Bernal Caboteja & Partners

22/02/2026

SC Affirms CIAC’s Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Construction Disputes, Rules Article 1729 Claims Must Be Brought to Arbitration |

Under Executive Order No. 1008, which created the CIAC, the Commission has original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with construction contracts where the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.

The Court underscored that construction disputes should not be split between arbitral tribunals and regular courts, as this would lead to multiplicity of suits and defeat the policy favoring arbitration.

Read the full story in the comment section.

19/02/2026

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has issued guidelines in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, clarifying that it must be evaluated based on the person’s true intent and the totality of the circumstances.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC granted the accused’s petition and reduced his sentence, recognizing his surrender as voluntary even if he surrendered after learning of the issuance of arrest warrant against him.

The accused went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to apply for clearance. During processing, his name registered a “hit”, indicating he had a pending case. He admitted this to the NBI officer.

He was instructed to return after one week while the records were being verified. When he came back, the NBI officer confirmed he had a pending bigamy case and an outstanding warrant for his arrest issued 13 years earlier. He then told the officer, “masuko na lang ako” (I will surrender) and asked help in posting bail. The arrest warrant was then served on him.

The NBI later issued a certificate stating that he voluntarily surrendered to their office. However, the return of the warrant and order of release described him as having been “arrested.”

During arraignment, the accused first pleaded not guilty but later entered into a plea bargain, asking the court to consider his voluntary surrender and guilty plea.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted him of bigamy and considered his plea of guilt, but ruled that he did not voluntarily surrender. It relied on the warrant’s return and release order, which stated that he was “arrested,” and noted that the case had been pending for 13 years because he could not be located. The Court of Appeals affirmed this, finding that he went to the NBI not to surrender but to apply for clearance, and that when he said he would surrender, he had no choice because he was already inside the NBI office.

The SC disagreed.

Under Article 13(7) of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, voluntary surrender requires that the offender had not been arrested; they surrendered themselves to a person in authority or its agent; and the surrender was voluntary.

In this case, the accused returned to the NBI and said he would surrender before the arrest warrant was actually served on him. He had not yet been arrested. He also surrendered to an NBI officer, a person in authority.

The SC ruled that voluntary surrender must be viewed with a “more considerate and broad-minded approach” once guilt has been established. It stressed that voluntary surrender must be assessed through the totality of circumstances, laying down the following guiding principles:

1. The voluntariness and spontaneity of the surrender must show that offender either admits their guilt or wish to spare authorities the trouble of searching for and arresting them.

2. The circumstances of the voluntary surrender is independent of the fact of the issuance of the arrest warrant. The mere fact of the arrest warrant’s prior issuance should not be taken against the accused’s claim of voluntary surrender when other circumstances point to the fulfillment of all requirements, including voluntariness. However, knowledge of the accused of the existence of an arrest warrant against them and their continued evasion of justice can negate voluntariness and spontaneity.

3. The lapse of time an accused used to evade the law could be a criterion in negating spontaneity.

4. Voluntariness is not negated by the fact that there is likelihood that the accused may be arrested anytime before they surrendered. Imminence of arrest should be coupled with an indication that the accused fled or could further escape and evade, before it could deny voluntariness.

5. The intention of the accused at the time of surrender must be considered with other circumstances in determining entitlement to mitigating circumstance. The offender is not required to surrender at the first opportunity.

6. If the records do not clearly show that the offender voluntarily surrendered, that doubt cannot be resolved in their favor.

As to the voluntariness of his surrender, the SC emphasized that if he intended to evade arrest, he would not have returned to the NBI. While his first visit was to secure a clearance, his decision to return despite knowing there might be an active case shows his willingness to cooperate with the authorities.

The SC also clarified that while he knew about the pending case, there was no proof that he knew a warrant for his arrest had already been issued. It also noted the absence of any attempt to flee, his open use of his real name, and the fact that he returned to the NBI on his own.

