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The Law Office of Atty. Jashera L. Gonzales, Buhangin, Davao City (2026)

19/08/2026

The has acquitted a woman of bigamy, ruling that a prior marriage that was void from the beginning (𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘣 𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰) may be raised as a defense even without a prior judicial declaration of nullity.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Pampanga and the Court of Appeals (CA), which had found Ma. Fe Imelda Lapira guilty of bigamy.

Lapira faced a bigamy charge under Article 349 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 for marrying Jimmy Fariscal while still married to Takahiko Sato as evidenced by a marriage certificate from the Office of the Civil Registrar General.

During trial, Lapira argued that her marriage to Sato was void because no ceremony took place and no marriage license had been issued, both of which were required for validity. The Local Civil Registrar confirmed that there was no record of the application for a marriage license for Lapira and Sato.

In acquitting Lapira, the SC applied its ruling in the 2021 case of 𝘗𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘥𝘰 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, which held that an accused in a bigamy case may directly argue that a previous marriage is void as a defense, even without a prior court declaration.

The SC explained that one of the essential elements of bigamy is the existence of a valid prior marriage. If the first marriage was void from the beginning, that element is absent.

In this case, the certification from the Local Civil Registrar sufficiently proved that no marriage license was issued to Lapira and Sato. This certification was enough to counter the presumption of the marriage certificate’s validity.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171178.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165698.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

19/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sales agent’s promise to issue a Contract to Sell after payment of reservation fee is not an “advertisement” under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, or the 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦, that would form part of developer’s warranties. However, the developer may still be required to refund a buyer if it fails to honor that promise.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ordered Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) to refund the payments made by John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) after it failed to issue the promised Contract to Sell.

Bautista paid Empire East for a residential unit PHP 130,000, consisting of a PHP 20,000 reservation fee and PHP 110,000 in additional payments. He claimed he made the payments because Empire East’s sales agent promised to issue a Contract to Sell once he paid the reservation fee. When more than a year passed without the contract being issued, Bautista stopped making payments and demanded a refund.

The SC, agreeing with both the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) and the Court of Appeals which ruled in Bautista’s favor, held that Bautista was entitled to a refund but clarified that the sales agent’s promise did not fall under Section 19 of PD 957.

The SC clarified that Section 19, which mandates truthful and non-misleading advertisements and sales materials, applies only to materials intended for the general public, such as those in those in newspapers, radio, TV, or similar mass communication channels. It does not cover promises made by a sales agent to individual buyers.

The SC emphasized that buyers remain protected, as developers may still be held liable under their contractual obligations and other applicable laws.

The SC ordered Empire East to refund Bautista the PHP 130,000 with interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint in 2012, as well as to pay PHP 260,000 in exemplary damages, which courts award to discourage wrongful conduct and warn against similar actions.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/272556-1.pdf.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

16/08/2026

SC EN BANC: RTC JUDGE FINED 3-MONTH SALARY FOR DELAYS; FAILURE TO DECIDE CASES WITHIN PERIOD VIOLATES CONSTITUTION

The Supreme Court (SC) En Banc found a Regional Trial Court judge administratively liable for undue delay in rendering decisions, emphasizing that the constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases demands strict compliance with the 90-day period for deciding cases. The Court held that failure to resolve cases and pending incidents within the prescribed period constitutes gross inefficiency and a violation of judicial duties.

READ: [https://dlsurf.com//delay-in-deciding-cases-violates-constitution-warrants-sanction]

15/08/2026

SUPREME COURT: CYBER LIBEL PRESCRIPTION STARTS UPON DISCOVERY, NOT AUTOMATICALLY WHEN A FACEBOOK POST IS PUBLISHED

The Supreme Court (SC) En Banc has ruled that the prescriptive period for cyber libel begins when the alleged defamatory material is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and not automatically on the date the post was uploaded online.

In this case, there is no presumption that an offended party discovered a Facebook post when it was uploaded. Social-media publication is [n]ot equivalent to registration in a public registry, which may give rise to constructive notice.

