it only requires proof of emotional anguish and mental suffering.

In a 17-page decision, the SC’s Second Division emphasized that the husband’s intention in choosing his mistress over his wife is immaterial, noting that his act of leaving the conjugal home and building a family with another woman was done consciously and deliberately.

It added that he cannot escape liability by invoking good intentions, such as remaining civil with his wife or providing financial support to their legitimate son, as the fact remains: he was unfaithful to his wife, and this caused her irreparable emotional and mental suffering.

The high court sentenced the accused to suffer the penalty of up to 8 years imprisonment and a fine of PHP100,000.

17/04/2026

"BOTH SEXES ARE CAPABLE OF INFIDELITY"

Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen has reminded the public to avoid stereotyping women as automatic victims and labeling all unfaithful men as abusers, stressing that both men and women are equally capable of disloyalty that could result in psychological harm to their partners.

Leonen made these remarks in his dissenting opinion on a recent ruling of the Supreme Court's Second Division, which convicted a man of psychological violence after he abandoned his wife to live with his mistress, with whom he had two children.

He ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the causal link between the husband's infidelity and the alleged psychological suffering of his wife.

The magistrate underscored that while infidelity is inherently painful, the justice system should not aggravate that pain by pursuing what he described as a misplaced desire for revenge through incarceration and instead suggested that spouses be encouraged to seek fair and balanced resolutions to marital conflicts.

Leonen also emphasized that marital infidelity alone does not automatically constitute psychological violence, the prosecution must be clearly established that the act directly caused mental or emotional suffering to the victim.

"I remain steadfast in my commitment to uphold the protection of women and their children against all forms of violence. The enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 has empowered more and more women to see themselves as equals to men and to recognize that they do not deserve to suffer any form of violence simply because of their s*x." Leonen stressed.

14/04/2026

LEGAL EXPLAINER: Sexual Consent ng 16 to 17 Years Old, Hanggang Saan ang Legal? ⚖️

Yes, 16 years old ang age of s*xual consent sa Pilipinas. Pero hindi dito nagtatapos ang usapan. Kahit 16 or 17 na, itinuturing ka pa ring "child" under the law (below 18), at may mga batas pa ring nagpoprotekta laban sa pang-aabuso at exploitation.

Ibig sabihin, hindi porke nasa "age of s*xual consent" na ang isang bata ay wala nang pwedeng ikaso sa kanyang s*xual partner.

Ganito po ang framework:

▪️Pag below 13: Walang consent na kinikilala ang batas. Automatic na Statutory R**e o Acts of Lasciviousness.

▪️Pag 13 and above but below 16: May "Romeo and Juliet" age gap rule. Kung 3 years or less ang age gap, at consensual, walang abuso, at walang exploitation, walang criminal liability.

▪️Pag 16 and above but below 18: Pwede na silang magbigay ng consent, pero may limitasyon. Kapag may exploitation, abuso, o panlilinlang, krimen pa rin.

Narito ang mga sitwasyon na kahit may consent, may criminal liability pa rin:

📌 Qualified Seduction (Art. 337, RPC, as amended by RA 11648)

Dito, inaabuso ng offender ang kanyang authority o ang tiwala (trust) na ibinigay sa kanya. Kahit pa "in love" ang minor, bawal ito dahil sa posisyon ng nakatatanda.

Sino ang bawal? G**o, amo, katulong sa bahay, pari, guardian, o opisyal ng gobyerno.

💡 Halimbawa: Ang isang 17-year-old student ay nakipag-relasyon at nakipag-s*x sa kanyang mismong g**o. Kahit sabihin ng estudyante na mahal niya ang g**o, liability pa rin ito ng teacher dahil sa kanyang "authority" sa bata.

📌 Simple Seduction (Art. 338, RPC, as amended by RA 11648)

Nangyayari ito kapag nakuha ang "oo" ng minor sa pamamagitan ng panloloko o deceit.

💡 Halimbawa: Isang 25-year-old na lalaki ang nangako sa kanyang 17-year-old na girlfriend na "pakakasalan kita agad sa huwes bukas" para lang mapapayag itong makipag-talik. Kung ang pangakong ito ay ginamit lang para makaisa, pasok ito sa Simple Seduction.