The SC also reminded judges to avoid making quick or premature conclusions, emphasizing:

“What the Court asks and expects of magistrates on the frontlines of justice is to adjudge each case wholly, fully, and fairly as discerning persons learned in the law and literate in life experience, and not as cold-hearted automatons or soulless supercomputers, for even a single judge’s role in the administration of our penal laws can indeed have far-reaching consequences for the parties and for human society as a whole… The law may be harsh, but it need not be harsher.”

The accused’s sentence was reduced from a maximum of six years to a maximum of four years in prison.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160857

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160836

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/258592-formerly-udk-no-17170-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

10/02/2026

The (SC) has ruled that same-sex couples who live together may be recognized as co-owners of property under Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, provided there is proof of actual contribution.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division granted a woman’s complaint for partition of property and recognized her as a co-owner of the house and lot she shared with her same-sex partner.

Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governs the property relations of couples who are living together but cannot legally marry, acknowledging co-ownership based on their actual contributions.

The two women lived together as a couple. A year into their relationship, they purchased a house and lot, and agreed to register the property in one partner’s name to facilitate banking transactions.

Upon separation, they agreed to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally. One partner signed an 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 stating that the other had paid about 50% of the purchase and renovation costs.

However, she later refused to sell the property and denied that her former partner was a co-owner.

To protect her interest, the former partner annotated an adverse claim on the title and demanded partition of the property. When this failed, she filed a case for partition of real estate and damages, relying on the 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 as proof of co-ownership.

The SC granted the complaint for partition of real estate, as it clarified the provisions in the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governing the property relations of unmarried couples living together.

Article 147 applies to unmarried couples who may legally marry. Property acquired during their cohabitation is presumed jointly owned.

Article 148, on the other hand, applies to couples who are not permitted to marry. Only properties obtained through actual contribution are considered common property.

Since the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 only allows marriage between a man and a woman, the SC held that same-sex couples necessarily fall under Article 148.

Here, the SC found that the signed 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, where one partner admitted that the other paid about half of the property costs, was a binding admission and sufficient proof of actual contribution. This established co-ownership.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160462.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160431.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160444.

Read the Concurrence of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160439.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

04/02/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has approved the 𝘈𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘎𝘶𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘝𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘰𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘧𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨, further strengthening the rules on virtual court hearings and remote appearances of parties and witnesses.

In a Resolution dated November 4, 2025, in A.M. No. 24-11-02-SC, the SC introduced key reforms to expand access to videoconferencing, particularly for digitally disadvantaged individuals, and to enable wider participation by individuals abroad.

The 𝘈𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘥 𝘎𝘶𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴 apply to videoconferencing before first- and second-level courts, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals. It covers all actions and proceedings at any stage, including mediation, consultation, deliberation, and the promulgation of decisions and resolutions, when conducted through videoconference.

Courts are now directed to ensure access to videoconferencing for individuals who are digitally disadvantaged, including those in geographically or geopolitically marginalized areas. This may include deploying court personnel to provide temporary or mobile internet access.

Courts may also establish designated “access points” within judicial regions where litigants, witnesses, and other participants can use computers and videoconferencing equipment under court supervision.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160150.

Read the full text of the 𝘈𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘎𝘶𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘝𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘰𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘧𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨 at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/A.M-No.-24-11-02-SC_FINAL.pdf.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

02/02/2026

01/02/2026

THE CONSTITUTION STEADIES THE SUPREME COURT'S HAND AMID GREAT POLITICAL TURBULENCE

Associate Justice Ricardo Rosario emphasized that the Supreme Court’s duty is to strictly interpret the Constitution, regardless of political turbulence or the personalities involved, especially in difficult and controversial cases.

This came after he concured with the High Court’s unanimous ruling that affirmed its earlier decision declaring unconstitutional the articles of impeachment against Vice President Sara Duterte for violating due process and the one-year bar rule.