READ: [https://dlsurf.com//cyber-libel-prescription-starts-upon-discovery-not-automatically-when-a-facebook-post-is-published]

15/08/2026

SUPREME COURT: CYBER LIBEL PRESCRIBES IN ONE YEAR, NOT 15 YEARS

The Supreme Court has ruled that cyber libel prescribes in one year, rejecting the argument that the offense should be subject to the 15-year prescriptive period applicable to crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties.

In its En Banc Resolution¹ dated April 8, 2026, the Court explained that cyber libel is not an entirely new crime created by the Cybercrime Prevention Act. Rather, it is libel as defined under Article 353, in relation to Article 355, of the Revised Penal Code, committed through a computer system or information and communications technology (ICT).

The Court noted that Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act, expressly refers to libel under the Revised Penal Code. Section 6 of the same law merely provides for a penalty one degree higher when crimes under the Revised Penal Code or special laws are committed through ICT. Thus, the use of a computer system constitutes a qualifying circumstance that increases the penalty; it does not transform cyber libel into an entirely different offense for purposes of prescription.

The Court therefore applied Article 90, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which specifically provides that “libel or other similar offenses” prescribe in one year. The fact that cyber libel carries a heavier penalty does not, by itself, place it under the 15-year prescriptive period in Article 90, paragraph 2.

The Court further emphasized that the Legislature has historically treated libel differently from other offenses carrying comparable penalties. Republic Act No. 4661 shortened the prescriptive period for libel to one year, in part to synchronize it with the one-year period for civil actions involving defamation under Article 1147 of the Civil Code.

Applying the principle that penal laws on prescription must be construed in favor of the accused, the Court held that the one-year period under Article 90, paragraph 4 governs cyber libel.

Thus, while cyber libel carries a penalty one degree higher because it is committed through ICT, the prescriptive period remains one year. The Court denied the motions for partial reconsideration with finality.

FOOTNOTES

1 Causing v. People, SC En Banc, (2026) Per Inting, J. [https://dlsurf.com/l/f0a673e]

14/08/2026

NLRC Tightens Procedure on Motions to Dismiss Under 2025 Rules

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) has introduced procedural refinements under its 2025 Rules of Procedure, clarifying the timing and resolution of motions to dismiss while reinforcing stricter case management standards.

Learn more in the comments.

12/08/2026

LAWYERING IS A NOBLE CALLING; WEALTH IS ONLY A BYPRODUCT — SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court disciplined a lawyer who failed to file his client's complaint despite receiving ₱25,000 intended for filing fees. Instead of using the money for its intended purpose, he admitted that he had spent it for his own personal use and repeatedly misled his client into believing that the complaint had already been filed.

In reminding lawyers that the practice of law is a noble calling, the Court emphasized:

"Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money."

-PANGANIBAN, J.

Supreme Court, Third Division
June 10, 2002

12/08/2026

The has ruled that employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled not only to full backwages but also to the remittance of their Social Security System (SSS) contributions.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division held that an employer’s obligation to remit SSS contributions continues during the period covered by an employee’s illegal dismissal.

The case involved four employees of Lopez Sugar Corporation (LSC) who were illegally dismissed. LSC was ordered to reinstate them to their former positions and pay them full backwages. After the ruling became final, the employees asked LSC to remit their SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages so they could qualify for retirement benefits.

LSC refused, arguing that under the 𝘚𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997, its obligation to pay SSS contributions ended upon the employees’ separation from employment, regardless of whether their dismissal was legal or illegal.

The Social Security Commission (SSC) rejected LSC’s position and ordered it to pay the contributions. The SSC ruled that because the employees were illegally dismissed, the employer-employee relationship was deemed to have continued during the period they were prevented from working.

Holding that LSC remained obligated to remit the employees’ SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages, the SC stated that under Article 294 of the 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages and other benefits.

The SC explained that such employees are considered to have remained employed during the period covered by their backwages and are therefore entitled to the rights and benefits that would have accrued during that period.

Since LSC failed to remit the illegally dismissed employees’ social security contributions, the SC held that LSC is liable to pay a penalty thereon of three percent per month, reckoned from the date they became due until full payment.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170676.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165713.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

The Law Office of Atty. Jashera L. Gonzales

19/08/2026

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