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The Law Firm of Torreon & Partners, JRY Villacin Bldg. II, Villa Villacin Mansion, Brgy. Buhangin Proper, Km. 5, J. P. Laurel Avenue, Bajada, Davao City (2026)

19/01/2026

PRESS STATEMENT
Regarding Junior Digamon's conviction for Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. 11313

The Law Firm of Torreon and Partners, acting as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. M-DVO-24-04237-CR pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6 of Davao City, welcomes the judgment of conviction finding Junior Ortiz Digamon guilty of Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. 11313, otherwise known as the Safe Spaces Act.

For the private complainant, this decision brings long-awaited vindication for an ordeal that began two years ago, in January 2024, when she was publicly humiliated, sexualized, and ridiculed in a live broadcast while simply performing her duties as a public attorney. While we respect the accused’s constitutional rights and the remedies available to him under the law, this case stands as a clear reminder that there are limits to what may be said or done in the name of commentary, humor, or entertainment. Misogyny and sexual degradation cannot be justified, excused, or concealed by invoking the mantle of journalism.

We note recent statements characterizing the acts subject of this case as mere “commentary,” “public service broadcasting,” or conduct arising from complaints brought to a media station. The Court has already squarely rejected this narrative. The conviction affirms that the remarks made were not protected journalistic expression, but constituted unwanted, sexualized, and degrading statements directed at an identifiable woman and disseminated through online platforms with wide reach. No invocation of public service, humor, banter, or audience engagement can convert gender-based harassment into protected speech.

Freedom of expression does not include the right to demean, sexualize, or humiliate another person. The Safe Spaces Act exists precisely to draw that line, especially in online and broadcast spaces where harm is amplified. The Court’s ruling confirms that accountability attaches not to the profession of the speaker, but to the nature and effect of the act itself.

We further emphasize that the conviction stands independently of any post-judgment remedies that the accused may choose to pursue. The judgment remains valid, enforceable, and binding unless and until set aside by a competent court. Promulgation in absentia, which occurred in this case, carries serious legal consequences under the law and does not diminish the authority of the decision rendered.

The Law Firm of Torreon and Partners likewise confirms that it shall continue to pursue the other pending cyber libel case against the accused on behalf of the private complainant. Accountability does not end with a single conviction, and the remaining case will be prosecuted to their lawful conclusion.

This ruling serves as a clear reminder that the Safe Spaces Act is real and enforceable. Media practitioners and online personalities, regardless of influence, position, or platform, are not above the law. Responsible journalism is not undermined by accountability. It is strengthened by it.

We thank the Honorable Court for its careful appreciation of the evidence and for upholding the rule of law, dignity, and respect for women.

_____________

PRESS STATEMENT
Mahitungod sa Pagkaconvict ni Junior Digamon tungod sa Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment ubos sa Republic Act No. 11313 (Safe Spaces Act)

Ang Law Firm of Torreon and Partners, nga naglihok isip private prosecutor sa Criminal Case No. M-DVO-24-04237-CR nga pending sa Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6 sa Davao City, nagadayeg ug nagadawat sa desisyon sa hukmanan nga nakakaplag kang Junior Ortiz Digamon nga guilty sa Gender-Based Online Sexual Harassment ubos sa Republic Act No. 11313, nga nailhan usab isip Safe Spaces Act.

Alang sa private complainant, kining desisyon usa ka dugay nang gipaabot nga pag-ila sa kamatuoran ug hustisya human sa usa ka masakit ug makapaubos nga kasinatian nga nagsugod duha ka tuig ang milabay, niadtong Enero 2024, sa dihang siya publikong gipakaulawan, gisekswalisa, ug gitamay sa usa ka live broadcast, samtang siya nagabuhat lamang sa iyang katungdanan isip public attorney. Samtang among girespeto ang konstitusyonal nga katungod sa akusado ug ang mga legal nga remedyo nga anaa kaniya ubos sa balaod, kining kasoha usa ka klarong pahinumdom nga adunay utlanan ang masulti ug mabuhat ilalom sa ngalan sa komentaryo, humor, o kalingawan. Ang misogyny ug sekswal nga pagdaot sa dignidad dili mahimong matarong, mapangatarungan, o matago pinaagi sa pag-angkon nga kini kabahin sa journalism.