Justice Rosario added that in resolving the Duterte impeachment case—like all other cases—it is the Constitution and the law that steady the Court’s hand, keep its judgment level-headed, and anchor its decisions in principle rather than passion

01/02/2026

: BIR approves higher tax free De Minimis Benefits to Filipino workers

🎉 GOOD NEWS for Filipino Employees and Employers! 💰

The BIR just increased TAX-FREE employee benefits under Revenue Regulations No. 29-2025! Here are some of the changes:

✅ Clothing Allowance: ₱7,000 → ₱8,000/year

✅ Christmas/Anniversary Gifts: ₱5,000 → ₱6,000/year

What this means:

• MORE take-home pay for employees (tax-free!)

• BIGGER benefits without additional tax burden

These de minimis benefits are EXEMPT from income tax and withholding tax when within the prescribed limits!

Want to know more? Read our complete guide (link in comments) 👇



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30/01/2026

By a unanimous vote of all those participating, the (SC) En Banc, denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the House of Representatives, which sought to reverse the Court’s July 25, 2025 Decision that declared the Articles of Impeachment against Vice President Sara Z. Duterte unconstitutional.

It affirmed that the fourth impeachment complaint transmitted to the Senate on February 5, 2025 was already barred by Article XI, Section 3, subsection (5) of the Constitution. Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa took no part. Associate Justice Maria Filomena Singh was on leave.

The SC clarified the following points:

First, the first three impeachment complaints filed in accordance with the first mode of initiating an impeachment, that is Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2), were not placed in the Order of Business within the required 10 session days.

"Session days" as used in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2) or for purposes of the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint does not mean legislative session days. A session day for purposes of Article XI in the Constitution was given its plain and ordinary sense, which the Court interprets to mean a calendar day in which the House of Representatives holds a session.

Second, the SC reiterated Gutierrez v. House of Representatives. However, it further elaborated that an impeachment complaint filed in accordance with the first mode of impeachment, Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2), is deemed initiated for purposes of the one-year bar in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (5) when:

(a) a properly verified and endorsed impeachment complaint is referred to the Committee on Justice;

(b) a properly verified and endorsed impeachment complaint is not placed in the Order of Business of the House of Representatives within 10 session days, or referred to the Committee on Justice after it has been put in the Order of Business within three session days as required by Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2) of the Constitution; or

(c) no Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to the Senate before the House of Representatives adjourns sine die. This means that the initiation of an impeachment complaint must occur during the term of Congress.

Third, the SC affirmed the power of the House of Representatives to promulgate its own Rules on Impeachment. However, it clarified that Section 2 of the House Rules, as it is currently worded, requires the referral to the Committee on Justice even when filed through the second mode. The second mode is provided in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (4) of the Constitution, where the endorsement of at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives would be sufficient to transmit the Articles of Impeachment.

In view of the current wording of Section 2 of the Rules on Impeachment as drafted and promulgated by the House of Representatives in its 19th and 20th Congress, the House may—optionally upon its own prerogative—refer an impeachment complaint already endorsed by at least one-third of all its members to the Committee on Justice only for the following purposes:

(1) to ensure that the endorsement of the members of the House is verified;

(2) to confirm that the evidence supporting the grounds in the complaint exists, and that every member of the House has been given a copy of the complaint, as well as the evidence supporting it; and

(3) to respect the Committee’s prerogative to consolidate different formulations of the complaint, if any, so that only one complaint is endorsed to the plenary for transmittal to the Senate.

The SC observed that there is a fundamental difference between the first and second modes of initiating impeachment complaints. Thus, Article XI, Section 3, subsections (2) and (3) cover the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint while Article XI, Section 3, subsection (4) covers the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint.

In the first mode, as contemplated under subsections (2) and (3), impeachment is initiated through the regular and deliberative process in the House of Representatives. A verified complaint may be filed either by a member of the House or by a private citizen with the endorsement of a member. Upon filing, the complaint is referred to the House Committee on Justice, which evaluates its sufficiency in form and substance and conducts the appropriate hearings. Only after favorable committee action does the impeachment process proceed further. This mode therefore emphasizes institutional screening and committee review.