📌 Child Prostitution (Section 5b, RA 7610, as amended by RA 11648)

Hindi kailangang may "bugaw" para masabing prostitution. Basta't may kapalit na pera, regalo, o profit, pasok ito rito.

💡 Halimbawa: Isang 16-year-old ang pumayag na makipag-s*x sa isang matanda kapalit ng 3,000 pesos o isang bagong cellphone. Kahit "voluntary" ang bata, ang matanda ay mananagot pa rin sa ilalim ng RA 7610 dahil sa pag-exploit sa minor.

📌 Other Sexual Abuse (Section 5b, RA 7610, as amended by RA 11648)

Dito naman, nakuha ang consent dahil sa coercion o influence. Hindi kailangang may physical na dahas. Sapat na ang moral pressure o pananakot.

💡 Halimbawa: Nakita ng isang kapitbahay na nagnakaw ang isang 16-year-old. Tinakot niya ang bata: "Makikipag-s*x ka sa akin, o isusumbong kita sa pulis at ipapakulong!" Dahil napilitan lang ang bata para hindi mapahamak, ang kapitbahay ay liable para sa Other Sexual Abuse.

Tandaan: Ang "consent" ng 16 to 17 years old ay hindi absolute.

Tanungin mo lagi:

-May power imbalance ba?
-May panlilinlang ba?
-May kapalit ba?
-May pressure o pananakot ba?

Hindi sapat ang "pumayag siya." Dapat ang s*xual consent na ibinigay ay malaya, informed, at walang pananamantala.

14/04/2026

The (SC) clarified the application of lascivious conduct under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 (𝘙𝘈) 𝘕𝘰. 7610, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘈𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘌𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘋𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵, in relation to acts of lasciviousness under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld Jeffrey L. Gramatica’s conviction for lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, but modified another accused’s (###2660399) conviction for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 366 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊.

In these consolidated cases involving minors, AAA, BBB, and CCC, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines to ensure the proper prosecution of cases under these two distinct laws.

AAA and BBB, both addicted to shabu, engaged in s*xual acts with Gramatica and another man in exchange for the drug. Gramatica was later arrested and prosecuted for violation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, which penalizes lascivious conduct committed against a child exploited in prostitution or other s*xual abuse.

In the other case, CCC was victimized by her grandfather, ###266039, who touched her private parts while she was sleeping. ###266039 was also charged under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610.

In his defense, Gramatica claimed that he courted BBB and had a s*xual relationship with her but did not know she was a minor because she looked mature. For his part, ###266039 denied the charges and claimed he merely woke CCC up to ask her for help applying his eye medicine.

The Regional Trial Court found both Gramatica and ###266039 guilty of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 towards BBB and CCC, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions.

A minor is considered to have been subjected to other s*xual abuse when they are a victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an adult. In this case, BBB was 14 and CCC was 17 at the time of the incident. Gramatica was 23, and ###266039 was 62.

Both courts found that Gramatica took advantage of BBB’s youth and vulnerable situation, using his influence over her to make her submit to his s*xual demands. Meanwhile, ###266039, due to his age and relationship as CCC’s grandfather, was able to exert control over her and exploit her trust.

The SC affirmed Gramatica’s conviction under RA 7610, but modified ###266039’s conviction from acts of lasciviousness under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 to acts of lasciviousness under the RPC explaining that RA 7610 does not apply where the minor is entirely unaware, coerced or unconscious as the victim in that instance is not considered to have “indulged” in the s*xual in*******se.

A plain and straightforward interpretation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 provides a clear definition of children subjected to other s*xual abuse as those who indulge in s*xual in*******se or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult.

The SC clarified the scope of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 and distinguished it from related crimes under the RPC. To ensure uniform and consistent prosecution of cases, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines, considering also RA 11648, which raised the age of s*xual consent to 16 years old.

𝙁𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 applies to children who are 12 years of age (now 16 years old following the amendment under RA 11648) to below 18 who are subjected to s*xual abuse.