Among namatikdan ang bag-ong mga pahayag nga naghulagway sa mga buhat nga sakop sa maong kaso ingon nga “komentaryo,” “public service broadcasting,” o mga lihok nga mitungha lamang tungod sa reklamo nga gidala sa usa ka media station. Kining depensaha klarong gisalikway na sa Hukmanan. Ang pagkakondenar nagpamatuod nga ang mga gipamulong dili protektadong journalistic expression, kundili mga dili ginahanglan, sekswalisa, ug makadaot nga pahayag nga gitumong sa usa ka mailhan nga babaye ug gipakatap pinaagi sa online ug broadcast platforms nga halapad ang maabot. Walay pag-angkon sa public service, humor, banter, o audience engagement nga makapabalhin sa gender-based harassment ngadto sa protektadong panultihon.

Ang kagawasan sa pagpamulong wala naglakip sa katungod nga mubugnot, mussekswalisa, o mupakaulaw sa lain nga tawo. Ang Safe Spaces Act mitumong gyud sa paglatid nianang utlanan, ilabi na sa online ug broadcast nga mga espasyo diin ang kadaot mas paspas ug mas halapad ang epekto. Ang desisyon sa Hukmanan nagpamatuod nga ang panagutan dili magdepende sa propesyon sa nagpanulti, kundili sa kinaiya ug epekto sa buhat mismo.

Among gipasiugda usab nga ang pagkakondenar nagabarug nga independente sa bisan unsang post-judgment remedies nga pilion sa akusado nga gamiton. Ang desisyon balido, mapatuman, ug nagabugkos gawas lamang kung kini mapapas sa usa ka hukmanan nga adunay awtoridad. Ang promulgation in absentia, nga nahitabo niini nga kaso, adunay seryoso nga legal nga mga epekto ug dili makapamenos sa gahum ug awtoridad sa desisyon nga gipagawas.

Ang Law Firm of Torreon and Partners nagpamatuod usab nga padayon namong ipadayon ang laing pending nga cyber libel case batok sa akusado alang sa private complainant. Ang panagutan dili matapos sa usa lamang ka pagkakondenar, ug ang nahibiling kaso ipadayun sa hustong pamaagi hangtod sa legal nga konklusyon niini.

Kining desisyon usa ka klaro ug lig-on nga pahinumdom nga ang Safe Spaces Act tinuod ug mapatuman. Ang mga media practitioner ug online personalities, bisan pa sa ilang impluwensya, posisyon, o plataporma, dili labaw sa balaod. Ang responsable nga journalism dili maluya tungod sa panagutan; mas lig-on kini tungod niini.

Among pasalamatan ang Dunggang Hukmanan tungod sa maampingong pagtan-aw sa ebidensya ug sa pagpanalipod sa balaod, dignidad, ug pagtahod sa kababayen-an.

07/01/2026

Congratulations to our paralegal, now lawyer Jason Lobaton, for passing the 2025 Bar Examinations!

26/12/2025

Please be advised of our office closure during this holiday.

22/12/2025

Lights, camera, action!

16/12/2025

Please be advised.

13/12/2025

OFFICIAL STATEMENT
OF MARC DOUGLAS C. CAGAS

I am issuing this statement to clarify matters relating to the administrative case involving the revocation of my firearm licenses, and to categorically correct false and misleading insinuations recently made by certain political quarters.

First, with respect to the revocation case, a clerical discrepancy appears in the extract copy of the police blotter, limited solely to the hour of reporting of the loss of fi****ms. The date of the report is correct, accurate, and not in issue.

Upon obtaining a copy of the blotter extract and noting the discrepancy, an authorized representative immediately coordinated with the Digos Police Station to formally call attention to the clerical entry for appropriate correction. The discrepancy arose from the administrative recording of the blotter officer and is not attributable to the firearm licensee.

The matter pertains strictly to documentation and record-keeping and does not involve any act of concealment, misrepresentation, unlawful possession, or unlawful use of fi****ms. The loss of the fi****ms was reported, duly supported by an Affidavit of Loss, and processed in accordance with existing PNP–Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) rules and procedures.

