Gandamra Legal Group

19/12/2025

The (SC) has admonished Marikina City Regional Trial Court Judge Rey P. Inciong for his conduct during a parking-related incident involving a Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer, Atty. Ivanheck U. Gatdula. A video of the incident was later shared on social media.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC En Banc found that Judge Inciong acted improperly when he publicly scolded Atty. Gatdula and demanded a public apology.

Judge Inciong was heard uttering demeaning remarks at Atty. Gatdula after the latter briefly parked his vehicle blocking an access ramp for persons with disabilities and a pedestrian pathway while he logged his attendance to avoid being marked late. Atty. Gatdula immediately apologized several times.

Despite this, Judge Inciong demanded a public apology from Atty. Gatdula. The judge later went to the PAO office, where he again insisted on the apology and lost his temper.

Atty. Gatdula and his supervisor said the judge’s remarks and actions were intimidating and unnecessary, especially since an apology had already been made. They also said that a public apology was no longer required.

The Office of the Court Administrator ordered Judge Inciong to explain his actions and initially recommended that he be reprimanded and sternly warned.

The matter was referred to the Judicial Integrity Board, which recommended that he be found guilty of the light offense of vulgar and unbecoming conduct under Canon VI, Section 35(b) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA).

In admonishing Judge Inciong, the Supreme Court recognized his intention to enforce order in the hall of justice but emphasized that this did not justify harsh language or aggressive behavior.

Citing Canons II (on Integrity) and IV (on Propriety) of the CPRA, the SC reminded judges that even when faced with improper conduct, they must still act with restraint and maintain the dignity of their office. Public confidence in the Judiciary, the SC said, depends on how judges behave.

The SC stressed that judges may exercise their right to free speech and expression, but they must do so within the limits of decency.

The SC observed that Judge Inciong’s conduct was his first offense and that he has maintained a clean record in public service since 1999. While the SC found him free from administrative liability, it issued a warning that future similar behavior will face more serious consequences.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157802

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157776

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157789

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

18/12/2025

The (SC) has held that while financial details of bank deposits remain confidential, the Cybercrime Prevention Act allows disclosure of bank account holder information for cybercrime investigations.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division denied the petition filed by EastWest Rural Bank (EastWest), which questioned the warrant to disclose computer data (WDCD) issued by the court and the subsequent Disclosure Order issued by the Philippine National Police Anti-Cybercrime Group (PNP-ACG) which required EastWest to disclose bank account holder information.

This EastWest bank account holder information sought to be disclosed is the account where Leonard Vendiola’s money was transferred after he was scammed by a caller posing as a bank employee.

Vendiola reported to the PNP-ACG that a caller who introduced herself as a bank employee deceived him by promising rewards contingent to disclosing his email and one-time password. When he checked his bank account, he discovered that an amount of PHP 10,000 was transferred to an EastWest account.

PNP-ACG applied for a WDCD to identify the EastWest account holder involved in the alleged scam. This was granted by the Regional Trial Court which authorized the PNP-ACG to compel EastWest to disclose and preserve data relating to the account holder. Pursuant to this, the PNP-ACG issued a Disclosure Order to EastWest.

EastWest filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the WDCD and arguing that the Bank Secrecy Law prohibits banks from revealing any information about bank deposits, including the identity of the account holder. It maintained that this rule remains in force because it was not repealed by the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

EastWest also asserted that it should not be subject to the Cybercrime law’s disclosure rules because it is a financial institution rather than a communications service provider.

The SC rejected these arguments and upheld the validity of the WDCD and Disclosure Order.

The SC clarified that while the Bank Secrecy Law protects the confidentiality of bank deposits and their financial details, it does not prevent the disclosure of basic identifying information when allowed by law. Under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, law enforcement agencies may, with a court-issued warrant, require the disclosure of computer data necessary to investigate cybercrime offenses.

The SC ruled that EastWest is considered a service provider under the Cybercrime Prevention Act because their digital banking services, such as online banking platforms, mobile applications, and automated email notifications, allow customers to communicate and transact through computer systems. As a banking institution, EastWest also processes and stores substantial amounts of computer data both in the course of its operations and on behalf of its customers, placing it within the law’s coverage for the disclosure of computer data when authorized by a court-issued warrant.