𝙎𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it covers situations where consent is present but defective. The minor may seem to “indulge” or agree, but does so not out of free will, but because of coercion or influence by an adult. Thus, engaging in s*xual acts with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to s*xual abuse is a criminal act, regardless of apparent consent.

𝙏𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it does not apply when the act involves force, intimidation, fraud, deprivation of reason, unconsciousness, or grave abuse of authority. In such cases, the crime falls under acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

𝙁𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩𝙝, if the victim is under 12 or under 16, and the case does not fit Section 5(b), the crime is r**e or acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

These principles, which distinguish force and intimidation on one hand, and coercion and influence on the other, and limit RA 7610 to minors who are exploited in prostitution or s*xual abuse, also apply to other s*xual crimes, including r**e.

In this case, BBB was a child exploited in prostitution or other s*xual abuse because she had s*xual in*******se with Gramatica in exchange for some consideration, namely shabu, which makes him criminally liable under Section 5(b).

Meanwhile, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 does not apply to ###266039.

The Supreme Court clarified that not all acts of lasciviousness against minors aged 12 to under 18 are covered by RA 7610. The law applies only when minors are subjected to s*xual abuse, such as when they “indulge” or give defective consent to the conduct.

Here, CCC did not indulge in lascivious conduct, as she was asleep and unconscious during the incident. ###266039 did not use coercion or influence, but relied on his moral ascendancy as her grandfather, which counts as intimidation. These circumstances make ###266039 liable for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, rather than RA 7610.

For lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) involving BBB, Gramatica was sentenced to a maximum of 17 years, four months, and one day in prison and ordered to pay BBB PHP 150,000 in civil indemnity and damages, as well as a PHP 15,000 fine.

For acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, ###266039 was sentenced to a maximum of six years in prison and ordered to pay CCC PHP450,000 in civil indemnity and damages with interest.

The SC acknowledged that under current laws, ###266039, “who committed abhorrent and be***al acts against his minor granddaughter,” faces a penalty lower than that under RA 7610, and called on the legislature to amend existing laws to better protect children.

The SC calls the legislature to review and amend current laws protecting children, thus:

“𝘐𝘯 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘷𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵’𝘴 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘱𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘦𝘨𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵, 𝘢𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘵𝘺, 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘭𝘦𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘴𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘯 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺, 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭-𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯.”

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162863

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162842

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-rodil-v-zalameda/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

14/04/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session today, April 8, 2026, through the ponencia of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, issued a 𝘸𝘳𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘬𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘬𝘢𝘴𝘢𝘯 against respondents Halrey Construction, Inc. and other persons acting on their behalf, for conducting illegal quarrying activities within the Angat River-Bustos Dam Forest Reserve in Banaban, Angat, Bulacan.

It also granted petitioner Narciso A. De Leon’s prayer for a temporary environmental protection order, ordering respondents to immediately stop quarrying, excavation, earth extraction, or similar activities within the watershed area. Respondents are further prohibited from committing acts that may cause additional damage to the environment.

In issuing the writ, the SC applied the precautionary principle based on technical findings showing that the respondents’ activities have significantly increased surface runoff, erosion, and sedimentation within the watershed system. Reports indicated that these activities have destroyed cultivated crops, vegetation, and fruit-bearing trees that serve as wildlife habitats.

The SC noted that a change in the natural landscape of just a portion of a protected forest reserve threatens the stability of the Angat River-Bustos Dam watershed, posing serious risks to the life, health, and property of inhabitants in several provinces.

The Angat River-Bustos Dam Forest Reserve was declared protected forest land under Proclamation No. 573.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162980.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

02/04/2026

WHEN THE JUDGE, THE PROSECUTOR AND THE PAO LAWYER VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED

This case is an eye-opener to all stakeholders in the administration of justice: the court, the prosecutor, and the defense.

The two accused were charged with homicide in connection with the killing of the victim. After arraignment, the trial court conducted trial. After which, it rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as charged and imposed upon them a penalty.

The appellate court affirmed the ruling. However, on further appeal to the Supreme Court, the accused were acquitted not because they were innocent or the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. Their right to speedy right was violated.

