Matiling and Maghopoy Law Office

20/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sales agent’s promise to issue a Contract to Sell after payment of reservation fee is not an “advertisement” under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, or the 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦, that would form part of developer’s warranties. However, the developer may still be required to refund a buyer if it fails to honor that promise.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ordered Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) to refund the payments made by John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) after it failed to issue the promised Contract to Sell.

Bautista paid Empire East for a residential unit PHP 130,000, consisting of a PHP 20,000 reservation fee and PHP 110,000 in additional payments. He claimed he made the payments because Empire East’s sales agent promised to issue a Contract to Sell once he paid the reservation fee. When more than a year passed without the contract being issued, Bautista stopped making payments and demanded a refund.

The SC, agreeing with both the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) and the Court of Appeals which ruled in Bautista’s favor, held that Bautista was entitled to a refund but clarified that the sales agent’s promise did not fall under Section 19 of PD 957.

The SC clarified that Section 19, which mandates truthful and non-misleading advertisements and sales materials, applies only to materials intended for the general public, such as those in those in newspapers, radio, TV, or similar mass communication channels. It does not cover promises made by a sales agent to individual buyers.

The SC emphasized that buyers remain protected, as developers may still be held liable under their contractual obligations and other applicable laws.

The SC ordered Empire East to refund Bautista the PHP 130,000 with interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint in 2012, as well as to pay PHP 260,000 in exemplary damages, which courts award to discourage wrongful conduct and warn against similar actions.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/272556-1.pdf.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

17/08/2026

13/08/2026

The has ruled that employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled not only to full backwages but also to the remittance of their Social Security System (SSS) contributions.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division held that an employer’s obligation to remit SSS contributions continues during the period covered by an employee’s illegal dismissal.

The case involved four employees of Lopez Sugar Corporation (LSC) who were illegally dismissed. LSC was ordered to reinstate them to their former positions and pay them full backwages. After the ruling became final, the employees asked LSC to remit their SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages so they could qualify for retirement benefits.

LSC refused, arguing that under the 𝘚𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997, its obligation to pay SSS contributions ended upon the employees’ separation from employment, regardless of whether their dismissal was legal or illegal.

The Social Security Commission (SSC) rejected LSC’s position and ordered it to pay the contributions. The SSC ruled that because the employees were illegally dismissed, the employer-employee relationship was deemed to have continued during the period they were prevented from working.

Holding that LSC remained obligated to remit the employees’ SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages, the SC stated that under Article 294 of the 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages and other benefits.

The SC explained that such employees are considered to have remained employed during the period covered by their backwages and are therefore entitled to the rights and benefits that would have accrued during that period.

Since LSC failed to remit the illegally dismissed employees’ social security contributions, the SC held that LSC is liable to pay a penalty thereon of three percent per month, reckoned from the date they became due until full payment.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170676.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165713.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

11/08/2026

24/07/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sale of land remains valid even if the deed of sale designates a different lot number from what was actually sold, as long as the parties’ true agreement can be clearly shown. The deed may then be corrected to match what the parties actually agreed to.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division upheld the sale of a 491-square-meter parcel of land in Cebu City between buyers Genara and Felipe Abay, Sr. (the Abays) and sellers Crispin Caballes and the heirs of Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (the Gallardos), despite the mistake in the designation of the lot number in the deed of sale.

The property formed part of the estate of Margarita Lopez, who had nine children, including Crispin and Trinidad.

The Abays visited the site with Crispin and Tomas Gallardo, one of Trinidad’s heirs before buying the property. During the visit, they were showed them the land’s boundaries. Tomas even helped the Abays build a concrete fence around it.

The Abays openly occupied the property for about 20 years until their possession was disrupted when workers of spouses Jacinto and Chiok Ngo Lim Young (the Youngs), who are claiming ownership over the property, entered it, destroyed the fence, and built their own posts.

The Abays discovered that a title over the property had been issued in the Youngs’ name. This prompted them to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the title.

The Gallardos challenged this, arguing that the documents the Abays presented referred to a different lot, Lot No. 6036-B, and not the lot they were occupying, which was Lot No. 7. While both lots were located in the same area, they were separate properties and were not beside each other. The Youngs supported the Gallardos’ position and maintained that they were buyers in good faith.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Abays which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA held that the documents presented by the Abays showed that they purchased Lot No. 6036-B and not Lot No. 7, which they claimed to own and possess.

The SC disagreed and reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases upholding the validity of the sale and allowing the correction of a contract to reflect the parties’ true agreement in instances where the deed of sale failed to accurately describe the land intended by the parties.

The SC stressed that a person buys property based on what they see on the ground, such as its boundaries, landmarks, and improvements, and not by its technical lot number. Ordinary buyers cannot be expected to identify property based only on survey descriptions or legal documents.

Under the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a written document may be corrected when, because of a mistake, it does not express the parties’ actual agreement.