Read the full text of the press release at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157653

Read the full text of the Decision at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157646

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

18/12/2025

R**e not simple r**e

The has clarified that the proper term for the crime under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊) is 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦 and not 𝘴𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division affirmed a man’s conviction for ra**ng a 13-year-old girl, sentencing him to a maximum of 40 years in prison.

The accused was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of 𝘴𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦.

Under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC, 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦 is committed when a man has sexual in*******se with a woman through force, threat, or intimidation.

The SC affirmed his conviction and also took the opportunity to clarify that the crime should be referred to as 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦 instead of 𝘴𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦:

“After all, there is nothing ‘simple’ about R**e and referring to it in such a manner downplays its severity and desensitizes the public to the harm it inflicts,” said the SC.

While 𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘦 was initially classified as a crime against chastity under Article 335 of the RPC, Republic Act No. 8353, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘙𝘢𝘱𝘦 𝘓𝘢𝘸 𝘰𝘧 1997, reclassified it as a crime against persons.

Crimes against chastity, such as adultery and seduction, are generally private crimes which focus on protecting the victim’s honor.

On the other hand, crimes against persons, such as homicide, murder, and physical injuries, aim to protect individuals’ bodily integrity and well-being.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157708.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157708.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

18/12/2025

Inordinate delay

The (SC) has ruled that the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) unreasonable delay in investigating an election offense violated a person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case and is a ground to dismiss the complaint against him.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the SC En Banc nullified the COMELEC’s resolution finding probable cause to charge Petronilo Solomon Sarigumba (Sarigumba) with violating the Omnibus Election Code.

Sarigumba lost the mayoral race in Loboc, Bohol, in the May 2010 elections. Four years later, the COMELEC Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) asked him to explain his alleged overspending based on his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE). After he submitted his explanation, the CFU filed a complaint against him before the COMELEC in December 2014.

The case was set for preliminary investigation on April 14, 2015, but Sarigumba sought several postponements due to illness. He also failed to submit his counter-affidavit on July 11, 2015.

Six years later, the COMELEC En Banc adopted the Law Department’s recommendation in a Resolution finding probable cause to charge Sarigumba with election overspending before the Regional Trial Court.

Sarigumba challenged this before the SC, arguing that the COMELEC was guilty of inordinate delay in investigating his case, thereby violating his right to a speedy disposition of cases.

The COMELEC argued that although its Rules of Procedure set a 20-day limit for the preliminary investigation, the period begins only upon the respondent's submission of the counter-affidavit. It also claimed that Sarigumba had waived his right to the speedy disposition of his case by failing to participate in the proceedings and by raising the issue only years later.

The SC disagreed and granted Sarigumba’s petition, stressing that all persons are guaranteed the right to the speedy disposition of cases before judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies under Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution.

The SC noted that more than six years had passed since Sarigumba was required to submit his counter-affidavit, yet the COMELEC failed to finish and resolve the preliminary investigation within the time limits set by its own rules. Sarigumba’s failure to file a counter-affidavit did not excuse the COMELEC’s prolonged inaction. Any delay after the filing period had lapsed was attributable to the COMELEC.

The SC explained that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a preliminary investigation should be completed within 20 days after receiving the respondent’s counter-affidavit or after the lapse of period to file it, and a resolution should be made within five days after that.

The SC observed that the COMELEC offered no justification for the delay. The case did not involve complex issues, as the finding of probable cause was based solely on Sarigumba’s SOCE.

Dismissing the complaint against Sarigumba, the SC also ruled that Sarigumba could not be faulted for invoking his right to the speedy disposition of his case only after receiving the COMELEC Resolution years later. A respondent in a criminal prosecution or investigation is not duty-bound to follow up on their case. Rather –

“It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.”

Read the full text of the press release at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157693

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157688

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

10/12/2025

The (SC) has denied the motion filed by officers of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police, National Security Council, and the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (Respondents) questioning the writs of 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢 earlier granted to environmental advocates Jonila F. Castro and Jhed Reiyana C. Tamano.