Second, I categorically deny and strongly refute the insinuations that the two (2) fi****ms mentioned in the Affidavit of Loss were allegedly used in the killing of Barangay Captain Oscar “Dodong” Bucol, Jr. This claim is factually false, reckless, and unsupported by evidence.

Official records and forensic findings clearly show that the bullets recovered from the crime scene do not correspond, match, or bear any ballistic relation to the fi****ms subject of the Affidavit of Loss. Any attempt to link those fi****ms to the killing is therefore baseless and misleading, and serves only to distort the facts and inflame public opinion.

Third, I am constrained to state that those who may have any motive against Kapitan Dodong should be subjected to proper investigation. Instead of spreading unfounded insinuations, they should submit themselves to lawful inquiry and fully cooperate with law enforcement authorities.

I reiterate my full cooperation with all lawful investigations and my firm commitment to the rule of law and due process. I will not allow false narratives, insinuations, or rumor-mongering to divert attention from the truth or to unfairly prejudice my rights.

I call on the public to rely only on verified facts and official findings, and I urge all parties to act responsibly and allow due process to take its proper course.

Let us work together to pursue the truth and uphold justice for our dear Kapitan Dodong, and to ensure that accountability rests where it rightfully belongs.

09/12/2025

Good afternoon, Atty. Torreon. This is ________ po of _______. May I get confirmation if Sen. Bato is now asking for a clear cut of guidelines to the Supreme Court and the Philippine government amid the alleged issuance of an arrest warrant against him?

Good afternoon and thank you for your question.

Let me clarify that Senator Dela Rosa is not primarily asking the Supreme Court to create new rules or legislate guidelines on surrender to the ICC. What he is asking for is clarity, among others, a judicial declaration of what the law already provides and, critically, which branch of government has the constitutional authority to regulate the surrender of Filipinos to a foreign tribunal. This issue is already squarely raised in Senator Dela Rosa’s submissions before the Supreme Court: there exists no Philippine procedure for the arrest or surrender of persons to the ICC, and if the government insists on invoking Section 17 of R.A. 9851, then the Court must determine first whether that provision remains applicable or enforceable after the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute.

By contrast, for extradition proceedings, the law already provides a statutory framework under P.D. 1069, and the 2025 Extradition Rules merely made extradition more consistent, clear, and efficient, covering applications for warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, bail, and other procedural matters. But in the case of ICC surrender, there is no such statute, no implementing law, and no judicial framework whatsoever.

As we repeatedly stressed, surrender to an international criminal court is an act of sovereignty that deprives a Filipino of liberty, allows foreign jurisdiction to attach, and defines when Philippine authorities may assist an external tribunal. These are matters that fall exclusively within the law-making power of Congress, not the judiciary.

At the same time, assuming without conceding that the Supreme Court could, in theory, issue guidelines pursuant to its constitutional power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, even such rules cannot supply what only Congress may provide- a substantive legal framework that authorizes surrender to a foreign tribunal. The Court’s rule-making power is procedural; it cannot create new obligations, new government powers, or new modes of depriving liberty that Congress itself has never authorized.

Comparative practice is consistent: Germany’s Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof (ICC Cooperation Act), Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, Austria’s Federal Law on Cooperation with the ICC, and the Netherlands’ ICC Implementation Act all show that ICC cooperation, including arrest and surrender, requires comprehensive domestic legislation, not judicial legislation.

Moreover, any attempt to effect surrender without a Philippine judge personally determining probable cause, as required by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, would raise even graver issues. Our Constitution demands that probable cause must be determined personally by a judge before any arrest warrant may issue. If the government seeks to allow the ex*****on of foreign or international warrants without this judicial safeguard, that is no longer a mere procedural change, but it may even require a constitutional amendment, not judicial guidelines.

In short, Senator Dela Rosa seeks constitutional order: in the absence of any Philippine statute authorizing ICC surrender, no agency may unilaterally enforce a foreign arrest claim. And if the government truly intends to adopt a surrender framework, only Congress may debate and enact such a law, and any deviation from the Constitution’s requirement of judicial determination of probable cause may even necessitate amending the Constitution itself.