The SC explained that a contract may be reformed or corrected if: (1) the parties agreed on the transaction; (2) the written document does not express their true agreement; and (3) the error was caused by a mistake, fraud, accident, or unfair conduct.

In this case, all these requirements were present.

Thus, the Court declared deemed reformed the Deeds of Sale and Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale by changing the designation of the property sold from “Lot No. 6036-B” to “Lot 7” and the Abays as absolute owners of such property.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/266298-spouses-genera-and-felipe-abay-sr-et-al-vs-spouses-jacinto-s-young-et-al/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

22/07/2026

17/07/2026

Nagpasya ang na kung ang karahasang sikolohikal (psychological violence) ay ginawa sa pamamagitan ng Facebook, maaari itong ituring na paggamit ng information and communications technology (ICT). Dahil dito, puwedeng patawan ang gumawa nito ng mas mabigat na parusa alinsunod sa Seksyon 6 ng RA 10175 o Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Sa isang Resolusyon na isinulat ni Kasangguning Mahistrado Ramon Paul L. Hernando, binago nang bahagya ngunit pinagtibay ng Unang Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang nauna nitong Desisyon noong Oktubre 22, 2025. Sa naturang desisyon, pinanatili ang hatol na nagkasala ang isang indibidwal (###) dahil sa paggawa ng karahasang sikolohikal laban sa dati niyang kasintahan (AAA) sa ilalim ng Seksyon 5(i) ng Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, o ang Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act), matapos siyang mag-post ng mga mapanirang pahayag tungkol kay AAA sa Facebook.

Gayunman, nagpasya ang Korte Suprema na itaas ng isang antas ang parusa dahil ang paglabag ay ginawa sa pamamagitan ng Facebook, na malinaw na nakasaad sa sakdal at napatunayan sa paglilitis.

Nagsampa si AAA ng kasong VAWC laban sa dati niyang kasintahan na si ### matapos siyang mag-post sa Facebook ng pahayag kung saan tinawag niya si AAA na maruming babae at hayop, at nagbanta siyang susuntukin kapag nakita niya ito. Inulit pa ni ### ang mga panlalait sa mga komento sa naturang post na maaaring mabasa ng publiko.

Habang dinidinig ang kaso, iniharap ni AAA ang mga screenshot ng post sa Facebook at sinabi niyang siya ang gumawa ng account para kay ### kung saan nai-post ang naturang pahayag. Pinatunayan naman ng dalawa niyang kapatid na kay ### ang account at nakatanggap sila ng mga mensahe mula sa kanya gamit ang parehong account.

Sa kabila ng pagtanggi ni ###, pinagtibay ng Korte Suprema, sa desisyong inilabas nito, ang mga naging pasya ng Family Court at Court of Appeals (CA) na naghatol na nagkasala si ###. Binigyang-diin ng Korte Suprema na sa mga kasong kriminal, kailangang mapatunayan ng prosekusyon hindi lamang ang mga elemento ng krimen kundi pati ang pagkakakilanlan ng gumawa nito. Pinagtibay din ng Korte Suprema ang parusang ipinataw ng CA kay ###, na kinabibilangan ng pagkakakulong mula anim na buwan at isang araw hanggang walong taon at isang araw, multang PHP 100,000, at pagsailalim sa psychological counselling o psychiatric treatment.

Sa pagresolba sa Motion for Reconsideration ni ###, sinabi ng Korte Suprema na napatunayang si ### ang gumawa ng post sa Facebook nang lampas sa makatwirang pagdududa (beyond reasonable doubt), batay sa mga pamantayang itinakda nito sa nauna nitong desisyon:

1. Pag-amin sa pagmamay-ari ng account o sa paggawa ng naturang post;
2. Pagkakaroon ng patunay na nakita ang akusado na gumagamit ng account o nagsulat ng naturang post;
3. Paglalaman ng impormasyon na tanging ang nagkasala o iilang tao lamang ang nakaaalam;
4. Paggamit ng mga salita o pananalitang naaayon sa karaniwang paraan ng pagpapahayag ng nagkasala;
5. Mga tala mula sa internet service provider, kumpanya ng telekomunikasyon, o social media site, pati na ang resulta ng pagsusuri sa mga digital device na nagpapakita ng lokasyon at iba pang katangiang nag-uugnay sa account sa nagkasala;
6. Mga kilos o gawain na naaayon sa mga nauna niyang post; o
7. Iba pang mga pangyayaring nagpapakita ng pagmamay-ari, paggamit, o paggawa ng account o post.

Dahil napatunayan na si ### ang gumawa ng post sa Facebook at natugunan ang lahat ng kinakailangang elemento ng karahasang sikolohikal, sinabi ng Korte Suprema na naaangkop ang Seksyon 6 ng Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Itinatakda ng probisyong ito ang pagpapataw ng mas mabigat na parusa sa mga krimen at paglabag na ginawa gamit ang ICT. Mas mabigat ang parusa dahil maaaring magamit ang ICT para makaiwas ang mga nagkasala sa pananagutan, makapinsala sa mas maraming tao, o magdulot ng mas malaking pinsala.