In a resolution written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld its earlier Decision granting the issuance of writs of 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢, along with the Temporary Protection Order (TPO), in favor of Castro and Tamano against the Respondents. The TPO barred the Respondents from entering within a radius of one kilometer from the persons of Castro and Tamano, their residence, schools, work, or current locations, and that of their immediate family members.

In praying for the issuance of the writs of 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢, Castro and Tamano alleged that the Respondents abducted them and coerced them into signing false affidavits based on unfounded suspicions of involvement in anti-government activities.

The SC issued the writs and directed the Court of Appeals (CA) to conduct summary proceedings to determine the full merits of the petition. The SC also ordered the Respondents to file a verified return before the CA.

The Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, challenged the Court’s finding of substantial evidence which, according to them, should be adjudicated by the CA. They also claimed they were denied due process when they were not required to comment, and that the enforcement of the issued TPO is a broad sweep.

The Supreme Court rejected their claims.

The SC explained that writs of 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢, unlike the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data, may be issued outright under the 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦 𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘞𝘳𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘈𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦 𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘞𝘳𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘏𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘢 if on the face of the petition, it ought to issue.

The quanta of proof in 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢 proceedings are two-fold. 𝘗𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘢 𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘪𝘦 evidence, which is evidence that is good and sufficient on its face, is the evidence necessary to issue writs of 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢. Substantial evidence, which is the evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is the evidence required for the issuance of the privilege of the writs of 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢 after a hearing.

In this case, the petition, on its face, shows more than 𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘢 𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘪𝘦 reason—substantial evidence—to conclude that the writs must issue in their favor. Despite this, the SC ruled that the use of substantial evidence to grant the writs did not violate Respondents’ right to due process. The 𝘈𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘏𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘢 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 allow courts to recognize stronger proof when it exists, justifying the immediate issuance of the writs.

The SC also affirmed its issuance of a TPO. A temporary protection order under the 𝘈𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦 may be issued to place petitioners or their family members under the care of a government agency, accredited person, or private institution capable of securing their safety. While Castro and Tamano did not seek a TPO in its technical sense, the SC saw it fit to prohibit Respondents from physically approaching petitioners, citing previous cases.

The SC also noted that the CA had denied the privileges of the writs of 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘰 and 𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘢𝘴 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢, which they are now challenging before the SC. It thus directed the Respondents to file their Comment to ensure the complete resolution of the case.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157257

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157248

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/12/2025

The has abandoned its earlier jurisprudence and clarified that votes clearly cast for a nuisance candidate, whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or not given due course, shall be considered stray votes and shall not be counted in favor of any candidate.

The Decision, penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, was rendered on the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Marcos “Macoy” Cabrera Amutan, who ran as Board Member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan for the fifth district of Cavite in the 2022 elections.

Amutan was proclaimed one of the winners. However, after losing candidate Alvic Madlangsakay Poblete was declared a nuisance candidate, the votes cast for him were counted in favor of Francisco Paolo Poblete Crisostomo. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) then annulled Amutan’s proclamation and declared Crisostomo as one of the winning candidates.

The Court granted Amutan’s petition and declared invalid and annulled the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.

The Court held it was imperative to revisit its existing jurisprudence, where the prevailing doctrine on the treatment of votes for nuisance candidates in manual elections required that votes cast for the nuisance candidate are counted in favor of the legitimate candidate.

Under the automated election system (AES), the Court said that there will no longer be “vague votes” because the voting machines will base their count on the full names with aliases of each candidate, as shaded in the ballots.

Thus, the Court held that in cases where a candidate is declared a nuisance candidate, the following are the corresponding effects on the kinds of votes reflected in the ballot:

•The votes clearly cast for the legitimate candidate are counted in favor of the legitimate candidate; and,
•The votes clearly cast for the nuisance candidate, whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or not given due course, are considered stray votes and shall not be counted in favor of any other candidate.

The Court emphasized that the previous rule had no basis in law as the clear tenor of Sections 69 and 211 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a nuisance candidate is deemed to have never filed a certificate of candidacy and therefore the votes cast for such nuisance candidate are considered stray.

Read the press release at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156725.

The full text of the Decision in G.R. No. 266331 (Marcos Amutan v. Commission on Elections) will be uploaded to the SC website once available.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

30/11/2025

The (SC) has set guidelines that the courts must follow before declaring an individual as a fugitive from justice, ruling that they are barred from seeking judicial reliefs as the courts do not acquire jurisdiction over them.