In light of these unresolved constitutional and legal questions, it is precisely the Supreme Court, and only the Supreme Court, that has the authority to definitively clarify these issues. The very heart of Senator Dela Rosa’s petition is the need for judicial determination on whether any legal basis exists for the arrest or surrender of a Filipino to the ICC after the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute, and whether Section 17 of R.A. 9851 remains operative at all.

That is why, in view of the reported imminent implementation of an alleged ICC arrest warrant against Senator Dela Rosa while the case is actively pending before the Court, we have repeatedly and urgently prayed for the issuance of a TRO or injunction, as expressly prayed for in the original petition. The status quo must be preserved because it is the Supreme Court that must first resolve these fundamental questions; no executive agency or foreign entity may pre-empt that constitutional process. Only after the Supreme Court speaks can the government act within the bounds of law, sovereignty, and due process.

Thank you.

11/11/2025

SECTION 17 OF R.A. 9851 IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING; THERE ARE NO IMPLEMENTING RULES THAT GOVERN THE SPECIFIC PROCESS OF “SURRENDER” TO AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

Section 17 of Republic Act No. 9851 provides that in appropriate cases, the Philippines “may surrender or extradite a person to another court or international tribunal that is conducting the investigation or prosecution of crimes punishable under this Act, pursuant to applicable extradition laws and treaties.”

However, it must be stressed that no Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) have ever been promulgated by the Department of Justice, the Department of Foreign Affairs, or any other competent authority to define or govern the specific process by which such “surrender” may be effected. There exists no rule of procedure identifying the proper petition to be filed, the court with jurisdiction, the evidentiary and due process requirements, or the coordination mechanism between the Executive and Judicial branches.

In the absence of such implementing rules, Section 17 cannot be invoked as a self-executing authority. By its own terms, the statute contemplates further regulation as it explicitly requires that surrender or extradition be carried out “pursuant to applicable laws and treaties.” This qualifying phrase demonstrates legislative intent that the provision is conditional, not automatic; it operates only within a complete and lawful framework of treaty obligations and procedural safeguards.

The rule of law demands specificity and due process in any measure that affects individual liberty. The act of surrendering a Filipino citizen to a foreign or international tribunal constitutes the gravest form of deprivation of liberty, involving physical transfer outside the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. Such an act cannot be founded on a vague statutory clause devoid of procedural implementation. The Constitution, under Article III, Section 1, prohibits any deprivation of life or liberty “without due process of law.” The absence of rules governing the mechanics of surrender renders any executive action to that effect constitutionally infirm.

Indeed, it is a fundamental principle of administrative and statutory construction that laws conferring coercive powers must be implemented through clear procedural regulations. The promulgation of implementing rules serves a dual purpose: (1) it informs the public of the specific procedures to be followed, ensuring fairness and predictability; and (2) it prevents arbitrary and discretionary action by executive agencies. Without such rules, there is no standard to measure compliance, no avenue for judicial review, and no assurance of protection for the rights of the person sought to be surrendered.

In contrast, Presidential Decree No. 1069 (the Philippine Extradition Law) and the 2025 Rules on Extradition Proceedings (A.M. No. 22-03-29-SC) provide detailed judicial procedures governing requests for surrender to foreign states, including the filing of a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court, the determination of probable cause, the issuance of summons, and the right to appeal. These procedural safeguards reflect constitutional due process. Section 17 of R.A. 9851 contains no such mechanisms; neither does any implementing rule fill that gap.

Hence, in the absence of promulgated implementing rules, Section 17 remains an incomplete and inoperative provision insofar as the actual act of surrender is concerned. It recognizes the possibility of cooperation with an international tribunal but does not itself create the procedural machinery to give that cooperation legal effect.

Accordingly, any attempt by the Executive Branch to implement Section 17 without a duly promulgated IRR, without judicial authorization, and without an operative treaty, would be ultra vires, unconstitutional, and void for lack of due process. The power to deprive a Filipino of liberty or to transfer jurisdiction over his person to a foreign or international court is not a matter of executive discretion. It is a matter of law, of sovereignty, and of constitutional justice and such power cannot exist in a vacuum.

Until the government properly enacts clear implementing rules, identifies the appropriate judicial forum, and reestablishes a valid treaty basis, Section 17 of R.A. 9851 remains merely declaratory, a statement of policy, not a self-executing source of power.