The Court observed:

(1) The Information against the accused was filed on June 30, 2003. They were arraigned on September 9, 2003, almost three months later.

(2) The Pre-trial Conference was postponed twice because of the unavailability of the Presiding Judge and the absence of the public prosecutor.

(3) The initial trial date was set for July 5, 2004, but was postponed due to the prosecution witnesses' absence. Consequently, trial only commenced on February 16, 2005—about two years after the Information was filed.

(4) From that point onward, the proceedings were marred by repeated delays, most of which was attributable to the prosecution. In contrast, in all of the postponements of the hearings, the accused were present.

(5) It was only on November 23, 2017, or over 14 years since the filing of the Information, that the prosecution finally rested its case. This protracted delay was caused by: (1) the repeated absence of prosecution witness; (2) the unavailability of court records and TSN; and (3) the frequent absences and unavailability of the public prosecutor, the Presiding Judge, and the assigned PAO lawyer.

(6) The accused were subjected to an unduly prolonged criminal trial, spanning over 14 years, with the primary causes of delay attributable to the public prosecutors and the presiding judge.

(7) This inordinate lapse of time, attributable not to the accused but to repeated procedural lapses, repeated absences of the key court officers, and poor case management, constitutes a clear violation of the accused right to a speedy trial as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court lamented:

(1) The nearly 17 years it took the trial court to resolve this criminal case is not a result of the complexity of the issues or the volume of evidence in the case, but the cumulative, persistent neglect and inefficiency of the very officers tasked to ensure the expeditious administration of justice.

(2) The public prosecutors assigned to the case repeatedly failed to appear at scheduled hearings, neglected to secure the presence of prosecution witnesses despite due notice, and manifested unpreparedness on multiple occasions.

(3) The frequent absences of PAO lawyers repeatedly disrupted the continuity of trial. More gravely, their counsel failed to timely invoke the accused' right to a speedy trial despite the multiple and evident breaches of statutory time limits.

(4) When those entrusted with upholding this constitutional right fail in their obligations, they not only violate the rights of the accused but also the public's trust and confidence on the administration of justice.

The Court held:

In view of these, the Court directed the assigned trial court judges, the assigned trial prosecutors, and the assigned counsel de officio to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held administratively liable for the inordinate delay in the resolution of the criminal case.

(Dela Cruz, et al. v. People, GR #266371, Aug. 13, 2025)

-Pros. Nojara

28/03/2026

JUSTICE SAMUEL GAERLAN PENNED CASE!!⚖️👨‍⚖️

Richard Balina vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 205950, January 12, 2021

ISSUE: Whether the absence of moral certainty of guilt constitutes reasonable doubt sufficient to warrant an acquittal.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that an accused can be acquitted on reasonable doubt if the uncertainty arises from the evidence adduced or from lack of evidence. Reasonable doubt is not such a doubt as any man may start questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts, for it is always possible to question any conclusion derived from the evidence on record. It noted that while absolute certainty of guilt is not required by the law to convict of any crime charged moral certainty is required and this certainty is required to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. The reasonable doubt should necessarily pertain to the facts constituted by the crime charged. Surmises and conjectures have no place in a judicial inquiry and thus are shunned in criminal prosecution.

Here the facts are undisputed, the accused and another person were grappling for the gun before a shot was heard, hitting the victim; there is, therefore, reasonable doubt as to who pulled the trigger. What is only clear is that the shot was fired during the scuffle. Since the identity of the accused is unclear, the element of intent to kill is lacking. Hence, the he was acquitted due to reasonable doubt, noting that it would be better to set free the men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.

28/03/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that search made after a lawful arrest extends to the surroundings within the immediate control of the accused and evidence obtained during such search is admissible even if they are not within the “plain view” of the arresting officers.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC’s First Division upheld the conviction of Jeryl Bautista for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165, or the 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘋𝘳𝘶𝘨𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2002, as amended.

During a buy-bust operation, a police officer posed as a buyer and received from Bautista 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 in exchange for PHP 500. After the officer made a pre-arranged signal, the rest of the arresting team rushed to the place of the transaction.

Bautista was arrested and a representative from the Department of Justice, and two barangay kagawads arrived shortly after.