By contrast, subsection (4) introduces an alternative and more direct mechanism for initiating impeachment. Under this provision, a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment signed by at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives immediately initiates impeachment proceedings.

These provisions reflect a deliberate constitutional design; subsections (2) and (3) provide a structured and committee-directed approach, while subsection (4) allows a streamlined initiation when a sufficient level of consensus already exists.”

Fourth, the Court affirmed that due process of law applies to the impeachment process. It stated that:

“The phrase ‘right to life, liberty, or property’ should not be read with undue literalism. It must be accorded reasonable flexibility to achieve its intent of protecting inherent and inalienable rights that could not have been exhaustively articulated at the time of its framing. The due process clause embodies the fundamental constitutional commitment to reasonableness, fairness, and non-arbitrariness. It envisions that we cannot have a true democratic and republican/representative state that is arbitrary and unfair.”

However, due process as it applies to the impeachment process is sui generis or a class of its own. Full-blown trial happens at the Senate. At least for the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint, it only requires:

One. The grounds invoked in the complaint or resolution are those contained in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Two. The procedure is governed by the Rules on Impeachment promulgated by the House of Representatives prior to any filing of any impeachment complaint.

Three. As already provided by the current House Rules on Impeachment, all endorsing members should have been given a copy of the complaint and all its supporting evidence.

The Court also noted that the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment should be done in a plenary session of the House of Representatives, providing all the members of the House of Representatives with full copies of the complaint and its accompanying evidence mentioned in Rule IV, Section 14 of the House Rules on Impeachment.

Transmittal to the Senate, however, requires only a vote of one-third of its members for the first mode of initiating a complaint, or proof of the endorsement of a complaint by one-third of its members for the second mode.

Fifth, the operative fact doctrine cannot be invoked by the party directly responsible in the commission of an unconstitutional act. Thus, it does not apply in this case.

Finally, the Court noted all the motions for intervention and pleadings filed by individuals who were not parties to the case.

The Resolution is immediately executory upon digital service on all parties.

No further pleadings will be allowed.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159965

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-sara-z-duterte-vs-house-of-representatives-et-al-atty-israelito-p-torreon-et-al-vs-house-of-representatives-et-al/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-ramon-paul-l-hernando-2/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-henri-jean-paul-b-inting-2/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-ricardo-r-rosario/

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-opinion-justice-amy-c-lazaro-javier/

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-opinion-justice-raul-b-villanueva/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

28/01/2026

27/01/2026

SC Issues Guidelines on Reduced Bail for Indigent Accused |

“…an indigent respondent may be recommended a bail amount equivalent to only 50 percent of the recommended bail under the 2018 Bail Bond Guide, or ₱10,000, whichever is lower.”

Read the full details in the comment section.

23/01/2026

𝐑𝐄𝐀𝐃: 𝐅𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐩𝐚𝐲, 𝐂𝐎𝐄 𝐦𝐮𝐬𝐭 𝐛𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞 – 𝐃𝐎𝐋𝐄


The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) reminded employers that they must release workers’ final pay and Certificate of Employment (COE) on time, as stated in Labor Advisory No. 06, Series of 2020.

𝘊𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘬 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘬 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘭 𝘴𝘵𝘰𝘳𝘺.

21/01/2026

Supreme Court Upholds Validity of Executed Oral Sale of Land |

An oral sale of real property, though unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds if executory, becomes valid and binding between the parties if it has been totally or partially executed, such as by delivery of possession and payment of the purchase price. However, payment of the purchase price must be made to the proper party—the seller or their authorized representative. If payment is made to an unauthorized person, the obligation to pay is not extinguished as to the rightful owner. Upon full payment to the rightful owner, the seller or their heirs are bound to execute a deed of sale in favor of the buyer. - Supreme Court

GAERLAN, J.

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