09/11/2025

WHY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT CANNOT INVOKE SECTION 17 OF R.A. 9851 AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER SENATOR DELA ROSA TO THE ICC WITHOUT COURT ORDER AND COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

We have received reports from reliable sources that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has already issued a warrant of arrest against Senator Ronald “Bato” M. Dela Rosa, and that, following said issuance, a diffusion order has allegedly been issued. We can only surmise that this diffusion order will soon be circulated to member law enforcement agencies for purposes of surveillance, coordination, and potential enforcement.

We have likewise received information that the government will again invoke Section 17 of Republic Act No. 9851 to justify immediate “surrender” of Senator Bato to the ICC.

This alarming development, if true, places Senator dela Rosa in immediate peril of unlawful arrest or surrender under the guise of international police cooperation, despite the absence of any formal judicial proceedings or extradition authorization within the Philippine legal framework.

It is our position that the government cannot rely on Section 17 of Republic Act No. 9851 to justify any attempt to surrender Senator Ronald Dela Rosa to the ICC without a valid extradition process or judicial authorization. Such an invocation constitutes a grave misreading of the statute, a distortion of its intent, and a direct violation of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 17 of R.A. 9851 provides that the State shall exercise jurisdiction over persons accused of crimes defined under the Act, and that in appropriate cases, the Philippines may surrender or extradite an accused person to another court or international tribunal that is conducting the prosecution. This provision, however, is not self-executing and cannot operate independently of existing extradition laws and treaties, nor can it override the constitutional framework on due process, liberty, and judicial oversight.

First, the law itself conditions any surrender or extradition on compliance with “applicable extradition laws and treaties.” This means that R.A. 9851 cannot be used to short-circuit or bypass the extradition process established under Presidential Decree No. 1069 and, now, the Rules on Extradition Proceedings (A.M. No. 22-03-29-SC, effective November 10, 2025). These laws explicitly require judicial proceedings, probable cause determination, and final judgment before any person can be surrendered to a foreign or international jurisdiction. The ICC has no extradition treaty with the Philippines, nor any valid implementing instrument that would authorize the direct ex*****on of its arrest warrants.

Second, even assuming arguendo that Section 17 remains operative, the Philippines’ 2019 withdrawal from the Rome Statute extinguished all treaty-based obligations of cooperation with the ICC. Without a subsisting treaty or domestic incorporation clause, there exists no legal nexus that can bind the Republic to implement ICC orders. Section 17 cannot revive an extinguished international obligation nor create one unilaterally, for the power to enter into or recognize treaty-based commitments lies exclusively with the Senate under Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution.

Third, the ICC is not a “court or international tribunal” within the contemplation of R.A. 9851 after the Philippines’ withdrawal. Section 17 presupposes an institution to which the Philippines remains legally bound, not one whose jurisdiction it has expressly renounced. The invocation of R.A. 9851 to justify compliance with ICC orders would therefore contradict the State’s declared withdrawal and render that act meaningless. The government cannot in one breath deny ICC jurisdiction and in the next surrender its citizens to that same court.

Fourth, Section 17 does not authorize unilateral executive surrender. The word “surrender” in the statute cannot be construed as empowering the Executive to forcibly deliver a citizen to a foreign tribunal without judicial process. In constitutional law, surrender of a Filipino citizen to a foreign authority is not a purely political act - it is a judicially regulated process. The power to determine whether the requisites of extradition or surrender are met belongs to the judiciary, not the executive. Any other interpretation would offend the doctrine of separation of powers and nullify the Supreme Court’s role as final arbiter of liberty.

Fifth, even the text of Section 17 must be harmonized with Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that “the liberty of abode shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.” The forcible transfer of a Filipino citizen to The Hague constitutes the ultimate impairment of abode—it expels a citizen from the national territory. Such an act cannot lawfully occur without a judicial order. The Constitution’s protection of abode is absolute; it does not yield to administrative discretion or to foreign requests, no matter how politically sensitive the case may be.

If even a temporary travel restriction requires due process, the permanent expulsion or surrender of a citizen to a foreign tribunal without a court order is unquestionably unconstitutional.