A fugitive from justice is someone who not only flees after conviction to avoid punishment, but one who also flees after being charged to avoid prosecution. The essential element is the intent to evade prosecution or punishment.

The SC ruled that it is vital that the person knows that an Information or criminal charge has been filed or that a warrant of arrest has been issued. Such knowledge may come from actual notice, such as personally receiving a copy of the Information, or from constructive notice, such as clear, public, and documented efforts by law enforcement to serve legal process even if personal service was evaded or unsuccessful.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 laid down the following guidelines that the courts must apply before declaring an individual fugitive from justice:

1. After finding probable cause, the court shall issue a warrant of arrest.

2. The warrant of arrest, including an e-warrant, shall be implemented within 10 calendar days from its receipt by the executing officer.

3. If there is a failure to execute the warrant of arrest by reason that the accused is outside the Philippine jurisdiction, as stated in the executing officer’s return, the court may, either by motion or motu proprio, and after assessment of the circumstances of the case, declare the accused a fugitive from justice. From then, such person loses their standing in court, can no longer participate in the proceedings, and seek any judicial relief. They can only restore their standing before the court through voluntary surrender.

4. A warrant of arrest which was not served personally to the accused because they are outside the Philippine jurisdiction shall remain outstanding until its eventual implementation.

5. The criminal case shall be archived only if the accused remains at large for six months from the date of the issuance of the warrant of arrest or creation of the e-warrant, without prejudice to the revival of the case upon successful implementation of the warrant of arrest or upon notice to the court that the person subject of the warrant of arrest has been arrested or committed under a different warrant.

The case stemmed from carnapping, violation of Public Service Act and grave coercion charges filed against Ricardo V. Yanson, Jr. (Yanson), who was Vice President for Maintenance of Vallacar Transit, Inc. (VTI).

Yanson left the country on March 7, 2020, after the Informations for carnapping had been filed in court on March 4, 2020 and before the other charges for grave coercion and violation of the Public Service Act were filed on June 9, 2020.

Yanson, through a petition filed by his counsel, secured a ruling from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City suspending the proceedings for grave coercion before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), because of a pending intra-corporate dispute. VTI questioned the RTC ruling before the SC.

The SC ruled that when the accused is declared a fugitive from justice, he is not entitled to any judicial reliefs, creating an exception to a prior ruling.

Previously, in 𝘔𝘪𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢 𝘷. 𝘛𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘰, the court is allowed to proceed to grant or deny the reliefs sought by an accused who is not physically under its custody but whose jurisdiction over his person was acquired when he or she participated in the case and asked for affirmative reliefs.

However, the SC noted that under this ruling, there is no assurance or guarantee that any decision would be enforceable on a fugitive from justice.

Thus, as an exception to the 𝘔𝘪𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘨, it declared that jurisdiction over the person of an accused, who is a fugitive from justice, would not be acquired by the courts simply by the filing of any pleading or by participating in the case through his or her lawyers.

The SC applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, a doctrine which originated in the United States that disentitles fugitives from seeking relief from the judicial system whose authority they seek to evade.

It cited the totality of circumstances that indicate Yanson’s intent to evade law enforcement and judicial processes — his flight, and his failure to return and surrender despite knowledge of pending criminal proceedings against him, and particularly the existence of Informations filed against him prior to his departure from the Philippines.

The SC remanded the case to the MTCC to apply the guidelines and determine if the warrant of arrest could not be executed because Yanson is outside Philippine jurisdiction, and if so, to declare him a fugitive from justice not entitled to any judicial relief.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156092

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/259337-vallacar-transit-inc-and-nixon-banibane-vs-ricard-v-yanson-jr/

Read the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/259337-concurring-and-dissenting-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Read the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/259337-concurring-and-dissenting-opinion-associate-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

19/11/2025

08/11/2025

The Supreme Court has issued a “status quo ante order” on the disqualification of Tarlac City Mayor Susan Areno Yap-Sulit.

This means Sulit will remain as mayor while the case is being resolved. | via Sandra Aguinaldo / GMA Integrated News