Subsequently, the officer searched Bautista and found three more sachets of suspected 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. The officer also found a cellphone, screwdriver, weighing scale, and marked money. The police then marked the four sachets, prepared an inventory of the seized items, and took photographs.

Bautista argued that the additional sachets should not be admitted as evidence because they were not within the plain view of the police officers when seized during his arrest.

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both convicted Bautista of illegal possession of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶.

The SC upheld Bautista’s conviction and rejected his argument. It explained that the plain view doctrine is not the only justification for a warrantless search, as the search could be done to a person who has just been lawfully arrested.

Searches and seizures generally require a warrant. If police perform a search or seize property without a valid warrant, any evidence obtained cannot be used in court and is considered inadmissible. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule.

One of these is the plain view doctrine, which allows police officers to seize evidence in plain sight when: (1) the officer has a lawful reason to be in the place where the item is seen, (2) the discovery of the item is unplanned or incidental, and (3) it is immediately obvious that the item is connected to a crime or is illegal.

Another recognized exception is a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. To be valid, it must meet these conditions: (1) the accused is lawfully arrested, (2) the arresting officers subsequently made a warrantless search, (3) the search is limited to the person of the accused and the area within the accused’s immediate control, and (4) the search is performed at the place of the arrest.

In this case, Bautista was arrested during a buy-bust operation. He was frisked as part of the arrest. While the sachets hidden inside his cellphone charger were not in the officers’ plain view, the SC held that the warrantless search remained valid because it was done as part of a lawful arrest and the search extended to those that are within the immediate control of the accused at the time of the arrest.

To convict a person of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the drug, that the possession was not authorized by law, and that it was done knowingly and freely.

The SC found that all these elements were present. The search revealed three additional sachets of 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘶 hidden inside a cellphone charger. Bautista could not explain why he had the drugs nor show any authority allowing him to possess them. His act of hiding the sachets inside the charger also showed his intent to keep them.

Bautista was sentenced to a maximum of 16 years in prison and ordered to pay a fine of PHP 300,000.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161226

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161221

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

28/03/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption is required even when the child is voluntarily surrendered by the mother.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division upheld the Regional Trial Court (RTC)’s dismissal of an adoption petition because it did not include a certification from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).

The case began when a mother, soon after giving birth, left her baby in the care of Eleazar Robiso (Robiso) and his parents. A year later, Robiso filed a petition for adoption before the RTC.

To support his petition, Robiso submitted an 𝘈𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘈𝘥𝘰𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘎𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘰𝘥𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥, executed by the mother. In the affidavit, the mother said she could not financially support her child. She entrusted the child and her parental authority to Robiso.

When both the RTC and the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition for lack of a DSWD certification clearing the child legally available for adoption, as required by RA 9523, Robiso filed a petition for review on 𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘳𝘪 before the SC, arguing that the certification was required only for abandoned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children.

The SC disagreed and denied Robiso’s petition.

In adoption cases, RA 9523 requires a DSWD certification declaring a child legally available for adoption. The law’s implementing rules clarified that the requirement applies to surrendered, abandoned, neglected, and dependent children.

Although the law does not define a 𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥, it defines a 𝘷𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 as one whose parents or legal guardian knowingly and willingly give up parental authority to the DSWD or an accredited child-placement or child-caring agency. The law's implementing rules adopt the same definition for a surrendered child.

The SC added that the law should be read together with Article 154 of Presidential Decree No. 603, or the 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘠𝘰𝘶𝘵𝘩 𝘞𝘦𝘭𝘧𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, which treats a child surrendered to an individual as a voluntarily committed child.

It explained: “When a parent—often a mother acting under difficult circumstances, as in this case—entrusts her child to another's care, the child is legally considered voluntarily committed. For purpose of adoption, the prospective adopter must therefore first secure the necessary DSWD certification.”

However, the SC clarified that Robiso may still pursue the proper remedy, including the streamlined administrative adoption process under RA 11642, or the 𝘋𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘥𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘈𝘥𝘰𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘭𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 𝘊𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘈𝘤𝘵, which took effect in 2022.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162472.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162466.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

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