Sixth, Section 17 of R.A. 9851 is intended to apply only in two limited contexts: (a) when the accused voluntarily surrenders to an international tribunal; or (a) when the person sought is an alien who may be deported under existing immigration laws. Neither of these circumstances applies to petitioner Dela Rosa. He is a Filipino citizen, constitutionally entitled to protection by the Philippine government, and has not consented to surrender. His forcible removal from the Philippines without judicial process would therefore constitute arbitrary detention, deprivation of liberty, and exile without due process of law.

Seventh, the Rome Statute itself, particularly Articles 89, 91, and 99, confirms that surrender requests must be executed in accordance with the domestic legal procedures of the requested State. The Statute envisions the participation of domestic courts, not their exclusion. Even among State Parties, compliance requires a written request, a copy of the warrant, and a judicial process to validate surrender. The Philippine government’s attempt to bypass its own judicial system by invoking Section 17 thus violates not only domestic law but also the procedural framework of the very treaty it claims to be assisting.

Eighth, the reliance on Section 17 would effectively convert a statutory provision into a blank check for the Executive Branch to surrender Filipino citizens to foreign bodies at will, without judicial review or due process. Such interpretation offends the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, which mandates that all statutes must yield to the Constitution. Under settled doctrine, any law or executive act inconsistent with the Constitution is void and without effect. Section 17, therefore, cannot be construed as an independent grant of authority that nullifies the procedural safeguards required by both the Extradition Law (P.D. 1069) and the Bill of Rights.

Ninth, an ICC-issued arrest warrant is not self-executing in the Philippines and cannot be enforced without first undergoing the appropriate recognition process under domestic law, following Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As a foreign-issued judicial order, it does not carry automatic legal force within Philippine territory. Thus, in the absence of any law or treaty currently in effect mandating the direct ex*****on of ICC warrants, any attempt to implement such a warrant without court recognition is not only procedurally defective—it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Tenth, the government’s reliance on Section 17 to justify the arrest and transfer of former President Rodrigo Duterte in March 2025, and their threatened use of the same provision against Senator Dela Rosa, constitute executive overreach of the highest order. By arrogating unto themselves the power to remove a citizen from the country without judicial imprimatur, the respondents have acted ultra vires and in open defiance of the Constitution. Their actions erode the institutional independence of the judiciary and threaten the rule of law.

Eleventh, even the Rome Statute does not authorize the ICC to demand surrender from non-State Parties absent a special agreement or ad hoc consent. Since the Philippines has withdrawn and no special agreement has been entered into, any cooperation with the ICC is purely voluntary and cannot serve as a binding legal justification for depriving a citizen of liberty. Thus, any attempt to enforce an ICC warrant through Section 17 is, in effect, executing a foreign judgment without jurisdiction, an act proscribed under Philippine jurisprudence.

Finally, to allow the Executive Branch to use Section 17 of R.A. 9851 as a unilateral basis for surrender would effectively create a parallel extradition regime outside the control of the judiciary. It would permit arbitrary rendition under the guise of “international cooperation,” thereby extinguishing the procedural guarantees that the Supreme Court has consistently protected in Secretary v. Hon. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000 [Per J. Melo, En Banc]. The result would be a constitutional regression where the liberty of a Filipino citizen depends not on law, but on political expediency.

For these reasons, the invocation of Section 17 of R.A. 9851 as authority to surrender Senator Dela Rosa or any Filipino citizen to the ICC without extradition proceedings, judicial oversight, or treaty basis is constitutionally void, statutorily baseless, and morally indefensible.

The government cannot obey an international tribunal it does not recognize, cannot perform treaty obligations that no longer exist, and cannot discard constitutional guarantees that remain binding. Any such act would not be an exercise of law; it would be an abandonment of sovereignty and a betrayal of the Constitution itself.

16/10/2025

Our fight to cleanse the election processes in our country continues!

It is our prayer that the Solicitor General will finally file its Comment so that our Petition to conduct manual counting will finally move forward.

The Law Firm of Torreon & Partners

19/01/2026

07/01/2026

26/12/2025

22/12/2025

16/12/2025

13/12/2025

09/12/2025

11/11/2025

09/11/2025

16/10/2025

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