Batay sa kahulugan ng ICT, sinabi ng Korte na ang mga social media platform tulad ng Facebook ay maituturing na ICT systems dahil pinapayagan ng mga ito ang mga gumagamit na lumikha, magpadala, tumanggap, mag-imbak, at magproseso ng mga datos na elektronikong mensahe gamit ang mga kompyuter, mobile phone, o iba pang katulad na kagamitang elektroniko.

Sa kasong ito, nakasaad sa sakdal na ginawa ni ### ang post sa Facebook gamit ang kanyang “Facebook Messenger Account… na maaaring makita ng sinuman (set to public view).” Ayon sa Korte Suprema, sapat na ang pahayag na ito para ipakitang ginamit ang ICT bilang isang nagpapabigat na sirkumstansya. Bagaman hindi tahasang nabanggit ang terminong “ICT,” malinaw pa ring ipinaalam sa sakdal kay ### na siya ay inaakusahan ng paggawa ng karahasang sikolohikal laban kay AAA sa pamamagitan ng Facebook, na kabilang sa saklaw ng isang ICT system.

Napatunayan ng prosekusyon ang nasabing pahayag sa paglilitis.

Dahil dito, itinaas ng Korte ng isang antas ang parusa mula sa pagkakakulong na anim na buwan at isang araw hanggang walong taon at isang araw, tungo sa pagkakakulong na anim na taon at isang araw hanggang 14 na taon, walong buwan, at isang araw. Nanatili naman ang multang PHP 100,000. Inatasan din si ### na sumailalim sa psychological counselling o psychiatric treatment.

Basahin ang buong press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168987

Basahin ang buong kopya ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168968

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

13/07/2026

Labor Law 3: The Fundamentals of Labor Law Review (2026 edition) is out!

The book presents related doctrinal topics and includes new special laws, such as the Magna Carta of Filipino Seafarers, the Caregivers' Welfare Act, and the Eddie Garcia Law.

We hope this piece helps students and bar reviewees in their quest to become members of the bar.

Get the book from Rex Education .

05/07/2026

The (SC) has reiterated that an employee's absence from work, by itself, is not enough to prove abandonment or justify dismissal.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division found Green Era Biotech Corp. (Green Era Biotech) and Great Value Management and Services Corporation (Great Value) guilty of illegally dismissing production utility worker Alvin G. Carpio (Carpio).

Carpio claimed he was originally hired by Green Era Biotech but was later transferred to its manpower service provider, Great Value. After he was absent from work at Green Era Biotech for eight straight days due to illness, Great Value issued him a notice to explain. He was warned that another similar violation would lead to an absence without leave (AWOL) notice.

Carpio was later absent from work for another nine consecutive days. Great Value issued him an AWOL notice, stating that his continued absences were considered serious misconduct and abandonment of work.

He later took another leave with his supervisor’s permission. However, when he returned to work the next day, he was barred from entering the workplace. A few days later, Carpio was informed he had been declared AWOL.

Carpio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Ruling that Carpio was illegally dismissed, the SC reiterated that abandonment, or the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his work, requires proof of two elements: (1) the employee was absent without a valid reason; and (2) the employee clearly intended to end the employer-employee relationship.

Of these, the second element is more important and must be shown through the employee’s actions. Since abandonment is a ground for dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving both elements.

In this case, although Carpio’s absences were unauthorized, the SC found no evidence that he intended to abandon his job. Instead, he tried to return to work and immediately challenged his dismissal by filing a complaint.

The SC ordered Carpio’s reinstatement but ruled that he was not entitled to backwages because his dismissal was made in good faith based on his unauthorized absences. If reinstatement is no longer possible, the companies must instead pay him separation pay.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168002.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165378.

Read the full text of Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao’s Dissenting Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165383.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/07/2026

Atty. Marlon J. Manuel, a Labor Law examiner for the 2022 Bar Examinations, a faculty member of the Ateneo de Manila University (AdMU) School of Law, a Bar Review and Mandatory Continuing Legal Education lecturer also at AdMU, and a Coordinator of the Alternative Law Groups from 2008-2017, discusses contracting agreements in #𝐒𝐂𝐩𝐡𝐏𝐨𝐝𝐜𝐚𝐬𝐭 𝐄𝐩𝐢𝐬𝐨𝐝𝐞 𝟏𝟐𝟑: 𝐅𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐫𝐮𝐞 𝐄𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐨𝐲𝐞𝐫.

When is job contracting considered legitimate? Does outsourcing services automatically amount to labor-only contracting?

This week's podcast is available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and the website.

Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/7F9vfAUNunYXumsMh9jFCA?si=-cYFk4cXQD6Gy_k3Pqc-uQ

Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/ph/podcast/supreme-court-ph-podcast/id1852172756?i=1000774330464

YouTube: https://youtu.be/16z0Z0NeGLE

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/185xfVLoKn/

SC website: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/podcasts/